Progressive Emu, Inc. v. Nutrition & Fitness, Inc. , 655 F. App'x 785 ( 2016 )


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  •            Case: 14-13485   Date Filed: 07/19/2016    Page: 1 of 30
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-13485
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-01079-WMA
    PROGRESSIVE EMU INC.,
    f.k.a. Johnson EMU Inc.,
    Plaintiff - Counter
    Defendant -Appellant
    Cross Appellee,
    versus
    NUTRITION & FITNESS, INC.,
    Defendant - Counter
    Claimant - Appellee
    Cross Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (July 19, 2016)
    Case: 14-13485        Date Filed: 07/19/2016    Page: 2 of 30
    Before JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and ROBREÑO, * District
    Judge.
    JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff Progressive Emu 1 sued Defendant Nutrition & Fitness alleging
    various breach-of-contract claims. Defendant responded with a lawsuit of its own.
    After the district court held in a preliminary order that Plaintiff had no contractual
    rights to a disputed trademark, Plaintiff amended its complaint to assert that
    Defendant’s registered trademark should be cancelled because it was procured by
    fraud. The district court disposed of all claims through summary judgment. The
    parties have now appealed several of the district court’s rulings.
    Plaintiff challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
    of Defendant on Plaintiff’s multiple claims for royalties as well as its trademark-
    cancellation claim. Defendant appeals the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s claim for overpayments. After
    careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in part and reverse
    in part and remand for further proceedings.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff, an Alabama corporation, raises and slaughters emus for their oil,
    which purportedly has various anti-inflammatory and soothing properties.
    *
    Honorable Eduardo C. Robreño, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    1
    Plaintiff was formerly known as “Johnson’s Emu Oil.”
    2
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    Defendant, a North Carolina corporation, manufactures, markets, and distributes
    consumer health products. In 2000, Plaintiff began developing an emu-oil pain
    cream. Defendant was brought on board to introduce Plaintiff’s cream to mass
    markets. Defendant placed its first order for “Super-Strength Blue Emu” with
    Plaintiff on May 3, 2002. That same day, Defendant filed an application with the
    United States Patent and Trademark Office (Trademark Office) for a trademark on
    the term “Blue Emu,” 2 describing the product as a “topical ointment for use in
    relieving joint or muscle pain.”3
    One week later, Plaintiff and Defendant executed an Operating Agreement
    Letter of Intent (Letter of Intent), according to which Defendant would purchase
    emu oil for its products exclusively from Plaintiff. Defendant also agreed to
    purchase 2.3 million units of emu-oil cream 4 from Plaintiff and loan Plaintiff
    $250,000 to buy additional emu oil. In return, Plaintiff agreed to grant Defendant
    “exclusive worldwide distribution, marketing, and advertising rights” for any
    products containing Plaintiff’s emu oil. 5 The Letter of Intent also stipulated that
    2
    Defendant’s application listed the mark as “Blue-Emu,” but we use “Blue Emu” throughout
    this opinion.
    3
    Three years later, the Trademark Office registered the Blue Emu mark on September 13, 2005.
    4
    The Letter of Intent refers to the cream as “Pain Solutions Super Strength Blue EMU” and
    “Super Strength Blue EMU.”
    5
    The Letter of Intent allowed Plaintiff to maintain its existing sales contracts until they expired.
    Plaintiff and Defendant would jointly determine whether to renew these contracts upon their
    termination.
    3
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    the parties would “jointly own any current and future trademarks of products that
    contain [Plaintiff’s] [e]mu [o]il.”
    A 2003 Sales, Marketing and Operating Agreement (the Agreement)
    between Plaintiff and Defendant expressly superseded their Letter of Intent and
    any other earlier contracts between the parties. The Agreement altered the parties’
    relationship in significant ways. First, Defendant agreed to place its orders for emu
    oil at least 30 days before a requested delivery date. Notwithstanding the notice
    requirement, Plaintiff agreed to “use its best efforts” to fulfill all orders “as quickly
    as reasonably possible.” Furthermore, if Plaintiff was unable to satisfy any of
    Defendant’s orders within 60 days of the order, Defendant could then purchase
    emu oil from a third party. However, as soon as Plaintiff became able to supply
    Defendant with oil and notified Defendant of the same, Defendant would lose its
    right to purchase oil from a third party. Defendant also agreed not to order more
    oil than would reasonably be needed for 60 days of production.
    Second, rather than pay Plaintiff per unit of cream, Defendant would
    purchase emu oil from Plaintiff for $118.18 per gallon and pay Plaintiff a royalty
    of 8% of net revenue from Blue Emu sales and a royalty of 5% of net revenue from
    sales of any other products containing emu oil.
    Third, either party could terminate the Agreement for cause if the other party
    (1) was in default (defined, in relevant part, as a failure to materially comply with
    4
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    any term in the Agreement) or (2) failed to make a payment due. Before
    termination could occur, the allegedly breaching party was to be given an
    opportunity to cure the breach.
    Fourth, whereas the Letter of Intent contemplated joint ownership of all
    trademarks for products containing oil harvested from Plaintiff’s birds, the
    Agreement was silent as to ownership. As for other intellectual property issues,
    the Agreement prevented Defendant from using Plaintiff’s marks without
    Plaintiff’s consent. And Defendant agreed that all of its products containing
    Plaintiff’s oil would bear Plaintiff’s trademark on its packaging. Finally, the
    Agreement clarified that Plaintiff and Defendant’s relationship would be one of
    independent contractors.
    The Agreement underwent two substantive amendments.6 In 2004, the
    parties stipulated that Plaintiff could develop, market, and sell products containing
    emu oil “in markets other than the Mass Retail Market.”7 A 2008 amendment,
    which the parties refer to as the “Fourth Amendment,” worked four major changes
    to the Agreement. First, it established an escalating price scale for barrels of oil.8
    Second, it prohibited Plaintiff from marketing, selling, or distributing emu fat or oil
    6
    The parties additionally made two minor modifications to the Agreement, neither of which
    bears on this lawsuit.
    7
    The Agreement defined “Mass Retail Market” as “all national drug store chains, national
    supermarket chains, mass market discount retailers and club retailers.”
    8
    Specifically, for each calendar year, the first 15 barrels would cost $6,500 per barrel. The next
    10 barrels would cost $8,000 per barrel. All additional barrels would cost $9,000 per barrel.
    5
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    to third parties unless Plaintiff obtained Defendant’s express consent, which was to
    be granted if Defendant could not use all of Plaintiff’s available supply. Third, the
    Amendment released Defendant from its obligation to pay Plaintiff royalties for
    products other than “Original Blue Emu.” Finally, it extended the Agreement’s
    term to December 31, 2015.
    The parties’ relationship began to unravel in 2011, when the market price of
    emu oil spiked. Defendant allegedly insisted that it had the right to purchase more
    oil than it actually needed and to resell that excess oil for a profit on the open
    market. Plaintiff disagreed. Defendant then accused Plaintiff of selling oil to third
    parties in breach of the Agreement. On September 20, 2011, Defendant notified
    Plaintiff that Defendant “plan[ned] to purchase all the oil [Plaintiff] produce[d]
    . . . until further notice” and that any sale to a third party would constitute a breach
    of the Agreement. The relationship remained strained, yet Plaintiff filled all of
    Defendant’s orders through February 2012.
    In March 2012, Defendant sent Plaintiff four purchase orders requesting a
    total of nine barrels of oil. Plaintiff wrote to Defendant on March 28 that it could
    not satisfy Defendant’s orders because it had no oil on hand and no birds ready to
    harvest. Plaintiff enclosed a copy of a complaint it had filed the day before in
    6
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    Alabama state court asserting various claims against Defendant. 9 On April 2 and
    13, Defendant covered by purchasing oil from third parties. Defendant then sued
    Plaintiff in the Eastern District of North Carolina on April 11 and informed
    Plaintiff that it would suspend all payments and royalties and would hold these
    funds until the litigation concluded. Plaintiff’s state-court action was removed to
    the Northern District of Alabama and consolidated with Defendant’s suit, which
    was transferred to the Northern District of Alabama from the Eastern District of
    North Carolina.
    In June 2012, Plaintiff slaughtered a number of its birds. Plaintiff did not
    notify Defendant of its renewed ability to fill Defendant’s oil needs but instead
    sold the oil to a third party on July 16. Plaintiff then sold 19,000 pounds of emu
    fat to the same third party in August 2012. The parties had no contact outside of
    litigation after March 2012.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    The parties have appealed various summary judgment rulings. We review a
    district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bank of Brewton v. Travelers
    Cos., 
    777 F.3d 1339
    , 1341 (11th Cir. 2015). In so doing, “we [construe] all
    9
    Plaintiff’s complaint asserted four counts. Count I alleged that Defendant had breached the
    Agreement in various ways. Count II sought declaratory relief concerning the meaning of
    certain provisions in the Agreement as well as the parties’ obligations under the Agreement.
    Count III sought a declaration concerning the intellectual property rights in Blue Emu. And
    Count IV asked for an accounting of Defendant’s sales of Blue Emu and its revenues deriving
    from those sales.
    7
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    evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party.” 
    Id. at 1342
    . “Summary judgment is required when ‘the movant
    shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
    A. Royalties Owed after March 2012
    Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to royalties through the end of the
    Agreement. Defendant moved for summary judgment on this claim, and the
    district court granted Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appeals that ruling here.
    1. Abandonment.
    The district court found that the parties abandoned the Agreement in March
    2012. By its terms, the Agreement was set to terminate on December 31, 2015.
    By March 2012, Defendant had suspended royalty payments to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
    had stopped supplying Defendant with emu oil, later selling its oil to a third party
    without Defendant’s consent. And the parties had stopped communicating outside
    of litigation. For these reasons, the district court concluded that the parties’
    Agreement was no longer in force and that Defendant was not required to perform
    its contractual obligations, including paying royalties. Plaintiff appeals that ruling.
    Plaintiff seeks royalties through the end of the Agreement on December 31,
    8
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    2015. 10 In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks royalties for sales that occurred before
    July 2012 when Plaintiff sold emu fat to a third party without Defendant’s
    consent. 11
    Under Georgia law, 12 parties to a contract “may by mutual consent abandon
    [their] contract . . . so as to make it not thereafter binding.” Brooks v. Boykin, 
    392 S.E.2d 46
    , 47 (Ga. App. 1990) (quoting Holloway v. Giddens, 
    236 S.E.2d 491
    , 492
    (Ga. 1997)). Abandonment “preclude[s] either [party] from complaining of a
    breach when both agreed to quit.” Eaves & Collins v. Cherokee Iron Co., 
    73 Ga. 459
    , 470 (Ga. 1975); accord Allen Housemovers, Inc. v. Allen, 
    219 S.E.2d 489
    (holding that parties to a contract cannot sue for a breach that occurs after
    abandonment). Georgia law demands that both parties actively and unambiguously
    disaffirm the contract’s continuing validity in order for abandonment to occur.
    Allen Housemovers, 
    219 S.E.2d at
    489–91.
    The relevant facts are as follows. In late March 2012, Plaintiff notified
    Defendant that it was unable to fill Defendant’s March orders for nine barrels of
    oil. Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has explained that it had no birds ready for
    10
    Plaintiff does not cite the Agreement in making this argument, but presumably Plaintiff relies
    on ¶ 2.4 of the Agreement (as amended by ¶ 4 of the Fourth Amendment), which states that
    Defendant shall pay Plaintiff royalties “during the term of this agreement,” and on ¶ 5 of the
    Fourth Amendment, which extended the term of the Agreement to December 31, 2015.
    11
    Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]here can be no doubt that [Defendant], at the very least,
    owes [Plaintiff] the royalty payments from March 2012 through July 2012 or August 2012.”
    12
    The district court determined early in the litigation that Georgia law governs the parties’
    breach-of-contract claims. Neither party disputes this determination.
    9
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    slaughter at the time, and Defendant has presented only speculative evidence to the
    contrary. The Agreement expressly contemplates Plaintiff’s inability, despite its
    best efforts, to fill Defendant’s orders.13 Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy Defendant’s
    March orders therefore cannot, by itself, constitute abandonment of the Agreement,
    unless Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to fill the orders. Assuming that Plaintiff
    abandoned the Agreement when it sold emu oil to a third party without first
    obtaining Defendant’s consent, that sale did not occur until July 2012, three
    months after Defendant suspended royalty payments.
    The district court also rested its conclusion that abandonment had occurred
    in March 2012 on the fact that Plaintiff and Defendant stopped communicating
    with one another outside of litigation as of spring 2012. Silence does not amount
    to abandonment, however. Nothing in the Agreement requires that the parties
    communicate for the sake of communication. Even if the Agreement obligates
    Plaintiff to inform Defendant when Plaintiff has oil to sell following a sales
    hiatus,14 the evidence indicates that Plaintiff did not have any oil until June or July
    2012, several months after Defendant suspended royalties.
    13
    We do not address whether Plaintiff used its “best efforts” as required under ¶ 2.2. This is a
    jury question, as the district court noted.
    14
    The parties dispute whether the Agreement required Plaintiff to notify Defendant of its
    renewed ability to provide oil or whether Defendant was required to continually notify Plaintiff
    of its desire to purchase oil. As far as efficiency and commonsense business practices are
    concerned, the former reading is more plausible. Nevertheless, the Agreement does not supply
    an explicit answer.
    10
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    2. Royalties as compensation for providing oil.
    In addition to arguing that the district court properly concluded that the
    Agreement was abandoned in March 2012—meaning no royalties were due
    Plaintiff after the date of abandonment—Defendant asserts that royalties were
    compensation for the exclusive supply of oil. According to Defendant, “the only
    value that [Plaintiff] provide[d] in order to receive [direct payments for oil under
    ¶ 2.3 and royalties under ¶ 2.4] is the exclusive supply of emu oil.” Under this
    theory, if Plaintiff failed to supply oil, Plaintiff was not entitled to any payment,
    including royalties. Defendant’s argument presents a question of contract
    interpretation: Does the Agreement condition royalties on the provision of oil?
    Under Georgia law, “[t]he construction of a contract is a matter of law.” Claussen
    v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
    380 S.E.2d 686
    , 687 (Ga. 1989) (quoting O.C.G.A. §13-
    2-1).
    Paragraph 2.4 of the Agreement states:
    In addition to the purchase price of the emu oil provided for in
    Section 2.3, [Defendant] shall pay [Plaintiff] an overriding
    royalty payment as follows:
    (a) Super Strength Blue Emu Cream. Eight percent
    (8%) of [Defendant’s] total revenue received from
    the sale of Super Blue Emu Cream or any similar
    product, net of discounts and refunds (“Net
    Revenues”);
    (b) Other Products. Five percent (5%) of
    [Defendant’s] Net Revenues from sales of all
    11
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    products other than Super Strength Blue Emu
    Cream sold by [Defendant] containing emu oil.
    Such royalty payments shall be paid with respect to Net
    Revenues for each month during the term of this Agreement to
    [Plaintiff] no later than the close of business on the tenth (10th)
    day after the end of each calendar month.
    The Fourth Amendment subsequently excised ¶ 2.4(b) from the Agreement so that
    Plaintiff would receive royalties only on sales of Blue Emu. These are the only
    provisions that expressly address royalties.
    Our analysis begins and ends with the plain language of the Agreement.
    Paragraph 2.4 directs Defendant to pay royalties “each month during the term of
    th[e] Agreement.” The Agreement does not enumerate any exceptions to
    Defendant’s obligation to pay royalties on a monthly basis. We decline to imply
    any such exceptions. Moreover, ¶ 2.2 of the Agreement contemplates Plaintiff’s
    inability to supply Defendant with oil. That provision does not specify or imply
    that Defendant may discontinue royalty payments during this period. Equally
    important, ¶ 2.2 explicitly states, “The remedies provided by [¶] 2.2 shall be
    [Defendant’s] exclusive remedies for any failure by [Plaintiff] to provide the
    quantities of emu oil required by [Defendant].” Defendant cannot now avail itself
    of a second remedy—withholding royalties—to address Plaintiff’s inability to
    provide oil. Doing so would render the exclusive-remedy provision of ¶ 2.2
    meaningless.
    12
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    We decline Defendant’s invitation to revise the Agreement. Main Station,
    Inc. v. Atel I, Inc., 
    378 S.E.2d 393
    , 395 (Ga. App. 1989) (“[C]ourts are not at
    liberty to revise contracts even when construing them.”). The plain language of the
    Agreement requires that Defendant pay royalties to Plaintiff on a monthly basis for
    the duration of the Agreement, irrespective of whether Plaintiff is providing oil.
    Of course, this is subject to Plaintiff’s “best efforts” obligation, and whether
    Plaintiff used its best efforts to supply oil is a question of fact to be answered by a
    jury.
    Because Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
    parties disaffirmed and thereby abandoned the Agreement in March 2012, we
    reverse and remand the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    Defendant on the limited issue of royalties withheld after March 2012. 15
    B. Royalties for Off-the-Books Sales
    Plaintiff amended its original complaint to add a claim that Defendant made
    off-the-books sales of Blue Emu for which it owes Plaintiff royalties. Plaintiff
    15
    Defendant argues that even if the parties did not abandon the Agreement in March 2012, we
    may nevertheless affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue because
    Plaintiff’s filing of this lawsuit on March 28, 2012, caused the Agreement to terminate in late
    April 2012. Thus, Defendant’s obligation to pay royalties ceased at that time. In particular,
    Defendant contends that the lawsuit served as a Termination Notice under ¶ 4.2 of the
    Agreement because it alleged that Defendant had committed various contractual breaches. When
    Defendant failed to cure those alleged breaches within 30 days, so the argument goes, the
    Agreement terminated pursuant to ¶ 4.2. Defendant pressed this argument below, but the district
    court did not address it. To the extent this argument is relevant to resolution of Plaintiff’s claims
    on remand, the district court should address Defendant’s alternative argument in the first
    instance.
    13
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    argued that Defendant “falsified its financial records, both in its business dealings
    with [Plaintiff] and before th[e] [district] court, in order to disguise some
    percentage of its sales so as to avoid royalty payments on them.” At bottom,
    Plaintiff contends that the amount of emu oil that Defendant purchased would have
    yielded far more units of Blue Emu than Defendant claims to have produced and
    sold. Defendant’s understatement of its sales thereby necessarily understated the
    amount of royalties due to Plaintiff.
    The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on this claim
    after concluding that Plaintiff “put forward no evidence of concealed sales other
    than its conjectural, best-case-scenario mathematical calculation.” In contrast, the
    court noted, Defendant “produced all of its sales records, compiled by computer
    during the ordinary course of business, and [] further retained an expert witness, an
    accountant, who [] reviewed all of [Defendant’s] records and found that they
    appear to be correctly compiled and maintained.”
    It is true that Defendant’s sales records do contradict Plaintiff’s assertion
    that it underreported those sales, and thereby the corresponding royalty obligation.
    Nonetheless, Defendant’s records are not dispositive if, in fact, Plaintiff has
    offered evidence reasonably creating an inference that, based on the amount of
    14
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    emu oil purchased by Defendant, the latter could have produced substantially more
    product than reflected in its sales records. 16
    On this point, neither party has been entirely clear in explaining the evidence
    in support of its respective position. But deciphering the parties’ positions as best
    we can, Plaintiff, on appeal, cites evidence from which, when taken in the light
    most favorable to Plaintiff, one could infer that a gallon of emu oil would yield
    substantially more units of product than the 362 units that Defendant claims to be
    the average yield per gallon. Defendant has not, on appeal, pointed to evidence
    that would counter the assertion that substantially more product was producible
    than reflected in its sales figures. Instead, Defendant argues only that the
    additional oil might not have found its way into final units produced because of
    waste naturally occurring in the production process and because some of the
    product was used for promotional samples that were never sold.
    Yet, undisputed by Defendant, Plaintiff relies on Defendant’s records to
    argue that the amount of sample produced would have used only 2 barrels of emu
    oil, leaving 205 barrels unaccounted for, according to Plaintiff’s calculations. As
    to any argument by Defendant that the remaining 205 barrels can be explained as
    having been lost through the waste naturally occurring in the manufacturing
    16
    Defendant has never asserted that it was unable to sell the product it produced for sale.
    Instead, it has argued that any unaccounted for oil never found its way into Blue Emu bottles
    packaged for sale.
    15
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    process, so far as we can tell, Defendant never quantifies the amount of waste that
    could be reasonably attributable to that process. Further, Plaintiff’s calculations of
    the amount of oil remaining unaccounted for, after deducting the amount of oil
    used in producing the samples, would translate to millions of dollars in sales.
    Accordingly, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we
    conclude that there are disputed issues of fact, and we therefore reverse the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment as to this claim. 17
    C. Royalties for Sales of Six-Ounce Bottles of Blue Emu
    Plaintiff also argues, in passing, that Defendant improperly withheld
    royalties for on-the-books sales of six-ounce bottles of Blue Emu.18 Plaintiff’s
    complaint does not include a claim for these allegedly withheld royalties. In fact,
    it appears that Plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in its response to
    Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. There, Plaintiff summarily asserted
    that “[Defendant’s] documents establish that [Defendant] sold approximately
    $250,000 of six ounce units and [] never paid [Plaintiff] a royalty on the six ounce
    units.”
    17
    Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff has created a triable issue of fact as to the alleged off-
    the-books sales, the missing sales necessarily date back as far as 2002, meaning that much of the
    damages derived from such a claim are time-barred. That may well be, but presumably some of
    the damages at issue will not be barred, and the district court can, with appropriate instructions,
    direct the jury to award only those damages that are not time-barred.
    18
    In contrast to the alleged off-the-books sales referenced above, the sales of six-ounce bottles
    are documented.
    16
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    The district court did not expressly address Plaintiff’s argument that
    Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on this claim for royalties for
    sales of six-ounce bottles of Blue Emu, nor did it explicitly grant summary
    judgment in favor of Defendant.19 We are unclear whether the district court
    considered Plaintiff’s argument concerning six-ounce bottles of Blue Emu. It may
    be that the district court declined to expressly address the argument after finding
    that a claim for royalties for sales of six-ounce bottles was neither properly pleaded
    nor adequately briefed. On remand, the district court should state why it declined
    to consider Plaintiff’s argument concerning royalties for on-the-books sales of six-
    ounce bottles of Blue Emu and, if appropriate, address the argument.
    D. Deduction of Advertising and Promotional Costs
    The parties’ Agreement states that Defendant must pay Plaintiff “[e]ight
    percent (8%) of [its] total revenue received from the sale of Super Blue Emu
    Cream or any similar product, net of discounts and refunds (‘Net Revenues’).”
    (emphasis added). At the district court, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had
    impermissibly deducted third-party retailers’ promotional and advertising expenses
    from “total revenue received” as “discounts” when calculating royalty payments.
    The district court disagreed and found that such expenses constituted
    discounts. The district court’s reasoning is sound. The Agreement was
    19
    However, in ruling on the parties’ summary judgment motions, the district court did state that
    “[a]ll [] claims [not addressed in the order] are not briefed, and are deemed abandoned.”
    17
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    ambiguous, so the court looked to the parties’ course of performance. Plaintiff and
    Defendant had treated third-party promotional and advertising expenses as
    discounts during the parties’ entire relationship. As such, these expenses were
    properly subtracted from Defendant’s total revenues for purposes of calculating
    royalties. The district court thus granted summary judgment to Defendant on
    Plaintiff’s claim to the contrary.
    On appeal, Plaintiff attempts to explain why certain marketing-related
    expenses—which Plaintiff refers to as “elective” expenses, whatever that term
    means—are not deductible for purposes of calculating royalties. Plaintiff also
    alleges that some of the deductions are otherwise suspect. We do not find
    Plaintiff’s vague and unsupported assertions persuasive. Plaintiff has not produced
    any evidence that the questioned expenses are anything other than ordinarily
    deductible marketing costs passed on by third-party retailers. We therefore affirm
    the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
    E. Overpayment for Oil
    Defendant sued Plaintiff to recover alleged overpayments for emu oil from
    April 2007 through March 2008. The district court entered summary judgment in
    favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s overpayment claim. Defendant now appeals that
    ruling.
    18
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    Defendant’s overpayment claim arises out of a dispute over the definition of
    the term “barrel.” Paragraph 2.3 of the original Agreement provided that
    Defendant would buy emu oil from Plaintiff by the gallon. But the Fourth
    Amendment priced emu oil by the barrel. The Fourth Amendment, executed in
    March 2008, did not define the term “barrel,” and after the parties signed the
    Amendment, a dispute arose over how much oil a barrel should contain. Not
    surprisingly, Defendant argued for the higher figure and Plaintiff for the lower
    amount. Defendant asserted that a barrel should contain 55 gallons of emu oil,
    whereas Plaintiff maintained that a barrel need only contain 52.63 gallons of emu
    oil. On August 20, 2008, the parties reached an agreement by e-mail according to
    which Defendant would accept barrels containing only 52.63 gallons of oil and
    Plaintiff would accept a reduced price. 20
    However, while negotiating this price concession, the parties discovered that
    Plaintiff had actually switched to 52.63-gallon barrels in April 2007, despite the
    fact that Plaintiff’s sales invoices had reflected sales of 55-gallon barrels of oil. In
    other words, from April 2007 through March 2008, Plaintiff charged Defendant for
    55-gallon barrels despite having supplied 52.63-gallon barrels. Plaintiff admits to
    the deficiency but argues that it owes Defendant no compensation for the deficient
    20
    The first e-mail, from Plaintiff to Defendant, stated, in relevant part: “[O]n the $8,000 barrels
    we will back the price down by $344.72 per barrel and on the $9,000 barrels that would work out
    to $387.83 per barrel. We can round these #’s off if it makes sense. Let us know what your
    thoughts are.” Less than 30 minutes later, Defendant replied, “This works for us.”
    19
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    barrels because a third-party processor filled the barrels and—unbeknownst to
    Plaintiff—modified the amount of oil pursuant to a change in industry practice.
    The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on Defendant’s
    overpayment claim. The court found that the parties’ August 2008 e-mail
    exchange modified the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the e-mails modified
    the parties’ Agreement on a going-forward basis. However, the district court
    further concluded that the parties “cannot now go back, in light of [this litigation],
    and say that, had they known litigation was going to occur anyway, they would
    have sought damages against each other for the 2008 breaches.” The district court
    thus concluded that if any breaches occurred when Plaintiff was providing 52.63-
    gallon barrels but charging for 55-gallon barrels, “the parties agreed to settle them
    on their own terms.” The district court cites no record support for this conclusion,
    and it has no basis in the parties’ e-mail agreement, which corrected the pricing
    going forward only, with no reference to past overpayments. Consequently,
    Defendant did not settle its claim to past overpayments by e-mail on August 20,
    and we see no reason why Defendant should be disallowed from pursuing a valid
    claim for the pre-August 2008 shortages.
    As noted above, Plaintiff admits that it supplied Defendant with barrels
    containing only 52.63 gallons of oil between April 2007 and March 2008.
    Defendant has therefore raised a genuine issue of material fact as to its claim for
    20
    Case: 14-13485        Date Filed: 07/19/2016         Page: 21 of 30
    overpayments. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
    of Plaintiff and remand for further proceedings on this claim. 21
    F. The Blue Emu Trademark
    1. Defendant’s motion to strike.
    We first address Defendant’s motion before us to strike Plaintiff’s licensee-
    estoppel argument. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is a licensee of
    Plaintiff’s Blue Emu trademark and should therefore be estopped from contesting
    Plaintiff’s right to the mark. In its motion to strike, Defendant points out that
    Plaintiff did not make its licensee-estoppel argument during summary judgment
    proceedings at the district court or in its initial brief before this Court. Defendant
    argues that Plaintiff should not be permitted to raise this argument for the first time
    at this late juncture.
    “[A]n issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an
    appeal will not be considered.” Depree v. Thomas, 
    946 F.2d 784
    , 793 (11th Cir.
    21
    Plaintiff asserts in passing that if Defendant’s claim for overpayment is allowed to proceed,
    then Plaintiff’s claim based on the August 20, 2008 modification should also be permitted.
    Specifically, Plaintiff argued below that Defendant provided no consideration for the price
    concession and in fact achieved it by duress. Even if Plaintiff’s passing reference sufficiently
    raises this argument on appeal, we readily dispose of Plaintiff’s claim. As the district court
    explained:
    [Plaintiff’s] argument is not persuasive. The consideration provided by
    [Defendant] was that it agreed to accept the barrels containing less emu
    oil, and “the mere fact that a person enters into a contract as a result of the
    nature of business circumstances, financial embarrassment, or economic
    necessity is not sufficient [for a claim of duress].” A-T-O, Inc. v. Stratton
    & Co., Inc., 
    486 F. Supp. 1323
    , 1325 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
    21
    Case: 14-13485     Date Filed: 07/19/2016     Page: 22 of 30
    1993). Plaintiff maintains that it argued in the district court that it had granted
    Defendant a license to use the Blue Emu mark. Fair enough, but arguing that
    Plaintiff granted Defendant a license is different from arguing that Defendant, as a
    licensee, should be estopped from contesting Plaintiff’s rights to the mark. For this
    reason, Plaintiff’s contention that it raised this argument below is unavailing.
    Plaintiff also did not adequately raise the licensee-estoppel argument in its
    initial brief before this Court. Plaintiff’s brief does list as an issue on appeal the
    question whether “the trier of fact was required to determine equitable issues
    because genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to the equitable right of
    [Plaintiff] to the trademark.” Nevertheless, Plaintiff failed to explore that question
    in its initial brief and certainly did not raise the licensee-estoppel argument
    “plainly and prominently.” United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1283 n.8
    (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we need not address it. Hamilton v. Southland
    Christian Sch., Inc., 
    680 F.3d 1316
    , 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A passing reference to
    an issue in a brief is not enough, and the failure to make arguments and cite
    authorities in support of an issue waives it.”). Defendant’s motion to strike is
    granted, meaning Defendant may contest Plaintiff’s claimed right to the mark.
    2. Plaintiff’s appeal.
    A party may petition the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel a
    registered trademark at any time if the mark was obtained by fraud. 15 U.S.C.
    22
    Case: 14-13485     Date Filed: 07/19/2016    Page: 23 of 30
    § 1064(3). Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to cancel registration “[i]n any
    action involving a registered mark.” 
    15 U.S.C. § 1119
    . Plaintiff asked the district
    court to cancel Defendant’s Blue Emu mark for an alleged fraud that Defendant’s
    chairman, Richard Guy, committed in completing Defendant’s trademark
    application. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that Guy fraudulently averred in the
    application oath that “to the best of his[] knowledge and belief no other [party]
    ha[d] the right to use the [Blue Emu] mark in commerce.” The district court
    granted Defendant’s summary judgment motion and found that Defendant retains
    sole ownership of the Blue Emu mark.
    On appeal, Plaintiff argues that it offered enough evidence to establish a
    genuine issue of material fact regarding Guy’s alleged fraud on the Trademark
    Office. Plaintiff emphasizes that at the time Defendant applied for a trademark,
    Plaintiff “had a superior claim to the mark” that should have been disclosed in the
    application by Guy. In support of this argument, Plaintiff offers evidence that it
    invented the Blue Emu formula and name and had disclosed the formula and name
    to Defendant under a confidentiality agreement, had sold thousands of units of the
    cream to Defendant, and controlled Blue Emu manufacturing at the time Defendant
    submitted its application to the Trademark Office.
    Defendant, for its part, urges us to uphold the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment. Defendant notes that the district court considered whether
    23
    Case: 14-13485     Date Filed: 07/19/2016    Page: 24 of 30
    Plaintiff had any right to the mark at the time of filing and concluded that it did not
    because Plaintiff had not used the Blue Emu trademark in commerce.
    Consequently, Guy could not have falsely averred that to the best of his knowledge
    no one else, including Plaintiff, had the right to use the mark. Defendant then
    reminds us of Plaintiff’s high evidentiary burden in pressing its fraud claim and
    explains why all the evidence Plaintiff has marshaled is inadequate to defeat
    summary judgment. Defendant concludes by arguing that Plaintiff’s claim is
    barred by laches and the statute of limitations.
    We are unpersuaded by the district court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s cancellation
    claim. The court relied almost exclusively on Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Intern.,
    Ltd., 
    96 F.3d 1217
     (9th Cir. 1996), a non-binding opinion from another circuit,
    despite the fact that more-recent Eleventh Circuit opinions are on point. Moreover,
    the word “fraud” does not appear in Sengoku. In fact, Sengoku dealt with a run-of-
    the-mill trademark-ownership dispute. 
    Id. at 1217
     (“Sengoku and RMC each claim
    ownership of the Keroheat trademark.”); 
    id. at 1219
     (“[Both [parties] claim
    ownership of the Keroheat trademark, and the issue is central to the finding for
    Sengoku on trademark infringement.”); see also 
    id.
     at 1217–21. Sengoku has
    nothing to say about an action under §§ 1064(3) and 1119 to cancel a trademark
    registration on the basis of fraud in the trademark application. In short, we find the
    district court’s reliance on Sengoku inapt, particularly given the existence of other
    24
    Case: 14-13485        Date Filed: 07/19/2016        Page: 25 of 30
    binding precedent. 22 We similarly disagree with the district court’s reliance on
    facts that arose after Defendant filed its application with the Trademark Office.23
    These particular facts are irrelevant to the question whether Defendant perpetrated
    a fraud in its application.
    The district court concluded that “[b]ecause the evidence in this case shows
    that [Defendant] has the superior claim to ownership,” Plaintiff cannot establish
    that Defendant committed fraud. (emphasis added). But a present superior claim
    to ownership is not the test for evaluating a claim that there was fraud in a
    trademark application. That said, Plaintiff nonetheless cannot prevail on its claim.
    A trademark applicant commits fraud by “knowingly mak[ing] false, material
    representations of fact in connection with an application for a registered mark.”
    Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., Inc., 
    522 F.3d 1200
    , 1209 (11th Cir.
    2008). A party seeking cancellation due to fraud must prove its claim by clear and
    convincing evidence. Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of
    Jerusalem of Rhodes & of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the
    22
    There are other problems with relying on Sengoku. For example, in that opinion, the Ninth
    Circuit explained that in a trademark-ownership dispute between a manufacturer and distributor,
    the manufacturer is entitled to a presumption of ownership. 
    Id. at 1220
    . To track Sengoku’s
    analysis, the district court was forced to assign the titles of “manufacturer” and “distributor” to
    Plaintiff and Defendant. The district court concluded that Defendant “is more deserving” of the
    presumption and should therefore be designated the “manufacturer.” Even if this is true, it
    makes no sense to label Plaintiff a “distributor.”
    23
    For example, the district court considered both the Letter of Intent and the Agreement.
    Because both these contracts were executed after filing, they should not inform an analysis of
    Plaintiff’s rights when Defendant applied for registration.
    25
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    Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Order,
    
    702 F.3d 1279
    , 1289 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Angel Flight, 522 F.2d at 1209).
    “This is necessarily a heavy burden, and any doubt must be resolved against the
    charging party.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    To prevail on its fraud claim at trial, Plaintiff would need to establish by
    clear and convincing evidence that Guy knew or believed that another organization
    had a right to use the mark. 
    15 U.S.C. § 1051
    (a)(3)(D); see also Sovereign
    Military, 702 F.3d at 1290; Angel Flight, 
    522 F.3d at 1211
    . As a matter of law,
    Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to meet this standard. Guy could
    not have known or believed that Plaintiff had a right to use the mark when Plaintiff
    actually had no such right, either by contract or under the common law.
    First, Plaintiff did not have a contractual right to use the mark at the time of
    filing. Any contractual right could have only materialized when the parties
    executed a Letter of Intent, which did not occur until one week after Defendant
    submitted its registration application (and nearly a month after Guy executed the
    accompanying affidavit).
    Plaintiff likewise did not possess a common-law ownership right in the Blue
    Emu mark when Guy submitted his registration application to the Trademark
    Office. “Common-law trademark rights are ‘appropriated only through actual prior
    use in commerce.’” Crystal Ent’t & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 
    643 F.3d 1313
    ,
    26
    Case: 14-13485     Date Filed: 07/19/2016    Page: 27 of 30
    1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 
    261 F.3d 1188
    , 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2001)). This Circuit applies a two-part test to
    determine whether a party has demonstrated prior use. 
    Id.
     The party claiming a
    right must present “‘evidence showing first, adoption, and second, use in a way
    sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate
    segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Planetary Motion, 
    261 F.3d at
    1193–94) (alteration omitted). Here, Plaintiff
    allegedly invented the name “Blue Emu” and circulated it to potential partners, so
    the “adoption” prong of the prior-use test is satisfied for purposes of summary
    judgment.
    Plaintiff’s right to the mark, however, collapses on the second prong, which
    requires “use in a sufficiently public way.” 
    Id.
     This Court has previously
    explained that the use prong was satisfied when “the distribution of the mark was
    widespread . . . , members of the targeted public actually associated the mark with
    the product to which it was affixed, the mark served to identify the source of the
    product, and other potential users of the mark had notice that the mark was in use
    in connection with the product.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks, citations, and alteration
    omitted).
    None of these factors is present here. The only sale at the time of filing was
    to Defendant itself, and that occurred on the day of filing. Plaintiff argues that this
    27
    Case: 14-13485       Date Filed: 07/19/2016       Page: 28 of 30
    constitutes using the mark in commerce. Aside from the temporal issues with this
    argument, Plaintiff never actually distributed the product to the public. Indeed, it
    contracted with Defendant for the express purpose of selling the product on the
    mass markets. And the sale of goods to a partner fails to establish a common-law
    mark under this Circuit’s precedent. Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 
    508 F.2d 1260
    , 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Secret, undisclosed internal shipments are
    generally inadequate to support the denomination ‘use.’ Trademark claims based
    upon shipments from a producer’s plant to its sales office, and vice versa, have
    often been disallowed.”);24 see also Planetary Motion, 
    261 F.3d at 1196
     (relying
    on Blue Bell in relevant part).
    It is also not clear that other potential users of the Blue Emu mark had notice
    that the mark was in use in connection with an emu-oil pain cream. Plaintiff
    developed Blue Emu two weeks before Guy executed his affidavit and roughly one
    month before Defendant submitted its registration application, leaving other
    would-be users a brief window within which to discover Plaintiff’s alleged use of
    the mark. Plaintiff claims that it had shipped Defendant samples of the product,
    which arguably would have notified Defendant that Plaintiff was using the mark.
    But the evidence cited in support of this proposition refers to the samples simply as
    24
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
     (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as
    binding precedent all decisions that the former Fifth Circuit had handed down before the close of
    business on September 30, 1981. 
    Id. at 1209
    .
    28
    Case: 14-13485      Date Filed: 07/19/2016    Page: 29 of 30
    “Arthritis Care.” Plaintiff offered no evidence about the packaging or whether it
    contained the Blue Emu mark. That said, Defendant placed an order with Plaintiff
    for “Super Strength Blue Emu,” but only on May 3, 2002—after Guy had signed
    his affidavit and on the same day that Defendant submitted its application to the
    Trademark Office.
    In sum, Plaintiff cannot show that it had a right to the Blue Emu mark when
    Defendant submitted its trademark application. Plaintiff thus falls short in raising a
    genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant fraudulently obtained its
    registered mark in Blue Emu. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of
    Defendant’s summary judgment motion on Plaintiff’s cancellation claim. Having
    done so, we need not address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s cancellation
    claim is barred by the statute of limitations or laches.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment in favor of Defendant, ruling that Plaintiff’s claim for royalties
    ended in March 2012. We also REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for royalties on off-the-books sales.
    We AFFIRM all other summary judgment grants in favor of Defendant that
    Plaintiff appeals. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    29
    Case: 14-13485       Date Filed: 07/19/2016       Page: 30 of 30
    in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s claim for overpayments.25 The case is
    remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    25
    As explained above, on remand, the district court should rule on whether Plaintiff can proceed
    on its claim for unpaid royalties for sales of six-ounce bottles of Blue Emu.
    30