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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-16929
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-01724-VMC-TBM
RACHEL PINKSTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
RANDY LARSEN,
DAVID MERKLER,
MATTHEW BATTISTINI,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 18, 2017)
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Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On May 16, 2016, Rachel Pinkston (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, was
ordered to pay attorneys’ fees to the University of South Florida Board of Trustees
and individual professors and employees of the university (“Defendants”) as
sanctions for repeated failure to comply with the district court’s discovery orders.
On June 9, the district court dismissed all but one of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants. On July 18, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss that remaining
claim, and the district court granted the dismissal the next day. Plaintiff then filed
a notice of appeal on July 20, which we later dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
While that appeal was still pending, on July 22, Defendants, as the
prevailing party, filed a motion to tax costs and, on August 12, filed a motion for
an order to show cause why Plaintiff should not be held in contempt based on
failure to pay attorneys’ fees and costs as directed by the May sanctions order. The
district judge referred the motions to the magistrate judge, and the magistrate judge
held a hearing on September 27 to address both. Despite being notified of the
hearing, Plaintiff did not attend. On October 5, the magistrate judge entered an
order taxing costs, denying the motion for a show cause order, and reducing the
previous sanctions award to judgment. Plaintiff never filed any opposition to
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Defendants’ motions or any objections to or appeal of the magistrate judge’s order
to the district judge. Instead, Plaintiff appealed to this Court on a variety of
grounds challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to enter the October order, the
proceedings leading up to the order, and the order’s substance. After review, we
AFFIRM.
DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s present appeal because it arises from
final postjudgment proceedings. Postjudgment proceedings are treated as “free-
standing litigation,” so “an order is deemed final if it disposes of all the issues
raised in the motion that initially sparked the postjudgment proceedings.” Mayer
v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc.,
672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted). The magistrate judge’s October 5th order and the subsequent entry of
judgment resolved all the issues raised in Defendants’ postjudgment motions, so
the judgment is final and appealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, e.g., Delaney’s
Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co.,
894 F.2d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
Court had jurisdiction over a postjudgment Rule 60(b) motion that “finally settle[d]
the matter in litigation”). This includes the attorneys’ fees sanctions levied in May
that Plaintiff objected to in her initial appeal. See Barfield v. Barton,
883 F.2d 923,
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930–31 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he appeal from a final judgment draws in question all
prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment.”).
But because Plaintiff never presented the objections to the district court that
she now raises on appeal, she waived them. 1 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an
issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will
not be considered by this court.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Even if Plaintiff’s arguments were not waived, none are meritorious. We
review the district court’s jurisdiction de novo, United States v. Iguaran,
821 F.3d
1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016), the award of costs for abuse of discretion, Mathews v.
Crosby,
480 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007), and the imposition of sanctions for
abuse of discretion as well, Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
446 F.3d
1137, 1146–47 (11th Cir. 2006).
The district court had jurisdiction after Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal to
this Court to hear Defendants’ motions, reduce the sanctions to judgment, and
award costs. Although a notice of appeal typically deprives the district court of
jurisdiction over a case, “a premature notice of appeal does not.” United States v.
1
There are exceptions to this doctrine, see Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324,
1332 (11th Cir. 2004), but none applies here.
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Kapelushnik,
306 F.3d 1090, 1094 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Hitchmon,
602 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc)), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Muzio,
757 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s first
appeal was premature, as our first ruling recognized, see Pinkston v. Univ. of S.
Fla. Bd. of Trustees, No. 16-15065 (11th Cir. Jan. 1, 2017), so the district court
retained its jurisdiction. Even if the notice of appeal had been effective,
Defendants’ motions for an order to show cause and for costs were about
“collateral matters not affecting the questions presented on appeal.” Weaver v.
Fla. Power & Light Co.,
172 F.3d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Zinni v. ER
Solutions, Inc.,
692 F.3d 1162, 1168 n.10 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a judgment is
entered by the district court, it will retain jurisdiction to resolve any attorneys’ fees
and costs disputes.”).
The district court, via the magistrate judge to whom the district judge
referred the motions, followed proper procedures in disposing of Defendants’
postjudgment motions. Title
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Middle District of Florida Local
Rule 6.01 empowered the magistrate judge to consider and issue orders on
Defendants’ motions after they were referred to him by the district court judge.
Plaintiff received sufficient notice when she was sent an electronic notification
fifteen days in advance of the September 27 hearing alerting her to a status
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conference about “post-judgment matters and pending appeal.” See Devaney v.
Continental Am. Ins. Co.,
989 F.2d 1154, 1159–61 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing the
“narrowly defined” due process protections that apply to sanctions); Fed. R. Civ. P.
14(d)(1). The only postjudgment matters were Defendants’ motions for an order to
show cause and tax costs. Nothing was disguised or hidden from Plaintiff.
At that hearing, Defendants’ attorney F. Damon Kitchen was appropriately
allowed to participate because the court’s entry of his withdrawal from the case
had been made in error. And the hearing was not conducted ex parte. Plaintiff
simply failed to participate and let anyone know that she would not attend. It also
was not an improper show cause hearing. The hearing was on a motion for a show
cause order. That motion was denied, so there never was a postjudgment show
cause hearing.
The magistrate judge’s order itself was also procedurally correct. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a court to state findings of fact or
conclusions of law when ruling on a motion unless the Rules state otherwise. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3). Rule 52(a)(1) does not apply to the magistrate judge’s order,
and neither Rule 54 nor any other rule requires findings of fact or conclusions of
law to be included in an order taxing costs, denying an order to show cause, and
reducing an earlier sanctions award to judgment.
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Finally, taxing costs and awarding attorneys’ fees as sanctions was
appropriate. There is a “strong presumption” under Rule 54(d)(1) that the
prevailing party will be awarded costs. Mathews,
480 F.3d at 1276. By obtaining
a favorable judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims except one—which Plaintiff then
voluntarily dismissed—Defendants were the prevailing parties and could be
awarded the costs authorized in
28 U.S.C. § 1290. See id.; Head v. Medford,
62
F.3d 351, 354–55 (11th Cir. 1995). The magistrate judge did just that, and his
careful parsing of Defendants’ costs reduced them from the $4,823.85 requested to
$1,378.65.
The district court also had authority to award attorneys’ fees as a sanction
for Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with discovery, unwillingness to follow
the court’s rules, deadlines, and orders, and her incivility towards Defendants’
counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Plaintiff was given multiple opportunities to
comply with the court’s orders, was warned that failure to do so would result in
sanctions, and yet still failed to comply. Hence, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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