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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-13499
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:17-cv-00707-MHH-JEO
CARL DARRELL HUTTO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
LAWRENCE COUNTY, ALABAMA,
WARDEN,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(April 3, 2018)
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Before MARCUS, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carl Darrell Hutto, an Alabama prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his construed
28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas corpus petition as successive. 1 Hutto argues that the district court erred
because he has not raised the same claim in any of his prior § 2254 petitions and
the issue has not been adjudicated on its merits.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a § 2254 petition as
successive. McIver v. United States,
307 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). A
certificate of appealability (COA), typically required for appeals from a final order
of a habeas proceeding, is not required for an appeal of an order dismissing a
petitioner’s filing as a successive habeas petition. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);
Hubbard v. Campbell,
379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established
procedures that a state prisoner must follow if he wishes to file a second or
successive habeas petition. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). AEDPA requirements
apply to any cases filed in district court after April 24, 1996, unless the petitioner
can show detrimental reliance on pre-AEDPA law, which caused him to omit from
1
We liberally construe pro se pleadings, because we hold those pleadings to a standard less
stringent than the standard we employ for pleadings drafted by attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United
States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
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his prior habeas petition the claims he raised in a later one. In re Magwood,
113
F.3d 1544, 1552–53 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). AEDPA provides that any
claim presented in a second or successive habeas petition that was presented in a
prior petition shall be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If the second or
successive habeas petition presents a new claim not previously raised, it too shall
be dismissed unless it satisfies one of the two grounds in § 2244(b)(2). Those
grounds are (1) the claim relies on a retroactive, new rule of constitutional law, or
(2) the claim relies on newly discovered evidence. Id. § 2244(b)(2). However,
before a petitioner can file a second or successive habeas petition in district court,
regardless of the claim or claims the petitioner seeks to present, he must move in
the appropriate court of appeals for a COA. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive motions are meant to prevent
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by, for example, “barring successive motions
raising habeas claims that could have been raised in earlier motions where there
was no legitimate excuse for failure to do so.” Stewart v. United States,
646 F.3d
856, 859 (11th Cir. 2011). However, the term “second or successive” is not “self-
defining” and does not necessarily refer to all habeas petitions filed second or
successively in time.
Id. Namely, where a petitioner seeks to challenge a different
judgment than was challenged in the first § 2254 petition, the petition will not be
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deemed second or successive. Magwood v. Patterson,
561 U.S. 320, 323–24,
130
S. Ct. 2788, 2792 (2010).
The district court correctly concluded that Hutto’s § 2254 petition was
successive. In the instant petition, he challenged the same 1987 judgment of
conviction for murder that imposed a sentence of life imprisonment as he did in his
first § 2254 petition in 1993. The 1993 petition was denied with prejudice.
Further, Hutto failed to present evidence that he obtained authorization from this
court to file such a second or successive petition. Finally, he has not shown any
detrimental reliance on pre-AEDPA law that was in effect at the time of his first
habeas petition. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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