United States v. Victor Aguirre-Rodriguez ( 2019 )


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  •             Case: 18-12434   Date Filed: 03/14/2019   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-12434
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00138-TWT-CMS-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    VICTOR AGUIRRE-RODRIGUEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (March 14, 2019)
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-12434     Date Filed: 03/14/2019    Page: 2 of 7
    Victor Aguirre-Rodriguez appeals his convictions after a jury trial for
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(A)(viii) and 846, and aiding and abetting possession with
    intent to distribute, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). He
    contends that the district court erred by not allowing him to present to the jury two
    letters and a photograph that he says would have rebutted the government’s
    portrayal of him as a high-level drug trafficker and supported his theory that the
    government prosecuted the wrong “Victor.” The letters were from his former
    employers in Nayarit, Mexico, and purported to show that he worked as a tortilla
    maker and hotel bellhop during the time of the alleged conspiracy; the photograph
    was a picture of him in a bellhop uniform. The letter from the tortilla factory
    owner was notarized by an attorney in Mexico, while the other letter and the
    photograph were not sworn to or notarized at all. The district court sustained the
    government’s hearsay objection and rejected Aguirre-Rodriguez’s argument that
    the letters and photograph should be admitted as foreign records of regularly
    conducted activity under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3505
    .
    Aguirre-Rodriguez contends that the district court abused its discretion by
    not admitting the evidence and that his constitutional right to assert a complete
    defense was thereby violated. We review for an abuse of discretion the district
    court’s evidentiary ruling, and we review de novo whether the district court
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    deprived Aguirre-Rodriguez of his constitutional right to present a complete
    defense. See United States v. Mitrovic, 
    890 F.3d 1217
    , 1220 (11th Cir. 2018).
    “We have explained that it is axiomatic that a defendant’s right to present a full
    defense does not entitle him to place before the jury irrelevant or otherwise
    inadmissible evidence.” United States v. Rushin, 
    844 F.3d 933
    , 941 (11th Cir.
    2016) (quotation marks omitted).
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3505
    , the provision on which Aguirre-Rodriguez relies, allows
    the admission of a “foreign record of regularly conducted activity,” which is
    defined as “a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
    acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, maintained in a foreign country.”
    
    Id.
     § 3505(c)(1). In order for such a record to be admissible, the statute requires a
    “foreign certification” that (A) the “record was made, at or near the time of the
    occurrence of the matters set forth, by (or from information transmitted by) a
    person with knowledge of those matters”; (B) the “record was kept in the course of
    a regularly conducted business activity”; and (C) “the business activity made such
    a record as a regular practice.” Id. § 3505(a)(1)(A)–(C). A “foreign certification”
    is “a written declaration made and signed in a foreign country by the custodian of a
    foreign record of regularly conducted activity or another qualified person that, if
    falsely made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of that
    country.” Id. § 3505(c)(2). Because Congress designed the statute to track the
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    business records exception to hearsay in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), we
    interpret § 3505 “in the same manner as the comparable language in Rule 803(6) is
    interpreted.” United States v. Ross, 
    33 F.3d 1507
    , 1515 (11th Cir. 1994)
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Aguirre-Rodriguez asserts that the sworn letter from his former employer
    stating that he worked as a tortilla maker from 2009 through 2015 constituted a
    foreign record of regularly conducted activity under § 3505(a).1 That letter
    included a copy of the factory owner’s photo identification and was notarized by
    an attorney in Mexico. According to Aguirre-Rodriguez, because notaries in
    Mexico are subject to more stringent requirements than are notaries in the United
    States, the letter “was the substantial equivalent of the certification and
    authentication requirements of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3505
    ” and should have been admitted.
    We disagree. No matter the additional credentialing of the Mexican notary
    public, his sign off does not do away with the requirements of § 3505(a)(1) that a
    foreign certification attest that the record was “kept in the course of a regularly
    conducted business activity” and that “the business activity made such a record as
    a regular practice.” See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3505
    (a)(1)(B), (C). Even if we view the letter
    1
    Aguirre-Rodriguez argued at trial that the unsworn letter and photograph attesting to
    his employment as a bellhop were also admissible, but he does not repeat these arguments on
    appeal except in passing. “Passing references to issues are insufficient to raise a claim for
    appeal,” so we deem those arguments abandoned. See Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    605 F.3d 1138
    ,
    1145 (11th Cir. 2010).
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    as both a business record and a certification rolled into one, there is still nothing in
    the letter that certifies that it was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
    business activity or that such an activity made the creation of similar letters a
    regular practice. See 
    id.
    It is more natural, of course, to view the letter only as a deficient foreign
    certification and not also as the record itself. Section 3505 was intended to create a
    “simple, inexpensive substitute for the cumbersome and expensive procedures” of
    Rule 803(6). Ross, 
    33 F.3d at 1515
     (quotation marks omitted). That Rule requires
    that a record custodian testify in court about the creation and maintenance of the
    business record. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The foreign certification process of § 3505
    stands in for the need for live testimony, but it does not lessen the requirements of
    the custodian’s certification or that there actually be a record about which the
    custodian is testifying. See Ross, 
    33 F.3d at 1515
    .
    Aguirre-Rodriguez concedes that the letter might not be admissible under
    Rule 803(6) for this reason, but argues that § 3505 is broader than Rule 803(6) and
    that the letter “fits well within the broad definition of a memorandum or a report as
    set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3505
    (c)(1).” The problem for Aguirre-Rodriguez, though,
    is not that a letter can never be a business record under § 3505 (or Rule 803(6), for
    that matter). It is that he did not show that this letter was such a record.
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    We also conclude that even if the district court erred, any error was harmless
    because the exclusion did not affect Aguirre-Rodriguez’s substantial rights. See
    United States v. Langford, 
    647 F.3d 1309
    , 1323 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v.
    Caldwell, 
    776 F.2d 989
    , 1003 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The harmless error doctrine
    operates in the realm of the admissibility of evidence, and where the trial judge
    erroneously excluded evidence, we must first determine what the evidence would
    have been and then determine whether the trier of fact would have found the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with the additional evidence
    inserted.”) (quotation marks omitted). At trial the government played numerous
    recorded phone conversations where a person named Victor used a cell phone in
    Nayarit, Mexico, to talk with Aguirre-Rodriguez’s former prison cellmate about
    arranging a methamphetamine transaction in Atlanta. The former cellmate testified
    that the person on the phone was Victor Aguirre-Rodriguez. A translator also
    testified that the voice from those recordings matched the voice heard on recorded
    phone calls that were made using Aguirre-Rodriguez’s personal identification
    number when he was in prison. In light of this evidence identifying Aguirre-
    Rodriguez as the “Victor” on the cell phone calls, we are “convinced beyond any
    reasonable doubt that the exclusion of [the notarized letter] would not have altered
    the jury’s verdict.” 
    Id.
     This is another reason Aguirre-Rodriguez’s constitutional
    claim that he was unable to present a complete defense fails. See United States v.
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    Hurn, 
    368 F.3d 1359
    , 1367 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[E]vidence introduced to ‘complete’
    a potentially misleading story offered by the government is pertinent only when it
    might color a jury’s assessment of the material facts of the case.”).
    AFFIRMED.
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