Carl Evans v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration , 551 F. App'x 521 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12384
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cv-01030-JRK
CARL EVANS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 6, 2014)
Before MARTIN, ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 2 of 8
Carl Evans appeals a magistrate judge’s order affirming the Commissioner’s
denial of Evans’s applications for disability insurance and Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) benefits. Evans suffered a back injury sometime around June 7,
2007, which led to a diagnosis of degenerative disc disease and depressive
disorder.
Dr. Bienvenido Samera, Evans’s treating physician, conducted numerous
physical examinations in 2009 and 2010. In those examinations, Samera evaluated
the severity of Evans’s mental impairments as being between two to six out of a
possible ten and never assessed his risk level as greater than moderate.
Nevertheless, Samera opined that Evans was not capable of being employed in
light of his physical and mental impairments. In a mental residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) assessment, Samera determined that Evans had eight marked
limitations and two extreme limitations. Evans mental impairments were evaluated
by Dr. Raymond P. Schoenrock, Dr. J. Patrick Peterson, and Dr. Jill Rowan, who
all concluded that his mental impairments were not sufficiently severe to prevent
him from working.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that Evans had a severe
combination of impairments, but that they did not meet or equal a Listing in the
Social Security regulations. The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to a vocational
expert (“VE”) about an individual with the following characteristics: (1) was 49
2
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 3 of 8
years old with Evans’s education and work history; (2) could sit up to 7 out of 8
hours per day with hourly breaks; (3) could stand or walk for up to 2 out of 8 hours
per day in 15-minute increments; (3) could occasionally lift up to 10 pounds, and
frequently lift up to 5 pounds; (4) could occasionally bend, stoop, walk up stairs,
and reach above shoulder level; (5) could not crawl, climb, crouch, kneel, work on
unprotected heights, work on moving or hazardous machinery, drive, or use foot
controls; (6) could only perform simple, unskilled, repetitive work; (7) could only
be exposed to low to moderate stress; and (8) needed to primarily work alone, with
little interaction with others. The VE identified several positions that such an
individual could perform. Evans then proposed a hypothetical that added a marked
limitation in the ability to concentrate, and the VE stated that such a person could
not perform any job. The ALJ subsequently explained that he was discrediting
Samera’s opinion and specifically concluded that Evans only suffered from a
moderate limitation in the ability to concentrate.
On appeal, Evans argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Samera’s opinion.
He asserts that ALJs are not entitled to discredit medical opinions at their own
discretion because they do not have the proper medical background to evaluate the
evidence. He emphasizes that Samera was his treating physician, and the mental
RFC assessment Samera conducted was consistent with Schoenrock’s evaluation.
3
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 4 of 8
The ALJ’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and violated the rule that the ALJ
should afford great weight to the opinions of treating physicians.
Evans also argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring the VE’s response to his
hypothetical, which relied on Samera’s RFC analysis, that an individual with his
characteristics could not work. The VE’s conclusion that relied on Samera’s RFC
analysis established that Evans was disabled beginning on June 7, 2007.
I.
If the Appeals Council grants review of a claim, then the decision that the
Council issues is the Commissioner’s “final decision.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S.
103, 106-07, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000). We review de novo the magistrate’s
determination of whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s final
decision. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). We review
the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and legal conclusions with
close scrutiny. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir.
2007). “[W]e review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s
decision is based.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
“[W]e review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence.” Id.Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a
reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support the ultimate conclusion.
4
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 5 of 8
Id. Under this standard, we will not reweigh the evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. Even
if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm
the decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v.
Comm’r of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Social Security Disability Insurance program provides for benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act to persons who have contributed to the
program and who are determined to be “disabled” due to a physical and/or mental
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The SSI program extends benefits under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act to indigent disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et
seq. The claimant bears the burden of proving his disability. Ellison v. Barnhart,
355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security
Administration applies a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
This process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage
in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a Listing and
meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant work, in light of
his residual functional capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to other work, in
5
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 6 of 8
light of his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Absent good cause, an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating
physicians substantial or considerable weight. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436,
1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1)-(2), 416.927(d)(1)-(2).
Good cause exists when: (1) the opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the
evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) the opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. An
ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion for good cause, but he must
clearly articulate the reasons for doing so. Id. Moreover, the ALJ must state with
particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987).
We conclude from the record that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
discrediting of Samera’s medical opinion. First, Samera’s opinion that Evans
suffered from multiple marked and extreme mental limitations was not supported
by his own medical findings regarding the severity and risk levels of Evans’s
mental impairments. See Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Second, Samera’s opinion was
inconsistent with the opinions of three other physicians that concluded that Evans’s
mental impairments were not severe. See id. Finally, Samera’s opinion was
contradicted by Evans’s self-reported daily activities, which included various
6
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 7 of 8
household chores, light yard work, driving, shopping, visiting with friends and
family, and playing chess daily. See id. Because the evidence was inconsistent
with Samera’s opinion, the ALJ clearly and specifically articulated his reasons for
affording less weight to Samera’s opinion and stated that he was affording great
weight to Schoenrock’s opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s rejection of Samera’s opinion.
II.
As to the fifth prong of the determination of a disability, the Commissioner
bears the burden of showing that, in light of the claimant’s RFC and other factors,
a significant number of jobs that the claimant can perform exist in the national
economy. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011);
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If such jobs exist, then the claimant is not disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). An ALJ may make this determination by
posing hypothetical questions to a VE. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180. An ALJ
may rely solely on the testimony of a VE in making this determination. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999). For the testimony of a VE to
constitute substantial evidence, “the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which
comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.” Id. at 1229.
As discussed above, the ALJ had good cause to assign less weight to
Samera’s opinion. Based on his finding that Evans only had a moderate limitation
7
Case: 13-12384 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 8 of 8
in the ability to concentrate, the posed hypothetical adequately comprised all of
Evans’s impairments. See id. The hypothetical was consistent with the medical
evidence and opinions of the majority of the physicians. Thus, the record supports
the hypothetical that the ALJ relied upon, and the Appeals Council did not err in
ignoring the VE’s response to Evans’s proposed hypothetical. Accordingly, we
affirm the magistrate judge’s order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of
Evans’s application for disability insurance and SSI benefits.
AFFIRMED.
8