United States v. Christopher Worden , 172 F. App'x 981 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-15135 MARCH 30, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00179-CR-ORL-19-JGG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER WORDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 30, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christopher Worden pled guilty to wire fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The district court sentenced him to a prison term
of six months. He now appeals his sentence.
Worden contends that the Government breached its obligation under the plea
agreement not to contest his request for a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines
sentence range by challenging his request for probation and asserting that he
should instead receive the low-end sentence of six months of imprisonment.
Whether the Government breached a plea agreement is a question of law
which we review de novo. United States v. Mahique, 150 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th
Cir. 1998). A material promise by the government, which induces the defendant to
plead guilty, binds the government to that promise. Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 496, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When a plea rests in any
significant portion on the government’s promise, so that it becomes part of the
inducement for the guilty plea, such promise must be fulfilled. Id. If a breach has
been established, we may either order specific performance of the government’s
promise – by ordering a resentencing before a different judge – or allow the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 262-63, 92 S.Ct. at 499. Although the
chosen remedy for the government’s breach of a plea agreement is within our
discretion, we have not favored withdrawal of the guilty plea, especially where
there is no doubt that the plea was made knowing and voluntarily. United States v.
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Johnson, 132 F.3d 628, 631 (11th Cir. 1998).
Whether the government violated a plea agreement is judged according to
the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement at the time he entered
the plea. United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 988 (11th Cir. 1992). If the
government disputes the defendant’s understanding of the agreement, however, we
ascertain its terms using objective standards. Id. The standards applied to the
interpretation of a plea agreement are as follows: (1) hyper-technical and rigid
construction of the language in a plea agreement is unacceptable; (2) the written
agreement should be viewed against the background of the negotiations and should
not be interpreted to contradict directly an oral understanding; and (3) an
ambiguous plea agreement must be interpreted against the government. United
States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990).
The commentary to Chapter 5, Part A, of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual
states that, when looking at the sentencing table, “[t]he intersection of the Offense
Level and Criminal History Category displays the Guideline Range in months of
imprisonment.” Section 5B1.1(a)(2) authorizes probation if “the applicable
guideline range is in Zone B of the Sentencing Table.”
With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the merits of this appeal.
Because the parties differ as to the meaning of the Government’s promise
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(regarding sentence recommendation), we interpret the agreement using objective
standards. Rewis, 969 F.2d at 988. The provision of the agreement at issue here –
that the Government would “not oppose the defendant’s request to the Court that
the defendant receive a sentence at the low end of the applicable guideline range
calculated by the Court” – is not ambiguous. The term “guideline range” is
consistently used throughout the Sentencing Guidelines to refer to the numbered
range of months of imprisonment that is calculated by reference to the sentencing
table. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A, U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a)(2). Objectively, then, the
unambiguous meaning of a “sentence at the low end of the applicable guideline
range” would be the lowest number of months of imprisonment designated in the
sentencing table, not “the least restrictive means of confinement,” as Worden
contends. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A, U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a)(2). Because the Government
recommended a prison term of six months, the lowest number of months specified
by the sentence range, 6-12 months, it carried out the promise it made in the plea
agreement.
AFFIRMED.
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