Armand Joseph v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 21-11597      Date Filed: 04/13/2022      Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-11597
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    ARMAND JOSEPH,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A090-597-547
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 21-11597         Date Filed: 04/13/2022    Page: 2 of 6
    2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11597
    Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The Board of Immigration Appeals, affirming the decision of
    an immigration judge, ruled that Armand Joseph was removable
    from the United States because he committed an “aggravated fel-
    ony,” see 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii), namely, a conspiracy offense
    that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or vic-
    tims exceeds $10,000,” 
    id.
     § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), (U). Joseph petitions
    this Court for review. We dismiss the petition.
    The records shows that Joseph, a native and citizen of Ja-
    maica, entered the United States in the 1970s and became a lawful
    permanent resident in 1990. In May 2017, he pled guilty to partici-
    pating in a conspiracy to defraud the government by cashing fraud-
    ulently obtained income-tax refund checks, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    . According to undisputed facts in his presentence in-
    vestigation report (“PSR”), Joseph stipulated in a written plea
    agreement that, while working as a teller at a check-cashing busi-
    ness, he cashed 34 federal income-tax refund checks—in the total
    amount of $247,344—for an individual who fraudulently obtained
    the checks. He received approximately $100 per check as a kick-
    back. As a result of Joseph’s participation, the government sus-
    tained a loss of $247,344. The district court sentenced him to serve
    24 months in prison and to pay $247,344 in restitution to the Inter-
    nal Revenue Service.
    USCA11 Case: 21-11597         Date Filed: 04/13/2022     Page: 3 of 6
    21-11597                Opinion of the Court                         3
    The Department of Homeland Security subsequently
    charged Joseph with removability under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleg-
    ing that his conviction was for an “aggravated felony.” Based on
    the indictment, the criminal judgment and restitution order, and
    undisputed facts in the PSR, the IJ determined that Joseph’s convic-
    tion qualified as an aggravated felony because it involved fraud or
    deceit and the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(M)(i).
    Joseph appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ. Accord-
    ing to the BIA, the record supported the IJ’s finding that the loss
    amount exceeded $10,000. Reviewing the “entire record of convic-
    tion,” the BIA noted that Joseph stipulated in his plea agreement
    that the 34 checks he cashed were worth approximately $247,344.
    It also cited the PSR’s undisputed statement that, “[a]s a result of
    Joseph’s participation in the scheme, the United States was de-
    frauded of $247,344.21.” Finally, the BIA found in the alternative
    that Joseph’s conviction qualified because the contemplated loss of
    the conspiracy was well over $10,000, even if the actual loss was
    not.
    Joseph now petitions this Court for review. He contends
    that the restitution order is not sufficient to prove the loss amount
    because it “encompasses the losses from criminal activity other
    than the conviction offense.” He asserts that the conspiracy count
    to which he pled guilty “did not calculate or reference a specific loss
    amount to any victim(s),” and so, in his view, the loss amount was
    USCA11 Case: 21-11597         Date Filed: 04/13/2022     Page: 4 of 6
    4                       Opinion of the Court                 21-11597
    not “tied to the specific counts covered by the conviction” as re-
    quired.
    “[W]e apply an exceedingly deferential standard of review
    to the agency’s fact-finding about the amount of loss” for purposes
    of determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as an aggra-
    vated felony. Garcia-Simisterra v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    984 F.3d 977
    ,
    980–81 (11th Cir. 2020). We will uphold the agency’s determina-
    tion of the loss amount if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial,
    and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 
    Id. at 981
     (quotation marks omitted). If substantial evidence supports
    the agency’s conclusion, we must dismiss the petition for review.
    
    Id. at 982
    .
    In determining whether the loss amount for a prior fraud or
    deceit conviction exceeded $10,000, the agency may consider “the
    specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s commission of a
    fraud and deceit crime on a specific occasion.” Nijhawan v. Holder,
    
    557 U.S. 29
    , 40 (2009) (holding that the categorical approach does
    not apply to § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). It is not limited to the indictment
    or the statutory definition or the “generic” form of the offense. Id.
    Nevertheless, the loss amount “must be tied to the specific counts
    covered by the convictions,” and cannot be based on uncharged or
    acquitted conduct. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
    USCA11 Case: 21-11597            Date Filed: 04/13/2022         Page: 5 of 6
    21-11597                  Opinion of the Court                               5
    In examining the “specific circumstances” of the prior con-
    viction, the agency is not limited to Shepard-approved 1 sources and
    may rely more broadly on “sentencing-related material.” Nijha-
    wan, 
    557 U.S. at
    41–42. In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court held that
    evidence of the “defendant’s own stipulation” that the conviction
    involved losses exceeding $10,000 and a restitution order showing
    that same thing was “clear and convincing” in the absence of con-
    flicting evidence. 
    Id.
     at 42–43; see also Garcia-Simisterra, 984 F.3d
    at 981–82 (finding that the agency’s loss amount was supported by
    the criminal information and the plea agreement).
    Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that
    Joseph was convicted of a fraud offense involving losses exceeding
    $10,000. Similar to Nijhawan, the agency here relied on evidence
    of Joseph’s own stipulation as part of the plea agreement that the
    34 tax refund checks he cashed as part of a conspiracy to defraud
    resulted in a loss to the government of $247,344, as well as a resti-
    tution order for that amount. See id. And Joseph does not point
    to “any conflicting evidence.” Id.
    Nor are we persuaded by Joseph’s claim that the restitution
    order includes “losses from criminal activity other than the
    1“Shepard-approved documents include the ‘charging document, the terms of
    a plea agreement, or transcript of [plea] colloquy between judge and defendant
    in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to
    some comparable judicial record of this information.’” United States v. Dud-
    ley, 
    5 F.4th 1249
    , 1257 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 16, 26 (2005)).
    USCA11 Case: 21-11597         Date Filed: 04/13/2022    Page: 6 of 6
    6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11597
    conviction offense,” as was the case in Obasohan v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    479 F.3d 785
    , 789–90 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds
    by Nijhawan, 
    557 U.S. at
    41–42. In Obasohan, we held that the
    restitution order there was insufficient proof of loss for
    § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because “[t]he restitution was not based on the
    conspiracy charge to which [the defendant] pled guilty, nor on the
    overt acts to which [he] admitted by pleading guilty.” 
    479 F.3d at 789
    . Rather, it “was based on additional conduct” in the PSR that
    was not “charged, proven or admitted.” 
    Id.
     at 789–91.
    But the restitution in this case, in contrast to Obasohan, was
    clearly based on conduct admitted by Joseph as part of his guilty
    plea to the conspiracy offense. It was based on Joseph’s stipulation
    that he cashed checks worth $247,344 for the conspiracy, causing a
    loss of that same amount to the government. That evidence clearly
    and convincingly established that the loss amount “tied to” the spe-
    cific conspiracy conviction exceeded $10,000. See Nijhawan, 
    557 U.S. at
    40–43.
    Because “substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclu-
    sion, . . . we lack jurisdiction over [Joseph’s] petition.” Garcia-Si-
    misterra, 984 F.3d at 982.
    PETITION DISMISSED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-11597

Filed Date: 4/13/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/13/2022