Kelvin Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc. , 489 F. App'x 314 ( 2012 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-14277
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-21639-DMM
KELVIN RANCE,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ROCKSOLID GRANIT USA, INC.,
as owner of the fictitious name Granite
Transformations,
GRANITE TRANSFORMATIONS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(September 4, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Kelvin Rance, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his request for a
continuance and the dismissal of his civil complaint asserting claims arising from
Rance’s half-day of employment with Defendants.
I.
Rance filed this suit in June 2008, and trial was initially scheduled to occur
in March 2009. That date was rescheduled a number of times over the course of
two years. On July 15, 2011, the district court set a trial date for August 4th and
the afternoon of August 5th—a time tailored to accommodate Rance’s dialysis
treatments which occurred three mornings a week. Rance then filed a motion to
continue the trial, and Defendants filed a motion to set trial for the week of August
8, 2011. The district court granted these requests and set a new date for trial:
August 11, 2011. On July 28, 2011, the district court held a status hearing and
confirmed with both parties that they could be present for trial on August 11, 2011.
Rance expressed concerns that he might have a kidney transplant some time soon,
but stated no other conflicts with the August 11th trial date. The district court
warned both parties that it would not continue the case, and closed by telling both
parties it would see them next on August 11th.
On August 8, 2011, Rance filed for a continuance on the grounds that (1) he
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had a cardiologist appointment on August 11, 2011 and (2) he had been unable to
depose a witness that knew material information. The district court denied the
continuance and pointed out that it had already granted Rance continuances for
medical reasons. Rance gave no formal notice to the court that he intended to miss
the trial, yet on August 11, Rance failed to show. The district court then dismissed
the case with prejudice.
II.
A.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a continuance and the
dismissal of a complaint. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2008); Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc.,
556 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.14 (11th Cir. 2009). A district court has the authority to
manage its own docket and “ need not tolerate defiance of reasonable orders.”
Equity Lifestyle Props., 556 F.3d at 1241. District courts “enjoy broad discretion in
deciding how best to manage the cases before them.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997).
B.
We determine whether a denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of
discretion by evaluating four factors: (1) the moving party’s diligence in case
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preparation; (2) the likelihood that granting the continuance would have remedied
the need for it; (3) the level of inconvenience the court and the opposing party
would have experienced had the continuance been granted; and (4) the harm that
the moving party suffered. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1320. We also consider as
relevant to our analysis whether a continuance has previously been granted. Quiet
Technology DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1351 (11th Cir.
2003).
Here, the record reveals that Rance was diligent in his case preparation, but
had difficulties actually readying himself for trial even after being granted
additional time. Indeed, the record reflects that prior to denying the continuance,
the district court had pushed back the trial date more than once and had tried to
accommodate Rance’s health problems when making scheduling decisions.
Although Rance was ultimately adversely effected by the denial of a continuance,
Defendants and the court would have suffered great inconvenience had it been
granted, especially given the history of this case. Nor is there any guarantee that
had the continuance been granted, Rance would have completed his discovery and
been in adequate health to show up to trial. In light of the record, we do not find
that the district court abused its discretion by denying Rance another continuance.
C.
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As part of its inherent authority to regulate its docket, a district court may
sua sponte dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with court
orders. Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1972); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v) (permitting dismissal as a sanction for failure to
comply with a court order); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that a dismissal is
permissible “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a
court order”). A dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction and should only be
employed when a plaintiff has demonstrated a record of delay or disobedience and
lesser sanctions would be insufficient. Pond, 453 F.2d at 349.
In this case, the district court moved the trial date later a number of times to
allow the parties additional time for discovery. When Rance requested a
continuance in July 2011, the district court granted it, despite the many delays and
deadline extensions in the trial. The court also made efforts to accommodate
Rance’s health issues and treatment schedule. After the district court had set a trial
date of August 11, 2011 and confirmed the date with both parties, Rance then
protested that a pre-existing medical appointment conflicted with the trial. Rance
did not provide the court with documentation of this appointment, nor did Rance
notify the court that he would not attend the trial or provide an alternate
explanation for his absence. Thus, on August 11, 2011—years after this case was
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instigated—Defendants stood present ready to litigate, but Rance was inexplicably
and inexcusably absent. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the district
court abused its discretion by responding to Rance’s absence by dismissing the
case with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case, we need not address the
other issues raised by Rance for which we could not provide meaningful relief. See, e.g., Cook v.
Randolph Cnty., 573 F.3d 1143, 1156 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009).
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