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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11687
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRAVONTA DEANGELO RIVERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00025-AW-GRJ-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
Before JILL PRYOR, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Travonta Deangelo Rivers appeals his conviction for two
counts of receipt or distribution of child pornography under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1), as well as his corresponding total
sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment. With respect to his con-
victions, Rivers argues—for the first time on appeal—that the evi-
dence produced at trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict.
He further argues that, in calculating his offense level, the District
Court incorrectly enhanced his offense level by two points under
U.S.S.G § 2G2(b)(3)(F) and should have instead applied a two-point
reduction under § 2G2.2(b)(1). Finding no error as to either claim,
we affirm.
I.
On September 1, 2020, a grand jury in the Northern District
of Florida indicted Travonta Deangelo Rivers on one count of re-
ceipt or distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1), for activity that occurred between Febru-
ary 13, 2020 and May 13, 2020 (Count I). 1 The indictment also
1 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) states: “Any person who knowingly receives or dis-
tributes (A) any child pornography using any means or facility of interstate or
foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer; or (B) any material that contains child pornography using any
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 3
charged Rivers with one count of possession of child pornography
with an intent to view for the same time period, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2) (Count 2). 2 Rivers was
arrested on December 15, 2020.
On April 27, 2021, the grand jury returned a superseding in-
dictment against Rivers, adding two counts. Count Three charged
that between on or about November 16, 2020, and on or about De-
cember 15, 2020, Rivers received or distributed child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1). Count Four
charged that during the same time period, Rivers possessed child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2).
Rivers pleaded not guilty. A two day trial began on June 30,
2021 and ended on July 1, 2021. Because Rivers’s appeal is based
on the sufficiency of the evidence against him, a concise summary
of the relevant evidence presented at trial follows.
has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
by any means, including by computer . . . shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).”
2 According to 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B): “Any person who either knowingly
possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, pe-
riodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an
image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or that
was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or trans-
ported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including
by computer . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).”
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
The government’s first witness was Detective Matthew
Holt of the Gainesville Police Department’s Internet Crimes
Against Children task force (the “ICAC task force”). According to
Detective Holt, in December 2019, he was investigating a “peer-to-
peer” network called Gnutella, looking for people sharing sus-
pected child pornography. 3 On December 3, 2019, Holt saw a sus-
picious IP address, 4 and, as was his usual practice, picked two vid-
eos to verify that they contained depictions of child exploitation
and that they were being shared. He then determined that this IP
address belonged to Cox Communications (“Cox”) and sent Cox a
subpoena for the subscriber information. The IP address was asso-
ciated with Cox subscriber Tammy Jenkins and was located at the
Lewis Place Apartments in Gainesville, Florida. He checked the
utilities information at the apartment associated with the IP ad-
dress to see if they matched Jenkins’s name, and they did.
Holt next testified that between March and April he contin-
ued to monitor the Gnutella network and ran across an IP address
that seemed similar to the previous one because of the types of files
it was offering to share. He verified that the videos included child
3 Detective Holt testified that a “peer-to-peer” network is a system that allows
you to connect to and download files from other computers using the same
software—that is, the “peers” on the network. This type of system does not
use a central server, but instead all the computers using the network connect
through the software.
4 Holt testified that an IP address is basically the physical address of your com-
puter on the internet.
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 5
exploitation, as he had done with the first IP address, and sent an-
other subpoena to Cox. According to Cox, the subscriber associ-
ated with that IP address was Ambrya Young, and the IP address
was associated with an address in Bella Vista trailer park in Gaines-
ville, Florida.
The next step in Detective Holt’s investigation was to deter-
mine who was living at that address by conducting surveillance.
The practice of the ICAC task force is to coordinate the execution
of a search warrant by the SWAT team. When SWAT executed
the warrant on Young’s home in May 2020, no one was home.
They seized a Dell desktop computer and a Toshiba laptop com-
puter. The ICAC task force then located the suspected occupants
of Young’s address—Young and Rivers. 5 Young was in Pennsylva-
nia; Rivers was in St. Johns County, Florida.
In a pre-arrest interview, 6 Rivers admitted that he was stay-
ing with Young and that he knew the computers were in the resi-
dence, but he did not claim ownership of them. Rivers mentioned
a program called Mixcraft that he used to edit songs together. This
program was found on the Toshiba, along with photos of Rivers
5 Four young children were also believed to live in the home. They were
Young’s two children and Rivers’s two children. All four children were aged
ten or younger.
6 Detective Holt testified that prior to the interview, he read Rivers his Mi-
randa warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
and Young, and a photo that showed Rivers using a computer that
looked like the Toshiba laptop. 7
Holt conducted a full forensic examination of the Dell and
Toshiba computers. The Toshiba contained 56 videos and two im-
ages of child abuse; the Dell contained eight videos of child pornog-
raphy. On the Toshiba laptop there were multiple videos in excess
of an hour; the longest one lasted 2 hours and 40 minutes. Accord-
ing to the examination of the computer, child pornography had
been accessed on the Toshiba on May 4; it was accessed on the Dell
on May 12. The most recent use of Mixcraft—the software Rivers
admitted to using—was on May 10. All of these uses were within
days of the execution of the search warrant. The Toshiba also
showed multiple email addresses associated with Rivers, as well as
one for Young.
The file list for the Toshiba laptop showed files with graphic
names. For example, file names included explicit acronyms such
as “PTHC” (or “pre-teen hard core”), “PEDO” (short for “pedo-
phile”), Julyjailbait, and “PTSC” (or “pre-teen soft core”). The file
list compiled from the Dell desktop computer contained files with
similarly explicit names.
Detective Holt continued his investigation after an arrest
warrant had been issued for Rivers. On December 9, 2020, he
7 The Toshiba also showed Netflix activity, as well as I-Station, an app used
by Alachua County schools.
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 7
discovered a new IP address offering to share files very similar to
those on the Dell and Toshiba computers. This IP address had not
shown such activity before. Holt subpoenaed Cox for the sub-
scriber’s information. The subscriber was Karen Sheppard, in
Sugarfoot Oaks, Gainesville, Florida. Holt testified that he knew
that Keicha Hamm, the mother of Rivers’s children, lived at that
address in Sugarfoot Oaks. As Sugarfoot Oaks was outside Holt’s
jurisdiction, the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office executed a war-
rant on the address. Officers found Rivers at that address and ar-
rested him. They also found an HP laptop next to the couch where
Rivers had been sleeping when the warrant was executed. Rivers
claimed that the laptop belonged to the apartment, but admitted to
using it for YouTube and Mixcraft, both of which require internet
access. 8 Rivers claimed to have obtained the laptop from a cousin.
Forensic examination of the laptop revealed 43 videos and three
pictures of child abuse. The file list revealed files with similar
names to those on the Dell and Toshiba laptops. The HP laptop
had also been used to log in to Rivers’s Gmail account.
Young testified on the second and final day of the trial. She
testified that she lived in Gainesville, Florida, at the Bella Vista
apartments, towards the end of 2019 and into 2020. She lived there
with her children, her aunt, her grandmother, and Rivers. She tes-
tified that when she was at work, Rivers supervised the children.
8 Detective Holt testified that Rivers was again informed of his Miranda rights
before he was questioned.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
She further testified that Rivers used the wireless network at her
apartment, that he set the network up, and that knew the pass-
words. According to Young, they would watch Netflix on the lap-
top during family nights, but other than that the computers were
used by Rivers. No one else used them alone. Young testified that
she left the apartment on April 19 and moved to Pennsylvania be-
cause she and Rivers had been fighting. Young’s daughter had her
own laptop and tablet; Young did not recall seeing her daughter
use the other devices.
Jacquelyn Armstrong also testified on the final day of trial.
On December 3, 2019, she lived in the Lewis Place Apartments.
Specifically, she lived in the unit where Detective Holt had noticed
suspicious activity. The internet at that address was in the name of
her sister, Tammy Jenkins. Armstrong testified that on the night
of December 3, 2019, she had a guest—Rivers. According to her
testimony, Rivers was there with his computer, but she never saw
him use it.
The government noted that it had a subpoena for Keicha
Hamm, but they could not find her. But since the government did
not believe they needed Hamm’s testimony, it rested its case
against Rivers. Rivers’s attorney also rested without putting on a
defense or making any kind of motion.
The trial concluded on July 1, 2021, and the jury returned a
guilty verdict on all four counts that day. Rivers’s attorney did not
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 9
move for a judgment of acquittal9 or for a new trial, 10 nor did he
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against Rivers in any other
way.
The probation officer’s presentence investigation report
(“PSR”) assigned Rivers a base offense level of 22 pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(2). It added two offense levels under §
2G2.2(b)(2) because the material involved a prepubescent minor;
two levels under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) because Rivers knowingly en-
gaged in distribution via peer-to-peer network Gnutella; four of-
fense levels under § 2G2.2(b)(4) because the material in Rivers’s
possession portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct or sexual ex-
ploitation of an infant or toddler; two offense levels under §
2G2.2(b)(6) because the offense involved the use of a computer for
possession of or accessing with intent to view the material; and five
9 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides the vehicle for such a mo-
tion: “After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the
evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of ac-
quittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Such a motion may also be made within 14 days
after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury. Fed. R. Crim. P.
29(c)(1).
10 According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, “[u]pon the defend-
ant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the
interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “A motion for a new
trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence must be
filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
33(b)(2).
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
offense levels because the offense involved 600 or more images.11
These adjustments resulted in a total offense level of 37. Rivers had
a criminal history score of nine and a resulting criminal history cat-
egory of IV. A total offense level of 37 and a criminal history cate-
gory of IV correspond to a guideline imprisonment range between
292 and 365 months.
Rivers, through counsel, made two objections to the PSR.
First, he objected that he was not awarded a two-point reduction
in the base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) because he
claimed that his conduct was limited to the receipt or solicitation
of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The pro-
bation officer responded that Rivers’s conduct was not limited to
receipt or solicitation because he had used a peer-to-peer network
to download child pornography, and his computer was equipped
with software that would allow others to download such files.
Rivers also objected to a two-level increase in the base of-
fense level under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), claiming that the indict-
ment did not allege distribution and the government did not prove
11 According to the PSR, Rivers possessed 59 videos containing child pornog-
raphy. Application Note 6(b)(ii) states that “[e]ach video, video-clip, movie,
or similar visual depiction shall be considered to have 75 images. If the length
of the visual depiction is substantially more than 5 minutes, an upward depar-
ture may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 2G.2, comment (n.6(B)(ii)). Even without
considering the length of the videos in this case, some of which were over 60
minutes long, under Application Note 6(B)(ii), Rivers was in possession the
equivalent of 4,425 photos.
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 11
it at trial. The probation officer responded that investigators spoke
to Rivers previously and that he knew that peer-to-peer platforms
allowed others to download files.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court dismissed the
two possession counts (Counts 2 and 4) against Rivers, as this
Court’s precedent in United States v. Phillips,
4 F.4th 1171, 1178,
(11th Cir. 2021) held that possessing child pornography is a lesser-
included offense of receiving it, and that if they arise from the same
incident, convictions for both cannot stand.
As relevant here, the District Court addressed the objections
Rivers made to the PSR at the sentencing hearing. The govern-
ment called Detective Holt to testify as to the objections. He ex-
plained that Rivers was the subject of an unrelated file sharing in-
vestigation in August 2011 and he was made aware that those im-
ages were being shared. Law enforcement again addressed the is-
sue with Rivers in May 2020. At that time, Rivers acknowledged
his understanding of peer-to-peer software. When he was arrested
in December 2020, Rivers was using the same peer-to-peer soft-
ware as in May 2020—software he knew allowed others to down-
load. Notably, Holt testified that Gnutella, which Rivers used, does
not share at all upon its initial installation—you have to allow the
program to share, and designate a folder or folders for the program
to share from.
The District Court overruled Rivers’s objections, stating:
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
I do find that the government has proven that, based
on the testimony we just heard. [Rivers] . . . had fa-
miliarity with this file sharing device, or file sharing
software. Understood how it works. Was aware,
back in 2011, that his computer was sharing these de-
vices – or these images and making them available to
other people. And then the same thing happened in
2020, when these offenses happened. . . . I find, con-
sistent with the testimony, that the default of that par-
ticular software is to not share, and that [Rivers] did
select and elect to share those images and make them
available to others.
Sent’g Tr., Doc. 101, at 27–28.
The District Court then accepted the guidelines calculations
and range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. Rivers’s mother
and daughter addressed the Court to ask for leniency on Rivers’s
behalf, as did Keicha Hamm, the mother of Rivers’s children. The
Court asked Rivers if he wished to address the Court on his own
behalf; he declined. Rivers, through counsel, requested a down-
ward departure from the guidelines range; specifically, he re-
quested the statutory minimum of five years, or even up to ten
years.
The District Court imposed the lowest guidelines sentence
of 292 months’ imprisonment for each of the two counts, to be
served concurrently with one another. His term of imprisonment
was to be followed by 20 years supervised release and also included
restitution, forfeiture, and a $200 special monetary assessment.
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 13
The District Court declined to grant a variance because the images
in this case were horrific and caused real harm to victims. The
Court was also troubled by the fact that Rivers has exhibited this
behavior multiple times and had a very serious criminal history, as
well as by the length of the videos involved. The District Court
offered both parties the opportunity to make any additional objec-
tions, which they declined.
Rivers timely appealed. On appeal, Rivers argues that there
was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for receipt or
distribution of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)
and (b)(1). He also appeals the increase of his base offense score by
two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2G2(b)(3)(F) and argues that he
should have instead received a two-point reduction under
§ 2G2.2(b)(1).
II.
When appropriate, we will review de novo the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a conviction. United States v. Dixon,
901 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018). A post-trial motion for a judg-
ment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 or
a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
33 that challenge the sufficiency of the evidence will preserve the
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
sufficiency issue for review. See United States v. Mann,
557 F.2d
1211, 1216 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977). 12
But where, as here, a defendant does not move for acquittal
or otherwise preserve an argument regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence in the court below, the defendant “must shoulder a some-
what heavier burden: we will reverse the conviction only where
doing so is necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Greer,
440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006). This
standard requires us to find either that the record is devoid of evi-
dence of an essential element of the crime or “that the evidence on
a key element of the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would
be shocking.” United States v. Milkintas,
470 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We do not distinguish between circumstantial and direct ev-
idence. United States v. Tate,
586 F.3d 936, 945 (11th Cir. 2009).
Circumstantial evidence is not testimony to the specific fact being
asserted, but testimony to other facts and circumstances from
which the jury may infer that the fact being asserted does or does
not exist. United States v. Henderson,
693 F.2d 1028, 1031 (11th
Cir. 1982). The jury must decide whether to draw the inference
between the evidence presented and the fact asserted.
Id. Further,
“[b]ecause a jury is free to choose among the reasonable
12 In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 15
constructions of the evidence, it is not necessary that the evidence
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly in-
consistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United
States v. Godwin,
765 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2014). If the gov-
ernment seeks to meet its burden of proof using circumstantial ev-
idence, it must rely on reasonable inferences to establish a prima
facie case. United States v. Mieres-Borges,
919 F.2d 652, 657 (11th
Cir. 1990).
Under
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), it is unlawful to knowingly dis-
tribute a visual depiction that has traveled by any means in or af-
fecting interstate commerce, including by computer, if producing
the visual depiction involved the use of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct and the visual depiction is of such conduct.
§ 2252(a)(2). Likewise, § 2252A(a)(2) prohibits knowingly receiving
or distributing any child pornography or material containing child
pornography that has been mailed or used in interstate commerce,
including by computer.
Here, there was no error, let alone one that—left uncor-
rected—would rise to the level of a “manifest miscarriage of jus-
tice.” Greer, 40 F.3d at 1271. At trial, Young testified that no one
in the apartment, aside from Rivers, used the computers alone.
None of the evidence at trial suggested that either Young or her
children were responsible for the child pornography on the com-
puters. In May 2020, when the Dell and Toshiba devices accessed
child pornography, Young was living in Pennsylvania. None of the
evidence presented at trial suggests that the pornography was
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
already on the computers when Rivers received them. Police have
photographic evidence of Rivers using one of the devices. One of
the devices had photos and video of him on it. Rivers had signed
into his email on one of the devices.
Moreover, Rivers is not just linked to one IP address and one
device containing child pornography. He is linked—in fact he is
the only link—between four devices at three different addresses. In
addition to Young’s testimony, child pornography was found on a
computer (that was laying next to Rivers while he slept) at Shep-
pard’s house. Armstrong testified that Rivers stayed with her at her
apartment one night and on that night—and only that night—two
videos containing child pornography were downloaded at that IP
address.
Taken together, this evidence is sufficient for a rational juror
to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivers violated
§ 2252A(a)(2)—regardless of the standard of review. Accordingly,
we affirm Rivers’s convictions in this respect.
III.
When determining whether a district court properly applied
a sentencing enhancement, we review “legal questions de novo,
factual findings for clear error, and the district court’s application
of the guidelines to the facts with due deference, which is tanta-
mount to clear error review.” United States v. Isaac,
987 F.3d 980,
990 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). The government
has the burden of proving the applicability of sections that would
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22-11687 Opinion of the Court 17
enhance the offense level, and the defendant has the burden of
proving the applicability of sections that would reduce the offense
level. See United States v. Martinez,
584 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (11th
Cir. 2009).
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1), a court should decrease
a defendant’s base offense level by 2 points if a defendant’s conduct
was limited to the receipt or solicitation of sexual material involv-
ing a minor and he “did not intend to traffic in, or distribute, such
material.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1). However, under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), a court should add 2 points if a defendant know-
ingly distributed child pornography. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). The com-
mentary defines “distribution” as
[A]ny act, including possession with intent to distrib-
ute, production, transmission, advertisement, and
transportation, related to the transfer of material in-
volving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Accord-
ingly, distribution includes posting material involving
the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website for
public viewing but does not include the mere solicita-
tion of such material by a defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, comment (n.1) (emphasis added).
The term “knowingly” means that the act was performed
voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of a mistake or acci-
dent. United States v. Woodruff,
296 F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir.
2002). Proof of an element of a crime may be established through
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-11687
circumstantial evidence or from inferences drawn from the con-
duct of an individual. See United States v. Utter,
97 F.3d 509, 512
(11th Cir. 1996).
In United States v. Grzybowicz,
747 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir.
2014), we vacated a conviction for distributing child pornography
under § 2252A(a)(2), where the defendant sent pictures of child por-
nography to his email address. Id. at 1309. We noted that the word
“distribute” ordinarily means to deliver, give out, dispense, or dis-
perse to others and that “peer-to-peer” networks are one method
of distributing files over the internet. Id. at 1307–08. We also ex-
plained that the distribution requirement for sentencing enhance-
ments under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2(b)(3) is
satisfied where a defendant posts child pornography to a publicly
accessible website or makes it accessible to others by storing it in a
shared folder connected to a file-sharing network. Id. at 1308.
However, because Grzybowicz did not share the child pornogra-
phy in question with anyone else or “put them where they could
be shared without any further action on his part,” we held that the
distribution element of § 2252A(a)(2) had not been met. Id. at
1309–10. We specifically noted that there was no evidence that he
uploaded images to a file-sharing website or that images on his
computer were accessible to other users of the file-sharing website.
Id. at 1309.
In United States v. Carroll,
886 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2018),
we held that knowingly placing or leaving files in a shared folder
connected to a “peer-to-peer” network undoubtedly constitutes
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distribution under § 2252(a)(2). Id. at 1353. We explained that the
use of a “peer-to-peer” sharing program alone is insufficient to
prove knowledge of distribution. Id. at 1354. However, we noted
that it would be difficult for a defendant to claim ignorance where
the “peer-to-peer” program prompts the user during installation to
choose whether he wants to share the downloaded files and then
involves the user in setting up a shared folder. Id. at 1354.
Here, we conclude that the District Court properly applied
the two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) and properly
declined to apply § 2G2.2(b)(1). Rivers used “peer-to-peer” soft-
ware to share child pornography over the internet, which we have
held is a method of distribution. Grzybowicz,
747 F.3d at 1307–08.
Moreover, the government presented sufficient evidence at the
sentencing hearing that Rivers knew the “peer-to-peer” software
involved sharing his downloads with other users. As part of inves-
tigations in both 2011 and 2020, officers explained that functionality
to him. Finally, at least one of the “peer-to-peer” programs used
by Rivers required the user, upon downloading the program, to
grant the program permission to share the files, which makes it dif-
ficult for him to claim he lacked knowledge. See Carroll,
886 F.3d
at 1354. Thus, the District Court did not clearly err in applying the
§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) enhancement, and Rivers was not entitled to a re-
duction under § 2G2.2(b)(1). We affirm the District Court in this
respect as well.
AFFIRMED.
