Karen Maddox-Jones v. Board of Regents of University , 448 F. App'x 17 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-10799 NOVEMBER 22, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-03317-JOF
KAREN MADDOX-JONES,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA,
d.b.a. Clayton State University,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(November 22, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Karen Maddox-Jones (Maddox-Jones) filed suit against Defendants Board
of Regents of the University System of Georgia d/b/a Clayton State University
(CSU) claiming employment discrimination under Title VII. Maddox-Jones
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CSU. On
appeal, Maddox-Jones argues that the district court erred when it found that she
had not demonstrated a prima facie case of race discrimination. She also asserts
that the district court erred in deciding that CSU’s non-discriminatory reason for
the adverse action against her was not pretextual.1 After reviewing the parties’
briefs and the record, we affirm the district court’s decision to grant CSU’s
summary judgement.
I
Maddox-Jones, an African American female, worked at CSU as a
continuing education instructor in computer related classes. Prior to Alexander
Federov (Federov) becoming the coordinator for the continuing education classes,
Maddox-Jones was assigned to teach classes each quarter, ranging from nine to
twenty classes.. However, when Federov became coordinator in the Winter 2007
term, Maddox-Jones’s assigned classes decreased to seven for that term and
thereafter she was not assigned to teach any classes.
When Federov became coordinator, he began to re-work the continuing
1
The district court also granted summary judgment to CSU on Maddox-Jones’s
retaliation claim, but Maddox-Jones did not appeal that decision.
2
education program. He hired nine new instructors (five of whom were African
American) and revised the curriculum. He also began to more evenly distribute
the classes to all of the continuing education instructors to ensure that it was easy
to cover classes if an instructor was unable to teach. As Maddox-Jones said in her
own deposition, Federov told her that she was teaching too many classes and it
would be difficult to replace her if she was in a car accident and died.2
After receiving only seven classes to teach (four of which were cancelled),
Maddox-Jones complained to Brenda Findley, CSU’s Human Resources Director,
and Dale Bower, the Director of the Continuing Education Department at CSU.
She informed Findley and Bower that she received less classes than in previous
semesters because she was being discriminated against on the basis of her race.
In Spring 2007, Federov did not assign Maddox-Jones to teach any classes.
Maddox-Jones claims that she contacted Federov’s office twice and left messages
with the receptionist. Federov claims that he may have called Maddox-Jones back
once, but never heard from her again. Either way, Federov says that he did not
assign Maddox-Jones to any classes because she did not contact him about
teaching for the Spring 2007 quarter. There is no evidence in the record that
2
Maddox-Jones and Federov seemed to have a less than amicable relationship. Along
with being rather blunt about her possibly dying in a car accident, Federov neglected to invite her
to a meeting and allegedly did not return her phone calls.
3
Maddox-Jones ever requested to be assigned classes in the Summer or Fall 2007
quarters.
In August 2007, Janet Winkler signed the Personnel Action Form
terminating the school’s relationship with Maddox-Jones. While Winkler could
not remember the exact reason she signed the form, she did testify that for
administrative purposes, the Human Resources Department prefers to terminate
the employment of instructors who are no longer teaching classes. Winkler also
testified that the termination was not punitive and that if a person terminated in
this way wanted to start teaching again, she could.
II
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552
(1986). Therefore, we consider all facts in the light most favorable to Maddox-
Jones.
The moving party, here CSU, bears the initial burden of showing the
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absence of a dispute about a material fact. Fickling v. United States, 507 F.3d
1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007). If the moving party meets its burden, “the
nonmoving party must present evidence beyond the pleadings showing that a
reasonable jury could find in its favor.” Id. A disputed fact is material if the fact
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id. “Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.”
Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, a plaintiff cannot defeat summary
judgment by relying upon conclusory assertions. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d
1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997).
III
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race [or] color . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employer discriminated against him
unlawfully. Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. Of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th
5
Cir. 2000).
Where, as here, the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, the case is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-
25 (1973). Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.
2006). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of presenting sufficient evidence of her prima facie case. 411 U.S. at 802,
93 S. Ct. at 1824. Once the plaintiff shows sufficient evidence of a prima facie
case, the burden then shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. Id. Then the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the reason is pretextual. Id. at 804.
IV
We apply different formulations of the elements of a prima facie case,
depending on the facts of the individual case. The prima facie case for disparate
treatment is our basic standard. This requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) she is a
member of a protected class, (2) she is quailed for the job, (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action, (4) and her employer treated similarly situated
employees outside the protected class more favorably. Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at
1323. Alternatively, a case involving a demotion requires a showing of the first
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three factors above, and the plaintiff must show that she was replaced by a person
outside her protected class rather than that an employee outside her class was
treated more favorably. Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (11th
Cir. 2008); Hinson, 231 F.3d at 828.3
Maddox-Jones’s case does not neatly fit into any of above standards, but she
argues that the demotion standard best fits her case. The Magistrate Judge agreed
because by teaching fewer classes, Maddox-Jones earned less money; therefore
demoted. The District Court did not agree with this analysis; nonetheless, the
District Court analyzed the case under the demotion standard. Usually our cases
that involve demotions involve more than simply a decrease in pay. See generally
Hinson, 231 F.3d at 828-29 (involving a plaintiff demoted from the position of
principal to a teacher position which had less responsibility and prestige but the
same amount of pay); Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1273 (involving a plaintiff demoted from
Deputy Fire Chief to Battalion Chief, requiring less responsibility and prestige).
Here, while Maddox-Jones did suffer a decrease in pay due to the decrease in the
number of classes taught, she retained the same title, prestige, and responsibility.
3
Maddox-Jones also argues for the first time on appeal that the prima facie case for
failure to hire is the appropriate standard to evaluate her claims. Even if this was not the first
time she raised this issue, the failure to hire standard would still be inappropriate because
Maddox-Jones was hired to teach at CSU in 2005, and the issues in this case arose during the
course of her employment in 2007.
7
In addition, the record does not show that an instructor was guaranteed to be
assigned to the same class each semester. Rather, the subject matter of classes and
the times the classes are offered changed every semester. Thus, being assigned to
teach different classes is not a demotion, but being assigned fewer classes is an
adverse employment action. Therefore, we analyze Maddox-Jones’s prima facie
case under the disparate treatment formulation.
It is undisputed that Maddox-Jones is a member of a protected class
(African American), that she is qualified to teach the majority of the continuing
education classes at CSU, and that she did suffer an adverse employment action.
Thus, the only issue is whether or not persons outside her protected class were
treated more favorably by Federov when he began assigning classes in the 2007
Winter term.
The Magistrate Judge found, under the demotion standard, that Maddox-
Jones was replaced by someone outside her protected class because three white
instructors taught her classes. The District Court, in a more thorough review of
the record, found that Maddox-Jones did not show that she was replaced by
someone outside of her protected class. First, to prove this prong of the prima
facie case, Maddox-Jones must identify comparators outside of her protected class.
Initially Maddox-Jones in her EEOC complaint, named several African Americans
8
as comparators. However, in her affidavit filed with her motion for partial
summery judgment, she asserted three Caucasians comparators: Federov, Luca
Yearsovich, and Cassandra Brackin.4 Since these individuals are all instructors in
CSU’s continuing education program and taught some of the same classes as
Maddox-Jones, they are similarly situated to her. Furthermore, one could come to
the conclusion that Brackin was less qualified than Maddox-Jones because
Brackin had no prior experience as a software application instructor.
Next, Maddox-Jones must show that these instructors were given favorable
treatment. Maddox-Jones first argues that Federov gave the three comparators a
disproportionate number of classes. In Winter 2007, Federov was assigned eight
classes, Yearsovich was assigned four classes and Brackin was assigned five
classes. Maddox-Jones was assigned seven classes, and two other African
Americans were assigned six and five classes, respectively. At first glance this
seems like Maddox-Jones was shown favorable treatment over the other
instructors because only one instructor had more classes assigned to him —
Federov.
Maddox-Jones counters this by arguing that although she was given more
4
Maddox-Jones named one other Caucasian that replaced her, but he taught at a different
campus and Federov did not assign him his classes.
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classes, the classes were ones that were not popular among students, guaranteeing
that the classes would be cancelled.5 CSU counters that it is unpredictable which
classes will be cancelled. This unpredictability is proven through the number of
classes cancelled for each instructor. In Winter 2007, Maddox-Jones had four of
her seven classes cancelled (57%). Yearsovich had three of his four classes
cancelled (75%), and Brackin had two of her five classes cancelled (40%).
Maddox-Jones had less cancellations than one of her comparators; therefore,
Yearsovich was not treated more favorably. Also, looking at the instructor pool as
a whole: three instructors had 100% cancellation rates (a Hispanic, an African
American, and a Caucasian), and only one instructor had zero cancellations in
Winter 2007 — an African American instructor.
The Defendant also argues that by limiting the comparators to only three
instructors, Maddox-Jones is “cherry-picking” her comparators. Maddox-Jones
does offer evidence that under Federdov’s administration of the program, the
number of classes assigned to African Americans decreased by about 33%.
However, Maddox-Jones failed to also acknowledge that despite this 33% drop,
5
One of these classes was “Brochures and Flyers,” a class that Maddox-Jones argues was
wholly composed of a chapter of the “Word Class.” Thus, the class would be of no value to
either students who had never taken the “Word Class” or to students that had taken the “Word
Class.”
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Federov still assigned a majority of the classes to African Americans (58%) .
Admittedly, it is strange that Maddox-Jones went from teaching several
classes for seven quarters to being assigned no classes in the Spring 2007 quarter.
However, during the Spring 2007 quarter, Federov still assigned 58% of the
classes to African Americans. Also, in the Spring 2007 quarter, the two
instructors with the highest number of classes were Yearsovich and an African
American instructor. Thus, it seems that there was genuine miscommunication
between Federov and Maddox-Jones regarding whether she wanted to teach
during the Spring 2007 quarter. Lastly, it is clear that Maddox-Jones was
terminated only for administrative reasons and that Federov did not participate in
her termination.
Since Maddox-Jones has failed to show that persons outside her protected
class were shown favorable treatment, Maddox-Jones has not proved her prima
facie case. Therefore, the analysis under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
framework ends, and the court does not need to evaluate Defendant’s alleged
reasons or Maddox-Jones’s claims of pretext.
AFFIRMED.
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