Ralph A. Udick v. State , 705 F. App'x 901 ( 2017 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-17321
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00562-JSM-PRL
RALPH A. UDICK,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
versus
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 25, 2017)
Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Florida District Courts of Appeals (“DCAs”) affirm some lower court
judgments through “per curiam affirmances” (“PCAs”)—unsigned, unpublished
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opinions that lack reasoned analysis and consist solely of the word “Affirmed”—
which the Florida Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review. Ralph Udick,
proceeding pro se, sued the State of Florida to obtain a declaration that this
practice violates the Fourteenth Amendment and that two PCAs entered against
him in a case he appealed are null and void. The district court dismissed his
complaint on the ground, among others, that Florida enjoyed sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, Udick contends that Florida is not
immune from his suit. Upon careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. PCAs’ Role in Florida’s Judicial Structure
To relieve the Florida Supreme Court of burdens in administering justice
caused by its growing docket congestion, Florida’s legislature created the DCAs
“to be courts of final, appellate jurisdiction” in most cases. Lake v. Lake, 103 So.
2d 639, 641-42 (Fla. 1958). As such, DCA opinions are “in most instances . . .
final and absolute,” with the Florida Supreme Court serving primarily “as a
supervisory body . . . exercising appellate power in certain specified areas essential
to the settlement of issues of public importance and the preservation of uniformity
of principle and practice.”1 Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958).
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The Florida Supreme Court may hear appeals only from those decisions of the DCAs
“declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution;” “expressly declar[ing]
valid a state statute;” “expressly constru[ing] a provision of the state or federal constitution[;]”
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Shortly after the DCAs’ creation, the Florida Supreme Court declared that it
would not review a PCA unless the PCA “prima facie conflicts with a decision of
another [DCA] or of the Supreme Court on the same point of law.” Lake, 103 So.
2d at 643. Yet litigants continued to inundate the Court with appeals from PCAs.
Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1965). Processing these
appeals exhausted the Court’s judicial resources. Id. And so, at the Court’s
urging, Florida’s legislature amended the state’s constitution to strip the Florida
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review PCAs altogether, even where the lower
court decision being affirmed arguably disregarded a state statute. See Fla. Const.
art. V, § 3(b)(3); Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262, 1266 (Fla. 2006); Jenkins v.
State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980). As a result, the Florida Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction over PCAs in all contexts. Jackson, 926 So. 2d at 1266.
B. Udick’s Lawsuits Against His Homeowners’ Association
Ralph Udick filed two complaints against his homeowners’ association,
Harbor Hills Development L.P., in Lake County Circuit Court, challenging the
association’s assessment of certain fees. The circuit court granted Harbor Hills
summary judgment in both suits, determining in each that res judicata precluded
“expressly affect[ing] a class of constitutional or state officers;” “expressly and directly
conflict[ing] with a decision of another [DCA] or of the supreme court on the same question of
law;” or “pass[ing] upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another [DCA].” Fla. Const. art. V §§
3(b)(1), (3)-(4).
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judgment in Udick’s favor because Udick had notice of an earlier Harbor Hills
derivative suit brought on behalf of the entire class of homeowners, but did not ask
to be removed or excluded from the class. The DCA affirmed both judgments. In
the first case, it published a five-page opinion. That opinion is not at issue here. In
the second case, it issued a PCA.
Udick requested rehearing en banc as to the PCA, which the DCA denied.
Udick then appealed the PCA to the Florida Supreme Court, which dismissed his
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The DCA granted Harbor Hills’s motion for
attorney’s fees and remanded the case to the circuit court to determine the amount
of the fee award. The circuit court awarded Harbor Hills $55,342.50, plus interest,
in attorney’s fees and expert fees. Udick appealed the circuit court’s attorney’s fee
award, and the DCA issued a second PCA.
C. Udick’s Present Suit
Udick filed a complaint against the State of Florida in the United States
District Court, asserting that PCAs’ nonreviewability violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. He requested that the
district court (1) declare Florida’s PCA system unconstitutional and the PCAs
entered against him in his appeals null and void, or in the alternative (2) direct the
Florida Supreme Court to review the PCAs. Florida moved to dismiss.
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The district court granted Florida’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1)
the state enjoyed immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded jurisdiction because Udick sought to
invalidate his state court judgments, see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); and (3) Udick
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Udick moved to alter or
amend the court’s judgment and sought leave to file an amended complaint, so that
he could remove his request for a declaration that his PCAs are null and void and
add the Governor of Florida and the Florida Supreme Court as defendants. The
district court denied both motions, determining that Udick had articulated no
reason why its order was erroneous or should be vacated, and that his proposed
amendments to the complaint would be futile. Udick timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A district court’s order denying or granting a motion to dismiss a complaint
against a state based on the Eleventh Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity is
reviewed by this court de novo.” In re Emp’t Discrimination Litig. Against Ala.,
198 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). We also review de novo a district court’s
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit in light of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327,
1331 (11th Cir. 2001). “Although we review a district court’s denial of a motion to
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amend only for abuse of discretion, we review de novo a decision that a particular
amendment to the complaint would be futile.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307,
1310 (11th Cir. 2007). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
III. ANALYSIS
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “Although, by its terms, the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar suits against a state in federal court by its own citizens, the Supreme
Court [in Hans v. Louisiana] has extended its protections to apply in such cases.”
Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir.
2005) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
“The Eleventh Amendment bar to suit is not absolute,” however, as “States
may consent to suit in federal court, and, in certain cases, Congress may abrogate
the States’ sovereign immunity.” Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495
U.S. 299, 304 (1990) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, under the Ex Parte
Young doctrine, “official capacity suits for prospective relief to enjoin state
officials from enforcing unconstitutional acts are not deemed to be suits against the
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state and thus are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Scott v. Taylor, 405
F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
The Ex Parte Young doctrine is a “narrow” “exception” to state sovereign
immunity; “[i]t applies only to prospective relief, does not permit judgments
against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past, and has no
application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred
regardless of the relief sought.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (internal citation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment barred Udick’s suit. See Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 15.
Udick does not argue that Florida consented to be sued or that Congress validly
abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. He instead argues that the
Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a person from suing his own state, and that
he may sue Florida as a citizen of Florida. Acknowledging that Hans holds
otherwise, Udick contends that Hans contravenes the Eleventh Amendment’s text
and thus is invalid. Even if we agreed, we lack authority to disregard Hans, which
remains good law and thus commands our adherence unless and until the Supreme
Court says otherwise. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982); see also
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (citing Hans as binding authority).
Nor can Udick sue Florida under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, as he argues,
because that doctrine permits only suits against state officials, not the State itself.
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P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146; Scott, 405 F.3d at 1255. Udick suggests that the
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits challenging State actions alleged to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, but
the cases he cites for this contention are distinguishable from the matter at hand.
Lawrence v. Texas, Loving v. Virginia, and Griswold v. Connecticut each reviewed
the constitutionality of criminal statutes, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003);
Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1967); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965), and thus did
not involve suits brought “against a state . . . by its own citizens,” Abusaid, 405
F.3d at 1303; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821)
(holding that a criminal defendant who appeals a judgment rendered against him to
the Supreme Court “does not commence or prosecute a suit against [a] State.”).
Similarly, Roe v. Wade, Boddie v. Connecticut, and Brown v. Board of Education
involved actions to enjoin state officials from enforcing allegedly unconstitutional
statutes. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973); Boddie, 91 U.S. 371, 373 (1971); 2 Brown,
347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954).3 Tennessee v. Lane involved a valid congressional
2
The Boddie plaintiffs had initially sued Connecticut directly, but conceded before the
district court that the state was not a proper party to the action. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 286
F. Supp. 968, 971 (D. Conn. 1968).
3
The Brown plaintiffs also sued local school boards, which do not necessarily receive
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280–81 (1977) (“[A] local school board such as petitioner is more like a county or city than
it is like an arm of the State . . . . [and thus] was not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in the federal courts.”); Walker v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 771 F.3d 748,
751 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We appl[y] a [multi]-factor test to determine whether [a] school board
enjoy[s] Eleventh Amendment immunity under federal law.”).
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abrogation of state sovereign immunity, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004), a circumstance
Udick does not contend is present here. None of these cases held that a plaintiff
may sue a non-consenting state in federal court to assert a Fourteenth Amendment
violation absent a valid congressional abrogation of a State’s sovereign immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the district court did not err in dismissing Udick’s
suit on the basis of Florida’s sovereign immunity. 4
AFFIRMED.
4
We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Udick’s
motion to amend his complaint to add the Governor of Florida and the Florida Supreme Court as
defendants, as Udick has abandoned this argument by failing to raise it on appeal. See Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants
liberally, . . . issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned . . . .”).
Having concluded that Florida is immune from Udick’s suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, we need not consider the district court’s alternative determinations that it lacked
jurisdiction over Udick’s suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that Udick failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. We also need not decide whether the district court
abused its discretion in denying Udick leave to amend his complaint to avoid implicating the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as such amendment would have been futile given that Udick’s suit
properly was subject to dismissal due to Florida’s sovereign immunity. See Cockrell, 510 F.3d at
1310 (“Leave to amend a complaint is futile [and thus properly denied] when the complaint as
amended would still be properly dismissed . . . .”).
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