USCA11 Case: 22-12562 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 05/03/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12562
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHN KEILEY LUBIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20046-CMA-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12562
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Lubin pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated
identity theft. Because his 36-month wire fraud sentence is
substantively reasonable, we affirm.
I.
In early 2021, Miami police arrested John Lubin at a traffic
stop. During the stop, Lubin repeatedly reached into his bag,
which the police discovered contained a firearm. When the police
asked Lubin to give his name and birthday, he gave the name on
his driver’s license and claimed that he did not remember his
birthday. He later admitted that his real name was not the name
on his license.
Soon after, Lubin pleaded guilty to wire fraud under
18
U.S.C. § 1343 and aggravated identity theft under § 1028A(a)(1). As
part of his factual proffer, he admitted that his driver’s license
featured his picture but included someone else’s personal
information. He knew that this information matched a real person.
With this fraudulent license, Lubin had purchased two luxury
vehicles—then defaulted on the loans—and rented multiple
apartments in Miami, for which he never fully paid.
The presentence investigation report (PSI) applied the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines to recommend an advisory range for
Lubin’s sentence. The PSI determined that he had an offense level
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22-12562 Opinion of the Court 3
of 13 and a criminal history category of II. Together, that
amounted to an advisory Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months for
the wire fraud count. By statute, the aggravated identity theft
count added a mandatory 24 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
Lubin did not object to anything in the PSI.
After a hearing, the court sentenced him to 60 months
imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The sentence
included the mandatory 24 months for aggravated identity theft
and 36 months for wire fraud—an upward variance of 15 months
from the Guidelines recommendation. To explain the variance,
the court first invoked the sentencing factors found in
18 U.S.C.
§ 3553. It considered the Guidelines range “inadequate in
addressing the statutory factors” because of “the nature and
circumstances of the offense conduct” and Lubin’s “history and
characteristics.” The court focused on his extensive history of
identity fraud, his knowledge of the wrongfulness of his acts, and
the harms he had caused. And the court concluded that there was
“a great need to deter Mr. Lubin from future wrongful conduct as
well as to deter others.”
Lubin now appeals the 36-month wire fraud sentence,
claiming that it is substantively unreasonable.
II.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Overstreet,
713 F.3d 627, 636
(11th Cir. 2013).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12562
III.
When imposing a sentence, a court may exceed the
Guidelines range based on the factors found in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
United States v. Butler,
39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). We
will not “second guess” the weight given to these factors as long as
the sentence is “reasonable under the circumstances.”
Id.
Lubin’s sentence is reasonable. Echoing § 3553(a)(1), the
court explained that he has “a history of taking liberties with other
people’s identities to defraud, to steal,” and do so “without regard
for those who he is hurting.” Our review of the PSI confirms this
observation. If anything, the district court understated Lubin’s
previous conduct. For example, the PSI contains convictions
showing that he had used stolen credit card information a “large
number” of times and already presented a fake driver’s license to
police. It also summarizes arrest affidavits suggesting that Lubin
cloned multiple credit cards for others, created fraudulent
identification cards, and possessed a vehicle stolen using someone
else’s identity. All this information is relevant. See Butler, 39 F.4th
at 1355–56 (summarizing the “broad leeway” courts have to weigh
criminal history (quotation omitted)); United States v. Williams,
989 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that courts may
consider “facts drawn from police reports” related to arrests when
the defendant does not contest their reliability).
We are also persuaded by the court’s characterization of
Lubin’s offense as serious and the weight it placed on the need for
both specific and general deterrence. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
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22-12562 Opinion of the Court 5
Indeed, Lubin’s “economic and fraud-based crimes” are “prime
candidates for general deterrence.” United States v. Martin,
455
F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration adopted and quotation
omitted). Finally, “a sentence imposed well below the statutory
maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United
States v. Taylor,
997 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2021). Lubin’s
three-year wire fraud sentence is well below the statutory
maximum of twenty years. See
18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Because Lubin’s sentence is reasonable given the statutory
guidance and undisputed facts, the court did not abuse its
discretion.
* * *
We AFFIRM.
