Mata Chorwadi, Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach ( 2023 )

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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-14694
____________________
MATA CHORWADI, INC.,
d.b.a. Homing Inn,
KIRIT SHAH,
DIPIKA SHAH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14694
D.C. Docket No. 9:19-cv-81069-WPD
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and GRANT,
Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
This appeal presents questions of third-party standing and
alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
owners of a hotel that the City of Boynton Beach declared a
“chronic nuisance property” complain that they were deprived of
property without due process and that the municipal chronic nui-
sance property code violates their First Amendment rights and
those of their hotel guests. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City because the City afforded the hotel
owners due process and enforcing the municipal code did not vio-
late rights protected by the First Amendment. Because the hotel
owners lack prudential standing to bring a First Amendment claim
based on the rights of hotel guests, failed to present any evidence
that the City otherwise violated the First Amendment, and failed
to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The City of Boynton Beach, Florida, enacted a Chronic Nui-
sance Property Code “to address and reduce nuisance activities . . .
that disrupt quality of life and repeatedly occur or exist at proper-
ties.” BOYNTON BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 15, art. VIII,
§ 15-111 (Am. Legal Pub. Supp. 2022). The Code defines a
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“nuisance activity” as “any activit[y] relating to” twenty-six viola-
tions, “whenever engaged in by the property owner, operator,
agent, tenant, or [their] invitee.” Id. § 15-112(d). Under the Code, a
property exhibits a pattern of nuisance activity when the City “has
responded to” three or more nuisance activities at that property
within thirty days or to seven or more nuisance activities within six
months. Id. § 15-112(h)(1)–(2).
If a property exhibits a pattern of nuisance activities, the City
may declare it a “chronic nuisance property.” Id. § 15-115(a). The
City gives notice to the property owner of the declaration of
chronic nuisance by hand delivery or certified mail and posts notice
at the property. Id. § 15-115(a)–(b). The declaration is accompanied
by a “proposed Nuisance Abatement Agreement [that] outlines the
corrective action to be taken by the property owner.” Id. § 15-
115(b)(5). The property owner then has fifteen days to sign the
agreement. Id. § 15-115(b)(6).
If a property owner refuses to sign the agreement or violates
the terms of a signed agreement, “the City may prosecute its Dec-
laration of Chronic Nuisance at a hearing before the City’s Special
Magistrate.” Id. § 15-116(a). The special magistrate conducts a hear-
ing that is limited to the evidence upon which the City based its
decision and “any rebuttal offered by the property owner.” Id. § 15-
116(c). Both the City and the property owner may call and cross-
examine sworn witnesses. Id. § 15-116(c). After the hearing, the
special magistrate issues a written decision that either upholds or
rejects the City’s determination that the property owner violated
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the agreement. Id. § 15-116(d)–(e). If the special magistrate finds a
violation, the special magistrate’s order authorizes the City to take
remedial actions on the property at the property owner’s expense.
Id. §§ 15-116(f), 15-112(b). Either party may appeal the special mag-
istrate’s order to the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County. Id. § 15-
117.
Mata Chorwadi, Inc., owns the Homing Inn, a 103-room ho-
tel in Boynton Beach. Kirit and Dipika Shah operate the hotel and
are the majority owners of Mata Chorwadi, Inc. We refer to them
collectively as the hotel owners. Between December 2017 and April
2018, there were thirteen calls for emergency services at the hotel
related to drug overdoses. All thirteen calls were placed by hotel
guests. The Code defines “[t]wo (2) or more calls for service within
a period of thirty (30) calendar days to the same property for . . .
emergency personnel . . . to assist an individual who displays the
symptoms of an overdose[] of a controlled substance” as a viola-
tion. Id. § 15-112(d)(26). Six of the drug overdose-related calls for
emergency services at the hotel occurred within a thirty-day period
beginning on December 30, 2017. Because two calls within thirty
days constitute one violation, those six calls within thirty days were
three violations, which is a “pattern of nuisance activity.” Id. § 15-
112(h).
In July 2018, the City sent the hotel owners a declaration of
chronic nuisance accompanied by a proposed nuisance abatement
agreement. The proposed agreement required the hotel owners to
install additional security cameras, post “no trespassing” signs,
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improve lighting on the property, and trim shrubs. The hotel own-
ers did not sign the agreement within the time specified in the let-
ter. In November, the hotel owners received a notice of a public
hearing to be held in December regarding a Code violation. The
notice stated that if the special magistrate found a violation, the
hotel owners could be fined $1,000 for each day that the violation
continued.
One day before the public hearing, the hotel owners’ coun-
sel signed the agreement on behalf of her clients and wrote under
the signature line, “[t]his Agreement was signed under duress, and
my clients do not waive their right to appeal and/or any right to
subject the City Ordinance to judicial review as it applies to my
clients.” The hotel owners’ complaint alleges that the agreement
was signed under duress because it was signed “[i]n fear of the hefty
fine of $1,000.00 per day.” At the hearing, the City requested that
the special magistrate reject the signed agreement because of the
“under duress” notation, and the special magistrate did so. Later
that month, counsel for the hotel owners signed an agreement
without any notation. The hotel owners’ complaint alleges that
this agreement was signed “[i]n fear” that the City would conduct
remedial work at the hotel owners’ expense. The City accepted this
signature.
At a hearing on April 17, 2019, the special magistrate found
that the hotel owners violated the agreement. The City posted a
sign on the front window of the hotel’s office that stated that the
property had been declared a chronic nuisance property as “a direct
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result of continued activity by person(s) at this location requiring
the attention of Police and/or Fire Department personnel.” The
hotel owners appealed the special magistrate’s decision to the Cir-
cuit Court of Palm Beach County on May 31, 2019.
On July 29, 2019, while the hotel owners’ state-court appeal
was pending, the hotel owners filed suit in the federal district court.
The amended complaint alleged violations of the First Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The com-
plaint requested injunctive and declaratory relief and compensa-
tory damages.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and
the hotel owners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and
denied as moot the hotel owners’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. The hotel owners timely appealed.
We ordered the parties to address the status of the state-
court appeal at oral argument and the effect, if any, of the availa-
bility and status of that appeal on the hotel owners’ due-process
claim. We also ordered the parties to address whether abstention
was proper in this litigation in the light of the state-court proceed-
ings. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). At oral
argument, the hotel owners stated that the Palm Beach County
Circuit Court had affirmed the special magistrate’s order. Although
further appellate review was available, the hotel owners did not
appeal that judgment.
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo a summary judgment. See Owen v. I.C.
Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment
is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-
terial fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). We may affirm the judgment on
any ground supported by the record. See Powers v. United States,
996 F.2d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993). “We review the decision to
deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” Scott v.
Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain
that the hotel owners’ First Amendment claim fails on the merits
and fails for lack of prudential standing insofar as it asserts third-
party rights. Second, we explain that the hotel owners failed to
state a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A. The Hotel Owners’ First Amendment Rights Were Not Vio-
lated and They Lack Prudential Standing to Assert Third-Party
Rights.
The hotel owners contend that the enforcement of the Code
violates the First Amendment rights of the hotel’s owners, employ-
ees, and guests. We conclude that the hotel owners’ First Amend-
ment rights were not violated. And we conclude that the hotel
owners lack prudential standing to assert the rights of hotel guests.
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1. The Hotel Owners’ First Amendment
Rights Were Not Violated.
The hotel owners argue that the Code violates the First
Amendment “because it imposes punishment on hotel owners, like
Appellants, when their guests exercise their First Amendment right
to call 911.” But the enforcement of the Code based on calls placed
by guests does not implicate the hotel owners’ First Amendment
rights. And the hotel owners’ argument that the Code penalizes
and chills their protected speech fails because the hotel owners’
speech was never the basis of enforcement and there is no evidence
that the hotel owners’ speech was chilled. No calls by the owners
or employees of the Homing Inn counted toward the pattern of
nuisance activity, so the hotel owners’ speech was not penalized.
And there is no evidence that the Code had a chilling effect on the
hotel owners’ speech or that of their employees. Kirit Shah and
Dipika Shah testified in their depositions that they have never
avoided calling 911 because of the Code, nor have they directed
anyone to avoid calling 911 because of the Code. And although a
hotel employee testified that she was initially confused by the sign
the City placed in the window and was “scared” to call 911, when
she asked Kirit Shah “if it was okay to call 911,” he replied that it
was.
2. The Hotel Owners Lack Prudential Standing to
Assert Third-Party Rights.
The hotel owners also assert the rights of the hotel’s guests
by maintaining that guests have a constitutional right to call 911
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and that “[t]he enactment and enforcement of the [Code] directly
penalizes and unduly chills the First Amendment rights of individ-
uals, including . . . hotel guests, to seek assistance for illness.” The
hotel owners contend that a 911 call is protected by the First
Amendment as both free expression and a petition for redress of
grievances. But whether the hotel’s guests could assert that their
911 calls are protected by one clause of the First Amendment or by
two is beside the point because the hotel owners lack prudential
standing to assert the rights of hotel guests.
With few exceptions, “a litigant may only assert his own
constitutional rights or immunities.” United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 22 (1960). The Supreme Court has explained that this pro-
hibition of asserting third-party rights is a prudential limitation, not
a jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article III. See United Food
& Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
557 (1996); see also CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
451 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized several exceptions to the prohibition against asserting
third-party rights. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Juris-
diction § 2.3.4 (6th ed. 2012). Those exceptions, of course, do not
alter the requirements of standing under Article III. See CAMP, 451
F.3d at 1271.
This appeal requires us to consider two exceptions to the
prohibition of third-party standing. The hotel owners argue that
the overbreadth doctrine, which allows a litigant to challenge a
statute not because it is unconstitutional as applied to him but
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because it may deter others from engaging in protected expression,
see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973), applies here.
The hotel owners also cite a separate exception, jus tertii standing,
although they do not distinguish that theory from an overbreadth
theory. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
HARV. L. REV. 423, 423–424 (1974) (explaining the “fundamental
distinction” between overbreadth claims and jus tertii claims). Jus
tertii standing allows litigants who challenge a statute in their own
right to assert “concomitant” rights of third parties when those
third parties’ rights would be violated by the enforcement of the
challenged restriction against the litigant. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 195–97 (1976). Neither of those exceptions applies here.
a. The Hotel Owners Cannot Rely on the Overbreadth Doctrine.
The overbreadth doctrine allows litigants “to challenge a
statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated,
but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 612. The overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine.” Id.
at 613. So, “a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless
it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications.”
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982).
The Code does not apply to guests, so there are no “imper-
missible applications,” id., on which the hotel owners can rely. The
hotel owners allege that the Code “penalizes” and “chills” hotel
guests’ speech. But on its face, the Code imposes penalties only on
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the owners of nuisance properties. See Code §§ 15-115, 15-116.
There is no evidence that the Code has been or could be enforced
against hotel guests, so the hotel owners cannot rely on the over-
breadth doctrine.
b. The Hotel Owners Do Not Have Jus Tertii Standing.
The hotel owners’ claim is closer to a jus tertii claim than to
an overbreadth claim, but the hotel owners lack prudential stand-
ing under a jus tertii theory as well. In a jus tertii case, a litigant is
permitted to challenge the enforcement of a statute against himself
and also assert that the legal duties imposed on the litigant operate
to violate third parties’ rights. For example, a vendor of low-alco-
hol beer who was prohibited from selling the beer to males under
age 21 and to females under age 18 was allowed to claim that the
prohibition—which caused the vendor financial injury by restrict-
ing its market—violated the equal-protection rights of males aged
18–20. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191–97. Similarly, medical providers who
prescribed a contraceptive device and were convicted of aiding and
abetting the prohibited use of contraceptives could assert the rights
of the married couple with whom they had a professional relation-
ship. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–81 (1965). As the
Supreme Court explained, “vendors and those in like positions
have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their
operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who
seek access to their market or function.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 195.
“Otherwise, the threatened imposition of governmental sanctions
might deter” vendors and those in like positions from allowing
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third parties to access their market or function, “result[ing] indi-
rectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.” Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
The key to jus tertii standing is the causal connection be-
tween the litigant’s injury and the violation of the third parties’
constitutional rights. In Craig, the beer vendor’s compliance with
the statute forbidding the sale of low-alcohol beer to young men
but not to women of the same age is what caused the equal-protec-
tion violation. Id. In other words, when the vendor complied with
the legal duty imposed by the statute, the young men were denied
their constitutional rights. Id. at 194. Likewise, in Griswold, the lit-
igant was prohibited from distributing contraceptives to married
couples, and compliance with that prohibition would have caused
constitutional injury to those couples. See 381 U.S. at 480–81.
The hotel owners’ claim lacks the causal connection be-
tween their injury and the third parties’ injuries that must be pre-
sent for jus tertii standing. The hotel owners’ theory is that their
violation of the Code made the City put up signs that gave notice
that the hotel is a chronic nuisance property, these signs confuse
guests, and confused guests might be deterred from calling 911. So,
the hotel owners suggest, the Code impermissibly chills the First
Amendment rights of hotel guests. But this theory is a far cry from
Craig, in which the statutory provision at issue imposed a duty on
the litigant and the litigant’s compliance with that duty indirectly
violated third parties’ rights. 429 U.S. at 194. Here, there is no legal
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duty imposed on the hotel owners that indirectly violates third par-
ties’ rights when the hotel owners comply.
Instead, there is a misalignment between the hotel owners’
interests and hotel guests’ interests. The hotel owners complained
that they “reasonably fear that any future calls made by hotel
guests for peace officer/emergency personnel assistance will cause
further harm to the [hotel owners].” But that “further harm” to the
hotel owners is predicated on guests’ choice to call 911. So, as the
hotel owners acknowledged at oral argument, the hotel owners are
injured under the Code only if guests’ First Amendment rights are
not violated. If guests’ rights are violated, then the hotel owners
are not injured. Any negative effect of the Code on third parties’
rights benefits the hotel owners. That misalignment distinguishes
this appeal from Craig and other jus tertii cases, in which litigants
were permitted to assert “concomitant” rights of third parties. 429
U.S. at 195.
The hotel owners’ real objection to the sign is not that it de-
terred guests from calling 911 but instead that potential guests
might see the sign and not stay at the hotel. Indeed, the hotel own-
ers’ counsel stated as much before the district court: “The sign is a
deterrent. The only thing that the sign has done is . . . told good
patrons not to stay here. . . . [T]he sign hasn’t done anything to pre-
vent 911 calls. I mean, it hasn’t done anything to reduce the num-
ber of 911 calls.” See Docket Entry 123 at 18–19. But as the hotel
owners acknowledged before this Court, even if they could prove
that potential guests were deterred by the sign from staying at the
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hotel, such deterrence would not violate the constitutional rights
of those potential guests.
B. The Hotel Owners Failed to State a Fourteenth Amendment
Claim.
The hotel owners’ claim that they were deprived of property
without due process also fails. The district court ruled on the merits
that the hotel owners received constitutionally sufficient process.
We do not reach the merits.
The hotel owners’ complaint failed to state a cognizable
claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As we have explained, “only when the
state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the proce-
dural deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under
section 1983 arise.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.
1994) (en banc). Even if there is a procedural defect in an adminis-
trative proceeding, “such a claim will not be cognizable under [sec-
tion] 1983 if the state provides a means by which to remedy the
alleged deprivation.” Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 347 F.3d
1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003). So, a plaintiff who seeks relief under
section 1983 must allege that there is no available state process. The
hotel owners alleged that they were deprived of procedural protec-
tions during the administrative proceeding, but they did not allege
in their complaint that there was no state process to remedy these
procedural defects. That failure is fatal under McKinney.
For the sake of completeness, we ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefing about the procedures available under state
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law. And the hotel owners’ cited authority—which could not cure
the pleading defect—goes against their argument on the merits be-
cause it establishes that they could have raised their constitutional
claims in state court. See Holiday Isle Resort & Marina Assocs. v.
Monroe Cnty., 582 So.2d 721, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The
hotel owners stated at oral argument before this Court that the
county court to which they appealed the special magistrate’s order
struck their constitutional claims as improper. The hotel owners
had the opportunity to appeal the final judgment of that court but
chose not to do so. Based on Holiday Isle Resort, the hotel owners
could have argued in an appeal of the judgment that the order strik-
ing their constitutional claims was erroneous because their consti-
tutional claims were “properly cognizable on an appeal to the
[county] circuit court from a final order of” a special magistrate. Id.
at 722.
That the hotel owners failed to take advantage of these state
procedures does not mean that the state deprived them of property
without due process. And the hotel owners’ complaint failed to al-
lege a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim in any event be-
cause it did not allege that state procedures were inadequate to
cure any procedural defect. So, the City was entitled to summary
judgment in its favor.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the City.