USCA11 Case: 22-11800 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11800
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
In re: ELLERY MYRON STEED,
Debtor.
___________________________________________________
ELLERY STEED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GSRAN-Z, LLC,
INVESTA SERVICES, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11800
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-02085-MLB,
Bkcy No. 1:18-bk-69488-JWC
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ellery Myron Steed, proceeding pro se, appeals the District
Court’s dismissal of his appeal from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Georgia. This case arises out of the pro-
posed tax sale of Steed’s property initiated by Investa, on behalf of
GSRAN-Z, and the subsequent loss of rental income by Steed.
Steed initiated an adversary proceeding against Investa and
GSRAN-Z for willfully violating the automatic stay. 1 He sought
$24,000 in actual damages, $100,000 in damages for substantial
mental anguish and distress, and $250,000 in damages.
The bankruptcy court partially granted Steed’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that Investa willfully violated the au-
tomatic stay; all issues relating to damages were reserved for trial.
1 The adversary proceeding arises out of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case Steed
filed on November 19, 2018. He listed both Investa and GSRAN-Z as creditors.
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22-11800 Opinion of the Court 3
After trial, the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Steed
and awarded him actual damages in the amount of $2,250. 2
Steed moved the bankruptcy court to vacate, reconsider, or
modify its order, and also moved for a new trial. The bankruptcy
court denied those requests. Steed then appealed to the District
Court. The District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s opin-
ion.
On appeal, Steed first argues that the bankruptcy court erred
in its calculation of his actual damages and in finding that he failed
to mitigate his damages. Second, Steed argues that the bankruptcy
court erred in finding that he failed to establish damages for emo-
tional distress. Third, he argues that the bankruptcy court erred in
denying punitive damages.
I.
As the second court of review, we examine the order of the
bankruptcy court independently, reviewing the bankruptcy court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
In re Fisher Island Invs., Inc.,
778 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015).
Neither we nor the District Court are authorized to make inde-
pendent factual findings; that is the function of the bankruptcy
court. In re Sublett,
895 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990). A factual
finding is clearly erroneous “if the reviewing court examines the
evidence and is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
2The bankruptcy court also entered judgment in favor of GSRAN-Z on all
counts. Steed does not address this ruling on appeal.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11800
mistake has been made.” In re Stanford,
17 F.4th 116, 121 (11th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Filing a bankruptcy petition automatically stays all efforts
outside of bankruptcy to enforce a lien against a debtor’s property
or to collect debts from a debtor who is under the protection of
the bankruptcy court.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), (6). Unless the action
comes under an exception in
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) or a party receives
relief from the stay under
11 U.S.C. § 362(d), the stay generally re-
mains in effect until the bankruptcy court disposes of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c).
If a creditor disregards its obligations to stay its collection
efforts, the debtor has a remedy: An individual injured by any will-
ful violation of a stay shall recover actual damages, including costs
and attorneys’ fees.
11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Unlike general, special, and
compensatory damages, “actual damages” has no consistent legal
interpretation. In re Horne,
876 F.3d 1076, 1080–81 (11th Cir. 2017).
Bankruptcy courts within this Circuit have required that actual
damages be proven with reasonable certainty and mere specula-
tion, guess, or conjecture will not suffice. In re Castillo,
456 B.R.
719, 725 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011). The debtor has the burden of
proving damages from an automatic stay violation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In re Horne,
876 F.3d at 1083.
The bankruptcy court granted Steed summary judgment on
the issue of whether Investa willfully violated the automatic stay,
leaving only the issue of damages for trial. It did not err in
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22-11800 Opinion of the Court 5
determining actual damages of $2,250 because its findings of fact
were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.
Before the bankruptcy court, Steed asserted that he had
leased the property in question to a tenant for three years, with a
monthly rent of $750 per month. According to Steed, Investa’s
willful violations of the automatic stay caused the tenant to termi-
nate the lease at the end of April 2019, which in turn caused him to
lose the 32 months of rent remaining on the lease, or $24,000. Ap-
pellees questioned whether the lease existed at all, and argued the
Steed had a duty to mitigate his damages but failed to do so by al-
lowing his tenant to cancel the lease and by failing to re-let the
apartment.
The bankruptcy court found that Steed had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had a month-to-month lease
with the tenant for $750 per month, but that he failed to establish
that the written lease governed the terms of the agreement. The
bankruptcy court awarded Steed three months of rent, or $2,250,
in actual damages because it found that the tenant would reasona-
bly have stayed until July, “but anything beyond that point” was
“too speculative given the parties’ loose relationship with any for-
mal terms and the dubious nature of the testimony and evidence
of [the tenant’s] use of the apartment.”
Steed argues that in determining that the written lease did
not govern the terms of the agreement, and that there was not a
three-year lease, the bankruptcy court made findings of fact that
were clearly erroneous and contrary to the record. But we cannot
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11800
say the bankruptcy court’s factual findings leave us with a definite
conviction that a mistake has been made.
The bankruptcy court found that there were inconsistencies
between the lease and the parties’ statements. First, both Steed and
the tenant claimed they agreed to a three-year lease with a monthly
rent of $750, but the written lease showed a rent of $7.50 per month
and the complaint alleged a five-year lease. The tenant described
the apartment as “great” and testified that he slept there “about”
every night for five months, but could not remember if it had run-
ning water. The property did not contain a refrigerator or a work-
ing stove, contrary to the terms of the written lease. The written
lease required the tenant to pay all utilities other than water, but
no utilities were put in his name, and he testified that he did not
pay any utilities. The bankruptcy court concluded that, while there
was evidence of some lease arrangement between Steed and the
tenant, “[o]ne thing clear is the written lease was an empty formal-
ity to which neither [the tenant] nor [Steed] paid any regard.”
Given the factual inconsistencies in the record, it was not clearly
erroneous for the bankruptcy court to find a month-to-month
lease. 3
3 The bankruptcy court further held that even if Steed had shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he and the tenant had a three-year lease, Steed
would still not be entitled to 32 months of damages because he failed to miti-
gate his damages. Steed argues that this was in error. Because we hold that
the bankruptcy court did not err in finding a month-to-month lease, we de-
cline to address this argument.
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22-11800 Opinion of the Court 7
II.
Emotional distress damages fall within the broad term of
“actual damages” in § 362(k). Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271. At a mini-
mum, to recover actual damages for emotional distress under
§ 362(k), a plaintiff must (1) suffer significant emotional distress, (2)
clearly establish the significant emotional distress, and (3) demon-
strate a causal connection between that significant emotional dis-
tress and the violation of the automatic stay. Id. Fleeting or trivial
anxiety or distress is not significant emotional distress, and gener-
alized evidence, without any additional, specific detail, does not
show significant emotional distress. Id. at 1271–72. Corroborating
evidence may not be necessary to prove emotional distress where
the violator engaged in egregious conduct and significant emo-
tional distress is readily apparent. Id. at 1272.
The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that Steed was
not entitled to damages for emotional distress because while the
Appellees’ conduct was willful, it was not egregious. Importantly,
Investa was not actively trying to get around the automatic stay.
When Investa initiated the levy process against Steed, his bank-
ruptcy case had been dismissed—Investa could not have known the
case would be reinstated at the time it initiated the levy process.
Because Investa’s conduct was not egregious, Steed needed
to provide corroborating evidence to clearly establish both that he
suffered significant emotional distress and that there was a causal
connection between that distress and violation of the automatic
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11800
stay. He failed to meet that standard, relying solely on his own
testimony.
III.
Under
11 U.S.C. § 362(k), actual damages recovered by a
debtor when a creditor disregards its obligations to stay its collec-
tion efforts can, in appropriate circumstances, include punitive
damages.
11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Punitive sanctions are appropriate
when a party acts with reckless or callous disregard for the law or
rights of others. In re McLean,
794 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, the bankruptcy court did not err in denying Steed pu-
nitive damages because Steed failed to show that the Appellees
acted with reckless or callous disregard for the law or rights of oth-
ers. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
