USCA11 Case: 23-11040 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 05/26/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11040
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
In re: IRVIN RANDAL KARR,
Debtor.
_________________________________________________
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANIES,
as Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROCCO J. LEO,
as Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Irvin Randal Karr,
Defendant-Appellee.
USCA11 Case: 23-11040 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 05/26/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 23-11040
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00787-AMM
____________________
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Upon our review of the record and the parties’ responses to
the jurisdictional questions, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
Appellant seeks review of the district court’s order affirming
the bankruptcy court’s March 7, 2022 grant of partial summary
judgment to Appellee. In that order, the bankruptcy court deter-
mined that Appellant had no right to Debtor’s interest in the prop-
erty in which he resides, and the bankruptcy estate was entitled to
a one-half interest in that property. The bankruptcy court did not
resolve Appellee’s claims requesting a judgment allowing for sale
of the property and an order requiring turnover of the property to
the estate, nor did it address Appellant’s counterclaim for sale of
the property and distribution of proceeds.
We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not properly cer-
tify its order, which did not resolve all claims and counterclaims in
the adversary proceedings, for immediate review under Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7054(a). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054(a) (providing that Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b) applies in adversary bankruptcy proceedings);
USCA11 Case: 23-11040 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 05/26/2023 Page: 3 of 4
23-11040 Opinion of the Court 3
Dzibowski v. Boomer’s Sports & Recreation Ctr., Inc. (In re Boca Arena,
Inc.),
184 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that a bankruptcy
court order disposing of fewer than all claims in an adversary pro-
ceeding is not immediately appealable absent Rule 7054 certifica-
tion). Specifically, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in de-
termining that there was “no just reason for delay.” See Lloyd No-
land Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp.,
483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th
Cir. 2007) (holding that to certify a case under Rule 54(b), a court
must determine, inter alia, that there is “no just reason for delay” in
permitting an immediate appeal).
As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court did not provide
any reasoning or explanation for its certification decision. It simply
stated, summarily, that there was no just reason for delay. Accord-
ingly, we accord no deference to the bankruptcy court’s certifica-
tion. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ.,
114 F.3d 162, 166–
67 (11th Cir. 1997).
Here, the “special circumstances” we have identified as war-
ranting departure from the historic federal policy against piece-
meal appeals are not present. See Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.,
21 F.4th 714, 722–23 (11th Cir. 2021); Peden v. Stephens,
50 F.4th 972,
978–79 (11th Cir. 2022). The Rule 54(b) certification did not occur
at an early stage of the litigation but after two years of litigation,
including a related removal and remand of a state court action.
There are not a large number of defendants, and it does not appear
that substantial discovery still awaits. Neither the bankruptcy court
nor the parties have identified any particular dangers of hardship
USCA11 Case: 23-11040 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 05/26/2023 Page: 4 of 4
4 Opinion of the Court 23-11040
or injustice associated with delaying appellate review until final res-
olution of the entire bankruptcy proceeding, and our review of the
record reveals no obvious reason to permit an immediate appeal.
See Peden, 50 F.4th at 978 (explaining that Rule 54(b) certification
should be limited to “instances in which immediate appeal would
alleviate some particular danger of hardship or injustice associated
with delay”).
Further, allowing an immediate appeal would likely result
in future piecemeal appeals involving similar factual backgrounds.
See Ebrahimi,
114 F.3d at 167 (noting that when the factual under-
pinnings of adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are intertwined,
courts “should be hesitant” to employ Rule 54(b)). The factual un-
derpinnings of the adjudicated issue of who is entitled to Debtor’s
interest in the property are intertwined with the unadjudicated is-
sues of whether the property should be sold, and if so, how to dis-
tribute the proceeds of such a sale. Thus, potential later appeals
would involve essentially the same facts presented in this appeal,
and judicial administrative interests would not be advanced by hav-
ing multiple panels of this Court familiarize themselves with this
case. See
id. Accordingly, the parties’ needs do not outweigh the
costs and risks of multiplying the proceedings and overcrowding
our docket.
