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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13426
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
In re:
TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
Debtor.
___________________________________________________
TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Defendants- Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13426
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01075-TJC,
Bkcy. No. 3:20-bk-00618-JAF
____________________
____________________
No. 21-13429
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
In re: TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
Debtor.
___________________________________________________
TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 3
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01047-TJC,
Bkcy. No. 3:20-bk-00618-JAF
____________________
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Taquan Rahshe Gullett-El appeals from the district court’s
order (1) holding that his appeal from the bankruptcy court’s
dismissal of his adversary complaint was untimely and otherwise
frivolous, and (2) denying his request for permission to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal. Gullett-El argues that he timely
filed his administrative appeal from the bankruptcy court’s
adversary proceeding to the district court and that the district court
erred in denying him IFP status on appeal. Additionally, he asserts
that both the bankruptcy court and the district court made multiple
errors in the disposition of his adversary complaint. After review,
we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13426
I. Background
Although this appeal arises out of a dismissal of two
bankruptcy court appeals, a brief summary of events leading to that
ruling is necessary for context.
In 2017, Gullett-El was convicted in the Central District of
California of two counts of submitting false, fictious, or fraudulent
claims to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and two counts of
attempting to file a false lien or encumbrance against the property
of government employees. See United States v. Taquan-Rashe,
752 F.
App’x 531, 531 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished).
Thereafter, in 2020, while imprisoned for those crimes,
Gullett-El, filed a pro se petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the
bankruptcy court for the Middle District of Florida. He alleged,
among other types of debt, that he had judicial liens, statutory
liens, and tax liens. And he listed as creditors, among others, the
California Franchise Tax Board and the United States of America.
On July 23, 2020, Gullett-El received a discharge from the
bankruptcy court. The discharge notice explained generally that
some debts are not dischargeable, including “debts for most taxes.”
The bankruptcy court closed the bankruptcy proceeding in
September 2021.
In March 2020, prior to receiving the bankruptcy discharge,
Gullett-El filed a pro se adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court
against the IRS, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and several
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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 5
other defendants.1 In the adversary complaint, he cited numerous
international treaties and alleged that (1) the IRS had instituted an
unlawful lien against him in 2010; (2) he was the victim of malicious
prosecution and his convictions were unlawful and violated
various international laws; (3) the California district court judge
breached a “contract” that Gullett-El filed in his criminal case
(which he contended created a binding contract between himself
and the district court judge over various matters); (4) the Federal
Bureau of Prisons attempted to force him via threats and extortion
to enter into a contract setting up a schedule of payments for the
allegedly unlawful $400 special assessment imposed as part of his
criminal sentence; (5) he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
from the bankruptcy court; (6) he was entitled to billions in
damages from the “United States Federal Corporation” and its
privies; (7) he was entitled to specific performance of the “contract”
he filed in his criminal case; and (8) he sought to invoke the
jurisdiction of the international court of criminal justice and the
international criminal court because he was a “non-immigrant
alien” and he was subject to genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and the denial of procedural justice by the United States,
1 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that certain bankruptcy
related proceedings are “adversary proceedings,” including a proceeding for
money damages, and a proceeding “to determine the dischargeability of a
debt.” See Fed. R. Bank. P. 7001. “[A]n adversary proceeding in the
bankruptcy court and the companion bankruptcy case are two distinct
proceedings.” In re Morris,
950 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992).
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13426
citing various international laws, treaties, and conventions. As
relief, he requested the bankruptcy court order: (1) specific
performance of the “contract” in his criminal case; (2) discharge of
the IRS’s allegedly unlawful tax lien, the $100,000 assessment owed
to State of California, and the $400 special assessment imposed as
part of his sentence; (3) his immediate discharge from unlawful
detainment; and (4) reparations, restitution, and damages related
to the unlawful convictions.
In response, the United States moved to dismiss the
adversary proceeding for lack of service, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and because the complaint was an impermissible
shotgun pleading. Similarly, the ABA moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that it was a shotgun pleading and alternatively
because it alleged no injuries caused by the ABA. Gullett-El
opposed the motions to dismiss.
On July 21, 2020 (the “July 21 order”), the bankruptcy court
granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed Gullett-El’s
adversary complaint. As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court
concluded that Gullett-El failed to state a claim concerning his
request for release from prison and for damages based on his
convictions, and it dismissed these claims with prejudice. Next, it
determined that Gullett-El failed to allege a legal or factual basis
concerning the dischargeability of his state or federal tax debts, but
it granted him leave to amend his adversary complaint as to those
claims within 30 days.
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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 7
Instead of filing an amended adversary complaint, however,
Gullett-El filed a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court. In the
notice of appeal, he asserted that “[d]ue to Defendants’ mail
tampering/obstruction/delay/hindering /withholding,” he did
not receive notice of the dismissal order, and that this delay
constituted “excusable neglect and good cause” for an extension of
time to appeal, citing various provisions of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4. Meanwhile, Gullett-El filed an identical
notice of appeal with the district court seeking to appeal the
bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the adversary complaint. The
district court docketed the appeal as Case No. 3:20-cv-01075.
With regard to the notice of appeal filed in the bankruptcy
court, the bankruptcy court dismissed it as untimely because it was
not filed within 14 days of the entry of the order dismissing the
adversary complaint as required by the bankruptcy rules. Gullett-
El appealed the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his notice of
appeal as untimely to the district court. This appeal was docketed
in the district court as Case No. 3:20-cv-01047.
On September 20, 2021, in a single order, the district court
held that both the appeal from the dismissal of the notice of appeal
as untimely and the appeal from the dismissal of the adversary
complaint were frivolous. Specifically, as to the bankruptcy court’s
dismissal of the notice of appeal as untimely, the district court
concluded that “the record includes no information upon which
the Court could find the decision as to [the] untimeliness [of the
appeal of the order dismissing the adversary complaint] to be
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13426
erroneous,” even under the prison mailbox rule. Furthermore,
because the appeal was untimely, the district court concluded that
it “need not consider Gullett-El’s appeal of the [bankruptcy court’s]
order dismissing his adversary complaint.” Nevertheless, the
district court noted that even if it considered the merits of his
appeal from the dismissal of the adversary complaint, the appeal
would still be frivolous because the bankruptcy court (1) concluded
correctly that it lacked jurisdiction over Gullett-El’s claims seeking
discharge from prison and damages from his convictions, and
(2) granted Gullett-El leave to amend his claim for dischargeability
of the tax debts, and a dismissal with leave to amend is not final and
appealable.
Thereafter, Gullett-El filed a motion to proceed on appeal
IFP in both cases. The district court denied the motions in a single
order, concluding that any appeal would be frivolous for the
reasons stated in its prior order.
Gullett-El appealed to this Court the district court’s order
concluding that the appeals were frivolous and its order denying
his motions to proceed on appeal IFP. 2 Gullet also moved for IFP
status on appeal in this Court, and a judge of this Court granted his
IFP motion.
II. Discussion
2 These appeals were initially docketed as two separate cases (case nos. 21-
13426 and 21-13429) and were later consolidated.
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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 9
As a threshold matter, we must consider whether we have
jurisdiction over this case. See In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC,
550 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,
even if no party raises the issue, and if the court determines that
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, it must dismiss the entire
case.” (quotations omitted)).
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal
court’s jurisdiction is limited to active “[c]ases” and
“[c]ontroversies.” U.S. Const., art. III, § 2. An “actual
controversy” must exist throughout all stages of the litigation.
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013). “A case
becomes moot . . . when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
Id.
at 91 (quotations omitted). In considering whether a case is moot,
we “look at the events at the present time, not at the time the
complaint was filed or when the federal order on review was
issued.” Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye,
256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.
2001). “When events subsequent to the commencement of a
lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the
plaintiff meaningful relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed.”
Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Health &
Rehab. Servs.,
225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
As an initial matter, we note that the district court’s denial
of Gullett-El’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is not an
appealable order. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5) & advisory
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13426
committee notes (1967 Adoption) (noting that Rule 24(a)(5)
“establishes a subsequent motion in the court of appeals, rather
than an appeal from the order of denial . . . as the proper procedure
for calling in question the correctness of the action of the district
court”); see also Gomez v. United States,
245 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir.
1957) (indicating that “[a]n application for leave to proceed [IFP on
appeal] is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and an
order denying such an application is not a final order from which
an appeal will lie”). 3 Regardless, because we subsequently granted
Gullett-El IFP status on appeal, this issue is rendered moot.
Turning to the substantive issues on appeal, even assuming
that Gullett-El’s notice of appeal from the dismissal of the
adversary complaint was timely, 4 meaningful relief is not available
to Gullett-El. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, an order of
3 Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to the close of business on
September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).
4 Adversary proceedings incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which requires a court
to set out a judgment in a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7058. Thus, in adversary proceedings, a judgment is entered for
purposes of filing a notice of appeal at the earliest of when the judgment is set
out in a separate document or once 150 days have run from the entry of the
order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5)(ii). The bankruptcy court’s order
dismissing the adversary complaint was dated July 21, 2020, and it was entered
on the bankruptcy docket on July 22. But the bankruptcy court failed to issue
a separate judgment as required by Rule 58. Thus, Gullett-El had 150 days to
file his notice of appeal, such that his notice of appeal from August 19, 2020,
was timely. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5)(ii).
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21-13426 Opinion of the Court 11
discharge is a final order marking the end of the adjudication of
claims against the bankruptcy estate. See In re McLean,
794 F.3d
1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, two days after the bankruptcy
court dismissed Gullett-El’s adversary complaint, it issued him a
Chapter 7 discharge, and it later closed the bankruptcy case.
Gullett-El’s challenge to the dismissal of the adversary complaint
was rendered moot by the bankruptcy court’s discharge order and
closing of his bankruptcy case. See In re Morris,
950 F.2d 1531, 1534
(11th Cir. 1992). Specifically, although “[a]n adversary proceeding
in the bankruptcy court and the companion bankruptcy case are
two distinct proceedings,” we have noted that “the dismissal of a
bankruptcy case normally results in the dismissal of related
proceedings because federal jurisdiction is premised upon the
nexus between the underlying bankruptcy case and the related
proceedings.”
Id. (citing In re Smith,
866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir.
1989)); see also In re Stardust Inn, Inc.,
70 B.R. 888, 890 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987) (“As a general rule, the dismissal of a bankruptcy case
should result in the dismissal of all remaining adversary
proceedings.”). 5 In the adversary proceeding, Gullett-El sought a
5 This general rule of dismissal is not without exception, however, because
“nothing in the statute governing jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy
courts prohibits the continuance of federal jurisdiction over an adversary
proceeding which arose in or was related to a bankruptcy case following
dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.” In re Morris, 950 F.2d at 1534.
We have identified certain factors that a court should consider in determining
whether discretionary jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding should be
retained following the dismissal of the related bankruptcy proceeding:
“(1) judicial economy; (2) fairness and convenience to the litigants; and (3) the
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13426
declaration that certain debts were dischargeable in the related
bankruptcy proceeding. The order of discharge, however, marked
the end of the claims against the bankruptcy estate and the
bankruptcy proceeding is closed. In other words, any ruling as to
the dischargeability of those debts was rendered moot by Gullett-
El’s discharge and the closing of his bankruptcy case.
Gullett-El also sought relief from his convictions and
damages related to the allegedly wrongful convictions.6 But such
relief is not available in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather, a motion
to vacate sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive
procedure for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his sentence,
and such motions must be filed in the district where the defendant
was convicted and sentenced—in this case the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. See
28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a); Amodeo v. FCC Coleman—Low Warden,
984 F.3d 992, 997
(11th Cir. 2021). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to grant the requested
relief.
Accordingly, Gullett-El’s appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
DISMISSED.
degree of difficulty of the related legal issues involved.” Id. at 1535. None of
these factors weigh in favor of the court’s discretionary jurisdiction in this case.
6 We note that, since filing this appeal, Gullett-El has been released from
prison.
