USCA11 Case: 21-13201 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/20/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13201
____________________
SEANA BARNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SARA MACARTHUR,
individually, et al.,
Defendants,
SHERIFF, SEMINOLE COUNTY FLORIDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13201
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-00469-GKS-DCI
____________________
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This Section 1983 case is before us for the third time. In Bar-
nett v. MacArthur (“Barnett II”),
956 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020),
cert. denied sub nom. Lemma v. Barnett,
141 S. Ct. 1373 (2021), we af-
firmed the judgment and the district court’s denial of Barnett’s mo-
tion for a new trial, but we reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment as to Count II of the Amended Complaint—
Barnett’s unconstitutional detention claim against the Sheriff.
Id.
at 1303. We held that if, after a warrantless DUI arrest based on
probable cause, “the officers seek and obtain information which
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrestee is not intoxi-
cated—in other words, that probable cause to detain no longer ex-
ists—the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrestee be re-
leased.”
Id. at 1299. And we further concluded that “Barnett’s de-
tention claim against the Sheriff must be decided by a jury.”
Id.
This Court in Barnett II then “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Barnett’s Fourth Amendment detention
claim against Sheriff under Monell and remand[ed] for a trial on that
claim.”
Id. at 1303.
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21-13201 Opinion of the Court 3
On remand, Barnett moved again for summary judgment on
the remaining claim. The Sheriff opposed the motion both on the
merits and as contrary to this Court’s mandate. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Barnett on the remaining
claim. Barnett v. MacArthur,
548 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1212 (M.D. Fla.
2021). The district court characterized Barnett’s motion as requir-
ing the “[i]nterpretation of a statute” and a “facial challenge” to the
Sheriff’s hold policy. Id. at 1208, 1209–10. The district court then
concluded that the hold policy was facially unconstitutional be-
cause “it requires that every DUI arrestee be detained for eight
hours without exception even after objective breathalyzer evidence
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrestee is not intox-
icated and probable cause no longer exists to continue the deten-
tion.” Id. at 1211. The district court then permanently enjoined
the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office from enforcing its hold policy.
Id. at 1212.
The Sheriff moved for relief from the district court order,
arguing that they had not received notice of, or the opportunity to
respond to, a potential injunction and that there were questions of
fact remaining about whether the evidence showed that probable
cause to detain Barnett had dissipated beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court denied the Sheriff’s motion to reconsider, and this
appeal ensued.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13201
After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral ar-
gument, we reverse both the entry of summary judgment and the
entry of the permanent injunction. 1
I.
We first address the Sheriff’s argument that the district court
violated this Court’s mandate by entering a summary judgment on
Count II in favor of Barnett following remand for a jury trial on the
remaining claim. “We review de novo the district court’s interpre-
tation and application of this Court’s mandate in a previous ap-
peal.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., v Dolgencorp, LLC,
881 F.3d 835, 843
(11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted).
The Sheriff argues that the district court’s grant of summary
judgment below was foreclosed by this Court’s mandate in Barnett
II where we “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment on Ms. Barnett’s Fourth Amendment detention claim . . . and
remand[ed] for a trial on that claim.” Barnett II, 956 F.3d at 1303 (em-
phasis added).
“The law of our circuit concerning the obligations of a dis-
trict court to follow our mandates is settled.” Litman v Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co.,
825 F.2d 1506,1511 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (collecting
cases). “A district court when acting under an appellate court’s
1 Because the district court entered a permanent injunction, we have jurisdic-
tion to entertain this appeal as the permanent injunction and summary judg-
ment orders are inextricably intertwined. See Smith v. LePage,
834 F.3d 1285,
1292 (11th Cir. 2016); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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21-13201 Opinion of the Court 5
mandate cannot vary it or examine it for any other purpose than
execution or give any other or further relief.”
Id. at 1510–11 (inter-
nal citations omitted).
The mandate rule holds that “[w]hen a case has been once
decided” on appeal and remanded to an inferior court, that inferior
court:
must carry it into execution according to the man-
date. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any
other purpose than execution; or give any other or
further relief; or review it, even for apparent error,
upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle
with it, further than to settle so much as has been re-
manded.
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co.,
160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895).
The mandate in Barnett II was clear. We expressly held that
“[o]n this record, Ms. Barnett’s detention claim against the Sheriff
must be decided by a jury.” Barnett II, 956 F.3d at 1299. And we
remanded the case back to the district court for “a trial on that
claim.” Id. at 1303. Notwithstanding our mandate, upon remand,
Barnett filed another motion for summary judgment with the dis-
trict court, arguing that no reasonable jury could find that the Sher-
iff did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights by detaining her.
Barnett further argued that the district court was only required to
hold a trial on the damages aspect of the claim. As the Sheriff cor-
rectly argued to the district court, this was in direct contravention
to the mandate.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13201
“A trial court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate
court, may not alter, amend, or examine the mandate, or give any
further relief or review, but must enter an order in strict compli-
ance with the mandate.” Piambino v Bailey,
757 F.2d 1112, 1120
(11th Cir. 1985). Because the district court was not free to ignore
this Court’s mandate and reexamine the issue, we reverse and once
again remand for a jury trial on Count II of Barnett’s Amended
Complaint.
II.
We now turn to the Sheriff’s second argument that the dis-
trict court erred by entering a permanent injunction without no-
tice. Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.,
339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950). Notice is adequate where it is “reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pre-
sent their objections.”
Id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S.
457 (1940)). This requirement is “flexible” and will vary depending
on what “the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
The Sheriff argues that he lacked notice that he could be sub-
jected to a permanent injunction because Barnett never sought a
preliminary or permanent injunction in any of her pleadings before
the district court. We agree and thus hold that the district court
erred by entering a permanent injunction sua sponte in this case
without providing the Sheriff notice and an opportunity to be
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21-13201 Opinion of the Court 7
heard on whether a permanent injunction should issue. Addition-
ally, as Barnett never moved for a permanent injunction, the four-
factor test for granting a permanent injunction was neither ad-
dressed nor analyzed by the district court. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010). An injunction
should issue, however, only after the court determines that the tra-
ditional four-factor test is satisfied.
Id. at 157. Here, that determi-
nation was not made.
III.
For the reasons stated, we reverse and vacate the district
court’s entry of summary judgment for Barnett and remand for a
jury trial on Count II of Barnett’s Amended Complaint. We also
reverse and vacate the district court’s order issuing a permanent
injunction.
REVERSED and REMANDED for a jury trial on Count II
of Barnett’s Amended Complaint; REVERSE and VACATE per-
manent injunction.
