USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14239
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
MELISSA STUTLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COCA-COLA BEVERAGES FLORIDA, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-24383-FAM
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 2 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 22-14239
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a slip-and-fall (or, more accurately, a slip-and-slam)
case arising from events in a Target self-checkout line. Melissa Stut-
ler appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in Coke
Florida’s favor. She contends that the district court failed to con-
sider the full record in the light most favorable to her on the issue
of causation, an essential element of her negligence claim. After
careful review, we agree and reverse.
I.
After an incident in a Target self-checkout line, Melissa Stut-
ler filed this lawsuit in Florida state court. Her complaint alleged
that she slipped on a puddle of liquid on Target’s premises. Trying
to catch her balance, Stutler “twisted” on the liquid and slammed
into the register and Coke Florida’s beverage cooler, sustaining in-
juries. She alleged that Target breached its duty of care by negli-
gently maintaining its premises. Target removed the case to federal
court.
Stutler later amended her complaint, adding Coca-Cola Bev-
erages Florida, LLC, as a defendant. Stutler alleged that the liquid
had leaked from Coke Florida’s cooler. And because Coke Florida
had a duty to maintain that cooler, Stutler contended, the company
had acted negligently by failing to keep it in a “reasonably safe con-
dition.”
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 3 of 8
22-14239 Opinion of the Court 3
The parties conducted discovery, and Coke Florida moved
for summary judgment. Stutler filed a brief opposing the motion
along with several photo exhibits of the accident site, which argu-
ably show a puddle of water coming from Coke Florida’s cooler.
Target had produced one of the photos during discovery. Stutler’s
daughter had taken others on the day of the incident and in the
following months. Until that filing, though, Stutler’s counsel had
been withholding the full photos taken by Stutler’s daughter under
a work-product-privilege theory.
A few weeks later, Target and Coke Florida sought—and the
district court granted—an extension of the discovery deadline.
With the additional time, Stutler requested more written discovery
from Coke Florida and deposed Liliana Mejia, a Target employee.
Shortly after the new discovery deadline, and without leave from
the district court, Stutler supplemented her opposition to Coke
Florida’s summary judgment motion with additional evidence—
Mejia’s deposition transcript and exhibits. Those exhibits were the
same photos—one produced by Target, the others taken by Stut-
ler’s daughter—that Stutler included in her original opposition to
summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment for Coke
Florida. The court ruled that Coke Florida had “a [contractual]
duty to maintain” the cooler at issue in this case. Because Coke
Florida had that duty, the court reasoned, the company “may be
held liable to members of the public, such as [Stutler], for its negli-
gence in performing that contract.” But the district court
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 4 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 22-14239
concluded that Stutler “failed” to establish “the existence of a gen-
uine issue of material fact” that Coke Florida’s “cooler caused the
liquid to be on the ground where [Stutler] slipped and fell.” Among
other things, the district court (1) concluded that summary judg-
ment was not premature; (2) refused to rely on the photos Stutler’s
daughter took because they were not timely produced in discov-
ery; and (3) determined that Stutler’s amended answers to Coke
Florida’s interrogatories contained unsupported factual allega-
tions.
Stutler moved for reconsideration, arguing that the district
court failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
her—mainly, by ignoring Mejia’s testimony. Stutler also contended
that she was entitled to additional discovery. The court summarily
denied that motion.
Stutler timely appealed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court. Ur-
quilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ.,
780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
When reviewing the record, a court must draw all reasonable in-
ferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ryder Int’l Corp. v. First
Am. Nat’l Bank,
943 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991).
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 5 of 8
22-14239 Opinion of the Court 5
III.
Stutler contends that the district court erred in concluding
that she failed to “present sufficient proof” that the water she
slipped on came from Coke Florida’s cooler. In its summary judg-
ment order, the district court emphasized that Stutler failed to in-
spect the cooler after she slipped to see if it was leaking, pointed
out that the surveillance video of the incident did “not indicate
whether the liquid . . . had been leaking” from the cooler, and dis-
missed some of Stutler’s interrogatory responses as “unsupported
factual allegation[s].” For its part, Coke Florida characterizes Stut-
ler’s testimony as “unsubstantiated and conjectural.” But we agree
with that Stutler that, considering all the evidence in the light most
favorable to her, there is a genuine dispute of material fact that
Coke Florida’s “act or omission was a cause-in-fact of [Stutler’s]
claimed injuries.” Stahl v. Metro. Dade Cnty.,
438 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
At summary judgment, a court must draw “all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Jones v. UPS Ground
Freight,
683 F.3d 1283, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2012). A court “may not
weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations of
its own.” FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com,
658 F.3d 1282, 1307
(11th Cir. 2011). And a district court should not discount testimony
at summary judgment “unless it is blatantly contradicted by the
record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law,
meaning that it relates to facts that could not have possibly been
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 6 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 22-14239
observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature.” Felici-
ano v. City of Miami Beach,
707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013).
We think the district court overlooked several pieces of evi-
dence that, when considered in the light most favorable to Stutler,
could lead a reasonable jury to find that she slipped on water leak-
ing from Coke Florida’s cooler.
To start, circumstantial evidence in the record supports a
reasonable inference that the cooler was leaking. There is video
footage of Stutler slipping in front of the beverage cooler on a pud-
dle of water. Target produced a photo of the liquid seemingly em-
anating from under the cooler, though the district court failed to
mention it. Further, a post-incident report prepared by Target
states that Stutler “slipped on a water leak next to [the] beverage
fridge.” The report also mentions that the floor was “wet” from a
“cooler leak.” The district court acknowledged the first quote (Stut-
ler’s characterization of the incident), but not the second (a Target
employee’s version of events). Finally, there is no other likely ex-
planation for how the water ended up on the floor beneath and
adjacent to the cooler. The court failed to make the obvious infer-
ence from this circumstantial evidence—that the liquid leaked
from the cooler—in Stutler’s favor, a requirement at the summary
judgment stage. See Jones,
683 F.3d at 1291-92.
In addition to this circumstantial evidence, there is also di-
rect evidence in the form of the deposition testimony of Liliana
Mejia, a Target employee, which the district court did not address
in its summary judgment order. After Coke Florida filed for
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 7 of 8
22-14239 Opinion of the Court 7
summary judgment, the district court extended the discovery dead-
line at Target and Coke Florida’s request. With the additional time,
Stutler deposed Mejia, a Target employee who arrived to the self-
checkout area “a minute” after Stutler slipped. There, Mejia con-
sulted another Target employee about what happened. That em-
ployee said Stutler had slipped on liquid that “leaked from the
cooler.” Mejia checked things out for herself and took a photo of
the liquid on the floor, which was submitted as an exhibit at her
deposition. After that inspection, she concluded with “100% cer-
tainty” that the liquid leaked from the cooler—there was not “any
doubt” in her mind. She was not surprised: she testified that the
cooler had leaked before, “sometime in 2020.” To address that leak,
Target’s staff wrapped a “snake”—a type of sponge—around the
bottom of the cooler. They used a similar “snake” after Stutler’s
slip.
Coke Florida contends that, even if “sufficient record evi-
dence exists to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether
the Coke Florida beverage cooler in the Target store was the
source of the puddle,” the district court was correct to grant sum-
mary judgment because there is “no evidence showing that Coke
Florida failed to properly maintain or repair the beverage cooler.”
We disagree. The district court held that Coke Florida had a duty
to maintain the cooler in a reasonably safe condition, a ruling Coke
Florida does not dispute on appeal. And Coke Florida did not argue
in its summary judgment motion that Stutler failed to present evi-
dence that it had breached this duty. Instead, Coke Florida argued
that it had no duty at all and that, even if it did, the cooler was not
USCA11 Case: 22-14239 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2023 Page: 8 of 8
8 Opinion of the Court 22-14239
leaking. So Stutler was never put on notice that she had to provide
evidence that the cooler was leaking because of Coke Florida’s neg-
ligence and not some other reason. A court may “grant [a summary
judgment] motion on grounds not raised by a party” only “[a]fter
giving notice and a reasonable time to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(f); see Amy v. Carnival Corp.,
961 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2020)
(concluding the district court erred by deciding an issue at sum-
mary judgment without prior notice to the plaintiff). Stutler was
never on notice that she needed to submit the evidence that Coke
Florida says she failed to submit. Accordingly, we cannot affirm
based on Coke Florida’s new theory.
Our conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists on
the issue of causation resolves this appeal in Stutler’s favor. Accord-
ingly, we need not address her additional arguments that (1) the
district court prematurely considered Coke Florida’s motion for
summary judgment; (2) the district court erred by refusing to rely
on photos of the liquid taken by Stutler’s daughter because they
were not timely produced in discovery; and (3) the district court
improperly characterized Stutler’s amended answers to Coke Flor-
ida’s interrogatories as “unsupported factual allegation[s].”
IV.
For these reasons, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further
proceedings.
