United States v. Timothy Tala ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-13027    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 08/25/2023   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-13027
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TIMOTHY TALA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00347-TWT-LTW-1
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 22-13027      Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 08/25/2023     Page: 2 of 10
    2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13027
    Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Timothy Tala appeals his conviction and sentence for sexual
    exploitation of a minor to produce child pornography. Tala argues
    that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction be-
    cause the contents of the video were not sexually explicit in nature.
    Tala also argues that the District Court for the Northern District of
    Georgia erred by failing to impose his federal sentence to run con-
    currently with his anticipated sentence in a pending state court case
    in Massachusetts. The Government moves to dismiss Tala’s sen-
    tencing challenge as moot because the state court in Massachusetts
    provided the relief that Tala now seeks on appeal by ordering his
    state sentence arising out of similar conduct to run concurrently
    with his federal sentence. We hold that there was sufficient evi-
    dence to support Tala’s conviction and affirm his conviction. His
    sentencing challenge is dismissed as moot.
    I.
    On February 11, 2020, a federal grand jury in the Northern
    District of Georgia issued a superseding indictment against Timo-
    thy Tala, charging him with one count of sexual exploitation of a
    minor to produce child pornography, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2251
    (a), (e). Tala pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial.
    At the trial, the Government presented the following evi-
    dence. Tala’s former girlfriend, Chayla Onuegbu, testified that she
    met Tala in Atlanta in 2014. At that time, Tala was in a relationship
    USCA11 Case: 22-13027      Document: 30-1     Date Filed: 08/25/2023     Page: 3 of 10
    22-13027               Opinion of the Court                        3
    with another woman, Engrid, who had two daughters—“A.S.” and
    “B.S.,” who were around 13 or 14 years old. At some point, Engrid
    and Tala moved to Massachusetts, but before that, Onuegbu and
    Tala’s relationship became romantic. Tala asked Onuegbu to
    move to Massachusetts, and in September 2016 she did so, moving
    in with Tala. Onuegbu testified that in February 2017, she found a
    video on Tala’s laptop of Tala bathing one of Engrid’s daughters—
    who was about 13 or 14 years old—and that Tala put his finger into
    the girl’s vagina.
    The Government admitted the video into evidence as Ex-
    hibit 1 and played roughly one minute of it during the trial. The
    video first showed Tala setting up the recording device, and then
    showed one of Engrid’s daughters, A.S., naked in the shower.
    Onuegbu asked a school administrator to call the police. The Wey-
    mouth Police Department responded and Onuegbu gave officers
    her statement. Onuegbu further testified that the video was filmed
    at Tala’s apartment in Atlanta, which she knew because she had
    been in that bathroom before. According to Onuegbu, throughout
    her relationship with Tala, they engaged in sex acts in the bath-
    room because “[t]hat was his form of intimacy, showering with
    music.” Tala would bathe Onuegbu as part of their sex life.
    Onuegbu testified further that Tala had strategically placed the
    camera. She testified that Tala took his middle finger and inserted
    it into the child’s vagina and then held up his finger and said, “You
    see that this has cream on it.” A.S. was crying as this occurred.
    Onuegbu waited a few weeks to report what she saw so that she
    could ensure that both she and A.S. were safe.
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    4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13027
    A.S. also testified. According to A.S., Tala put her through
    sexual abuse, rape, and molestation. The abuse started when she
    was in the third grade, when Tala put his fingers in her vagina and
    told her it was because she did not clean it very well. The first time
    A.S. saw Tala’s penis was in the fifth grade. He sometimes put his
    penis in her vagina after he bathed her. The abuse continued when
    they moved to Massachusetts in 2017 and lasted for about six years.
    A.S. did not know that Tala recorded her and did not want to see
    the video. 1
    After the Government rested, Tala moved for a judgment of
    acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). 2 Tala
    argued that the case hinged on whether the sexually explicit con-
    duct was lascivious. Ultimately, Tala’s attorney argued that the
    material shown in the video was not sexual in nature—it is a video
    of an individual giving a young lady a bath. He argued that the
    video was not a specific depiction of the pubic area or genitals, but
    instead was a visual depiction of the entire body.
    1 The Government also presented testimony from: Kim Peterson, a guidance
    counselor at A.S.’s school in Massachusetts; Lieutenant Denise Doherty, an
    investigator with the Special Victim’s Unit of the Norfolk District Attorney’s
    Office; B.S.; and Special Agent Tyler Dervish of the FBI. Because the facts of
    this case are graphic, we have chosen to limit the details of the evidence pre-
    sented to Onuegba and A.S’s testimony and the contents of the video.
    2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides, in pertinent part: “After
    the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the
    court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any
    offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”
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    22-13027               Opinion of the Court                         5
    The Government objected, arguing that the evidence was
    more than sufficient to support a conviction. According to the
    Government, “the best evidence and [most] objective evidence is
    the video itself.” The video shows Tala starting the video and then
    raising and adjusting the camera to be focused on the shower. Tala
    then proceeds to “not just lasciviously display [A.S.’s] genitals in
    the video, but to masturbate her. You see very clearly in the video
    that he rubs her vagina multiple times. He inserts his fingers into
    her labia multiple times.” Trial Tr., Doc. 95, at 18–19. The Gov-
    ernment’s bottom line was that “the video is very clear that this
    was sexually explicit conduct. It was sexual abuse.”
    The District Court denied Tala’s motion and the defense
    rested. The jury found Tala guilty the same day. At sentencing,
    there were no objections to the presentence investigation report
    (the “PSR”), but Tala did submit a sentencing memorandum that
    argued that his federal sentence should run at least partially con-
    currently with any sentence imposed by the state of Massachusetts,
    where related charges were pending against him. The District
    Court sentenced Tala to 300 months’ imprisonment and five years’
    supervised release.
    Tala’s attorney asked the Court to determine whether Tala’s
    sentence should be concurrent or consecutive with any sentence in
    Massachusetts. The Government interjected that it did not believe
    the Court could affect that. Since the District Court was imposing
    its sentence first, according to the Government, “it will be up to the
    State of Massachusetts, when they impose sentence, about what
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    6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13027
    they would want to do, knowing what it is that you have done
    down here.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr., Doc. 108, at 33. The District Court
    decided to leave Tala’s sentence “as it is.”
    Tala timely appealed. On appeal, he argues (1) that the evi-
    dence against him was insufficient to support his conviction for sex-
    ual exploitation of children, (2) that the District Court erred when
    it did not recognize that it had the discretion to impose a concur-
    rent sentence to related pending state charges, and (3) that the Dis-
    trict Court plainly erred in not calculating the guidelines sentence
    to run concurrently with at least some of the pending Massachu-
    setts charges.
    Since Tala filed his appeal, the Massachusetts courts have re-
    solved his case, and the charges are no longer pending. Tala
    pleaded guilty to some of the Massachusetts charges, and the rest
    were dismissed. He was sentenced to several concurrent sen-
    tences, which were imposed to run concurrently with his federal
    sentence. The Government moved to dismiss Tala’s appeal as to
    his second and third arguments because they became moot when
    the Massachusetts court imposed concurrent sentences. That mo-
    tion was carried with the case.
    II.
    We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a con-
    viction de novo, view all the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the government, and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility
    choices in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Grzybowicz,
    
    747 F.3d 1296
    , 1304 (11th Cir. 2014). We will not overturn a jury’s
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    22-13027               Opinion of the Court                         7
    verdict “if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have
    allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 
    732 F.3d 1299
    , 1303
    (11th Cir. 2013)). We must sustain a verdict where “there is a rea-
    sonable basis in the record for it.” United States v. Farley, 
    607 F.3d 1294
    , 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Brown, 
    415 F.3d 1257
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2005)).
    Section 2251(a) provides a penalty of 15 to 30 years’ impris-
    onment for
    [a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces,
    entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any sex-
    ually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
    any visual depiction of such conduct . . . if such visual
    depiction has actually been transported or transmit-
    ted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign
    commerce
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2251
    (a); see also 
    id.
     § 2251(e) (mandating a statutory
    term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years for a violation of
    § 2251(a)). Sexually explicit conduct includes the “lascivious exhi-
    bition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” Id.
    § 2256(2)(A)(v). We have previously defined a “‘lascivious exhibi-
    tion’ as one that potentially ‘excit[es] sexual desires’ or is ‘sala-
    cious.’” Grzybowicz, 
    747 F.3d at 1305-06
     (alteration in original)
    (quoting United States v. Williams, 
    444 F.3d 1286
    , 1299 (11th Cir.
    2006), rev’d on other grounds, 
    553 U.S. 285
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008)
    ).
    In Grzybowicz, we found four photographs to be “blatantly
    lascivious” where a small child’s vagina was the focal point of the
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    8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13027
    photographs, and, in two of the photographs, the defendant digi-
    tally penetrated her. 
    Id. at 1306
    . “[W]hat constitutes a forbidden
    lascivious exhibition ‘is not concrete,’ and for this reason[, we have
    stated,] it is necessary to determine the potentially lascivious na-
    ture ‘with respect to the actual depictions themselves.’” United
    States v.
    Holmes, 814
     F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wil-
    liams, 
    444 F.3d at 1299
    ). We have recognized the importance of
    factors such as the “placement of the cameras in the bathroom
    where [the child] was most likely to be videoed while nude” and
    the “focus on videoing and capturing images of her pubic area.” Id.
    at 1252. Accordingly, “[i]n considering whether an image consti-
    tutes a lascivious exhibition, [the] court[] look[s] to the intent of
    the producer or editor of an image.” Id. Depictions of “otherwise
    innocent conduct may in fact constitute a ‘lascivious exhibi-
    tion[,] . . .’ based on the actions of the individual creating the de-
    piction.” Id. at 1251–52. We have noted that photographs of the
    victim being “found with other sexually explicit photographs could
    make it more likely that their purpose was to elicit a sexual re-
    sponse.” United States v. Smith, 
    459 F.3d 1276
    , 1296 n.17 (11th Cir.
    2006).
    Many circuits have used the six factors developed by a district
    court in California in United States v. Dost, 
    636 F. Supp. 828
     (S.D. Cal.
    1986), that are relevant to the determination of whether an image
    constitutes the “lascivious exhibition” of genitals. Williams,
    
    444 F.3d at
    1299 n.62. The factors are: (1) whether the focal point
    of the visual depiction is on the child’s genitalia or pubic area;
    (2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually
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    22-13027                Opinion of the Court                           9
    suggestive, i.e. in a place or pose generally associated with sexual
    activity; (3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or
    in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; (4) whether
    the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; (5) whether the visual
    depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sex-
    ual activity; and (6) whether the visual depiction is intended or de-
    signed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. Dost, 
    636 F. Supp. at 832
    . The Dost factors are incorporated into this Circuit’s pattern
    jury instructions under O83.4A’s pattern instructions to help decide
    whether a visual depiction is a lascivious exhibition, and the in-
    struction concludes: “A visual depiction need not have all these fac-
    tors to be a lascivious exhibition.” See 11th Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury
    Instructions O83.4A (Mar. 2022).
    Here, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction
    for sexual exploitation of a minor to produce child pornography.
    Based on testimony from the victim, A.S., about the sexual conduct
    she suffered at Tala’s hands, testimony from Tala’s ex-girlfriend
    about Tala’s past sexual behavior, other descriptions of the con-
    tents of the video, and the video itself, a reasonable jury could have
    found that Tala engaged in the lascivious exhibition of the minor
    victim’s genitals that constituted sexually explicit conduct. His con-
    viction is therefore affirmed.
    III.
    We review de novo whether a case is moot. Troiano v. Super-
    visor of Elections, 
    382 F.3d 1276
    , 1282 (11th Cir. 2004). “Article III of
    the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the
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    10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13027
    consideration of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,
    
    273 F.3d 1330
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). “[A] case is moot
    when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which
    the court can give meaningful relief.” 
    Id. at 1336
     (quoting Fla. Ass’n
    of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dept’ of Health and Rehab. Servs., 
    225 F.3d 1208
    , 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2000)). In considering whether a case
    is moot, we “look at the events at the present time, not at the time
    the complaint was filed or when the federal order on review was
    issued.” Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Kaye, 
    256 F.3d 1251
    , 1254 (11th Cir.
    2001). “If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or
    an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or
    appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dis-
    missed.” Al Najjar, 
    273 F.3d at 1335
    . “Indeed, dismissal is required
    because mootness is jurisdictional.” 
    Id.
    We grant the government’s motion to dismiss the second is-
    sue on appeal as moot because the state court in Massachusetts
    provided the relief that Tala now seeks on appeal—that court or-
    dered his state sentence arising out of similar conduct to run con-
    currently with his federal sentence.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.