USCA11 Case: 22-12817 Document: 67-1 Date Filed: 08/22/2023 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12817
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
J.I.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BARROW COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00087-SCJ
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12817
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
J.I. alleges that, when she was seventeen, Clayton Crowe,
one of her high school classmates, sexually assaulted her at an out-
door field-day event hosted by their school. Over two years after
she turned eighteen, J.I. filed suit against several parties, bringing a
state law negligent supervision claim and federal claims under Title
IX and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judg-
ment against J.I. on her federal claims, ruling that they are time
barred by the statute of limitations. The district court also granted
judgment on the pleadings on her negligent supervision claim. The
court determined that claim was also time barred when ruling on
J.I.’s motion for reconsideration. J.I. argues on appeal that she suf-
fered from mental incapacity following the assault, and the statute
of limitations for her federal claims tolled by reason of that inca-
pacity. J.I. also challenges the district court’s grant of judgment on
the pleadings on her negligent supervision claim. But she does not
argue that the district court erred in ruling that claim is time barred.
After careful review, we affirm.
I.
During the 2016-2017 school year, J.I. and Crowe were stu-
dents at Apalachee High School. On October 7, 2016, their school
hosted an outdoor field-day event called “Chee Fest” as a reward
for students. Chee Fest spanned the school’s grounds—some
games were in the gym, and others were on the sports fields. A
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22-12817 Opinion of the Court 3
school resource officer, faculty (including eighty-two teachers), and
staff volunteered to help supervise Chee Fest.
That day, Principal Jennifer Martin and Assistant Principal
Angela Boyd were roving the premises and observing the school’s
track and nearby bleachers. Martin received a phone call from a
volunteer, who said that she and other volunteers had “found two
students having sex” behind the baseball field, and that they “ha[d]
the two students.” The two students were J.I. and Crowe. Martin
and Boyd met the group of teachers, J.I., and Crowe on their way
to the school’s main office.
Martin gathered information from teachers who witnessed
the incident and from students who had been in the area. Crowe
wrote a statement, which he revised at Martin’s direction because
his initial draft was a single sentence. The school’s counselor, Amy
Bishop, spoke with J.I. She was “really upset and was having trou-
ble focusing.” She told Bishop that Crowe raped her.
As part of her preliminary investigation, Martin concluded
that J.I. had willingly decided to meet Crowe behind the baseball
field. So Martin assigned both students to two days of out-of-school
suspension for being “out of assigned area” during Chee Fest. J.I.
was allowed to return to school on October 19, 2016. But she did
not do so; she was uncomfortable going back. Crowe was not per-
mitted to return to Apalachee High School.
On the first school day after the incident, Bishop went to
J.I.’s home for a welfare check and to deliver her school assign-
ments. Because J.I. was not comfortable returning to school, the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12817
school continued to send her assignments to her home. The school
system provided home-based educational services to J.I. for the rest
of that school year.
Under the school system’s Title IX policies, Martin reported
the incident to Dr. Kenneth Greene, the Title IX investigator for
the school system. Dr. Greene initiated an investigation. He ob-
served forensic interviews taken by the Barrow County Sheriff’s
Office, conducted his own interviews, reviewed evidence that Mar-
tin submitted, and documented all investigative actions in his file.
Dr. Greene concluded that J.I. and Crowe “willingly went
behind the baseball stadium, and that there was sexual activity, and
it was unwelcomed [and] unwanted [by J.I.].” Dr. Greene applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard and concluded that J.I. did
not intend or consent to having intercourse with Crowe.
Dr. Lawanda Harmon, a licensed psychologist, treated and
observed J.I. after the incident. She used those treatment sessions
and J.I.’s medical records to develop clinical opinions about her
mental capacity. Dr. Harmon determined that “[a]s a direct result
of the sexual assault,” J.I. suffered from depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, an increased level of histrionic personality disorder,
and increased symptoms from her preexisting attention-deficit/hy-
peractivity disorder. Dr. Harmon found that J.I.’s “diagnoses have
rendered her mentally and physically incapable of managing the
ordinary affairs of her life.” J.I. required “direct assistance from her
mother” for self-care; she did not “bathe and take her daily
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22-12817 Opinion of the Court 5
medications without prompting and direction.” Dr. Harmon also
found that J.I. did not “manage her financial affairs independently.”
Before the incident, J.I. enjoyed dancing at church, partici-
pating in Girl Scouts, and shopping with her mom. J.I. testified that
she could not engage in these activities during her senior year. Still,
at her psychiatrist’s suggestion, J.I. returned to Apalachee High
School for her senior year. J.I. testified that she typically received
“A’s, B’s, [and] sometimes C’s” in her classes. During her senior
year, J.I. kept in touch with her biological family, who she had re-
connected with earlier in high school. In addition, J.I. maintained
social media accounts and developed friendships. She graduated
from high school with a general education diploma.
After the incident and before filing this lawsuit, J.I. held sev-
eral jobs and pursued higher education. In 2017, when she was
eighteen, J.I. worked as a teacher’s assistant at a daycare for about
three months before resigning to focus on school. J.I. also worked
at a Taco Bell for about a year. Though her mother helped fill out
the application, J.I. interviewed for the position and kept track of
her work schedule, which changed weekly. She left that job be-
cause her coworkers repeatedly asked her for money. After gradu-
ation, J.I. attended Lanier Technical College for about a year—Au-
gust 2018 to May 2019—because she wanted to be a teacher. But
she withdrew due to the workload—it was difficult for her to “stay
on track.” In November 2019, J.I. started working as a teacher’s as-
sistant at a daycare. She was in that role until the COVID-19
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12817
pandemic began. She was let go because “there were no children
at the day care at the time.”
At the time of the incident, J.I. was seventeen. She turned
eighteen years old on August 11, 2017. A few months later, on No-
vember 6, 2017, her counsel sent an ante litem notice to the Barrow
County School System and other potential defendants. J.I. was
twenty years old when she filed this lawsuit on March 27, 2020.
Relevant to this appeal, J.I. asserted Title IX and Section 1983
claims against the Barrow County School System, Superintendent
Chris McMichael, Principal Jennifer Martin, and Assistant Principal
Angela Boyd (collectively, the Barrow Defendants). She also
brought a negligent supervision claim against Clayton Crowe’s par-
ents, Tonya and Keith Crowe (the Crowe Defendants).
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court. John-
son v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga.,
263 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir.
2001). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes
“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). When reviewing the record, we resolve all reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the non-moving party. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward
Cnty.,
604 F.3d 1248, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2010).
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for recon-
sideration for abuse of discretion. Farris v. United States,
333 F.3d
1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
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22-12817 Opinion of the Court 7
III.
In this appeal, J.I. contends that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in the Barrow Defendants’ favor. She
argues that the district court should have determined that her men-
tal incapacitation following the assault tolled the statute of limita-
tions for her claims. She also contends that the district court erred
in granting judgment on the pleadings on her negligent supervision
claim and denying her motion for reconsideration of that ruling.
We take each argument in turn.
A.
The district court entered summary judgment in the Barrow
Defendants’ favor, ruling that J.I.’s Section 1983 and Title IX claims
are time barred. We agree.
The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims “is that
which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Accordingly, a two-year statute of limita-
tions applies to J.I.’s Section 1983 claims under Georgia law. See
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (“[A]ctions for injuries to the person shall be
brought within two years after the right of action accrues . . . .”).
Title IX claims are subject to the same two-year statute of limita-
tions. See M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs.,
172 F.3d 797, 803 (11th Cir.
1999). For a person under the age of eighteen when her claim ac-
crues, the statute of limitations tolls until she turns eighteen.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90(b).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12817
Although J.I. had two years from her eighteenth birthday to
bring her Section 1983 and Title IX claims, J.I. filed her complaint
on March 27, 2020—seven months after her twentieth birthday.
She does not contest that she filed her claims late. Instead, she con-
tends the statute of limitations for her claims should have further
tolled because of her mental incapacity stemming from the alleged
assault.
Under Georgia law, statutes of limitations are tolled for the
claims of “[i]ndividuals who are legally incompetent because of in-
tellectual disability or mental illness.” O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90(a). And if
a person begins suffering from such a disability “after [her] right of
action has accrued . . . the limitation applicable to [her] cause of
action shall cease to operate during the continuance of the disabil-
ity.” Id. § 9-3-91. The statutes “make plain” that tolling “is confined
to situations where it is not fair to charge a suitor with the running
of the clock, because of [her] mental condition.” Martin v. Herring-
ton Mill, LP,
730 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Carter v. Glenn,
533 S.E.2d 109, 114 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000)). It becomes unfair to run the clock on a person’s claims
when that person is “so unsound in mind, or so diminished in in-
tellectual capacity that she is incapable of managing the ‘ordinary
affairs of life.’”
Id. (quoting Carter,
533 S.E.2d at 114). Accordingly,
a diagnosis of mental illness, by itself, will not suffice. Georgia
courts have held “that diagnoses of depression, despondency, bor-
derline personality disorder, and even PTSD, without additional ev-
idence that a plaintiff was unable to manage the ordinary business of life,
are mental conditions that fall short of the applicable legal standard
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22-12817 Opinion of the Court 9
of incompetence and, thus, are insufficient to trigger the tolling
provisions of O.C.G.A § 9-3-90.” Id. at 167.
Juries ordinarily resolve the issue of a person’s mental capac-
ity. See Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats,
273 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1980). But a court may decide as a matter of law that a litigant
did not suffer from mental incapacity that made her unable to man-
age her ordinary business if no genuine issues of material fact exist
in the record. See Martin,
730 S.E.2d at 166. J.I. bears the burden of
proving her mental incapacity prevented her from managing her
own affairs. See
id.
Before the assault, J.I. “suffered from” ADHD and “cogni-
tive deficits.” She was eligible for special education services and an
individualized education program. After the assault, Dr. Harmon,
one of J.I.’s therapists, diagnosed her with “Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, Depression, an increased level of Histrionic Personality
Disorder, and a high level of fear and codependency.”
Despite her diagnoses, the record does not support an infer-
ence that J.I. “was unable to manage the ordinary business of life.”
Id. After the incident, she returned to school for her senior year.
She generally received “A’s, B’s, [and] sometimes C’s” in her clas-
ses. J.I. kept in touch with her biological family and stayed active
on social media. After she received her GED, she enrolled in Lanier
Technical College for a full school year to pursue teaching. J.I.
opened a bank account in her own name. And she held multiple
jobs. Though her mother helped with at least one of the
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12817
employment applications, J.I. kept track of her shift schedules,
cared for children, and worked without disability accommoda-
tions.
Further, J.I.’s mother retained counsel for J.I. a few months
after she turned eighteen—long before the two-year statute of lim-
itations expired. J.I.’s mother may have arranged for J.I.’s represen-
tation, but the attorney affirmatively stated he represented J.I. And
because J.I. has never been subject to a guardianship or conserva-
torship, she must have agreed to representation and given in-
formed consent about material aspects of her case.
Courts may also “rel[y] upon the testimony that was given
by a plaintiff as to his or her own mental soundness or unsound-
ness.” Branch v. Carr,
396 S.E.2d 276, 277 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). Like-
wise, courts may consider testimony of others, like psychiatrists,
therapists, and social workers. See, e.g., Martin,
730 S.E.2d at 167-68
(weighing a social worker’s testimony). But professionals’ opinions
and findings are not dispositive: a plaintiff’s testimony or the pro-
fessional’s own testimony can rebut a clinical opinion that a plain-
tiff is mentally unsound.
Id.
One of J.I.’s therapists stated that she “has a high level of fear
which has incapacitated her ability to manage the ordinary affairs
of her life,” including “an inability” to care for herself “without di-
rect assistance from her mother.” But the rest of the record—in-
cluding J.I.’s own testimony—undermines that statement. J.I. testi-
fied that the only activities she could not undertake after the inci-
dent that she pursued before were dancing, scouting, and
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22-12817 Opinion of the Court 11
shopping. Asked whether J.I. was incapable of certain activities af-
ter the incident, her mother responded that J.I. is “not motivated”
to “go shopping,” “keep[] her own personal hygiene together,” or
“mak[e] her bed.” Ability and motivation are distinct issues. And
generalized statements about J.I.’s abilities to shop, maintain her
hygiene, and make her bed do not carry enough weight to create a
genuine issue of material fact in the face of a mountain of evidence
that she attended school, pursued a career, managed her finances,
cared for others, and otherwise kept track of her affairs. No reason-
able jury could find that J.I. was incapable of handling her affairs. See
Martin,
730 S.E.2d at 166.
Because J.I. cannot satisfy the standard to establish further
tolling of her Title IX and Section 1983 claims, the district court
properly granted summary judgment to the Barrow Defendants on
the ground that those claims are barred by the statute of limita-
tions.
B.
J.I. also contends the district court erred in granting judg-
ment on the pleadings for the Crowe Defendants on her negligent
supervision claim. Moreover, J.I. argues that the district court erred
by denying her motion for reconsideration of that ruling. When
ruling on her motion for reconsideration, the district court deter-
mined that, merits aside, the statute of limitations bars that claim
too. Although J.I. acknowledges the district court’s statute of limi-
tations ruling, she makes no argument in her opening brief that it
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12817
was incorrect. She argues only that she satisfied the pleading re-
quirements for the negligent supervision claim.
By failing to argue the district court’s statute of limitations
ruling on appeal, J.I. has abandoned any challenge to that disposi-
tive ruling. See United States v. Ford,
270 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir.
2001 (“[O]ur well established rule is that issues and contentions not
timely raised in the briefs are deemed abandoned.”). J.I.’s failure to
challenge the district court’s dispositive ruling on her negligent su-
pervision claim necessitates that we affirm the district court’s judg-
ment for the Crowe Defendants on that claim. See Sapuppo v. All-
state Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When an
appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds
on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to
have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that
the judgment is due to be affirmed.”).
But, even if J.I. had challenged the district court’s statute of
limitations ruling, we would affirm for the same reasons that we
conclude the statute of limitations bars J.I.’s federal claims against
the Barrow Defendants.
IV.
For these reasons, the district court is AFFIRMED.
