United States v. Tony L. Ford ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 20-11126     Document: 64-1    Date Filed: 08/30/2023   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-11126
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TONY L. FORD,
    a.k.a. BoBo,
    a.k.a. Bo,
    a.k.a. Big Head,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 20-11126      Document: 64-1       Date Filed: 08/30/2023     Page: 2 of 5
    2                       Opinion of the Court                  20-11126
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 8:05-cr-00044-SCB-JSS-1
    ____________________
    Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
    UNITED STATES
    We previously issued an opinion affirming the district
    court’s denial of Tony Ford’s motion for a sentence reduction un-
    der section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. See United States v.
    Ford, 
    858 F. App’x 325
     (11th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
    In our original opinion, we concluded that a sentence of life
    imprisonment remained the lowest possible penalty available to
    Ford under the Fair Sentencing Act given the quantity of drugs in-
    volved in Ford’s offense (5 kilograms of powder cocaine and 50
    grams of crack cocaine) and Ford’s two prior felony drug convic-
    tions. See 
    id. at 328
     (explaining that, “[b]oth before and after pas-
    sage of the Fair Sentencing Act, [21 U.S.C. §] 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) im-
    posed a mandatory life sentence for offenses involving five kilo-
    grams or more of powder cocaine committed by defendants with
    two or more prior felony drug convictions.”). For that reason, we
    concluded -- relying on our decision in United States v. Jones, 
    962 F.3d 1290
     (11th Cir. 2020) -- that the district court lacked authority to
    reduce Ford’s sentence. See Ford, 858 F. App’x at 327-28.
    USCA11 Case: 20-11126       Document: 64-1      Date Filed: 08/30/2023      Page: 3 of 5
    20-11126                Opinion of the Court                           3
    We also rejected Ford’s suggestion that his sentence should
    be reduced based on other changes in the law that had since low-
    ered the statutory-mandatory-penalty for his offense. We ex-
    plained that -- because the district court was not free to consider
    changes in the law “beyond those mandated by sections 2 and 3” of
    the Fair Sentencing Act -- it was immaterial that “Ford might be
    subject to a lower statutory mandatory sentence under the most
    recent version of section 841(b)(1)(A).” See id. at 328.
    The Supreme Court later granted certiorari, vacated our de-
    cision, and remanded the case to us for additional consideration in
    the light of its decision in Concepcion v. United States, 
    142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022)
    . See Ford v. United States, 
    143 S. Ct. 71 (2022)
    . In Concepcion,
    the Supreme Court concluded that district courts may “consider
    intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to
    reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” See 142 S. Ct. at
    2404. The parties have filed supplemental briefs addressing what
    effect, if any, Concepcion has on the disposition of this appeal.
    In his supplemental brief, Ford contends that the district
    court had discretion under Concepcion to consider an intervening
    change to the statutory-mandatory-minimum sentence in section
    841(b)(1)(A) in ruling on Ford’s First Step Act motion. We disagree.
    We have already concluded that the Supreme Court’s deci-
    sion in Concepcion did not abrogate our decision in Jones. See United
    States v. Jackson, 
    58 F.4th 1331
    , 1333 (11th Cir. 2023). In distinguish-
    ing the circumstances presented in Concepcion from those pre-
    sented in Jones, we explained that Jones involved a determination
    USCA11 Case: 20-11126      Document: 64-1     Date Filed: 08/30/2023     Page: 4 of 5
    4                      Opinion of the Court                 20-11126
    about drug-quantity: “an issue that arises before the sentencing
    court’s discretion comes into play.” Id. at 1336. Concepcion, on the
    other hand, addressed what factors a district court may consider
    when exercising its discretion to modify a movant’s sentence: “an
    issue that arises only after drug quantity and the corresponding
    statutory penalties have been established.” See id. In drawing that
    distinction, we were guided by language in Concepcion specifying
    that “[a] district court cannot . . . recalculate a movant’s benchmark
    Guidelines range in any way other than to reflect the retroactive
    application of the Fair Sentencing Act.” See id. at 1337 (citing Con-
    cepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2402 n.6, 2403 n.8).
    We have also reaffirmed post-Concepcion our conclusion in
    Jones that a district court lacks authority to reduce a sentence under
    the First Step Act if the movant “received the lowest statutory pen-
    alty that also would be available to him under the Fair Sentencing
    Act.” See United States v. Clowers, 
    62 F.4th 1377
    , 1380-81 (11th Cir.
    2023) (affirming the denial of a sentence reduction under the First
    Step Act because the movant would still be subject to a mandatory
    life sentence had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect when he
    committed his offense). And we have stressed that a district court
    determines the applicable statutory penalty by “recalculat[ing] the
    statutory sentencing range as if the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes -
    - and only those changes -- were in effect at the time the offense was
    committed.” See id. at 1378 (emphasis added).
    The central issue in this case involves the calculation of the
    minimum-statutory-penalty Ford would face under the Fair
    USCA11 Case: 20-11126     Document: 64-1     Date Filed: 08/30/2023    Page: 5 of 5
    20-11126              Opinion of the Court                        5
    Sentencing Act: a matter “that arises before the sentencing court’s
    discretion comes into play.” See Jackson, 58 F.4th at 1336. Applying
    only those changes made by the Fair Sentencing Act, Ford would
    still be subject to a statutory-mandatory-minimum-sentence of life
    imprisonment. The district court, thus, lacked authority to reduce
    Ford’s sentence and never reached the discretionary decision-mak-
    ing stage addressed in Concepcion. See Clowers, 62 F.4th at 1380-81.
    We see no conflict between our prior opinion in this appeal
    and the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion. We reinstate our
    prior opinion and affirm the district court’s order denying Ford’s
    motion for a reduced sentence.
    OPINION REINSTATED; AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-11126

Filed Date: 8/30/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/30/2023