USCA11 Case: 22-13540 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13540
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KYLE GEOFFREY SANDLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00342-WKW-KFP-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13540 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13540
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kyle Sandler appeals his twenty-three-month imprisonment
sentence, imposed on revocation of supervised release. On appeal,
he argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
substantively unreasonable sentence by varying upward from the
guidelines range by fourteen months. We disagree and therefore
affirm Sandler’s sentence.
I.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence imposed on rev-
ocation of supervised release under a deferential abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir.
2014); Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party chal-
lenging the sentence bears the burden to demonstrate that the sen-
tence is unreasonable based on the record and the
18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th
Cir. 2010).
The district court may revoke a defendant’s term of super-
vised release where it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised release.
18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The district court revoked Sandler’s supervised
release after he pleaded guilty to violating two conditions of his su-
pervised release, and the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that he violated a third. For a new sentence, the court
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22-13540 Opinion of the Court 3
noted that the guidelines advised three to nine months’ imprison-
ment, but the statutory maximum was not more than two years
for a defendant who originally committed a Class C felony, like
Sandler.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Although the district court “must consider the advisory
guideline range in making the sentencing decision,” the guidelines
“do not control it.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249,
1258 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 246
(2005)). A sentence that varies upward from the guidelines “repre-
sents a district court’s judgment that the combined force of the
other [Section] 3553(a) factors are entitled to greater weight than
the guidelines range.” Id. at 1259.
That is exactly what the district court did here. The court
explicitly stated it “considered all of the 3553(a) factors,” listing sev-
eral that it weighed heavily in reaching its decision—i.e., Sandler’s
history and characteristics, the need to promote respect for the law,
the seriousness of Sandler’s conduct, the need to protect the public,
and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. In addi-
tion to Sandler’s multiple supervised release violations, Sandler’s
probation officer described his “nonstop barrage of words and
emails and text messages,” and how he believed some rules “didn’t
apply to him.”
The court commended several accomplishments Sandler
achieved in prison but ultimately concluded, “This was not just one
mistake” and “you’re not amenable to supervision because you’re
going to do what you want.” The court stated it considered the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13540
sentencing guidelines, but it determined that a twenty-three-
month imprisonment sentence (a fourteen-month upward vari-
ance), followed by no supervised release was the appropriate sen-
tence for Sandler. The district court’s decision to weigh any of the
Section 3553(a) factors more heavily than the guideline range was
well within its discretion. See Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d at 1259. Ac-
cordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
term of imprisonment that varied upward from the guidelines by
fourteen months.
II.
We AFFIRM.
