United States v. Cameron D. Chandler ( 2023 )

USCA11 Case: 22-12620 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 1 of 13
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12620
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CAMERON D. CHANDLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00047-HL-TQL-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12620
Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cameron Chandler appeals his sentence of 90 months’ im-
prisonment following his conviction for one count of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. Chandler argues that the District
Court erred in applying an enhancement for possession of a firearm
in connection to another felony because the firearm was merely
present when he committed the other felony. He also argues that
the District Court imposed a procedurally and substantively unrea-
sonable sentence because the sentence was greater than necessary,
and the District Court failed to consider or discuss the § 3553(a)
factors. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
In September 2021, a federal grand jury in the Middle Dis-
trict of Georgia indicted Cameron Chandler on one count of pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Chandler initially pleaded not guilty to
the charge but later changed his plea to guilty.
According to the presentence investigation report (the
“PSR”), on November 13, 2020, loss prevention staff at a depart-
ment store saw Chandler remove a bottle of cologne from a shelf
and place it in his clothing. The department store notified the po-
lice; the responding officer and a loss prevention staff member ap-
proached Chandler and escorted him to the loss prevention office.
The officer attempted to detain Chandler, but he actively resisted
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22-12620 Opinion of the Court 3
and tried to leave the office. After a brief struggle—which resulted
in the officer and loss prevention staff member sustaining multiple
scratches—Chandler was detained. Additional officers arrived on
the scene and searched Chandler. Inside Chandler’s pants, the of-
ficers found $2,795 in cash, along with a .45-caliber Glock pistol
with a 30-round magazine and laser-light attachment. Investiga-
tion revealed that the Glock was manufactured in Austria and had
been reported stolen on September 3, 2020. After these discoveries,
Chandler continued to resist and the officers had to subdue him
again. After subduing Chandler, the officers continued to search
him, finding two rounds of ammunition.
Chandler was then transported to the Lowndes County Jail
in Valdosta, Georgia. During booking, a corrections officer
searched Chandler and found 11.89 grams of methamphetamine.
The local authorities charged Chandler with felony obstruction of
an officer, possession of methamphetamine, possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm during the com-
mission of certain felonies, theft by shoplifting, and battery.
The PSR noted that, because Chandler possessed a firearm
capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and because Chan-
dler was a prohibited person when he committed the instant of-
fense, the base offense level was 20, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). The probation officer assessed a two-level in-
crease under § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because the firearm Chandler pos-
sessed was stolen, as well as a four-level increase under
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because Chandler possessed the firearm in
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12620
connection with multiple felony offenses, including possession of
methamphetamine and obstruction of an officer. The PSR then
applied a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility un-
der § 3E1.1 because he pleaded guilty. Chandler’s total offense level
was reported at 23.
Chandler’s past criminal history included previous convic-
tions for theft by receiving stolen property, entering an automobile,
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Chandler’s crim-
inal convictions resulted in a subtotal criminal history score of nine
points. The PSR assessed a two-point increase pursuant to
§ 4A1.1(d) because Chandler committed the instant offense while
under a criminal justice sentence. Chandler’s total criminal history
score was 11, which corresponded to a criminal history category of
V.
A total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of
V correspond to a guideline imprisonment range of 84 to 105
months for the firearm possession charge. The statutory maxi-
mum term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon is ten years.
Chandler objected to the four-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because (1) there was no evidence that
Chandler possessed the methamphetamine with an intent to dis-
tribute it as opposed to possessing it for personal use or (2) that the
firearm facilitated, or had the potential to facilitate, the obstruction
of the officer.
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At the sentencing hearing, Chandler again raised his objec-
tion to the four-level enhancement. While acknowledging that he
had a personal use quantity of methamphetamine, Chandler ar-
gued that “mere proximity to the gun” was not enough. The same
applied to the felony obstruction. Possession could not just be co-
incidental—the possession of the firearm either had to facilitate the
felony or have the potential to facilitate the felony.
The Government argued that—with respect to the felony
obstruction—Chandler had the gun on him when he obstructed
the officers. There was an altercation between Chandler and the
officers and he could have used the gun at any time. To support
this argument, the Government called Officer Jones, one of the of-
ficers who responded to the department store and attempted to de-
tain Chandler. Officer Jones testified that when he arrived, Chan-
dler was behaving in an unruly manner and that both the initial
officer on the scene and the loss prevention officer had wounds on
them.
According to Officer Jones, the firearm was in Chandler’s
pants and Chandler was in possession of that firearm at the time
he inflicted the injuries on the officers. Officer Jones further testi-
fied that Chandler “continually reached for his pockets” and that
“the firearm was in that area.” The gun was not directly in Chan-
dler’s pocket but was inside his pants; for the officers to retrieve the
gun they had to unbuckle Chandler’s belt, unbutton his pants, and
reach down his pant leg. Officer Jones testified that the gun was
retrieved that way because “[w]hen you’re searching somebody,
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12620
you have to use care because you don’t know if they have needles
or sharp objects.”
Chandler reiterated that the Government had not presented
sufficient evidence to support the enhancement and that the pos-
session was coincidental—no testimony showed that he ever tried
to get ahold of the gun, or that anyone on scene was even aware of
it. The District Court overruled Chandler’s objection, finding that
Chandler could have used the gun to facilitate the crime by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
After resolving the objections, the District Court moved to
sentencing. The Government requested the guideline range maxi-
mum of 105 months’ imprisonment to protect the public and deter
Chandler from reoffending. Chandler’s attorney read a letter
Chandler wrote, where Chandler discussed his struggles with drug
addiction and mental health. He said he only had the firearm that
day for protection. Chandler’s attorney then discussed Chandler’s
mental health history with the Court, including his issues with
ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, and bipolar
disorder, as well as Chandler’s extensive drug history.1 Chandler
requested that the Court vary downward and impose a sentence of
70 months.
The District Court stated that it had considered the guide-
line range, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and the facts
1 Chandler also discussed this history in his sentencing memorandum, which
was submitted to the Court.
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presented to the Court. It sentenced Chandler to 90 months’ im-
prisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Chan-
dler objected “to the reasonableness of the sentence” and main-
tained his objection to the four-level enhancement. He then timely
appealed.
On appeal, Chandler argues (1) that the District Court erred
when it applied the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
and (2) that the District Court imposed a procedurally and substan-
tively unreasonable sentence. We address each argument in turn.
II.
We review a district court’s legal interpretation de novo, and
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d
621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). A determination that a defendant pos-
sessed a gun “in connection with” another felony is a factual finding
that we review for clear error. United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242,
1250 (11th Cir. 2019). To be clearly erroneous, the district court’s
finding must leave this Court with a “definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Rothenberg, 610 F.3d at 624.
Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a four-level enhancement is
warranted if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or am-
munition in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 explains that
the enhancement applies if “the firearm or ammunition facilitated,
or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” Id.,
§ 2K2.1, cmt. 14(A). Another felony offense is generally classified
as an offense which is punishable by imprisonment of more than a
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12620
year regardless of whether it results in a conviction. § 2K2.1, cmt.
14(C).
The guidelines distinguish between drug trafficking offenses
and “another felony offense” for purposes of applying the enhance-
ment. Id. § 2K2.1, cmt. 14(A)–(C). For drug trafficking offenses, a
firearm in close proximity to the drugs warrants applying the en-
hancement; for all other felonies, the court must find that the fire-
arm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate another felony of-
fense. Id. § 2K2.1, cmt. 14(B)–(C). The Government bears the bur-
den of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts nec-
essary to support an enhancement. United States v. Askew, 193 F.3d
1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 1999).
In determining whether to apply the enhancement, the fire-
arm need not directly facilitate the underlying offense for it to be
possessed “in connection with” the offense. United States v. Rhind,
289 F.3d 690, 695 (11th Cir. 2002). But mere proximity between a
firearm and drugs possessed for personal use cannot support the
enhancement without a finding that the firearm facilitated, or had
the potential to facilitate, the defendant’s drug possession. Bishop,
940 F.3d at 1252. 2 Moreover, the term “in connection with” should
be given its ordinary and natural meaning, and the firearm need
not serve a purpose related to the crime. United States v. Smith, 480
2 Though Chandler thoroughly argues the drug point, the District Court’s
finding was that Chandler could have used the firearm to obstruct the officers.
In finding that the enhancement applied, the Court did not rely on the posses-
sion of methamphetamine.
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22-12620 Opinion of the Court 9
F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the phrase “in connec-
tion with” “merely reflects the context of the defendant’s posses-
sion of the firearm,” and is entitled to an expansive interpretation.
Rhind, 289 F.3d at 695 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Fur-
ther, in certain circumstances, mere possession of a firearm meets
the “in connection with” requirement. Smith, 480 F.3d at 1280
(quoting United States v. Jackson, 276 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.
2001)).
Here, the District Court did not err when it applied the four-
level enhancement. The Court properly applied the requirements
for “another felony offense” by determining whether the firearm
facilitated or had the potential to facilitate another felony—the ob-
struction of the officers attempting to arrest Chandler. Although
Chandler argues that the firearm was only in mere proximity to the
felony and he did not attempt to use it, the record supports the Dis-
trict Court’s determination that the firearm had the potential to
facilitate the obstruction offense. The firearm and magazine were
found in Chandler’s pants, on his person during the struggle with
officers, and officers made attempts to thwart him from reaching
into his pockets. The District Court was entitled to expansively in-
terpret Chandler’s possession of the firearm and its potential to be
used in connection with the felony obstruction. See Rhind, 289 F.3d
at 295.
We cannot say we are left with a “definite and firm convic-
tion” that the District Court erroneously found that the firearm in
Chandler’s possession could have facilitated the felony. Rothenberg,
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610 F.3d at 624. Thus, application of the enhancement was proper,
and we affirm in this respect.
III.
Turning to Chandler’s other argument on appeal, we review
the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of dis-
cretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128
S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007) (holding that appellate courts review all sen-
tences, whether inside or outside the guideline range, for abuse of
discretion). When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we
conduct a two-step inquiry, first ensuring that there was no signifi-
cant procedural error, and then examining whether the sentence
was substantively reasonable. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191,
1219 (11th Cir. 2009).
First, a district court commits a significant procedural error
if it calculates the guidelines incorrectly, fails to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, ne-
glects to explain the sentence, or treats the guidelines as mandatory
rather than advisory. United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 879 (11th
Cir. 2011). The District Court must consider the § 3553(a) factors,
but it need not state on the record that it has explicitly considered
each of the factors or discuss each factor individually. United States
v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). An acknowledg-
ment by the court that it considered the § 3553(a) factors is suffi-
cient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
When explaining a sentence, the district court must “set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered
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22-12620 Opinion of the Court 11
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his
own legal decision-making authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). Similarly, a sentence within
the guidelines range does not necessarily require a lengthy expla-
nation, and failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate
that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evi-
dence.” Id.; see also United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th
Cir. 2007).
If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then examine
whether it is substantively reasonable by considering the totality of
the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The dis-
trict court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), in-
cluding the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter
criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s fu-
ture criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
The weight due each § 3553(a) factor lies within the district
court’s sound discretion, and this Court will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the district court. United States v. Joseph, 978 F.3d
1251, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). Still, a district court abuses its discre-
tion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due sig-
nificant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrel-
evant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing
the proper factors unreasonably. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1326–27.
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Nevertheless, a district court may reasonably attach great weight
to a single factor. Id. at 1327.
Finally, a district court’s decision not to grant a downward
variance alone does not demonstrate that the district court failed
to afford consideration to mitigating factors. United States v. Le-
bowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1016 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). An indi-
cator of a reasonable sentence is one that is imposed at the bottom
of the advisory guideline range and is substantially below the stat-
utory maximum sentence. United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224,
1234 (11th Cir. 2015). The party challenging the sentence bears the
burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable considering
the record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference af-
forded sentencing courts. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, Chandler fails to show the District Court abused its
discretion when it imposed a sentence within and at the low end of
his guideline range. First, his sentence is procedurally reasonable.
As already discussed, the District Court correctly calculated the
guideline range, including the four-level enhancement. The Dis-
trict Court explicitly stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors, the
advisory sentencing range, and made an individualized assessment
based upon the facts presented at sentencing. Additionally, the Dis-
trict Court reviewed the PSR, which included all relevant details of
Chandler’s mitigation factors, and it heard Chandler and his coun-
sel’s in-court statements related to his mitigating circumstances.
Thus, his sentence was procedurally reasonable.
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Similarly, Chandler fails to show that the sentence is substan-
tively unreasonable considering the record and the § 3553(a) fac-
tors. The District Court reviewed evidence surrounding Chan-
dler’s mitigating circumstances; the mere fact that the Court de-
clined to vary downward does not show that it impermissibly over-
looked that mitigating evidence. Further, Chandler’s 90-month
sentence is near the bottom of the advisory guideline range of 84–
105 months and was well below the statutory maximum sentence,
indicating reasonableness. Accordingly, his sentence was substan-
tively reasonable, and we affirm in this respect as well.
AFFIRMED.