USCA11 Case: 22-12682 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12682
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
KENNETH LEE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants,
JESSIE WILLIAMS,
Superintendent, Long State Prison,
individual and official capacities,
USCA11 Case: 22-12682 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2023 Page: 2 of 6
2 Opinion of the Court 22-12682
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00002-LGW-BWC
____________________
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Brown, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se,1 ap-
peals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 com-
plaint against Long State Prison Superintendent Jessie Williams.2
The district court dismissed without prejudice Brown’s complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants.See Timson v.
Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se
pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998).
2 On appeal, Brown raises no challenge to the district court’s dismissal of (1)
his claims against the Georgia Department of Corrections, (2) his claims
against Long State Prison, or (3) his official-capacity claims for money damages
against Superintendent Williams. Those claims are not before us.
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22-12682 Opinion of the Court 3
I.
This civil action arises from a 1 January 2019 incident during
which Brown was stabbed five times in the head by a fellow inmate,
Franklin Wood. According to Brown, Wood made broad threats to
harm someone if he was not granted parole at his upcoming parole
hearing. Although Brown told Superintendent Williams about
Wood’s threats, Brown says no action was taken to protect him or
other inmates from Wood. After Wood was denied parole, he at-
tacked Brown.
In January 2021, Brown filed pro se this civil action in the dis-
trict court. Brown asserted that Superintendent Williams failed to
protect him from Wood’s attack. As relief, Brown sought $300,000
in money damages.
In his complaint, Brown acknowledged that the prison had a
grievance procedure and indicated that he was unsure whether his
failure-to-protect claim was covered by the grievance procedure.
Brown also stated that he had filed no grievance for the 1 January
2019 incident.
Superintendent Williams moved to dismiss Brown’s com-
plaint on the ground that Brown failed to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies under the prison’s grievance procedure.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”), advising the district court to dismiss without prejudice
Brown’s complaint. The magistrate judge concluded that Brown
failed to file a grievance before initiating his lawsuit. The magis-
trate judge also rejected Brown’s arguments that the prison’s
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12682
grievance process was inapplicable under the circumstances of this
case. Brown objected to the R&R, arguing chiefly that the prison’s
grievance process was inapplicable to his claim.
The district court overruled Brown’s objections. The district
court adopted the R&R, granted Superintendent Williams’s mo-
tion to dismiss, and dismissed without prejudice Brown’s complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and ap-
plication of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Johnson v.
Meadows,
418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005).
Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not file a section 1983 com-
plaint about “prison conditions” unless “such administrative reme-
dies as are available are exhausted.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory; “unexhausted
claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 211
(2007).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies, the district court applies a two-step inquiry.
See Turner v. Burnside,
541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). “First,
the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion
to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they conflict,
takes the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true.”
Id. At this step,
“[t]he court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the prisoner
show a failure to exhaust.” Whatley v. Smith,
802 F.3d 1205, 1209
(11th Cir. 2015). “Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the
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22-12682 Opinion of the Court 5
prisoner’s view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to re-
solve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those find-
ings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust.”
Id. Here, the
district court dismissed Brown’s complaint at the first step.
The district court committed no error in dismissing Brown’s
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. That
Brown filed no prison grievance related to the 1 January 2019 inci-
dent is undisputed. Because the facts as stated by Brown show that
Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the district
court concluded properly that Brown’s complaint was subject to
dismissal.
The district court also rejected properly Brown’s arguments
that the prison-grievance procedure was inapplicable under the cir-
cumstances. That Brown’s failure-to-protect claim arose from a
single assault -- not from a prison-wide condition -- does not render
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement inapplicable. The Supreme
Court has concluded that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement ap-
plies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve gen-
eral circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” See Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S.
516, 532 (2002). Brown was also required to comply with the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement even though money damages were
unavailable under the prison’s grievance process. See
id. at 524
(“Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance
proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite
to suit.”).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12682
Brown also contends that complaints about prisoner vio-
lence are resolved typically under a prison policy dealing with ad-
ministrative segregation and protective custody -- Georgia Depart-
ment of Corrections Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”)
209.06 -- not through the prison’s grievance process (SOP 227.02).
Accepting Brown’s assertion as true, we read nothing in SOP 209.06
that can be construed reasonably as superseding the prison’s griev-
ance process. Nor do we read SOP 209.06 as preventing a prisoner
from filing a grievance about prisoner violence or about an alleged
failure to place an inmate in protective custody.
Brown argues further that he was not required to file a griev-
ance (1) because he did not initiate the complaint about Wood and,
instead, notified Superintendent Williams about Wood’s threats
only after Superintendent Williams asked Brown expressly about
Wood’s conduct; and (2) because Superintendent Williams failed to
advise Brown that he needed to file a written grievance about
Wood’s threats. We reject these arguments as without merit.
Brown was required to comply with the prison’s grievance
process before filing this civil action. Because Brown failed to do
so, the district court concluded properly that Brown’s complaint
was subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies.
AFFIRMED.
