United States v. Clifford Deangelo Jackson , 534 F. App'x 917 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16045
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00411-WSD-RGV-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLIFFORD DEANGELO JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 12-16046
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00252-WSD-RGV-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
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CLIFFORD DEANGELO JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(August 21, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clifford Deangelo Jackson appeals his convictions and 194-month total
sentence in this consolidated appeal. Jackson pled guilty to one count of aiding
and abetting an attempted armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(a), (d), and 2 (Bank Count 1), and one count of aiding and abetting the
discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and 2 (Bank Count 2). A jury then convicted Jackson on one
count of conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery at Weeyums Philly Style
restaurant (Weeyums), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Weeyums Count 1),
and one count of aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery at Weeyums, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), and 2 (Weeyums Count 2). The district court
sentenced Jackson to concurrent 74-month sentences for Bank Count 1 and
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Weeyums Counts 1 and 2, followed by a consecutive mandatory minimum 10-year
sentence for Bank Count 2.
With respect to the Weeyums Counts, Jackson asserts the district court erred
in instructing the jury that a minimal effect on interstate commerce was sufficient
to convict him. He contends even under a de minimis standard, the Government
failed to present sufficient evidence that the robbery had an effect on interstate
commerce such that it supported his convictions. As to Bank Count 2, Jackson
asserts the district court erred in sentencing him to a ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence because he is not accountable for his codefendant’s accidental discharge
of a firearm after they left the bank.1 After review, we affirm Jackson’s
convictions and sentences.
Interstate commerce
We review the sufficiency of the evidence of a Hobbs Act violation de novo.
United States v. Dean (Dean I), 517 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’d in
part, 556 U.S. 568 (2009). “[W]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the
Government’s favor.” United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290-91 (11th Cir.
2011) (quotations omitted). We will not overturn a jury’s verdict “if any
1
After briefing concluded, Jackson filed supplemental authority citing to the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), without further
explanation of how the case applied to his appeal. We deem arguments not fully articulated on
appeal as abandoned. United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, we do not address Jackson’s citation to Alleyne.
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reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1291 (quotation omitted).
The Hobbs Act prohibits robbery and conspiracies to commit robbery that
“in any way or degree obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). To prove a Hobbs
Act conspiracy, “the government need only prove a robbery and effect on
commerce.” Dean I, 517 F.3d at 1227-28. As to the interstate commerce element,
“the government is only required to establish a minimal effect on interstate
commerce. Id. at 1228 (quotations omitted). “[A] ‘mere depletion of assets’ is
sufficient proof of an effect on interstate commerce.” Id.Jackson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the robbery
element of his Weeyums convictions; thus, the parties’ arguments are limited to the
interstate commerce element. Jackson’s contention the Government failed to
present sufficient evidence of an effect on interstate commerce is without merit.
The Government presented evidence that Jackson’s codefendant took $500-600
from the cash register at Weeyums, and we have held that “a mere depletion of
assets” is sufficient evidence of an effect on interstate commerce. See Dean I, 517
F.3d at 1228. Even if such a depletion of the restaurant’s assets were not
sufficient, however, the Government also presented evidence that Weeyums had
interstate customers, ordered supplies from other states, banked with a national
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bank, and closed for at least three days as a result of the robbery. Thus, it
presented evidence of, at the least, a minimal effect on interstate commerce
sufficient to support Jackson’s convictions for conspiracy to commit, and aiding
and abetting the commission of, a Hobbs Act robbery. See id.We also “review de novo a challenge to the district court’s jury instructions.”
United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court
has “broad discretion in formulating jury instructions provided that the charge as a
whole accurately reflects the law and the facts,” and we will only reverse a
conviction based on a jury instruction if “the issues of law were presented
inaccurately, or the charge improperly guided the jury in such a substantial way as
to violate due process.” Id. (quotations omitted).
As to Jackson’s assertion the district court’s jury instruction was erroneous,
the district court did not err by instructing the jury that a minimal effect on
interstate commerce was sufficient, because that charge accurately reflects the law.
See id.; see also Dean I, 517 F.3d at 1228. Accordingly, we affirm Jackson’s
convictions for conspiracy to commit, and aiding and abetting the commission of, a
Hobbs Act Robbery.
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Accidental discharge of firearm
We review “[t]he district court’s legal interpretation of statutes and
Sentencing Guidelines . . . de novo.” United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82,
87 (11th Cir. 2013). Section 924(c) states, in relevant part, that:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . .
uses or carries a firearm . . . shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence . . .--
....
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii). The Supreme Court has held a defendant’s
accidental discharge of a firearm is punishable by the ten-year mandatory
minimum set forth in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Dean v. United States (Dean II), 556
U.S. 568, 577 (2009).
Section 2 of Title 18 provides that “[w]hoever . . . aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures [the commission of an offense against the United
States] is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). “Under § 2, the acts of the
principal become those of the aider and abettor as a matter of law.” United States
v. Williams, 334 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, a defendant who aided
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and abetted a § 924(c) offense “is accountable for the entirety of the conduct”
relating to the § 924(c) offense. Id. at 1233.
The district court did not err in applying the ten-year mandatory minimum
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) to Jackson. A defendant’s accidental discharge
of a firearm is punishable by the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Dean II,
556 U.S. at 577. The indictment charged Jackson with violating
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2 by aiding and abetting his codefendants in knowingly
using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. At
Jackson’s change-of-plea hearing, he agreed with the Government’s description of
the attempted bank robbery and admitted that a firearm was discharged from the
vehicle in which he and his codefendants escaped from the bank. The criminal
judgment indicates that Jackson was adjudged guilty of violating
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2. On appeal, Jackson does not contest that his
codefendant discharged his firearm. Moreover, an accidental discharge of a
firearm is a reasonably foreseeable result of bringing a gun to an attempted bank
robbery. Accordingly, under § 2, Jackson is accountable for his codefendant’s
accidental discharge of the firearm and he is punishable by the ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; Williams, 334 F.3d at 1232-33. Thus, we
affirm Jackson’s sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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