Alabama Space Science Exhibit Commission v. Merkel American Insurance Company ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • USCA11 Case: 21-13313    Date Filed: 05/25/2022   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-13313
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    ALABAMA SPACE SCIENCE EXHIBIT COMMISSION,
    d.b.a. U.S. Space & Rocket Center,
    Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-
    Third-Party Defendant-Appellant,
    versus
    MARKEL AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Counter Claimant-
    Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
    DEBORAH BARNHART, et al.,
    Counter Defendants-Third-Party Defendants.
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313        Date Filed: 05/25/2022     Page: 2 of 9
    2                      Opinion of the Court                21-13313
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00594-LCB
    ____________________
    Before WILSON, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Alabama Space Science Exhibit Commission (ASSEC)
    entered into an agreement to produce a children’s television show
    with funding from NASA. When the funding never came through,
    an arbitration panel found ASSEC liable for breaching the
    agreement. ASSEC then sued Markel American Insurance
    Company, which had agreed to provide coverage for liability
    unless it resulted from a breach of contract. The question before
    us, then, is whether Markel’s insurance policy covers ASSEC’s
    losses.
    It does not. The insurance policy at issue excludes liability
    “under a written or express contract or agreement,” and ASSEC’s
    liability flows solely from its breach of such an agreement. Because
    ASSEC’s arguments to the contrary do not alter the plain meaning
    of the insurance contract, we affirm.
    I.
    In 2016 ASSEC signed a Memorandum of Agreement with
    Space Race, LLC to produce a children’s television show called
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313       Date Filed: 05/25/2022    Page: 3 of 9
    21-13313              Opinion of the Court                       3
    Space Racers. 1 The two companies promised to “work together to
    promote” the series and to “collaborate on all press, public
    relations, events and activities.” Most importantly, ASSEC
    promised to fund the project—a commitment of over $4 million—
    provided that it received a NASA grant for that purpose. Around
    the same time, ASSEC entered a “Cooperative Agreement” with
    NASA, which pledged $4.5 million to the project to be disbursed
    over three years.
    Space Racers enjoyed a successful launch. But by 2018,
    ASSEC had stopped providing the promised funding. So Space
    Race filed an arbitration demand against ASSEC pursuant to the
    Memorandum’s terms, alleging “a straightforward breach of
    contract—the refusal to fund by [ASSEC] in contravention of the
    parties’ Agreement and in violation of the duty of good faith and
    fair dealing inherent in every contract.” In Space Race’s view,
    ASSEC had created a “false pretext to prevent NASA, a willing
    funder, from funding,” and had therefore violated the terms of the
    Memorandum.
    ASSEC promptly notified its insurer, Markel, about the
    arbitration complaint. ASSEC had taken out a “Directors and
    Officers” insurance policy ensuring that Markel would pay “all Loss
    which [ASSEC] becomes legally obligated to pay on account of any
    Claim”—including an arbitration claim—“for a Wrongful
    1 In the Memorandum of Agreement and elsewhere, ASSEC is sometimes
    referred to as “U.S. Space & Rocket Center” or “USSRC.”
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313        Date Filed: 05/25/2022     Page: 4 of 9
    4                      Opinion of the Court                21-13313
    Act.” “Wrongful acts” generally included any “actual or alleged
    error, misstatement, misleading statement, act, omission, neglect,
    or breach of duty” committed by ASSEC. But there were
    exceptions. As relevant here, the policy clearly stated that Markel
    would not be liable to “pay any Loss on account of,” and would
    “not be obligated to defend,” a claim for “any actual or alleged
    liability of [ASSEC] under any written or express contract or
    agreement, except to the extent that [ASSEC] would have been
    liable in the absence of such contract or agreement.”
    Markel refused to defend and indemnify ASSEC against
    Space Race’s claims. In its view, the breach-of-contract exclusion
    put the claims squarely outside ASSEC’s insurance policy. Because
    “all liability alleged against” ASSEC was “for breach of the parties’
    Agreement,” Markel explained, the policy provided no coverage.
    Nine months later, ASSEC received more bad news. After a
    four-day hearing, the arbitration panel concluded that ASSEC had
    “materially breached” its obligations under the Memorandum and
    the Cooperative Agreement with NASA. The panel ordered
    ASSEC to pay the rest of the amount promised in the
    Memorandum—over $1.3 million, plus interest.
    ASSEC sued Markel, alleging breaches of the duties to
    defend and indemnify and bad faith. The district court granted
    summary judgment for Markel. Like the arbitration panel, it found
    that Space Race’s arbitration claims alleged no “wrongful acts”
    beyond a breach of the Memorandum, meaning that there was no
    coverage under the policy. ASSEC now appeals.
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313        Date Filed: 05/25/2022     Page: 5 of 9
    21-13313               Opinion of the Court                        5
    II.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
    novo, “viewing all facts and drawing all inferences in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pelaez v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co.,
    
    13 F.4th 1243
    , 1249 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Summary
    judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    III.
    ASSEC argues that the insurance policy requires Markel to
    defend and indemnify it against Space Race’s claims. We are not
    persuaded. The plain language of the policy and the nature of the
    arbitration claims make clear that the breach-of-contract exclusion
    applies to those claims. Because Markel thus had no duty to defend
    or indemnify ASSEC, we affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment.
    The text of the insurance policy is not in dispute. As
    explained above, the policy covered liability incurred by ASSEC for
    claims brought against it for “wrongful acts,” subject to an
    exception “[f]or any actual or alleged liability of [ASSEC] under any
    written or express contract or agreement, except to the extent that
    [ASSEC] would have been liable in the absence of such contract or
    agreement.” The question, then, is whether Space Race brought
    any claim based on a “wrongful act” that was not “under any
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313        Date Filed: 05/25/2022     Page: 6 of 9
    6                      Opinion of the Court                21-13313
    written or express contract or agreement.” Unless it did so, the
    policy provides no coverage.
    Space Race brought three claims against ASSEC in its
    arbitration action. Each of these claims asserts liability based on
    ASSEC’s failure to honor its Memorandum of Agreement with
    Space Race; none of them alleges bad acts independent of that
    agreement. The first cause of action is an explicit claim for breach
    of contract. The second is a request, in the alternative, for “a
    declaratory judgment that [ASSEC] owes Space Race $1.5 million
    under the Agreement, plus interest.” (Emphasis added.) And the
    third is a claim sounding in quantum meruit, or implied contract,
    for the same alleged failure to adhere to the agreement. On its face,
    then, the arbitration complaint alleges just what it purports to
    allege: “a straightforward breach of contract.”
    ASSEC’s counterarguments do not convince us otherwise.
    ASSEC first attacks the scope of the breach-of-contract exclusion in
    the insurance policy. Under Alabama law (which the parties agree
    governs), insurance contracts are “construed liberally in favor of
    the insured and strictly against the insurer,” in order to “provide
    maximum coverage for the insured.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton,
    
    675 So. 2d 377
    , 379 (Ala. 1996). ASSEC explains that in the
    insurance policy at issue, other exclusions apply to claims “based
    upon, arising out of or in any way involving” certain
    circumstances. But the breach-of-contract exclusion does not use
    such expansive language. According to ASSEC, this difference in
    wording shows that “the Breach of Contract Exclusion was
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313        Date Filed: 05/25/2022     Page: 7 of 9
    21-13313               Opinion of the Court                        7
    intended to be narrow.” And because of that, it says, Space Race’s
    claims should not fit within it.
    The trouble with this argument is that even when narrowly
    construed, the plain language of the breach-of-contract exclusion
    still applies to Space Race’s claims. Space Race alleged a breach of
    the Memorandum of Agreement (and, in the alternative, two other
    claims based on the same behavior). The only basis for its
    allegations that ASSEC owed it $1.5 million was a “written or
    express contract or agreement,” as explicitly contemplated by the
    exclusion.
    ASSEC disagrees. In its view, the “plethora of allegations of
    wrongdoing in the Statement of Claim suggest potential liability
    for torts such as negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
    duty, and wantonness.” But a passing reference in a complaint,
    especially when placed in the introduction rather than the “Facts”
    section (as much of the language quoted by ASSEC was), does not
    by itself generate an independent cause of action. The district court
    correctly explained that while no precedent suggests that
    “statements in the introduction of a complaint can put an insurer
    on notice for a claim of a wrongful act triggering a duty to defend,
    courts have found no claim to exist where a plaintiff state[d]
    various acts and violations of law in the introduction of her
    complaint but failed to flesh those assertions out in its body and
    into a fully formed count.” See, e.g., Bracewell v. Patrick, No.
    1:10–cv–992–MEF, 
    2011 WL 1431521
    , at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 14,
    2011).
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313         Date Filed: 05/25/2022    Page: 8 of 9
    8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13313
    ASSEC does not explain how the arbitration complaint
    might encompass another cause of action (one for negligence or
    misrepresentation, for example). Instead, it seems to suggest that
    the court has the obligation to diligently identify “any potential for
    coverage arising out of the allegations” and fill in any gaps left by
    the complaint. But ASSEC offers no binding legal support for this
    proposition, and we find none ourselves. While Alabama law
    requires that insurance contracts be liberally construed, we do not
    interpret that principle to require courts to rewrite complaints to
    trigger coverage.
    ASSEC next argues that Space Race not only alleged a
    breach of the Memorandum, but also a breach of the implied duty
    of good faith and fair dealing—a breach creating “liability that
    could be imposed independent of the contract.” This argument
    fails immediately because, as a leading treatise succinctly explains,
    “[v]iolation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing constitutes a
    breach of contract.” Williston on Contracts § 63:22 (4th ed.). And
    Alabama law has long held that a “mere failure to perform” a
    “contract-obligation is not a tort, and it furnishes no foundation for
    an action on the case.” Bentley-Beale, Inc. v. Wesson Oil &
    Snowdrift Sales Co., 
    165 So. 830
    , 832 (Ala. 1936). While Space Race
    alleged a breach of an implied contractual duty, that does not
    constitute a “wrongful act” independent of a breach of contract.
    Finally, ASSEC argues that Space Race’s quantum meruit
    claim is based on a wrongful act rather than breach of contract. But
    as the district court explained, when “an express contract exists, an
    USCA11 Case: 21-13313         Date Filed: 05/25/2022   Page: 9 of 9
    21-13313              Opinion of the Court                        9
    argument based on a quantum meruit recovery in regard to an
    implied contract fails” as a matter of Alabama law. Mantiply v.
    Mantiply, 
    951 So. 2d 638
    , 656 (Ala. 2006) (quotation
    omitted). Furthermore, Space Race’s quantum meruit claim
    alleged that ASSEC “knowingly induced Space Race to render
    cobranding services for [ASSEC] while agreeing to reimburse Space
    Race for its submitted invoices,” that ASSEC gave “promises and
    assurances” to work with Space Race, and that ASSEC “willingly
    accepted the benefits of Space Race’s services on the understanding
    that Space Race would be reimbursed for its submitted invoices.”
    The entire basis for the quantum meruit claim was ASSEC’s failure
    to perform under the Memorandum of Agreement. That claim is
    thus not based on an independent wrongful act.
    *       *     *
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-13313

Filed Date: 5/25/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2022