United States v. Lawani , 588 F. App'x 62 ( 2014 )


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  •      13-4574
    United States of America v. Lawani
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 19th day of December, two thousand fourteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    8                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    9                              Circuit Judges.
    10
    11       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    12       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    13                Appellee,
    14
    15                    -v.-                                               13-4574
    16
    17       YASSER LAWANI,
    18                Defendant-Appellant.
    19       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    20
    21       FOR APPELLANT:                        Ryan Thomas Truskoski,
    22                                             Harwinton, Connecticut.
    23
    24       FOR APPELLEE:                         Alixandra E. Smith, David C.
    25                                             James, Assistant United States
    26                                             Attorneys (for Loretta E. Lynch,
    27                                             United States Attorney for the
    1
    1                              Eastern District of New York),
    2                              Brooklyn, New York.
    3
    4        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    5   Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brodie, J.).
    6
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    8   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    9   AFFIRMED.
    10
    11        Yasser Lawani appeals from a judgment of the United
    12   States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
    13   (Brodie, J.), sentencing him to 60 months of imprisonment
    14   for conspiring to export stolen motor vehicles (in violation
    15   of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 553(a)(1)) and for filing false
    16   federal income tax returns (in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    17   § 287). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    18   underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
    19   presented for review.
    20
    21        Lawani claims that his sentence is procedurally
    22   unreasonable, citing two alleged errors in the calculation
    23   of the advisory guidelines range: (1) imposing an
    24   enhancement for obstruction of justice, and (2) refusing to
    25   apply a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Both
    26   arguments are meritless.
    27
    28        1. “On review of a district court’s decision to
    29   enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice,
    30   we accept the court’s findings of facts unless they are
    31   clearly erroneous.” United States v. Pena, 
    751 F.3d 101
    ,
    32   105 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
    33   omitted). “We review de novo a ruling that the established
    34   facts constitute obstruction of justice, giving due
    35   deference to the district court’s application of the
    36   guidelines to the facts.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks
    37   omitted).
    38
    39        The district court made two independent findings
    40   relating to obstruction. First, based on a series of
    41   recorded telephone calls from jail, the court found that
    42   Lawani instructed his brother to destroy evidence relating
    43   to his crime and discussed the possibility of fleeing the
    44   country if released on bail. Second, the court found that
    45   Lawani lied under oath at the trial of his (co-defendant)
    46   brother. These factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
    47
    2
    1        Directing others to destroy evidence of a crime,
    2   planning an escape, and perjury each may suffice as
    3   obstruction of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Triumph
    4   Capital Grp., Inc., 
    544 F.3d 149
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008)
    5   (destruction of evidence); United States v. Aponte, 
    31 F.3d 6
      86, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (flight with intent to avoid judicial
    7   proceedings); United States v. Savoca, 
    596 F.3d 154
    , 159 (2d
    8   Cir. 2010) (perjury at trial of a co-defendant). Moreover,
    9   U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 covers failed attempts as well as acts of
    10   successful obstruction. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz,
    11   
    286 F.3d 118
    , 120 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). So the
    12   district court’s decision to impose an enhancement for
    13   obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is affirmed.
    14
    15        2. As to the court’s refusal to apply a reduction for
    16   acceptance of responsibility, a defendant may qualify for
    17   such a reduction if the district court finds that “the
    18   defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
    19   for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
    20
    21        On appeal, “a district court’s determination whether a
    22   defendant is entitled to credit for acceptance of
    23   responsibility merits ‘great deference’ because the
    24   ‘sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
    25   defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.’” United States
    26   v. Nouri, 
    711 F.3d 129
    , 146 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S.S.G.
    27   § 3E1.1 cmt. 5). The question is one of fact, so “a
    28   district court’s determination in this regard will not be
    29   disturbed unless it is without foundation.” United States
    30   v. Taylor, 
    475 F.3d 65
    , 68 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
    31   (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
    32
    33        Although Lawani pleaded guilty, “[a] defendant ‘who
    34   enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment [for
    35   acceptance of responsbility] as a matter of right.’” United
    36   States v. Kumar, 
    617 F.3d 612
    , 635 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
    37   U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 3). More to the point here, a
    38   defendant who obstructs justice is typically disentitled to
    39   such a reduction. See 
    id. (an obstruction
    enhancement
    40   forecloses an acceptance of responsibility reduction except
    41   in “extraordinary cases”) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt.
    42   4).
    43
    44        The district court found that Lawani’s perjury at his
    45   brother’s trial--which took place after Lawani entered his
    46   guilty plea--“belies the fact that [Lawani] ha[d] indeed
    47   accepted responsibility for what happened here.” The
    3
    1   district court’s refusal to treat Lawani’s as an
    2   “extraordinary case” (i.e., one in which the reduction was
    3   warranted notwithstanding the obstruction) was not without
    4   foundation. So, we affirm.
    5
    6                               ***
    7
    8        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
    9   Lawani’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
    10   the district court.
    11
    12                              FOR THE COURT:
    13                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    14
    4