Zhunusov v. Garland ( 2021 )

19-3704
Zhunusov v. Garland
BIA
Montante, IJ
A215 671 266
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL
RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS
COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th
day of May, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
BAKTIIAR ZHUNUSOV,
Petitioner,
v. 19-3704
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: JILLIAN E. NOWAK, ESQ. (Karen Murtagh-
Monks, Executive Director, on the
brief) for Prisoners’ Legal Services
of New York, Buffalo, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: JONATHAN ROBBINS, Senior Litigation
Counsel, (Anthony P. Nicastro,
Assistant Director, on the brief)
for Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Baktiiar Zhunusov, a native of Kyrgyzstan and
citizen of Russia, seeks review of a BIA decision affirming an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Baktiiar Zhunusov, No. A215 671
266 (B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2019), aff’g No. A 215 671 266 (Immigr. Ct.
Batavia Apr. 23, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts and procedural history. 1
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and
reach only the grounds that the BIA relied on in sustaining the
1 The government argues that Zhunusov’s petition is now moot
because of his removal and his failure to maintain contact with
his counsel during the intervening 18 months. Resp’t Ltr. Br.
at 5-6. A petitioner’s removal ordinarily does not deprive the
Court of jurisdiction to consider a petition for review. See
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424 (2009); Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357
F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2004). Zhunusov’s counsel has informed
the Court that Zhunusov authorized counsel to pursue the present
petition for review, and the government conceded at oral
argument that, if Zhunusov’s petition is granted, it would be
obligated to attempt to facilitate his return to the United
States. Accordingly, we conclude that Zhunusov’s petition for
review is not moot. We therefore consider it on the merits.
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IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d
Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination for
substantial evidence). In relevant part, the Immigration and
Naturalization Act provides as follows:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness
of the applicant . . . , the consistency between the
applicant’s . . . written and oral statements (whenever
made and whether or not under oath, and considering the
circumstances under which the statements were made), the
internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the
consistency of such statements with other evidence of
record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the
applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Our precedent teaches that “[w]e
[will] defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,
from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. On such review, we conclude
that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination.
We defer to the agency’s finding that Zhunusov’s evasive
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demeanor undermined his credibility. The IJ was “in the best
position to evaluate whether apparent problems in the witness’s
testimony suggest a lack of credibility or, rather, can be
attributed to an innocent cause such as difficulty understanding
the question.” Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104,
113 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Moreover, the record supports the agency’s adverse credibility
finding. As the BIA noted, the IJ repeatedly instructed Zhunusov
to answer questions directly, reflective of an assessment that
Zhunusov was being evasive.
Zhunusov argues that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding.
He observes that the IJ made only a general finding that Zhunusov
was evasive. Although the BIA is not authorized to make findings
of fact, it reviews the IJ’s findings for clear error. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). Here, the IJ found that Zhunusov was
evasive, and the BIA did not fact-find on its own. Rather, it
merely determined that there was no clear error in the IJ’s finding
that Zhunusov was evasive by reviewing the hearing record and
noting where the IJ called attention to Zhunusov’s relevant
conduct.
In making its adverse credibility finding, the agency also
properly considered inconsistencies in Zhunusov’s submissions. It
pointed out that during his border and credible fear interviews,
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Zhunusov failed to mention the threats that he later said prompted
him to leave Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and then to leave Russia in 2018. 2
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166–
67 & n.3 (in credibility determinations, allowing reliance on
omissions). Zhunusov testified that he left Kyrgyzstan in 2010
after his political work led to him receiving telephonic threats
from “the mafia” three to four times over an unspecified period.
Special App’x 3 (B.I.A. Decision). He also testified that his
political work led to death threats against him in the two weeks
preceding his departure from Russia. But, during his border
interview, Zhunusov stated that he was seeking “political asylum”
only because he experienced “racial discrimination” in Russia.
Further, although Zhunusov asserted during his credible fear
interview, which was conducted through a Russian interpreter, that
he left Kyrgyzstan because of “political prosecution” (as stated
by the interpreter) and was afraid to return to Russia because he
2 In his appeal to the BIA, Zhunusov did not challenge the
reliability of the interview records. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 107 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
“usually . . . issues not raised to the BIA will not be examined
by the reviewing court”). Nor would he have had obvious grounds
to do so. The records bear “hallmarks of reliability”: they are
typewritten lists of questions and answers; Zhunusov had an
interpreter; his responses to the questions indicate that he
understood the interviewers; and the interviewers asked questions
designed to elicit an asylum claim. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585
F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009).
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feared the Kyrgyz government would send someone to Russia to harm
him, he did not elaborate further on these isolated comments and
instead focused on the racial persecution he allegedly suffered in
Russia. A.R. 848, 849. Nor did Zhunusov refer to the 2010 threats
that he later identified as motivating him to flee Kyrgyzstan or
the 2018 threats that he said prompted him to flee Russia. The
agency did not err in relying on these omissions together with its
demeanor and other inconsistency findings, since the threats
formed a material part of Zhunusov’s claim. See Hong Fei Gao, 891
F.3d at 78, 82 (holding that “the probative value of a witness’s
prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts
are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to
disclose”); see also Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 726 (2d
Cir. 2009) (the agency may “draw an adverse inference about
petitioner’s credibility based, inter alia, on h[is] failure to
mention” important details or events in prior statements).
Finally, the agency reasonably relied on Zhunusov’s
inconsistent representations regarding when he resided in
Kazakhstan and when he was detained in that country. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Because the contradictions among his
statements were apparent (that is, whether he was detained in 2006,
2007, 2010, or 2016), the agency was entitled to rely on these
inconsistencies without first soliciting explanations. See Majidi
6
v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005); Ming Shi Xue v. BIA,
439 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2006). In any event, the record reveals
that the attorney for the Department of Homeland Security cross-
examined Zhunusov about both the timing and length of his detention
in Kazakhstan by pointing to inconsistencies between his testimony
and his I-589.
Having called Zhunusov’s credibility into question on these
sound bases, the agency reasonably relied on his failure to
rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence.
See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear
on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general
makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has
already been called into question.”). Zhunusov submitted
extensive country conditions evidence, but provided no evidence
tending to corroborate his claim that he was involved in high-
profile political work. Further, Zhunusov affirmatively stated
that he had not attempted to obtain medical records or letters
from his former employer or attorney in Russia to corroborate his
account of alleged beatings.
Considered together, the IJ’s demeanor finding and the
omissions, inconsistencies, and lack of corroboration in
Zhunusov’s record amount to substantial evidence supporting the
7
agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534
F.3d at 165–66. The adverse credibility determination is
dispositive of Zhunusov’s claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief rest on
the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,
156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
We do not reach Zhunusov’s argument that, even absent his own
credible testimony, his country conditions evidence established
that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Russia. Zhunusov
did not exhaust the argument that the evidence showed a pattern or
practice in Russia of persecuting similarly situated individuals
as would establish a well-founded fear of persecution under 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “we may
consider only those issues that formed the basis for [the BIA’s]
decision”); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471
F.3d 315, 334–35 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that we may not “engage
in an independent evaluation of the cold record” or sit as “fact-
finders in the first instance”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. Zhunusov’s pending motions for a stay of removal and to
compel his return are DENIED as moot and the order granting a
temporary emergency stay is VACATED. The joint motion by the
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American Immigration Council and Immigrant Defense Project for
leave to file a brief amici curiae is GRANTED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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