Wu v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  •      19-2455
    Wu v. Garland
    BIA
    Wright, IJ
    A205 628 610
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 15th day of June, two thousand twenty-one.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            GUIDO CALABRESI,
    8            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   XIFENG WU,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                   v.                                          19-2455
    17                                                               NAC
    18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.*
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                  Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York,
    24                                    NY.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
    27                                    Attorney General; Stephen J.
    * Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General
    Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted as Respondent.
    1                                          Flynn, Assistant Director; Lynda
    2                                          A. Do, Trial Attorney, Office of
    3                                          Immigration Litigation, United
    4                                          States Department of Justice,
    5                                          Washington, DC.
    6
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    8   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    9   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    10   is DENIED.
    11        Petitioner         Xifeng    Wu,     a   native   and    citizen   of    the
    12   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 17, 2019
    13   decision of the BIA affirming a February 20, 2018 decision of
    14   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding
    15   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    16   (“CAT”).     In re Xifeng Wu, No. A205 628 610 (B.I.A. July 17,
    17   2019), aff’g No. A205 628 610 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 20,
    18   2018).       We    assume        the    parties’    familiarity      with     the
    19   underlying facts and procedural history.
    20        We review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
    21   sake of completeness.”            Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
    22   
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                  The applicable standards
    23   of   review       are     well     established.              See   
    8 U.S.C. § 24
       1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d
    25   Cir. 2009).
    2
    1       The agency did not err in finding that Wu failed to
    2   demonstrate that the harm he suffered for opposing China’s
    3   family planning policy rose to the level of persecution.
    4   “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include
    5   every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”
    6   Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 
    633 F.3d 64
    , 72 (2d Cir. 2011)
    7   (internal quotation marks omitted).              Past persecution may
    8   “encompass[]     a   variety   of   forms   of    adverse    treatment,
    9   including non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,”
    10   but the harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere
    11   harassment.”     Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    433 F.3d 12
       332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    13   “‘[T]he difference between harassment and persecution is
    14   necessarily one of degree,’ . . . the degree must be assessed
    15   with regard to the context in which the mistreatment occurs.”
    16   Beskovic v. Gonzales, 
    467 F.3d 223
    , 226 (2d Cir. 2006)
    17   (quoting Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341).           “The [agency] must,
    18   therefore, be keenly sensitive to the fact that a ‘minor
    19   beating’   or,   for   that    matter,   any     physical   degradation
    20   designed to cause pain, humiliation, or other suffering, may
    21   rise to the level of persecution if it occurred in the context
    22   of an arrest or detention on the basis of a protected ground.”
    3
    1   Id.
    2         In determining whether Wu established past persecution,
    3   the agency acknowledged Beskovic. The agency did not err in
    4   concluding      that,        even     though          Wu’s     beating    occurred     in
    5   detention and was reprehensible, it did not rise to the level
    6   of persecution under Beskovic because he was not severely
    7   beaten or injured and he was held for only one night.                                  See
    8   Mei Fun Wong, 
    633 F.3d at 72
    ; cf. Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632
    
    9 F.3d 820
    , 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding no error in the agency’s
    10   determination            that    applicant            failed    to   establish        past
    11   persecution when before an “arrest and detention by local
    12   police, he suffered only minor bruising from an altercation
    13   with family planning officials, which required no formal
    14   medical    attention            and   had   no        lasting    physical      effect”).
    15   Because Wu did not demonstrate past persecution, he was not
    16   entitled       to    a     presumption           of     a    well-founded      fear    of
    17   persecution         on     account     of   his        resistance    to    the   family
    18   planning policy.            See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1).
    19         Absent        past    persecution,          an     applicant       may   establish
    20   eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear
    21   of    future    persecution,           
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(2),     “which
    22   requires that the alien present credible testimony that he
    4
    1   subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is
    2   objectively reasonable,” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 3
       169,    178   (2d    Cir.   2004).        “[I]n   order    to    establish
    4   eligibility    for    relief      based   exclusively     on     activities
    5   undertaken after his arrival in the United States, an alien
    6   must make some showing that authorities in his country of
    7   nationality are (1) aware of his activities or (2) likely to
    8   become aware of his activities.”           Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey,
    9   
    528 F.3d 135
    , 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
    10          The agency reasonably declined to credit unsworn letters
    11   from Wu’s wife asserting that Chinese officials know about
    12   Wu’s pro-democracy activities in the United States.                    The
    13   agency pointed out that the letters were written by an
    14   interested witness who was not subject to cross-examination.
    15   See Y.C. v. Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 334 (2d Cir. 2013).                  And
    16   the agency was not compelled to conclude that Wu’s testimony
    17   in     this    regard       was     persuasive.           See     8 U.S.C.
    18   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii);        Hongsheng     Leng,   
    528 F.3d at 143
    .
    19   Further, we have found “most unlikely” the “suggestion that
    20   the Chinese government is aware of every anti-Communist or
    21   pro-democracy piece of commentary published online,” and have
    22   deemed speculative the assertion that the Chinese government
    5
    1   will    likely      discover     political    activities     in    the     United
    2   States        and   articles     published        online   years       before     a
    3   noncitizen is removed.            Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334 (citing Jian
    4   Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In
    5   the    absence      of   solid   support     in    the   record    .   .   .    [an
    6   applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”)).                     Accordingly,
    7   the agency reasonably concluded that Wu failed to establish
    8   that Chinese officials are aware of or likely to become aware
    9   of his pro-democracy activities.                  See id.; Hongsheng Leng,
    10   
    528 F.3d at 138
    .         Alternatively, the agency reasonably found
    11   that     Wu     failed    to     establish    that       similarly      situated
    12   individuals face persecution because “[t]he record is silent
    13   as to whether the Chinese government views domestic pro-
    14   democracy advocates differently from Chinese nationals who
    15   espouse pro-democracy ideals abroad.”                Y.C., 741 F.3d at 335.
    16          Because Wu failed (1) to persuasively demonstrate that
    17   authorities are aware or likely to become aware of his
    18   political activities in the United States, or (2) to show an
    19   objectively reasonable fear of persecution on account of
    20   those activities, the agency reasonably concluded that he
    21   failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.                         See
    22   Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334–35; Hongsheng Leng, 
    528 F.3d at 142
    .
    6
    1   That    finding   was   dispositive   of   asylum,   withholding   of
    2   removal, and CAT relief, see Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    ,
    3   119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (failure to show fear of persecution
    4   required for asylum “necessarily” precludes meeting higher
    5   burden for withholding of removal and CAT relief), and thus
    6   we do not reach the Government’s argument that Wu failed to
    7   exhaust his CAT claim, see INS v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25
    8   (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
    9   required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
    10   unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
    11          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    12   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    13   stays VACATED.
    14                                   FOR THE COURT:
    15                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    16                                   Clerk of Court
    7