Ayazi v. New York City Department of Education , 586 F. App'x 600 ( 2014 )

13-639(L)
Ayazi v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
2 at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
3 York, on the 14th day of January, two thousand fourteen.
4
5 PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
6 DENNY CHIN,
7 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
8 Circuit Judges.
9 _____________________________________
10 MARYAM AYAZI,
11 Plaintiff-Appellant,
12
13 v. No. 13-639-cv(L);
14 No. 13-641-cv(con)
15 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
16 EDUCATION,
17 Defendant-Appellee.
18 _____________________________________
19
20 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: MARYAM AYAZI, pro se, Elmhurst,
21 New York.
22
23 FOR APPELLEE: Tahirih M. Sadrieh, Edward F. X. Hart, Jane
24 Anderson, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation
25 Counsel for the City of New York, New York,
26 New York.
1 Appeals from the judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern
2 District of New York (Margo K. Brodie, Judge).
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
4 AND DECREED that the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.
5 In these consolidated cases, pro se plaintiff Maryam Ayazi appeals from adverse
6 judgments in related actions alleging discrimination and retaliation in employment in
7 violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
8 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
9 Ayazi’s first action, initiated in 1998 (the “1998 Action”), was resolved against her at
10 trial, and her second action, filed in 2008 (the “2008 Action”), was thereafter dismissed
11 on the defense’s motion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
12 and the procedural history of the case, which we reference only as necessary to explain
13 our decision to affirm.
14 1. Inability To Pursue § 12112(d)(4)(A) Claim
15 Ayazi argues that the district court erroneously prevented her from presenting an
16 ADA challenge to medical testing, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), in her 1998 Action,
17 and then improperly ruled her “precluded” from pursuing that claim in her 2008 Action.
18 Her first argument fails because the district court correctly found that Ayazi had
19 not raised a medical testing challenge in her 1998 complaint. Accordingly, Ayazi’s
20 attempt to press that claim at trial effectively constituted a request to amend. We review
21 a denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec.
22 Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). We identify no such abuse here given that Ayazi
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1 raised the medical testing issue only two weeks before trial of the 1998 Action, and the
2 addition of the new claim would prejudice defendant insofar as it required additional
3 evidence and, possibly, motion practice. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d
4 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Undue prejudice arises when an amendment [comes] on the eve
5 of trial and would result in new problems of proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6 Although Ayazi now asserts that the district court ignored her multiple earlier
7 attempts to amend her 1998 complaint, the implication that she attempted to add a new
8 ADA claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12112 is without foundation in the record. Specifically,
9 she did not reference that theory of relief in any of the documents she identifies in her
10 brief as attempts to amend her complaint, none of which were styled as motions and only
11 one of which referenced an amended complaint.
12 As for the district court’s dismissal of Ayazi’s 2008 Action, our standard of review
13 is de novo, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all
14 inferences in Ayazi’s favor. See Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106,
15 108 (2d Cir. 2010). Even when we construe her complaint in the 2008 Action to raise a
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) claim, however, we must conclude that the claim was
17 properly dismissed as time-barred. In her amended complaint, Ayazi identified only two
18 instances when defendants required her to undergo a medical examination: once in 1996
19 before she received her first teaching license, and once in 1999 when she requested an
20 accommodation in connection with a part-time teaching position. Because Ayazi did not
21 file her second charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
22 until December 2006, any § 12112(d)(4)(A) claim that she sought to raise in the 2008
3
1 Action fell well outside the ADA’s 300-day limitations period. See Butts v. N.Y. Dep’t
2 of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993) (“When a plaintiff fails to file
3 a timely charge with the EEOC, the claim is time-barred.”); See also Zerilli-Edelglass v.
4 N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s
5 ADA claim as time-barred for failure to file EEOC complaint within 300-day limitations
6 period).
7 2. Sufficiency of Trial Evidence
8 Ayazi’s second argument on appeal, that defendant’s “affirmative defense” at trial
9 in the 1998 Action was “false,” challenges the district court’s denial of her Rule 50
10 motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (permitting court to set aside jury verdict upon
11 finding that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to
12 find” as it did). While we review de novo a party’s claim that it was entitled to judgment
13 as a matter of law, see Highland Capital Mgmt. LP v. Schneider, 607 F.3d 322, 326 (2d
14 Cir. 2010), in doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury
15 verdict. See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 370 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that in
16 examining evidence as a whole, court “must disregard all evidence favorable to the
17 moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” (internal quotation marks and
18 emphasis omitted)).
19 When we do that here in our independent review of the trial evidence, we agree
20 with the district court that the defendant presented ample evidence that the “R” notation
21 placed on the medical screen of Ayazi’s records in defendant’s computerized human
22 resources database had no effect on the validity of her teaching licenses. On appeal,
4
1 Ayazi identifies perceived inconsistencies in the testimony of the Appellee’s witnesses,
2 most of which appear to stem from confusion regarding the differences between notations
3 appearing on Ayazi’s actual teaching licenses and notations on the Appellee’s
4 computerized database. Because the jury was “free to believe part and disbelieve part of
5 any witness’s testimony,” it cannot be said, even in light of the inconsistencies Ayazi
6 identifies, that the jury was “compelled” to rule in her favor. Id. at 371 (internal
7 quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the
8 reasons set forth by the district court in its February 4, 2013 order denying Ayazi’s Rule
9 50 motion.
10 3. Jury Instruction
11 Finally, Ayazi argues that the district court improperly instructed the jury in the
12 1998 Action that, when deciding whether the defendant constructively revoked her
13 teaching licenses, it was required to consider the licenses collectively, rather than
14 individually. This argument challenges the district court’s denial of Ayazi’s motion for a
15 new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Although generally we review the denial of a
16 Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion, when the basis for the motion is an erroneous jury
17 instruction, our review is de novo. See Velez v. City of New York, 730 F.3d 128, 134
18 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, however, we review Ayazi’s instruction challenge only for plain
19 error because she failed to raise this objection in the district court. See Henry v. Wyeth
20 Pharms., 616 F.3d 134, 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
21 In denying Ayazi’s Rule 59 motion, the district court correctly concluded that the
22 challenged instructions were not plainly erroneous because considering the two licenses
5
1 separately was inconsistent with the theory Ayazi presented at trial. Ayazi has not raised
2 any specific arguments on appeal contesting this conclusion, and we therefore affirm for
3 substantially the reasons set forth by the district court in its February 4, 2013 order.
4 We have considered all of Ayazi’s remaining arguments and conclude that they
5 are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district court.
6
7 FOR THE COURT:
8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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6