Singh v. Garland ( 2022 )

19-3030
Singh v. Garland
BIA
Thompson, IJ
A205 928 500
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 2nd day of March, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
BALBIR SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 19-3030
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond
Hill, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Carl McIntyre,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Brooke
M. Maurer, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Balbir Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of an August 23, 2019 decision of the BIA
affirming a November 14, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and
humanitarian asylum. In re Balbir Singh, No. A 205 928 500
(B.I.A. Aug. 23, 2019), aff’g No. A 205 928 500 (Immig. Ct.
N.Y.C. Nov. 14, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts and procedural history.
We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions
“for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The
applicable standards of review are well established. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195
(2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing factual findings for substantial
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evidence and questions of law de novo).
Where, as here, the agency concludes that an asylum
applicant suffered past persecution, the applicant is
entitled to a presumption of future persecution. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(1) (asylum), 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (withholding of
removal). The burden then shifts to the Government to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a
fundamental change in circumstances in the country of removal
or that the applicant could safely relocate within the country
of removal to avoid future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §§
1208.13(b)(1) (asylum), 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (withholding of
removal); Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2010).
We find no error in the agency’s conclusion that the
Government demonstrated that Singh could internally relocate.
Singh was threatened or attacked by Congress Party
members in 2012 and 2013 near his home in Bhadas, Punjab.
Singh testified that he feared persecution from the Congress
Party due to his Sikh religion and membership in the Mann
Party, but he also acknowledged that the Mann Party had
branches in states across India, that there were large Sikh
populations outside of Punjab, and that the Congress Party
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did not control the federal government or a large number of
state governments. Singh argues that he would face
persecution across the whole of India due to tenant
registration systems that would track his movement and allow
police and Congress Party members to locate and harm him.
But the evidence he relies upon—a 2013 report from the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada—states that tenant
registration “varies from state to state” and “largely it is
non-existent in most cities and states.” Certified
Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 760. Moreover, there is no
indication that Indian authorities use the registration
system to track or persecute Sikhs or Mann Party members.
See Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021). By
contrast, a 2015 report issued by the United Kingdom concluded
that although Sikhs were attacked in the 1980s and may suffer
lingering distrust in some areas, “there is little
discrimination” or “no discrimination” against Indian Sikhs
in the modern day. CAR at 275; see also Singh v. Garland,
11 F.4th at 118 (“An Indian citizen such as Singh is unlikely
to face persecution for his Sikh beliefs and his membership
in [the Mann Party,] and any threat faced by [such an
4
applicant] in India is not country-wide.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Singh has identified no contradictory
country-conditions evidence.
Given evidence that Singh could safely relocate, and that
it would be reasonable to expect him to do so, see Singh v.
Garland, 11 F.4th at 117 (identifying no relocation
difficulties for Sikhs living in India), the agency
reasonably concluded that the Government rebutted the
presumption of future persecution. This finding is
dispositive of Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B); Lecaj v.
Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).
Singh also requested humanitarian asylum, which may be
granted in the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution
if the applicant demonstrates either “compelling reasons for
being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising
out of the severity of the past persecution” or “a reasonable
possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon
removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); see also Matter of
Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A. 1989). Humanitarian
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asylum is granted only “in certain rare cases,” Mirzoyan v.
Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 2006), and in “the
decision-maker’s discretion,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
The agency’s denial of this relief is “conclusive unless
manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 96–
97 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2006). We find no abuse of discretion in
the agency’s decision on this record to deny humanitarian
relief.
For humanitarian asylum based on the severity of past
persecution, the applicant must establish both “severe harm
and the long-lasting effects of that harm.” Jalloh v.
Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Singh asserts that his beatings were “severe
past harm” entitling him to humanitarian asylum and that he
has suffered long-lasting pyschological effects. But in
considering whether the severity of past persecution is
sufficient to warrant granting humanitarian asylum, the
agency considers the “degree of harm suffered by the
applicant” and “the length of time over which the harm was
6
inflicted.” In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 326 (B.I.A.
1998). Singh reported only two physical altercations with
members of the Congress Party, neither of which produced
lasting physical injury. Accordingly, the agency did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that neither the degree
nor duration of Singh’s harm were of a severity that warranted
humanitarian asylum. See, e.g., Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468
F.3d 179, 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (harm not sufficiently
“atrocious” where supporter of Albanian Democratic Party was
beaten and harassed on six occasions).
Finally, Singh alleges that he will suffer “other serious
harm” if he returns to India because of the likely
psychological effects stemming from the harm inflicted on him
in the past. Although Singh provided a social worker’s
evaluation of his condition, which concluded that he had
“symptoms consistent with” post-traumatic stress disorder and
“would suffer severe detriment to his psychological,
emotional, and physical functioning, possibly resulting in a
suicide attempt,” CAR at 210-11, we defer to the agency in
its decision to accord this evidence limited weight. See Y.C.
v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). The agency’s
7
finding that the social worker’s conclusion was speculative
is not clearly erroneous and does not rest on a legal error
because, inter alia, the record is unclear as to the extent
of Singh’s contact with the social worker, and there is no
indication of suicidal ideation in her report or elsewhere in
the record. Apart from three or four conversations with the
social worker prior to preparation of the report, Singh had
not sought any treatment for his psychological issues.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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