Huda v. Garland ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •      20-529
    Huda v. Garland
    BIA
    Lurye, IJ
    A200 815 893
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 3rd day of March, two thousand twenty-two.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    8            PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    9            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   NAJ MUL HUDA,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                     v.                                  20-529
    17                                                         NAC
    18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                   Mahfuzur Rahman, Esq., Elmhurst,
    24                                     NY.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
    27                                     Assistant Attorney General;
    28                                     Daniel E. Goldman, Senior
    1                                    Litigation Counsel; Robbin K.
    2                                    Blaya, Trial Attorney, Office of
    3                                    Immigration Litigation, United
    4                                    States Department of Justice,
    5                                    Washington, DC.
    6         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9   is DENIED.
    10         Petitioner,    Naj   Mul    Huda,   a    native      and    citizen    of
    11   Bangladesh, seeks review of a January 15, 2020, decision of
    12   the BIA affirming a May 7, 2018, decision of an Immigration
    13   Judge   (“IJ”)      denying      Huda’s   application            for    asylum,
    14   withholding   of    removal,     and   relief      under    the    Convention
    15   Against Torture (“CAT”).          In re Naj Mul Huda, No. A200 815
    16   893 (B.I.A. Jan. 15, 2020), aff’g No. A200 815 893 (Immig.
    17   Ct.   N.Y.   City   May    7,    2018).       We   assume    the       parties’
    18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    19         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision including the portions
    20   not explicitly discussed by the BIA.                See Yun-Zui Guan v.
    21   Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 391
    , 394 (2d Cir. 2005).                  We review the
    22   dispositive adverse credibility determination for substantial
    23   evidence.     See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.
    24   Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
    2
    1       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    2   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    3   determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
    4   or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal
    5   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of
    6   such statements with other evidence of record.”             8 U.S.C.
    7   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).       “We       defer . . . to       an      IJ’s
    8   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
    9   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
    10   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”          Xiu Xia Lin
    11   v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei
    12   Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.      Substantial evidence supports the
    13   adverse credibility determination.
    14       The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between
    15   Huda’s hearing testimony and credible fear interview.           See 8
    
    16 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).       As   an   initial   matter,   the
    17   record reflects that the interview record was sufficiently
    18   reliable because the interviewer’s questions were designed to
    19   elicit the details of Huda’s claim, the interviewer asked
    20   follow-up questions and asked Huda if there was additional
    21   information that he wanted to provide, and there was no
    3
    1   indication that Huda was reluctant to reveal information or
    2   that he was confused by the interpreter’s translations.    See
    3   Ming Zhang v. Holder, 
    585 F.3d 715
    , 723–25 (2d Cir. 2009).
    4       The agency was not required to credit Huda’s explanations
    5   that the interviewer mis-transcribed his answers and that the
    6   Bengali interpreter misinterpreted his statements.    Indeed,
    7    the IJ put Huda on notice of the contents of the credible
    8    fear interview nearly two years before he testified, yet Huda
    9    declined to object when the IJ admitted the interview into
    10   evidence;    and he challenged the interpreter’s translation
    11   of his interview answers only when confronted with them during
    12   cross-examination.   A comparison of the interview with Huda’s
    13   later statements reflects substantial inconsistency.      Huda
    14   testified in detail regarding two attacks and a kidnapping he
    15   suffered, none of which he mentioned during the credible fear
    16   interview.   See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (cautioning that
    17   omissions from preliminary statements are not as probative as
    18   “inconsistencies created by direct contradictions,” but that
    19   omission would be probative where “facts are ones the witness
    20   would reasonably have been expected to disclose”) (internal
    21   quotation marks omitted).   These omissions lent considerable
    4
    1   support to the adverse credibility determination because they
    2   concerned “the very persecution from which he sought asylum.”
    3   Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    446 F.3d 289
    , 295 (2d
    4   Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Likai
    5   Gao v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 137
    , 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a
    6   single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing
    7   that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.                      Multiple
    8   inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”).
    9    The agency also properly relied on internal inconsistencies
    10   within Huda’s hearing testimony because he first testified
    11   that he and other supporters of the Bangladeshi National Party
    12   (“BNP”) were attacked by supporters of the rival Awami League,
    13   but later stated that he did not remember who hit him.                     See
    14   
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii)            (credibility   finding      may   be
    15   based   on    “the    internal   consistency”      of   an    applicant’s
    16   statement).
    17       The      agency    also    reasonably     concluded      that    Huda’s
    18   corroborating    evidence      did   not    rehabilitate     his    lack   of
    19   credibility.          An      alien’s      “failure     to    corroborate
    20   his . . . testimony may bear on credibility, because the
    21   absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable
    5
    1   to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
    2   question.”       Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir.
    3   2007).    “We defer to the agency’s determination of the weight
    4   afforded    to    an     alien’s      documentary      evidence.”          Y.C.   v.
    5   Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 334 (2d Cir. 2013).              The agency was
    6   not   required      to       credit    affidavits      from    Huda’s       family,
    7   friends, and BNP allies because the authors were not available
    8   for   cross-examination          and    some    of     them   were    interested
    9   witnesses.       See 
    id.
     (deferring to agency decision to afford
    10   little weight to petitioner's husband's letter because it was
    11   unsworn and from an interested witness); see also In re H-L-
    12   H- & Z-Y-Z-, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 209
    , 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding
    13   letters    from    friends       and   family    insufficient         to   support
    14   alien's claims because the authors were interested witnesses
    15   not subject to cross-examination), overruled on other grounds
    16   by Hui Lin Huang, 677 F.3d at 133-38.                     And Huda’s medical
    17   evidence,    some       of    which    was     vague    and    some    of    which
    18   contradicted      his     hearing      testimony,      did    not    resolve      the
    19   inconsistencies in his statements.                   See Biao Yang, 
    496 F.3d 20
       at 273; see also Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334.
    21
    6
    1       Given the multiple inconsistencies, substantial evidence
    2   supports the adverse credibility determination.   See 8 U.S.C.
    3   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .      This
    4   adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,
    5   withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
    6   claims arose from the same factual predicate.     See Paul v.
    7   Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    8       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    9   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    10   stays VACATED.
    11                               FOR THE COURT:
    12                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    13                               Clerk of Court
    7