Boda v. Garland ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •      20-4258
    Boda v. Garland
    BIA
    Schoppert, IJ
    A206 562 606
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 3rd day of March, two thousand twenty-two.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            GERARD E. LYNCH,
    8            RAYMOND J LOHIER, JR.,
    9            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   FRANCOIS BODA,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                     v.                                  20-4258
    17                                                         NAC
    18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                   Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York,
    24                                     NY.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
    27                                     Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
    28                                     Assistant Director; Monica G.
    1                                    Antoun, Trial Attorney, Office of
    2                                    Immigration Litigation, United
    3                                    States Department of Justice,
    4                                    Washington, DC.
    5          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    8    is DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
    9           Petitioner Francois Boda, a native and citizen of the
    10   Central African Republic, seeks review of a December 9, 2020,
    11   decision of the BIA affirming a November 1, 2018, decision of
    12   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of
    13   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    14   (“CAT”).    In re Francois Boda, No. A206 562 606 (B.I.A. Dec.
    15   9, 2020), aff’g No. A206 562 606 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov.
    16   1, 2018).        We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    17   underlying facts and procedural history.
    18          We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the
    19   BIA.    See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 20
       520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).            For the following reasons, we
    21   dismiss    the   petition   as    to    asylum   and   deny   it   as   to
    22   withholding of removal and CAT protection.
    2
    1        Our   jurisdiction     to   review     the     agency’s         findings
    2   regarding the timeliness of an asylum application and the
    3   circumstances    excusing    the   untimeliness         is     limited    to
    4   constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C.
    5   §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D).          In the present case, we lack
    6   jurisdiction to review the denial of asylum because Boda
    7   challenges the agency’s factual determination that his 11-
    8   month delay in filing after the overthrow of the government
    9   in his home country that prompted his fear of return was
    10   unreasonable.    See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 471
    
    11 F.3d 315
    , 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e remain deprived of
    12   jurisdiction . . . when the petition for review essentially
    13   disputes the correctness of an IJ's fact-finding or the wisdom
    14   of   his   exercise   of    discretion.”);        see   also     8    U.S.C.
    15   §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D), (3); 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4
    (a)(4)(ii),
    16   (a)(5).    Although Boda asserts the agency overlooked country
    17   conditions evidence, he does not identify evidence the agency
    18   failed to consider.    See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 336 n.17
    19   (“[W]e presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the
    20   evidence before him, unless the record compellingly suggests
    21   otherwise.”).
    3
    1         We deny the petition as to withholding of removal and
    2   CAT protection.    An applicant bears the burden of proving his
    3   eligibility for relief with credible testimony and reasonably
    4   available    corroboration.      
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i),
    5   (ii), 1231(b)(3)(C); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2).                 We find no
    6   error in the agency’s conclusion that Boda failed to meet his
    7   burden of proof.
    8         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    9   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    10   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
    11   the    applicant . . . ,       the        consistency     between      the
    12   applicant’s . . . written      and       oral   statements . . . ,     the
    13   internal    consistency   of   each      such     statement,   [and]   the
    14   consistency of such statements with other evidence of record
    15   . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy,
    16   or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
    17   any other relevant factor.”          
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    18   “We   defer . . . to      an   IJ’s       credibility     determination
    19   unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could
    20   make such an adverse credibility ruling.”               Xiu Xia Lin v.
    4
    1   Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei
    2   Gao v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
    3        We defer to the IJ’s conclusion that Boda’s demeanor
    4   undermined his credibility given his vague testimony about
    5   his work for the New York embassy of the Central African
    6   Republic and his knowledge of the current government.                        See
    7   Karaj v. Gonzales, 
    462 F.3d 113
    , 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (giving
    8    “particular   deference”      to    demeanor          findings        (internal
    9    quotation marks omitted)).          That finding, and the adverse
    10   credibility   determination    as       a    whole,       were   bolstered   by
    11   inconsistencies regarding whether Boda lived at the embassy,
    12   how he was paid, and whether he had siblings.                    See 8 U.S.C.
    13   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
    14   
    453 F.3d 99
    , 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We                      can be . . . more
    15   confident in our review of observations about an applicant’s
    16   demeanor where . . . they are supported by specific examples
    17   of   inconsistent   testimony.”).                 Those    findings     provide
    18   substantial      evidence     for           the     adverse       credibility
    19   determination.    See Likai Gao v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 137
    , 145 n.8
    20   (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude
    21   an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him
    5
    1   credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even
    2   more forcefully.”).
    3          Moreover, Boda did not rehabilitate his credibility with
    4   reliable corroboration.         See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 5
       268,    273   (2d    Cir.     2007)    (“An       applicant’s          failure   to
    6   corroborate     his . . . testimony           may     bear    on       credibility,
    7   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
    8   applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
    9   been called into question.”).              The agency reasonably afforded
    10   minimal weight to the family letters, particularly given
    11   Boda’s inconsistent statements about whether he had siblings.
    12   See Y.C. v. Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013)
    13   (holding      that    “[w]e    generally          defer      to    the    agency’s
    14   evaluation     of    the   weight     to    be    afforded        an   applicant’s
    15   documentary evidence” and upholding BIA’s decision to afford
    16   little weight to letter from applicant’s spouse); Matter of
    17   H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 209
    , 215 (B.I.A. 2010)
    18   (finding letters from relatives and friends did not provide
    19   substantial support for claim where authors were “interested
    20   witnesses . . . not           subject            to    cross-examination”),
    21   overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677
    6
    
    1 F.3d 130
     (2d Cir. 2012).        And the pay stub Boda submitted did
    2   not confirm his employment with the embassy in the United
    3   States.
    4       Accordingly,       absent    credible       testimony   or       reliable
    5   corroboration, the agency did not err in concluding that Boda
    6   could     not   meet   his   burden       of   proof.    See     8     U.S.C.
    7   §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),            1231(b)(3)(C);             8         C.F.R.
    8   § 1208.16(c)(2).        That    determination       is   dispositive      of
    9   withholding of removal and CAT relief because both forms of
    10   relief were based on the same discredited factual predicate.
    11   See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    12       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DISMISSED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.              All pending motions
    14   and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
    15                                     FOR THE COURT:
    16                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    17                                     Clerk of Court
    7