Edible Arrangements International, Inc. v. Chinsammy , 446 F. App'x 332 ( 2011 )


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  • 10-3214-cv
    Edible Arrangements v. Incredible Franchise
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
    BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE
    32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A
    PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
    THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
    COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
    York, on the 3rd day of November, two thousand eleven.
    PRESENT:
    ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    DENNY CHIN,
    Circuit Judges.
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    EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    -v.-                                10-3214-cv
    RICHARD CHINSAMMY,
    Defendant-Cross Defendant,
    INCREDIBLE EDIBLE DELITES, INC., MAUREEN
    DUGERT, RM INVESTMENTS, LLC,
    Defendants,
    INCREDIBLE FRANCHISE CORP.,
    Defendant-Cross Claimant-Appellee.
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    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:      NANCY FITZPATRICK MYERS, Lynch,
    Traub, Keefe & Errante, P.C.,
    New Haven, Connecticut.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:       JOHN J. JACKO, III (Alan S.
    Fellheimer, on the brief),
    Fellheimer & Eichen LLP, New York,
    New York.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.).    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION,
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of
    the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Plaintiff-appellant Edible Arrangements International,
    Inc. ("Edible Arrangements") appeals from the district court's
    judgment entered July 14, 2010, awarding it damages of $150,000
    and denying its claim for punitive damages.    The judgment was
    entered following the jury's award of $150,000 in damages to
    Edible Arrangements and the denial, by the district court in a
    memorandum decision entered May 25, 2010, of its motion for
    punitive damages.   We assume the parties' familiarity with the
    underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
    issues on appeal.
    "We review a district court's decision not to award
    punitive damages for abuse of discretion."    Ragin v. Harry
    Macklowe Real Estate Co., 
    6 F.3d 898
    , 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
    McCann v. Coughlin, 
    698 F.2d 112
    , 127 (2d Cir. 1983)).    See also
    Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
    492 U.S. 257
    , 279 (1989) (holding court of appeals should review
    district court's determination regarding punitive damages under
    abuse-of-discretion standard).    Edible Arrangements' claim that
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    the district court's denial of punitive damages implicates its
    Seventh Amendment rights does not change the standard of review.
    See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 
    532 U.S. 424
    , 433, 437-48 (2001) ("If no constitutional issue is raised,
    the role of the appellate court    . . . is to review the trial
    court's determination [regarding punitive damages] under an
    abuse-of-discretion standard." (internal citation and quotation
    marks omitted)).   "Because the jury's award of punitive damages
    does not constitute a finding of 'fact,'" a trial court's
    determination regarding punitive damages "does not implicate
    . . . Seventh Amendment concerns."      
    Id. at 437
    .
    We have reviewed the record in light of these
    principles.   We affirm the district court's denial of Edible
    Arrangements' motion for punitive damages for substantially the
    reasons articulated by the district court.
    Specifically, the jury found defendant-appellee
    Incredible Franchise Corporation ("IFC") liable only on a claim
    of unjust enrichment.   Under Connecticut law, however, an award
    of punitive damages in these circumstances is impermissible, and
    thus the jury's verdict that an assessment of punitive damages
    was warranted contravened Connecticut law.
    "In a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where
    state law provides the basis of decision, the propriety of an
    award of punitive damages for the conduct in question . . . [is
    a] question[] of state law."   Browning-Ferris Indus., 
    492 U.S. at 278
    .   Punitive damages in Connecticut are limited to litigation
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    expenses and "serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his
    injuries."    Berry v. Loiseau, 
    614 A.2d 414
    , 435 (Conn. 1992).
    The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized that "in the light
    of the increasing costs of litigation," punitive damages can also
    "punish and deter wrongful conduct."     
    Id.
    In Connecticut, however, punitive damages are not
    ordinarily available in a breach of contract case unless the
    breach is "founded on tortious conduct."       L.F. Pace & Sons, Inc.
    v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
    514 A.2d 766
    , 776 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
    See also Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 
    222 A.2d 220
    , 225 (Conn. 1966).    A claim of unjust enrichment is a quasi-
    contract claim for which the right to recovery is "essentially
    equitable."    Meaney v. Conn. Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 
    735 A.2d 813
    ,
    819-20 (Conn. 1999) (internal citations omitted).       Relief comes
    in the form of restitution measured in terms of a theoretical
    contract price -- in other words, "the precise amount for which
    the defendant would have been liable if there had been an
    enforceable contract."    Id. at 821.
    Here, despite finding liability only on the unjust
    enrichment claim, the jury still awarded punitive damages against
    IFC.   Further, Edible Arrangements failed to prove any underlying
    tortious conduct sufficient to warrant punitive damages.       See
    L.F. Pace & Sons, 514 A.2d at 776.      The jury's limited finding
    with respect to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
    ("CUTPA") -- that IFC had engaged in an unfair trade practice
    that was deceptive -- did not create a basis for an award of
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    punitive damages because the jury did not find that IFC's acts
    proximately caused Edible Arrangements to suffer an
    "ascertainable loss."   See Larobina v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 
    821 A.2d 283
    , 288 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) ("[T]o be entitled to any
    relief under CUTPA, a plaintiff must first prove that he has
    suffered an 'ascertainable loss' due to a CUTPA violation."
    (emphasis in the original) (citing Hinchliffe v. American Motors
    Corp., 
    440 A.2d 810
    , 815 (Conn. 1981))).    Thus, the district
    court correctly concluded that the jury's award of punitive
    damages on the unjust enrichment count contravened Connecticut
    law.1
    We note that the jury's award was likely due to the
    fact that both the jury charge and the special verdict form
    failed to instruct the jury that it could not award punitive
    damages on the unjust enrichment count.2   The district court,
    1
    Edible Arrangements cites two cases for the contention
    that punitive damages involving equitable claims are nevertheless
    appropriate under Connecticut law. These cases are
    distinguishable as both involved an underlying tort and not a
    contract or quasi-contract claim. See Waterbury Petroleum
    Prods., Inc. v. Canaan Oil and Fuel Co., Inc., 
    477 A.2d 988
    , 990
    (Conn. 1984); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 
    234 A.2d 825
    , 828
    (Conn. 1967). The parties offer no Connecticut cases that
    squarely address an award of punitive damages on an unjust
    enrichment claim. We have only found one. See Withers Bergman,
    LLP v. New England Personnel of Hartford, LLC, No. CV054007037,
    
    2007 WL 1193165
    , at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 5, 2007) (denying
    recovery of punitive damages on a breach of contract claim and an
    unjust enrichment claim noting that the plaintiff conceded that
    such claims do not support an award of punitive damages).
    2
    Specifically, the jury charge stated that "if you've
    awarded compensatory damages in this case on any of the
    Plaintiff's claims, then you must also determine whether an award
    of punitive damages may be assessed against IFC." (Trial Tr. 92,
    April 14, 2010). Similarly, the special verdict form explained
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    however, in denying the motion for punitive damages, caught this
    error and corrected it before entering judgment for Edible
    Arrangements.   A trial court certainly may correct a legal error
    of its own, prior to or even after entering a final judgment.
    Cf. In re 310 Assocs., 
    346 F.3d 31
    , 35 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
    that motions for relief from judgment or order brought under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provide means for "a
    district court to correct legal errors by the court" (internal
    citation omitted)); Schildhaus v. Moe, 
    335 F.2d 529
    , 531 (2d Cir.
    1964) ("[T]here is indeed good sense in permitting the trial
    court to correct its own error . . . ; no good purpose is served
    by requiring the parties to appeal to a higher court, often
    requiring remand for further trial proceedings, when the trial
    court is equally able to correct its decision in the light of new
    authority . . . ." (internal citation omitted)); McDowell v.
    Celebrezze, 
    310 F.2d 43
    , 44 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Overburdened
    courts, trial and appellate, should not have to squander precious
    time and resources in such artificial maneuvers where the Judge
    on his own and in time faces up to the error and corrects it by
    effective action.").
    Here, the district court acted properly and "within the
    permissible scope of discretion" to correct its error and deny
    Edible Arrangements' motion for punitive damages.   See Aczel v.
    that if the jury answered affirmatively on certain questions,
    including the last interrogatory under the unjust enrichment
    count, it should proceed to the questions on compensatory and
    punitive damages.
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    Labonia, 
    584 F.3d 52
    , 59 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district
    court's striking of compensatory damages awarded by jury that
    also found defendant entitled to qualified immunity).
    Further, we conclude that ordering a new trial
    altogether or ordering a trial limited to damages, as is often
    done when a jury verdict is deemed excessive, see Tingley Sys.,
    Inc. v. Norse Sys., Inc., 
    49 F.3d 93
    , 96 (2d Cir. 1995), would be
    of no use here.   We have previously found that there is no point
    in ordering a new trial where such a trial would result "in the
    same outcome," making any previous error of the court an "error
    without consequence."   
    Id.
       Here, a new trial would not change
    the outcome: if punitive damages are not available on an unjust
    enrichment claim, then the jury charge and special verdict form
    would so instruct, and Edible Arrangements would still not
    receive an award of punitive damages on the unjust enrichment
    count.
    We have considered appellant's other arguments on
    appeal and have found them to be without merit.   Accordingly, the
    judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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