Wayne County Employees' Retirement System v. Dimon , 629 F. App'x 14 ( 2015 )


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  •      14-3245
    Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v. Dimon et al.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 16th day of October, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    8                              Circuit Judges.
    9                GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD,*
    10                              District Judge.
    11
    12       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    13       WAYNE COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
    14       SYSTEM,
    15                Plaintiff-Appellant,
    16
    17                    -v.-                                               14-3245
    18
    19       JAMES S. DIMON et al.,
    20                Defendants-Appellees.
    21       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    22
    *
    The Honorable Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States
    District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by
    designation.
    1
    1   FOR APPELLANT:             JOSEPH D. DALEY, ROBBINS GELLER
    2                              RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, San Diego,
    3                              California.
    4
    5   FOR APPELLEES:             DARYL A. LIBOW (with Richard C.
    6                              Pepperman, II & Christopher
    7                              Michael Viapiano on the brief)
    8                              SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP,
    9                              Washington, DC.
    10
    11        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    12   Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.).
    13
    14        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    15   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    16   AFFIRMED.
    17
    18        Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System (“Wayne
    19   County”) appeals from the judgment of the United States
    20   District Court for the Southern District of New York
    21   (Daniels, J.), dismissing its complaint pursuant to Rule
    22   23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We assume the
    23   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
    24   procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
    25
    26        Although Rule 23.1 is a “rule of pleading that creates
    27   a federal standard as to the specificity of facts alleged,”
    28   the “adequacy of those efforts is to be determined by state
    29   law.” RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 
    928 F.2d 1318
    , 1330
    30   (2d Cir. 1991). Since JPMorgan Chase (“JPMorgan”) is a
    31   Delaware corporation, this appeal is governed by Delaware
    32   law.
    33
    34        Wayne County contends that it has properly pled demand
    35   futility because a majority of JPMorgan’s Board of Directors
    36   (“Board”) consciously disregarded pertinent indicators of
    37   business risk and thereby failed to properly exercise their
    38   oversight duties. These allegations plead Board inaction
    39   and are therefore analyzed under Rales v. Blasband, 
    634 A.2d 40
      927, 933-34 (Del. 1993). Wayne County’s complaint directly
    41   implicates the theory of liability articulated in In re
    42   Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
    698 A.2d 959
    , 968
    43   (Del. Ch. 1996). See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation
    44   v. Ritter, 
    911 A.2d 362
    , 370 (Del. 2006) (“We hold that
    45   Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for
    46   director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly
    47   failed to implement any reporting or information system or
    2
    1   controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or
    2   controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its
    3   operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of
    4   risks or problems requiring their attention.”).
    5   Accordingly, “[w]here directors fail to act in the face of a
    6   known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious
    7   disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty
    8   of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation
    9   in good faith.” Id.; see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder
    10   Derivative Litig., 
    964 A.2d 106
    , 123 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Thus,
    11   to establish oversight liability a plaintiff must show that
    12   the directors knew they were not discharging their fiduciary
    13   obligations or that the directors demonstrated a conscious
    14   disregard for their responsibilities such as by failing to
    15   act in the face of a known duty to act. The test is rooted
    16   in concepts of bad faith; indeed, a showing of bad faith is
    17   a necessary condition to director oversight liability.”).1
    18
    19        The standards governing the pleading of Caremark claims
    20   are exacting. See 
    Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971
    (“[O]nly a
    21   sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
    22   oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
    23   reasonable information and reporting system exists—will
    24   establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
    25   condition to liability.”). And that considerable threshold
    26   is raised when, as here, the claims involve a failure to
    27   monitor business risk, as opposed to legal risk. See
    28   
    Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131
    (“While it may be tempting to say
    29   that directors have the same duties to monitor and oversee
    30   business risk, imposing Caremark-type duties on directors to
    31   monitor business risk is fundamentally different.”). Thus,
    32   “[a]ssuming excessive risk-taking at some level becomes the
    33   misconduct contemplated by Caremark, the plaintiff would
    34   essentially have to show that the board . . . consciously
    35   disregarded red flags signaling that the company’s employees
    36   were taking facially improper, and not just ex-post ill-
    37   advised or even bone-headed, business risks. Such bad-faith
    38   indifference would be formidably difficult to prove.” In re
    39   Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011
    
    40 WL 4826104
    at *22 n.217 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). “Even a
    41   showing of gross negligence by a majority of the Board will
    1
    The exculpation clause in the JPMorgan Charter is
    irrelevant here because it does not immunize actions taken
    in bad faith, which is a prerequisite for director oversight
    liability.
    3
    1   not suffice.” In re SAIC Inc. Derivative Litig., 
    948 F. 2
      Supp. 2d 366, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d Welch v.
    3   Havenstein, 553 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2014). In short, a
    4   Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in
    5   corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
    6   judgment.” 
    Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967
    .
    7
    8        Wayne County’s pleading does not satisfy the
    9   requirements for alleging a Caremark claim predicated on
    10   failed oversight of business risk. The complaint cites
    11   instances in which warning signs of excessive risk reached
    12   members of the Board, and identifies members of the Board
    13   who received particular warnings. But Wayne County cannot
    14   sustain its burden by relying on red flags that reached a
    15   single Board member or a minority of the Board: “Delaware
    16   law does not permit the wholesale imputation of one
    17   director’s knowledge to every other for demand excusal
    18   purposes.” Desimone v. Barrows, 
    924 A.2d 908
    , 943 (Del. Ch.
    19   2007).
    20
    21        The complaint does allege that some warnings reached
    22   the majority of the Board; but the most urgent signs were
    23   given in a single quarter in which an audit report was
    24   prepared and delivered, and the severe loss followed the
    25   audit report by a few days or a couple weeks. Thus, even if
    26   there were red flags warning of facially improper business
    27   risk, the warning signs were not received, let alone
    28   ignored, over a sustained period of time. Wayne County has
    29   not pled a “sustained or systematic failure of the [B]oard
    30   to exercise oversight.” 
    Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971
    .
    31
    32        Nor may we substantively evaluate the magnitude of
    33   business risk JPMorgan was facing with the benefit of
    34   hindsight. See Goldman Sachs, 
    2011 WL 4826104
    at *22 (“If
    35   an actionable duty to monitor business risk exists, it
    36   cannot encompass any substantive evaluation by a court of a
    37   board’s determination of the appropriate amount of risk.
    38   Such decisions plainly involve business judgment.”).
    39
    40        Finally, Wayne County’s argument that the district
    41   court erred in denying it leave to amend its complaint must
    42   also be rejected given that the length and fulness of this
    43   complaint does not appear to have been abbreviated, or
    44   foreshortened.
    45
    46
    47
    4
    1        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
    2   Wayne County’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the
    3   judgment of the district court.
    4
    5                              FOR THE COURT:
    6                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    7
    5