United States v. Borrero , 630 F. App'x 20 ( 2015 )

14-4115-cr
United States v. Borrero
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
10th day of November , two thousand and fifteen.
Present:
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
PETER W. HALL,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges,
____________________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 14-4115-cr
LOUIS BORRERO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant: GLENN A. GARBER, P.C., New York, NY.
For Appellee: RAHUL MUKHI, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York (Brian A. Jacobs, Assistant United States
Attorney, on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
____________________________________________________
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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Forrest, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
On November 12, 2013, Defendant Louis Borrero was convicted by a jury of conspiring
to distribute and possessing with the intent to distribute over one kilogram of heroin in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(b)(1)(A), conspiring to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and carrying or possessing a firearm in relation to these crimes, or aiding
and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The offenses stemmed from a
DEA sting operation designed to halt a series of violent robberies of drug dealers committed by a
group that called itself the “Crew.” Following conviction, Borrero was sentenced to 324 months
imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues
presented on appeal.
Borrero first contends that the court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of his
co-defendant Victor Moral, who later became a cooperating witness. Moral testified that
Borrero’s co-conspirator, Julio Camacho, had informed him prior to the robbery that Borrero was
a “wild boy” who “gets busy” and that Camacho had “work[ed]” with Borrero “before.” JA 412.
Moral testified that he interpreted Camacho’s statements to mean that Borrero was capable of
going into victims’ houses and tying people up and that he had done so in previous robberies
with Camacho.
Borrero asserts that it was error to admit Moral’s testimony because (1) the testimony
was unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; (2) Moral did not have sufficient
personal knowledge to provide a lay opinion as to the meaning of Camacho’s statements, see
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Fed. R. Evid. 701, 602; and (3) admission of the statements violated the Confrontation Clause.
Because Borrero did not raise any of these arguments below, our review is solely for plain error.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Borrero’s arguments are not persuasive. Although Camacho’s statements regarding
Borrero’s willingness to participate in the robbery were indeed prejudicial, they were also highly
probative of Borrero’s planned role in the crime as understood by Camacho, who was widely
acknowledged to be one of the conspiracy’s ring leaders.1 See United States v. Borrero, No. 13
CR. 58 KBF, 2013 WL 5797126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013) (noting that Camacho’s
statements were “plainly designed to assure other potential crew members of the strengths and
skill sets of crew members,” including Borrero). Despite the implication that Borrero was
involved in other uncharged crimes, the statements were “needed to explain the basis of the
relationship [between Borrero and the Camachos] and [to] provide[] background for the jury’s
understanding as to how and why there [was] trust by the Camachos in Borrero’s skills.” Id. at
*5. Any past criminal acts referenced in Camacho’s statements were not “any more sensational
or disturbing” than the crimes with which Borrero was charged. United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d
1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992).
Moral’s testimony regarding his interpretation of Camacho’s statements was based on his
personal knowledge and was helpful to the jury’s understanding. A lay witness’s relevant fact
testimony is admissible so long as “evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Here, Moral had personal
knowledge of Camacho’s statements because he participated in the conversation about which he
later testified. See United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding admission
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Borrero does not appeal the trial court’s determination that Camacho’s statements, as
elicited through Moral’s testimony, were admissible as statements by a co-conspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).
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of witness’s testimony regarding meaning of conversations where witnesses “had first-hand
knowledge of the conversations”).
Under Evidence Rule 701, opinion testimony of a lay witness is admissible when it is “(a)
rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Moral’s testimony was rationally based
on his association with the Camacho brothers, and the testimony assisted the jury in
understanding ambiguous or slang terms such as “wild boy,” and “get[ting] busy,” and also
Camacho’s vague assertion that he had “work[ed]” with Borrero “before.” See United States v.
Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding admission of lay opinion testimony that
clarified “ambiguous references to events that [were] clear only to the conversants” (alteration
omitted)).
Finally, the admission of Moral’s testimony pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) did not violate
Borrero’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. The “co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule is steeped in our jurisprudence,” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987), and
admission of such testimony does not require the unavailability of the declarant or a judicial
finding of reliability in order to comport with the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 183–84.
Accordingly, Borrero’s arguments that the Camacho brothers’ unavailability to testify and
Moral’s unreliability as a witness undermined his confrontation rights are inapposite.2
Moreover, “statements [made] in furtherance of a conspiracy” are “by their nature . . . not
2
Borrero had ample opportunity effectively and thoroughly to challenge Moral’s
credibility on cross-examination. Ultimately, it was for the jury to decide the weight to give
Moral’s testimony. See Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 58 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A]ssessment of [a
witness’s] credibility is within the province of the jury alone.”).
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testimonial” and thus do not implicate the protections of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
Borrero also contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “A sentencing
judge has very wide latitude to decide the proper degree of punishment for an individual offender
and a particular crime.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). “[W]e will
not substitute our own judgment for the district court’s on the question of what is sufficient to
meet the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) considerations in any particular case.” Id. at 189. Instead, we
will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the
trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Based on an Offense Level of 37 and a Criminal History Category of VI (and his Career
Offender status), Borrero’s guideline range was 420 months (35 years) to life. In determining
the sentence, the court took into account the seriousness of the “large-scale violent armed
robbery” that Borrero and his co-defendants had planned, though not executed, and the fact that
they possessed the “tools of the trade,” including guns, police gear, and ski masks. JA 839.
Further, the court noted that Borrero himself came into possession of two of the guns prior to the
robbery and credited the testimony at trial that he “was part of a robbery crew” that had
participated in violent robberies in the past. JA 839. The court also considered Borrero’s
extensive criminal history and his admission that he supported himself financially with criminal
activity for a period of at least two years. At the same time, the court believed that a sentence at
the bottom of the guidelines range would be greater than necessary to punish the offense
conduct, particularly considering the relatively lighter sentences received by Borrero’s co-
defendants. The court sentenced Borrero to 324 months (27 years) of imprisonment, eight years
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less than the minimum of the guidelines range and two years higher than the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence of 25 years.
The trial court thoughtfully considered each of the § 3553(a) factors, and its sentence was
substantively reasonable. The disparity between the sentences of Borrero and co-defendants was
justified in light of Borrero’s extensive criminal history and his decision, unique among his co-
defendants, to go to trial.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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