Walker v. Schult , 717 F.3d 119 ( 2013 )

12-1806-cv
Walker v. Schult
U NITED S TATES C OURT OF A PPEALS
FOR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT
August Term 2012
(Argued: January 30, 2013 Decided: May 23, 2013)
Docket No. 12-1806-cv
________________________
E LLIS W ALKER ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D EBORAH G. S CHULT , Warden, FCI Ray Brook, R USSELL P ERDUE , Warden,
FCI Ray Brook, D AVID S ALAMY , Unit Manager, FCI Ray Brook,
S EPANEK , Counselor, FCI Ray Brook, D AVID P ORTER , Associate
Warden, FCI Ray Brook, A NNE M ARY C ARTER , Associate Warden, FCI
Ray Brook, S TEVEN W AGNER , Associate Warden, FCI Ray Brook,
J.L. N ORWOOD , Regional Director, H ARLEY L APPIN , Director,
Bureau of Prisons,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Before:
W ESLEY and C HIN , Circuit Judges,
and L ARIMER , District Judge. *
Appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn,
*
The Honorable David G. Larimer, of the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York, sitting by
designation.
J.), entered on March 27, 2012, granting defendants-
appellees' motion to dismiss plaintiff -appellant's
complaint alleging that his conditions of confinement
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED.
J OHN D. C ASTIGLIONE (Kyle L. Wallace,
Noreen A. Kelly-Dynega, Natalie M.
Georges, on the brief), Latham &
Watkins LLP, New York, New York, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
P AULA R YAN C ONAN , Assistant United
States Attorney (Charles E. Roberts,
Assistant United States Attorney, on
the brief), for Richard S.
Hartunian, United States Attorney
for the Northern District of New
York, Syracuse, New York, for
Defendants-Appellees.
C HIN , Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Ellis Walker brought this
action below pro se, alleging that the conditions of his
confinement in the Federal Correctional Institution in Ray
Brook, New York ("FCI Ray Brook") amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The United States District Court for the Northern District
-2-
of New York (Kahn, J.) granted defendants-appellees' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Walker appeals.
We conclude that Walker's complaint plausibly
alleged violations of his constitutional rights, except as
to two defendants. We therefore affirm in part and vacate
in part and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
The following facts are drawn from Walker's pro se
complaint, and we assume them to be true for purposes of
this appeal. On November 18, 2008, while Walker was an
inmate at FCI Ray Brook, he was placed in a six-man cell.
Compl. ¶ 1. The cell was approximately 170 to 174 square
feet in size, providing each prisoner with 28 to 29 square
feet of total space, and "less than 6-square feet moving
space," which was not enough space "to even turn or move in
the 6-man cell." Id. ¶ 4 & n.3. In addition to the six
prisoners, the cell contained their bunk beds, their
belongings, two toilets, and two sinks. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8, 19.
The prisoners were required to be in their cells each day
-3-
from approximately 9:15 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., and for 45 -
minute periods each mid-morning and mid-afternoon. Id.
¶ 23.
Walker, who is 6'4" tall and weighs 255 pounds,
was assigned to one of the top bunk beds for four months.
Id. ¶ 4 n.3. The bed itself was only twenty-eight inches
wide -- four inches narrower than what guards told Walker
was the required width of beds -- which forced Walker "to
sleep on his side; rotating back and forth." Id. ¶ 7 &
n.4. There were no ladders to climb up to the top bunks ;
Walker had to climb onto a chair and then onto another
inmate's locker to reach his bed. Id. ¶ 8. Once, when
climbing up to his bed, Walker fell onto the chair, which
"broke [his] fall to the floor." Id. ¶ 9. If, when
climbing up to his bed, he knocked another inmate's
property off a locker, it "would lead to arguments and
possibly fights." Id. ¶ 8.
Walker's cellmates included gang members, non -gang
members, and men of different races. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 11, 12.
Mixing inmates from different backgrounds caused
"insurmountable problems," including fights, friction, and
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violence throughout the prison. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 11, 12.
The "overcrowding, gang activities, violence . . . [and]
fights" in the cell placed Walker "in a situation to kill
or be killed." Id. ¶ 12. Further, because the cell was so
crowded and noisy, the prison guards would not know when
prisoners were fighting unless another prisoner alerted
them. Id. ¶ 13.
Walker's five cellmates stayed up all night
watching television and playing games, which led to
"hollering, screaming and sometimes fights." Id. ¶ 15. In
addition, his cellmates "constantly" had other prisoners
running into the cell "using the toilet/sink and making
noise." Id. ¶ 22. Walker got "almost no sleep" and was
"tired most of the time," because "[t]he noise inside the
cell [was] constant and loud." Id. ¶ 14. Walker got so
little sleep that there was "no way [he] could work on a
job 8 hours/day without hurting himself or someone else. "
Id. ¶ 16.
Walker's cell was also unsanitary, with so much
"urine . . . on the floor and sometimes . . . on the
toilet" that the toilet required cleaning "[a]t least 15 -20
-5-
times per day." Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Walker's cellmates warned
him that "urin[e] or defecat[ion] would splatter to the
floor." Id. ¶ 19. The inmates were not provided
sufficient cleaning supplies or equipment to keep the
toilet and surrounding area clean. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. Thus,
Walker had to use his personal soap and dishwashing liquid
to clean the toilets and cell. Id. ¶¶ 18-20 & n.5.
Finally, Walker's cell was inadequately
ventilated, such that "during the winter the cell [was]
cold and [during the] summer months extremely hot and quite
difficult to breathe." Id. ¶ 21. 1
1
In Walker's opposition to defendants' motion to
dismiss, he further alleged:
The ventilation in the six man [cell] was
the same as it was when the six man cell was
a two man cell. The ventilation was so bad
in the summer months [that] Schult[] would
send out memo[]s to the units to have the
food slot[] door[s] open so air could flow
through the cells. In the winter the cell
windows have ice two to four inch[e]s thick
on the inside of the six man cell.
Plaintiff had to make his bunk short because
if not my feet would freeze from the ice
that came out of the window frame and the
bunk was maybe six inch[e]s from the
windows. The cell stayed cold and everybody
in the six man cell would go to bed with
hats on or fully dressed in the winter
months.
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Walker still resided in the six-man cell when he
filed his complaint on March 16, 2011 -- nearly twenty-
eight months after having been placed there on November 18,
2008. 2 For Walker, the experience of being in the six-man
cell was "horrifying." Id. ¶ 23.
According to Walker, defendants were aware of and
did nothing to remedy the conditions in his cell. FCI Ray
Brook wardens Deborah G. Schult and Russell Perdue, 3
associate wardens David Porter, Anne Mary Carter, and
Steven Wagner, unit manager David Salamy, and counselor
Sepanek each "knew of the overcrowding, gang activities,
[and] violence in the cells" and the physical danger that
Pl.'s Opp. at 11, Walker v. Schult, No. 11 Civ. 0287 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 24, 2011), ECF No. 29. A district court deciding a motion
to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se
party in his papers opposing the motion. See, e.g., Gill v.
Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering a pro
se plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to a motion to dismiss in
addition to those in the complaint).
2
At some point after he filed the complaint, Walker was
transferred from FCI Ray Brook to another institution, Allenwood
Medium Federal Correctional Institution.
3
On appeal, Walker explains that he named both Schult
and Perdue in the complaint because the wardenship at FCI Ray
Brook changed while he was incarcerated there. On February 13,
2011, Schult left FCI Ray Brook and Perdue became the new
warden.
-7-
Walker faced. 4 Id. ¶ 12. Walker informed Schult, Sepanek,
Salamy, Porter, and Carter that his bed was too narrow for
him, but he received no response. Id. ¶ 7. Further,
defendants were "fully aware that the noise in the unit
[was] so loud and constant," id. ¶ 13, and that the cell
was inadequately ventilated, id. ¶ 21. Finally, Sepanek,
whose job it was to issue cleaning supplies, failed to do
so. Id. ¶ 18 n.5.
Walker pursued his administrative remedies, but
alleged that defendants interfered with and obstructed his
efforts to obtain relief. Id. ¶¶ 24-27.
B. Procedural History
On March 16, 2011, Walker, proceeding pro se,
filed the instant action alleging that defendants violated
4
Although the complaint also named Bureau of Prisons
director Harley Lappin and regional director J.L. Norwood,
Walker does not appeal the dismissal of his claims against these
two defendants. We affirm the dismissal of his claims against
Lappin and Norwood because he did not assert that they were
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.
See Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010)
("[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under §
1983.").
-8-
his constitutional rights while he was imprisoned at FCI
Ray Brook. 5
On August 25, 2011, defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint based on (1) Walker's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; (2) Walker's failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; (3) Walker's
failure to allege defendants' personal involvement in the
constitutional violations; and (4) qualified immunity.
By report and recommendation filed on January 20,
2012, Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece recommended
dismissing Walker's complaint for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Magistrate Judge noted that
he was unable to properly assess whether Walker fully
exhausted his available administrative remedies or whether
defendants should be estopped from asserting failure to
exhaust as an affirmative defense. With respect to
5
Although Walker used the forms associated with civil
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to file his complaint, the
district court properly construed his claims -- asserted against
federal officials -- pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See
Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that
district court liberally construed plaintiff's § 1983 lawsuit as
a Bivens action).
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Walker's allegation that his cell lacked a ladder to access
his top bunk bed, the Magistrate Judge recommended in the
alternative granting the motion to dismiss on qualifi ed
immunity grounds. The Magistrate Judge also recommended
dismissing the claims against Sepanek and Lappin for
failure to serve them. 6
6
Walker received permission to proceed in forma
pauperis. Generally, a pro se litigant proceeding in forma
pauperis is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshals Service to
effect service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the
court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [in forma
pauperis] cases."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Wright v. Lewis, 76
F.3d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (a plaintiff's in forma pauperis
status "shift[s] the responsibility for serving the complaint
from [the plaintiff] to the court"). The failure of the U.S.
Marshals Service to properly effect service of process
constitutes "good cause" for failure to effect timely service,
within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). See
Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1986)
(reversing dismissal where the U.S. Marshals Service failed to
effect timely personal service through no fault of the
plaintiff). Here, the Bureau of Prisons returned unsigned
requests for waivers of service on behalf of Sepanek and Lappin,
explaining that Sepanek was on "extended medical leave" and
Lappin had retired. Under these circumstances, it was error for
the district court to dismiss Walker's claims against Sepanek
and Lappin for failure to serve without considering whether
Walker attempted to effect personal service on them through the
U.S. Marshals Service and whether the Marshals' failure to serve
them constitutes "good cause" for failure to effect proper
service. See id. Walker does not contest the dismissal of his
claims against Lappin. On remand, the district court shall
consider whether Walker may be entitled to another opportunity
to serve Sepanek.
-10-
Finally, the Magistrate Judge declined to address
defendants' argument that all of Walker's claims should be
dismissed for failure to allege that defendants were
personally involved in the constitutional violations.
On March 27, 2012, the district court adopted the
report and recommendation in full and dismissed the case.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
1. Motions To Dismiss
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible
"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In exercising
this review, our "task is necessarily a limited one. The
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
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support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald ,
457 U.S. 800 (1982); accord DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C.,
622 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) ("In ruling on a motion
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the duty of a court
is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint,
not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be
offered in support thereof." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se, it
must be construed liberally "to raise the strongest
arguments [it] suggest[s]." Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241,
248 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787,
790 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible
claim for relief. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d
Cir. 2009).
We review de novo a district court's grant of a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all
factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing
-12-
all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Chambers v.
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
2. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of
"cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
Although the Constitution does not require "comfortable"
prison conditions, the conditions of confinement may not
"involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain."
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on
conditions of confinement, an inmate must allege that: (1)
objectively, the deprivation the inmate suffered was
"sufficiently serious that he was denied the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities," and (2)
subjectively, the defendant official acted with " a
sufficiently culpable state of mind . . . , such as
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety."
Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
-13-
To meet the objective element, the inmate must
show that the conditions, either alone or in combination,
pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180,
185 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Thus, prison officials
violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his
"basic human needs" such as food, clothing, medical care,
and safe and sanitary living conditions. Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]here is no static
test to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently
serious; the conditions themselves must be evaluated in
light of contemporary standards of decency." Jabbar v.
Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, conditions of
confinement may be aggregated to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, but "only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of
a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)
(noting that "low cell temperature at night combined with a
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failure to issue blankets" may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation).
To meet the subjective element, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted with "more than mere
negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. To constitute
deliberate indifference, "[t]he prison official must know
of, and disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety." Jabbar, 683 F.3d at 57. Evidence that a risk was
"obvious or otherwise must have been known to a defendant"
may be sufficient for a fact finder to conclude that the
defendant was actually aware of the risk. Brock v. Wright,
315 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2003).
3. Qualified Immunity
A federal official is entitled to qualified
immunity from suit for money damages unless the plaintiff
shows that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and that the right was "clearly
established" at the time of the challenged conduct.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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"A Government official's conduct violates clearly
established law when, at the time of the challenged
conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear
that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 2083
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts
"do not require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate." Id. If an official's conduct did
not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or
if the official reasonably believed that his conduct did
not violate such a right, then he is protected by qualified
immunity. Sudler v. City of N.Y., 689 F.3d 159, 174 (2d
Cir. 2012).
Although courts should resolve the question of
qualified immunity at the "earliest possible stage in
litigation," Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated
on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223(2009), "a defendant presenting an immunity defense on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion instead of a motion for summary
-16-
judgment must accept the more stringent standard applicable
to this procedural route," McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432,
436 (2d Cir. 2004).
B. Application
We conclude that the district court erred by
dismissing Walker's complaint for failure to state a claim.
First, he plausibly alleged conditions that, perhaps alone
and certainly in combination, deprived him of a minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities. Second, he
plausibly alleged that defendants were deliberately
indifferent to this deprivation. Third, he plausibly
alleged violations of clearly established rights. We
address each of these issues in turn.
1. The Conditions of Confinement
Walker plausibly alleged that his conditions of
confinement at FCI Ray Brook deprived him of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities and subjected him
to unreasonable health and safety risks. He alleged that
for approximately twenty-eight months, he was confined in a
cell with five other men, with inadequate space and
ventilation, stifling heat in the summer and freezing cold
-17-
in the winter, unsanitary conditions, including urine and
feces splattered on the floor, insufficient cleaning
supplies, a mattress too narrow for him to lie on flat, and
noisy, crowded conditions that made sleep difficult and
placed him at constant risk of violence and serious harm
from cellmates. Based on these allegations, we conclude
that Walker has plausibly alleged cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
First, it is well settled that exposing prisoners
to extreme temperatures without adequate ventilation may
violate the Eighth Amendment. See Gaston, 249 F.3d at 164("We have held that an Eighth Amendment claim may be
established by proof that the inmate was subjected for a
prolonged period to bitter cold."); see also, e.g.,
Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1988)
(claims that inmate was exposed to subfreezing temperatures
for three months with ice forming in toilet bowl were
sufficient to raise issues of fact for jury, even where
prison officials gave inmate extra blanket).
Second, sleep is critical to human existence, and
conditions that prevent sleep have been held to violate the
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Eighth Amendment. See Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d
317, 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Courts have previously
recognized that sleep constitutes a basic human need and
conditions that prevent sleep violate an inmate's
constitutional rights.") (citing Harper v. Showers, 174
F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also, e.g., Wright v.
McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521-22, 526 (2d Cir. 1967) (inmate
stated Eighth Amendment claim by alleging he was "forced to
sleep completely nude on the cold rough concrete floor and
that the cell was so cold and uncomfortable that it was
impossible for him to sleep for more than an hour or two
without having to stand and move about in order to keep
warm"); Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F. Supp. 2d 666, 683 (D.
Del. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss Eighth Amendment
claims based on allegations that "defendants took spec ific
acts designed to deprive [plaintiff] of sleep"). 7 Further,
at least one court recently found that the condition of a
prisoner's mattress may be so inadequate as to constitute
7
Cf. Spivey v. Doria, No. 91 C 4169, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3527, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1994) (holding that pre-
trial detainee failed to allege constitutional violation where
he "alleged only that the lights and noise interfere[d] with
his sleep not that he [wa]s unable to sleep or that the sleep
deprivation ha[d] caused him any harm").
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an unconstitutional deprivation. See Bell v. Luna, 856 F.
Supp. 2d 388, 397-98 (D. Conn. 2012) (denying motion to
dismiss where inmate lived for seven months with mattress
that was torn, unstuffed, and smelled like mildew) .
Third, we have long recognized that unsanitary
conditions in a prison cell can, in egregious
circumstances, rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment. See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 106 (2d
Cir. 1981) (noting that prisoners are entitled to, inter
alia, sanitation); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978
(2d Cir. 1972) ("Causing a man to live, eat and perhaps
sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too
debasing and degrading to be permitted.") ; Young v.
Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the
denial of "basic sanitation . . . is cruel and unusual
because, in the worst case, it can result in physical
torture, and, even in less serious cases, it can result in
pain without any penological purpose." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). 8 Indeed, unsanitary
8
But see Jones v. Goord, 435 F. Supp. 2d 221, 237
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (evidence that several inmates urinated on,
rather than in, the toilet reflected "isolated incidents of
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conditions lasting for mere days may constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation. See, e.g., Gaston, 249 F.3d at 165-66(inmate stated an Eighth Amendment claim where the area in
front of his cell "was filled with human feces, urine, and
sewage water" for several consecutive days); Wright, 387
F.2d at 522, 526 (placement of prisoner for thirty-three
days in cell that was "fetid and reeking from the stench of
the bodily wastes of previous occupants which . . . covered
the floor, the sink, and the toilet," combined with other
conditions, would violate the Eighth Amendment).
Further, the failure to provide prisoners with
toiletries and other hygienic materials may rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. See Trammell v.
Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]his court and
other circuits have recognized that deprivation of
toiletries, and especially toilet paper, can rise to the
level of unconstitutional conditions of confinement
. . . ."); see also, e.g., Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 372
F. Supp. 2d 377, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ( "The failure to
misbehavior, or simple inaccuracy, [that] do not signify a
structural lack of proper hygiene as a result of double-
celling").
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regularly provide prisoners with . . . toilet articles
including soap, razors, combs, toothpaste, toilet paper,
access to a mirror and sanitary napkins for female
prisoners constitutes a denial of personal hygiene and
sanitary living conditions." (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted)). Availability of hygienic materials is
particularly important in the context of otherwise
unsanitary living conditions. See, e.g., MacDougall, 473
F.2d at 978.
Fourth, conditions that place a prisoner at a
"substantial risk of serious harm" from other inmates may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. Goord,
435 F. Supp. 2d 221, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Farmer,
511 U.S. at 833 ("[P]rison officials have a duty to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners."
(citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir.
1985) ("The failure of custodial officers to employ
reasonable measures to protect an inmate from violence by
other prison residents has been considered cruel and
unusual punishment."); see also, e.g., Villante v. Dep't of
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Corr., 786 F.2d 516, 522-23 (2d Cir. 1986) (inmate could
prevail on constitutional claim based on conditions of
confinement if he could prove that "there was a pervasive
risk of harm to him from other prisoners and that prison
officials displayed deliberate indifference to the
danger").
In dismissing Walker's complaint, the district
court improperly "assay[ed] the weight of the evidence,"
DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 113, and failed to draw all reasonable
inferences in Walker's favor. For example, the district
court found that Walker's failure to indicate "the exact
extent or duration of [his] exposure to unsanitary
conditions" was fatal to his Eighth Amendment claim.
Similarly, the court held that Walker's allegations of
inadequate ventilation were insufficient because he did not
provide any details about the temperature s in his cell.
Such detailed allegations, however, are not required for a
pro se complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover,
Walker alleged that he was placed in the six-man cell on
November 18, 2008 and was still there when he filed his
complaint on March 16, 2011. He also alleged that it was
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so hot during the summer that he had difficulty breathing,
and it was so cold during the winter that ice formed inside
the cell windows. Drawing all reasonable inferences in
Walker's favor, these allegations plausibly alleged that
the conditions persisted for twenty-eight months and that
the temperatures were extreme enough to state an Eighth
Amendment claim.
Further, the district court erred by dismissing
Walker's claims of overcrowding on the ground that "[t]he
twenty-nine square feet that Plaintiff complains about
having in his six-person cell is fundamentally the same
complaint confronted by the Supreme Court in Rhodes [v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981),] and by the Northern District
[of New York] in Chapdelaine [v. Keller, No. 95-CV-1126,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23017 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1998)]."
Rhodes and Chapdelaine are plainly distinguishable for
three reasons. First, while the Supreme Court in Rhodes
found that the thirty-one square feet afforded each inmate
in that case did not violate the Eighth Amendment, see
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, it did not hold that that amount
of living space was sufficient as a matter of law. Rather,
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housing multiple inmates together in one cell "can amount
to an Eighth Amendment violation if combined with other
adverse conditions." Bolton v. Goord, 992 F. Supp. 604,
626 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67
(3d Cir. 1996)). Here, Walker plausibly alleged that the
overcrowding and lack of living space in his cell were
exacerbated by the ventilation, noise, sanitation, and
safety issues, leading to deprivations of specific life
necessities.
Second, in contrast to the six-man cell to which
Walker was assigned, the inmates in Rhodes and Chapdelaine
were housed in two-man and four-man cells, respectively.
See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 343 (plaintiffs were assigned to
two-man cells of approximately 63 square feet in size);
Chapdelaine, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23017, at *10, *15
(plaintiff was assigned to four-man cell at FCI Ray Brook
of less than 120 square feet in size). While we do not
hold that a six-man cell can never be constitutional, it is
at least plausible that housing six men in one cell poses
additional, greater risks to the inmates' health and
safety.
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Third, Rhodes and Chapdelaine were decided after
development of the factual record. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
340-41, 342-43 (noting that district court had made
"extensive findings of fact about [the prison] on the basis
of evidence presented at trial and the court's own
observations during an inspection that it conducted without
advance notice," which showed that the prison was
"unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Chapdelaine, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23017, at *3-4, *13-15 (treating defendants'
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment "[s]ince the
parties . . . submitted affidavits and exhibits"). Here,
in contrast, Walker has not had any opportunity to take
discovery or develop the record. 9 Whether or not the
9
Further, the principal cases cited by defendants on
appeal were decided after development of the facts on motions
for summary judgment or after trial. See, e.g., Trammel v.
Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding "no factual
dispute regarding whether the temperature in [plaintiff's] cell
posed a threat to his 'health or safety'" and affirming district
court's award of summary judgment); Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d
156, 164-66 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's award of
summary judgment); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 976 (2d
Cir. 1972) (district court made findings of fact and conclusions
of law after trial); Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 238 (3d
Cir. 2008) (affirming district court's award of summary judgment
dismissing Eighth Amendment claim "based on the totality of the
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factual record, when developed more fully, will ultimately
show that the Eighth Amendment was violated, the facts
asserted in Walker's complaint plausibly alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Accordingly, the district court erred by
concluding as a matter of law that Walker failed to allege
objectively serious conditions that denied him the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.
2. Deliberate Indifference
Liberally construed, Walker's complaint adequately
alleged that defendants knew of and disregarded the
excessive risks to his health and safety to which he was
exposed at FCI Ray Brook. Specifically, Walker alleged
that "Defendants Schult, Perdue, Salamy, Sepanek, Porter,
Carter, [and] Wagner" each "knew of the overcrowding" in
his cell, Compl. ¶ 12, and that he "spoke[] with Defendant
Schult four times about the unconstitutional 6-man cells,"
circumstances presented on this factual record"); Chandler v.
Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1283, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming
judgment following a bench trial); Green v. Walker, 398 F. App'x
166, 169 (7th Cir. 2010) (non-precedential order) (affirming
district court's award of summary judgment).
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id. ¶ 2. 10 He alleged that "[a]ll of the Defendants are
fully aware that the noise in the unit is so loud and
constant" and that "Defendants are aware of the inadequate
ventilation [and that] during the winter the cell is cold
and summer months extremely hot and quite difficult to
breathe." Id. ¶¶ 13, 21. Walker also alleged that he
informed Sepanek, Schult, Salamy, Porter, and Carter that
his bed was too narrow. Id. ¶ 7. Finally, Walker alleged
that Sepanek, whose job it was to issue cleaning supplies,
failed to do so. Id. ¶ 18 n.5. Yet, despite these
complaints and defendants' knowledge, the conditions in
Walker's cell did not change.
Because Walker set forth sufficient allegations of
defendants' deliberate indifference, the district court
erred by dismissing his complaint. See Gaston, 249 F.3d at
166 (asserting that defendant prison guards "made daily
rounds of SHU" was sufficient to allege that defendants had
actual knowledge of obvious inhumane conditions); Phelps,
308 F.3d at 186-87 (noting that a plaintiff's ability to
10
As noted, Walker does not challenge the dismissal of
his claims against Norwood and Lappin.
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prove facts such as subjective intent is an issue for
summary judgment).
In so holding, we reaffirm that each prisoner
complaint alleging a constitutional violation must be
carefully analyzed in light of the particular facts
contained therein. Here, the specific facts in Walker's
complaint plausibly alleged a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. But each complaint is different, and courts
have the power and duty to dismiss complaints that contain
only conclusory, frivolous, or implausible allegations.
3. Qualified Immunity
Although the district court's discussion of
qualified immunity was limited in scope, defendants assert
on appeal that they are entitled to qualified immunity on
all of Walker's claims because any constitutional rights
they may have violated were not "clearly established."
Although federal officials' claims of qualified
immunity should be decided as early as possible in a case,
see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, it would be premature to
dismiss the case now on this basis. Rather, as we have
noted previously, qualified immunity is often best decided
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on a motion for summary judgment when the details of the
alleged deprivations are more fully developed. See Castro
v. United States, 34 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1994)
("Although a defense of qualified immunity should
ordinarily be decided at the earliest possible stage in
litigation, and it is a defense that often can and should
be decided on a motion for summary judgment, some limited
and carefully tailored discovery may b e needed before
summary judgment will be appropriate." (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)); Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d
70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The better rule, we believe, is for
the court to decide the issue of qualified immunity as a
matter of law, preferably on a pretrial motion for summary
judgment when possible . . . .").
Because we hold that Walker's complaint plausibly
alleged conditions of confinement that could constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, and that defendants acted (or
failed to act) with deliberate indifference, further facts
are required to decide the question of qualified immunity.
In light of the specific allegations here, it would be
inappropriate to conclude as a matter of law at the
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pleadings stage of the litigation that defendants did not
violate Walker's clearly established constitutional
rights. 11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed as to defendants Norwood and
Lappin, and vacated as to defendants Schult, Perdue,
Salamy, Sepanek, Porter, Carter, and Wagner. The case is
remanded to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
11
Insofar as the district court concluded that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to Walker's
allegation that his cell lacked ladders to access the top bunk,
we conclude that, while the claim in and of itself does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation, it must be
considered as part of the total circumstances of Walker's
confinement.
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