Ram v. Sessions ( 2018 )

17-138
Ram v. Sessions
BIA
A200 239 615
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 7th day of August, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
DAWINDER RAM,
Petitioner,
v. 17-138
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Fremont, CA.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Justin R.
Markel, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Benjamin Zeitlin, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Dawinder Ram, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a December 23, 2016 decision of the BIA
denying his August 19, 2016 motion to reopen. In re Dawinder
Ram, No. A200 239 615 (B.I.A. Dec. 23, 2016). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
history in this case.
We have reviewed the BIA’s denial of Ram’s motion to
reopen for abuse of discretion, and its factual findings
regarding country conditions under the substantial evidence
standard. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d
Cir. 2008). In his motion, Ram asserted that his family had
informed him that his life was in danger in India given his
past political activity, and that police had raided his house
and arrested and beat his father in an effort to find Ram.
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It is undisputed that Ram’s 2016 motion to reopen was
untimely because his removal order became final in 2014. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day filing period
for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)(same). This
time limitation does not apply if the motion is filed to apply
for asylum “based on changed country conditions” since the
time of the original hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
The BIA did not err in finding Ram’s evidence
insufficient to establish a material change in conditions in
India, i.e., increased police violence, corruption, and
harassment of Ram’s family. Contrary to Ram’s contention,
the BIA expressly considered his country conditions evidence,
and reasonably concluded that police violence and corruption
in India has persisted since before Ram’s hearing. See In
re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (“In
determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen
demonstrates a material change in country conditions that
would justify reopening, [the agency] compare[s] the evidence
of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that
existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”).
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Moreover, the country conditions evidence does not mention
politically-motivated police violence as would be relevant to
Ram’s claim. Because the BIA reasonably concluded that Ram
failed to establish a material change in conditions as needed
to excuse his untimely filing, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion as time barred. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
The BIA also did not err by according little weight to
the affidavits Ram submitted in support of his motion. See
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring
to the BIA’s determination of the weight afforded to
documentary evidence); see also Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales,
500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA may
decline to credit certain evidence submitted by a movant who
was found not credible in underlying proceedings). Moreover,
the affidavits list three incidents when police purportedly
arrested and beat Ram’s father to force him to divulge Ram’s
whereabouts, but they provide no details about the incidents,
they do not state why police were searching for Ram, and they
assert, without any support, that police will kill Ram if he
returns to India. Given that Ram’s claim is substantially
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related to the political persecution claim underlying his
original asylum application, which the agency reasonably
determined was not credible, the BIA did not err in finding
that these affidavits, lacking any detail, did not establish
Ram’s prima facie eligibility. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d
232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding no abuse of
discretion in the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen when
“evidence submitted by petitioner in support of her motion
was not ‘material’ because it did not rebut the adverse
credibility finding that provided the basis for the IJ’s
denial of petitioner’s underlying asylum application”). In
light of the above, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
denying Ram’s motion to reopen based on his failure to
establish his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS
v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
5
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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