Assad v. Sessions ( 2018 )


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  •     17-521
    Assad v. Sessions
    BIA
    Poczter, IJ
    A087 146 447
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESsENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 28th day of August, two thousand eighteen.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    MUHAMMAD ASSAD, AKA ASAD BUTT,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                       17-521
    NAC
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                     Naresh M. Gehi, Forest Hills, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
    Assistant Director; Russell J.E.
    Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel,
    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, DC.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner     Muhammad   Assad,   a   native   and   citizen   of
    Pakistan, seeks review of a January 27, 2017, decision of the
    BIA affirming a December 23, 2015, decision of an Immigration
    Judge (“IJ”) denying Assad’s motion to reopen his removal
    proceedings.    In re Muhammad Assad, No. A 087 146 447 (B.I.A.
    Jan. 27, 2017), aff’g No. A087 146 447 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
    Dec. 23, 2015).    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    Assad’s petition is timely filed only as to the denial
    of reopening, so our review is limited to that decision.
    See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    265 F.3d 83
    , 89-
    90 (2d Cir. 2001).    We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as
    supplemented by the BIA.      Gertsenshteyn v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    544 F.3d 137
    , 142 (2d Cir. 2008).          We review the
    agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
    discretion, “mindful that motions to reopen ‘are
    disfavored.’”     Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d Cir.
    2
    2006, quoting INS v. Doherty, 
    502 U.S. 314
    , 322-23 (1992).
    To obtain reopening based on new evidence, a movant must
    present previously unavailable evidence that establishes
    his prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.       See 8
    C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 104
    (1988).   For reopening based on ineffective assistance of
    counsel, a movant must establish that counsel’s performance
    resulted in actual prejudice.       See Esposito v. INS, 
    987 F.2d 108
    , 111 (2d Cir. 1993).       In sum, to obtain reopening
    based on ineffective assistance or new evidence, a movant
    has to show that reopening is likely to change the result
    of the proceedings.   Id.; Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 168 (2d Cir. 2008) (reopening “requires the alien
    to carry the ‘heavy burden’ of demonstrating that the
    proffered new evidence would likely alter the result in her
    case”).   Assad did not meet his burden of showing prejudice
    because he did not show that the outcome would have been
    different had proceedings been reopened.
    Assad essentially argues that had his counsel presented
    Assad with the opportunity to testify, the agency would not
    have found him removable for a misrepresentation because
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    Assad’s testimony would have proved that his and his wife’s
    affidavits were coerced.   But the agency found that Assad
    made a material representation on his adjustment
    application even if the affidavits were not considered.
    Accordingly, he did not show that the failure to offer his
    testimony was prejudicial.   See 
    Esposito, 987 F.2d at 111
    .
    A letter from Assad’s landlord contradicted Assad’s
    allegation that he had been living with his wife when he
    filed his application for permanent residence, and the IJ
    was not required to give greater weight to affidavits from
    Assad’s friends, which all contained near-identical
    language and repeated an incorrect spelling of Assad’s
    address.   Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    489 F.3d 517
    , 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that “striking similarities
    between affidavits are an indication that the statements
    are ‘canned.’”); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
    209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished weight to letters
    from relatives because they were from interested witnesses
    not subject to cross-examination), remanded on other
    grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 
    677 F.3d 130
    (2d Cir.
    2012).
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    Assad also requested reopening on the ground that his
    counsel should have filed an asylum application on his
    behalf.   Assad did not meet his burden for reopening
    because the country conditions evidence offered in support
    of his application was not new or previously unavailable.
    See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); 
    Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104
    .
    Moreover, as the agency found, Assad did not allege, much
    less prove, that he told any of his former attorneys that
    he feared returning to Pakistan.
    Finally, Assad argued for reopening to seek a
    redetermination of the denial of the removal of the
    conditions on his permanent resident status and to request
    a waiver of the joint filing requirement.   But the agency
    reasonably concluded that Assad failed to demonstrate that
    he was prima facie eligible for a “good faith” waiver
    because the evidence showed that he misrepresented material
    information (the address where he lived with his wife) and
    thus failed to demonstrate that he had entered his marriage
    in good faith.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(4)(B); see also 8
    C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); 
    Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104
    .
    5
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    Clerk of Court
    6