MICHAEL RANTZ VS. THE PLANNING BOARD OF THE BOROUGH OF BAY HEAD (L-0626-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2847-19
    MICHAEL RANTZ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    THE PLANNING BOARD OF
    THE BOROUGH OF BAY
    HEAD and PATRICK WATERS
    and SHANNON WATERS,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ____________________________
    Argued July 6, 2021 – Decided September 8, 2021
    Before Judges Messano and Suter.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-0626-17.
    Edward F. Liston, Jr. argued the cause for appellant.
    Barry A. Stieber argued the cause for respondent
    Planning Board of the Borough of Bay Head (Citta,
    Holzapfel & Zabarsky, attorneys; Barry A. Stieber, on
    the brief).
    Angelo A. Stio, III argued the cause for respondents
    Patrick Waters and Shannon Waters (Troutman Pepper
    Hamilton Sanders, LLP, attorneys; Angelo A. Stio, III,
    of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This matter is before us a second time. We refer to our prior opinion
    which explains the context of this appeal.
    Defendants Patrick and Shannon Waters purchased a home in Bay Head
    and submitted a development application to the Planning Board of the Borough
    of Bay Head (the Board) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68, seeking to have an
    accessory structure to the rear of their house declared a pre-existing non-
    conformity.1 Rantz v. Planning Bd. of Bay Head, No. A-5765-17 (App. Div.
    Aug. 20, 2019) (slip op. at 2–3).      Specifically, defendants contended the
    structure had a sink, toilet and shower in it for years prior to their purchase.
    Id., slip op. at 3. The application was hotly contested before the board by
    plaintiff and others, since defendants' notices referred to their intention to
    continue the use of the accessory structure as sleeping quarters for family and
    guests. Id., slip op. at 3–4. Our prior opinion recounted what followed.
    [D]efendants attempted to prove the sink, toilet and
    shower were in the accessory structure prior to a 2003
    1
    The Board is a unified board that also exercises all powers of a board of
    adjustment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25(c).
    A-2847-19
    2
    amendment to Bay Head's zoning regulations. Prior to
    the amendment, the ordinance was silent as to whether
    plumbing fixtures were permitted inside accessory
    structures; the amendment added language that
    prohibited "interior plumbing except for . . . clothes
    washers, dryers and work sinks" in any "accessory
    building in a residential zone." Borough of Bay Head
    Ordinance, § 147-6(D)(7). Plaintiff, on the other hand,
    asserted that if the plumbing fixtures were installed
    prior to 2003, they had been abandoned.
    [Id., slip op. at 4.]
    The borough zoning officer, Bart Petrillo, who was a member of the
    Board, had recused himself at the first public meeting based on prior meetings
    he had with defendants and objectors to the application before it was filed. Id.,
    slip op. at 3–4. However, defendants subsequently called Petrillo as a witness
    without objection. Id., slip op. at 4.
    After considering the testimony of Petrillo, . . . nine
    other witnesses and documentary proof, the Board
    voted to issue a certificate of non-conformity as to the
    sink and toilet, but not the shower. In its January 2018
    memorializing resolution, the Board found that the
    "sink and toilet [were] located in the accessory
    structure since at least prior to 2003" and no owner had
    "intended to abandon" their use. Citing Petrillo's
    testimony, the Board credited his "opinion that prior to
    the ordinance change in 2003, use of the sink and toilet
    in the accessory structure [was] permitted" under Bay
    Head's zoning regulations.
    [Id., slip op. at 4–5.]
    A-2847-19
    3
    Plaintiff filed suit in the Law Division, and the judge vacated the Board's
    resolution without consideration of plaintiff's arguments on the merits. Id., slip
    op. at 5.      The judge concluded once Petrillo disqualified himself from
    consideration of the application, his testimony as a witness "irreparably tainted
    the proceedings." Id., slip op. at 6. Defendants appealed and we reversed,
    explaining that plaintiff failed to object when defendants called Petrillo as a
    witness, and Petrillo's testimony was properly admitted and considered by the
    Board. Id., slip op. at 10–11. We remanded the matter to the Law Division to
    consider the merits of plaintiff's challenge to the Board's resolution. Id., slip op.
    at 12.
    On remand, the parties agreed that no further briefing or argument was
    necessary. In a detailed opinion supporting his order affirming the Board's
    resolution, the judge noted the apparent confusion before the Board based on
    defendants' notices regarding continuation of the structure as a residential
    dwelling. However, quoting extensively from the transcripts, the judge noted
    the Board and defendants' counsel clarified the issue, such that "the only
    approval being sought by [defendants was] a determination pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-68 that the existing plumbing facilities within the accessory building
    were legal prior nonconformities and could be maintained."
    A-2847-19
    4
    The judge quoted Petrillo's testimony, and the testimony of Robert Dege,
    a licensed plumber called by defendants, who testified that based on his
    examination of the fixtures, the existing toilet and sink were installed no later
    than 1940.    Dege, however, was less certain about when the shower was
    installed. The judge noted that the objectors' and plaintiff's opposition primarily
    focused on the possible use of the structure for sleeping quarters, but
    once that issue was resolved, neither . . . plaintiff nor
    the others provided any substantial and relevant
    evidence regarding the history of the plumbing
    facilities in question other than the accessory structure
    had not been used as a living space and therefore they
    presumed these facilities were either not used or
    abandoned.
    The judge concluded the Board's "findings [were] supported by substantial
    evidence." In particular, Petrillo's testimony supported the conclusion that prior
    to the 2003 amendment, "the zoning ordinance allowed such fixtures in
    accessory buildings." The judge also determined the Board reasonably relied on
    Dege's testimony as to when the fixtures were installed. The judge noted there
    was no evidence suggesting the fixtures "were ever disconnected, removed or
    abandoned." Therefore, "the Board could and did reasonably infer that the use
    of the facilities ha[d] been continuous and never abandoned." He found the
    Board's findings "were based on the uncontroverted testimony of [defendants']
    A-2847-19
    5
    witnesses." The judge also found "no legal basis . . . to disturb the factual
    findings and ultimate decision of the Board." He entered an order affirming the
    Board's resolution, and this appeal followed.
    Before us, plaintiff argues that plumbing fixtures cannot be non-
    conforming uses under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    1 to -163, and even if they could be "certified" as such under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    68, the evidence before the Board was insufficient. Alternatively, plaintiff
    contends the evidence demonstrated a prior owner "abandoned" the facilities ,
    and therefore defendants lost any protection for the facilities as pre-existing non-
    conformities. Defendants and the Board argue otherwise. We affirm.
    "When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the validity of a local
    board's determination, 'we are bound by the same standards as was the trial
    court.'" Jacoby v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Englewood Cliffs, 
    442 N.J. Super. 450
    , 462 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Fallone Props., LLC v. Bethlehem
    Twp. Plan. Bd., 
    369 N.J. Super. 552
    , 562 (App. Div. 2004)). "[T]he action of
    a board will not be overturned unless it is found to be arbitrary and capricious
    or unreasonable, with the burden of proof placed on the plaintiff challenging the
    action." Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Franklin, 233 N.J.
    A-2847-19
    6
    546, 558 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Grabowsky v. Twp. of
    Montclair, 
    221 N.J. 536
    , 551 (2015)).
    "[Z]oning boards, 'because of their peculiar knowledge of local
    conditions[,] must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated
    discretion.'" Price v. Himeji, LLC, 
    214 N.J. 263
    , 284 (2013) (second alteration
    in original) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 
    45 N.J. 268
    , 296
    (1965)). "Th[e] board's decisions enjoy a presumption of validity, and a court
    may not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear
    abuse of discretion."    
    Ibid.
     (citing Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of
    Adjustment of W. Windsor Twp., 
    172 N.J. 75
    , 81 (2002)).
    However, "[a]lthough a municipality's informal interpretation of an
    ordinance is entitled to deference, that deference is not limitless." Bubis v.
    Kassin, 
    184 N.J. 612
    , 627 (2005) (citing Fallone Props., 
    369 N.J. Super. at 561
    ).
    "[T]he meaning of an ordinance's language is a question of law that we review
    de novo." 
    Ibid.
     (citing In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 
    168 N.J. 1
    , 11 (2001));
    see also Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 
    132 N.J. 509
    , 518 (1993).
    In relevant part, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 provides:         "[A]ny . . . person
    interested in any land upon which a nonconforming use or structure exists may
    apply in writing for the issuance of a certificate certifying that the use or
    A-2847-19
    7
    structure existed before the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use or
    structure nonconforming.     The applicant shall have the burden of proof."
    (emphasis added).     The MLUL defines both nonconforming structures and
    nonconforming uses:
    "Nonconforming structure" means a structure the size,
    dimension or location of which was lawful prior to the
    adoption, revision or amendment of a zoning ordinance,
    but which fails to conform to the requirements of the
    zoning district in which it is located by reasons of such
    adoption, revision or amendment.
    "Nonconforming use" means a use or activity which
    was lawful prior to the adoption, revision or
    amendment of a zoning ordinance, but which fails to
    conform to the requirements of the zoning district in
    which it is located by reasons of such adoption, revision
    or amendment.
    [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5.]
    Bay Head's zoning regulations permit "[a]ccessory uses and buildings" in
    residential zones, specifically, "[p]rivate garages, carports or other accessory
    structures on the same lot with, and customarily incidental to, the principal
    building or use."   Borough of Bay Head, N.J., Ordinance 2003-6, § 147-
    6.1(B)(1). Since 2003, the ordinance provides that "[a]n accessory building
    shall not have interior plumbing except for purposes of clothes washers, dryers,
    and work sinks."
    A-2847-19
    8
    Plaintiff contends sinks and toilets are simply "facilities," not uses, and so
    the Board could not "certify" them as pre-existing nonconformities under the
    MLUL. He argues the use of bathroom facilities cannot be disassociated from
    the accessory structure itself; if defendants could not use the accessory structure
    for housing or sleeping quarters, i.e., uses routinely associated with bathrooms,
    the Board could not simply certify fixtures.
    However, before the judge, plaintiff acknowledged more than once that a
    sink and toilet made the accessory building a "nonconforming structure."
    Indeed, this exchange took place between the judge and defense counsel:
    Judge: Let's say for the sake of argument that the set
    back and height were conforming. The structure itself
    . . . met all the other bulk requirements of the ordinance
    —
    Counsel: Mm-hm.
    Judge: — it would still be a nonconforming structure
    in the sense that . . . it has a toilet and a sink, which an
    accessory structure can't have, right?
    Counsel: That's correct.
    The Board did not consider whether having a sink and toilet within the accessory
    building made its existence a nonconforming use, because defendants conceded
    they would not use the building for a non-permitted use, i.e., residential dwelling
    purposes.
    A-2847-19
    9
    Having conceded the point before the trial judge, plaintiff's brief does not
    address whether defendants' accessory building was a non-conforming structure
    because of the sink and toilet. "An issue that is not briefed is deemed waived
    upon appeal." N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 
    438 N.J. Super. 501
    ,
    505–06 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Fantis Foods v. N. River Ins. Co., 
    332 N.J. Super. 250
    , 266–67 (App. Div. 2000)). We therefore accept that the accessory
    building was a nonconforming "structure." As such, plaintiff's contention that
    defendants' application was beyond the certification procedure permitted by
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 lacks any merit.
    Plaintiff contends that the Board lacked sufficient evidence upon which to
    support a finding that the nonconformity legally existed prior to the 2003
    amendment to the zoning regulations. He notes the 1940 zoning ordinance
    described an accessory building as "a building, such as a stable, garage,
    playhouse, barn or greenhouse which is subordinate and accessory to the main
    building on the same lot," and did not expressly permit installations of sinks and
    toilets.   Plaintiff argues defendants failed to prove when their accessory
    structure was actually built, and whether the building contained a sink and toilet
    in conformity with zoning regulations prior to 2003.
    A-2847-19
    10
    The Board relied on Petrillo's testimony regarding the zoning regulations
    prior to 2003 and concluded a sink and toilet would not have made defendants'
    accessory building nonconforming. Nothing in the 1940 ordinance prohibited
    the fixtures, and Petrillo explained why the 2003 amendment limited permissible
    fixtures to "clothes washers, dryers, and work sinks."
    Undoubtedly, there was evidence implying that a prior owner may have
    stopped using the fixtures, such as the lack of their inclusion in official "fixture
    records" and the lack of a sewer assessment by the borough. Two witnesses who
    rented the property from one of its prior owners testified that they were told not
    to use the fixtures, implying any pre-amendment nonconformity was abandoned.
    However, "[a] board 'has the choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony
    of witnesses. Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on appeal.'"
    Ne. Towers, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Paterson, 
    327 N.J. Super. 476
    , 498 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Kramer, 
    45 N.J. at 288
    ). The Board found
    there was no evidence that at any point in time the owners of the property
    "intended to abandon use of the sink and toilet," and, as recently as 2012, the
    fixtures had "been 'winterized' and otherwise maintained by a licensed plumber."
    "[A]n intention to abandon" a nonconformity is essential to concluding it
    was in fact abandoned. Berkeley Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
    A-2847-19
    11
    of Trenton, 
    410 N.J. Super. 255
    , 265 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting S & S Auto
    Sales, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Stratford, 
    373 N.J. Super. 603
    , 613
    (App. Div. 2004)). "Temporary non-use does not constitute abandonment."
    
    Ibid.
     (quoting S & S Auto Sales, 
    373 N.J. Super. at 614
    ). We "may not substitute
    [our] judgment for that of the local board," and therefore we cannot conclude
    the Board's factual determination in this regard was unsupported by sufficient
    credible evidence. S & S Auto Sales, 
    373 N.J. Super. at
    615 (citing Kramer, 
    45 N.J. at 296
    ).
    To the extent we have not addressed any other arguments raised by
    plaintiff, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
    written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-2847-19
    12