Elaine Stites v. Alan Ritchey , 458 F. App'x 110 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 11-1275
    _____________
    ELAINE STITES; LAUREN BALL; BARBARA BUCHMAN,
    Appellants
    v.
    ALAN RITCHEY, INC.
    ______________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00392)
    District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
    ____________
    Argued: December 6, 2011
    ____________
    Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: January 23, 2012)
    ____________
    Jeremy M. Cerutti, Esq. (Argued)
    Ari R. Karpf, Esq.
    Karpf & Karpf
    3331 Street Road
    Suite 128, Two Greenwood Square
    Bensalem, PA 19020
    Counsel for Appellants
    David M. Walsh, Esq. (Argued)
    Jackson Lewis
    220 Headquarters Plaza
    East Tower, 7th Floor
    Morristown, NJ 07960
    Counsel for Appellee
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    BARRY, Circuit Judge
    Elaine Stites, Barbara Buchman, and Lauren Ball appeal the District Court’s grant
    of summary judgment on their reverse race discrimination and retaliation claims brought
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    , Title VII, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act. We will
    affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its thorough opinion.
    I.
    Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts, and we do so
    in the light most favorable to Appellants. Appellants, who are Caucasian, were employed
    as inspectors by Alan Ritchey, Inc. (“ARI”), a company that, prior to closing all of its
    mail transport facilities, serviced mail transport equipment (“MTE”) pursuant to a
    contract with the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Inspectors were required to sort
    through bins of MTE to check for damaged or defective products. To track how
    efficiently individual inspectors performed their work, ARI utilized a software program
    that calculated an individual inspector’s efficiency rating based on the number of items
    2
    serviced by that inspector in a given time period.
    In 2006, in response to a steady decline in the volume of MTE arriving at its
    facility for servicing, ARI initiated a Reduction in Force (“RIF”), which resulted in the
    layoff of six employees, including Ball. In early 2007, as its revenues continued to
    plummet, ARI conducted a second RIF, this time laying off fifteen employees, including
    Buchman. In September 2007, Stites was terminated in accordance with ARI policy after
    failing to meet the minimum required weekly efficiency rating for the fourth time that
    year. In both RIFs, ARI conducted a “Reduction in Workforce Analysis,” which ranked
    employees based on the efficiency ratings, and eliminated those employees with the
    lowest ratings, regardless of their race. Each time, this methodology resulted in the
    termination of Asian and non-Asian employees; similarly, both Asian and non-Asian
    employees were retained in each RIF. Likewise, three weeks after Stites’ termination for
    low efficiency ratings, an Asian inspector was terminated for the identical reason.
    On January 27, 2009, Appellants filed suit accusing ARI of reverse race
    discrimination and retaliation. On January 10, 2011, the District Court granted ARI’s
    motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
    II.1
    A. Discrimination
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary
    review over a grant of summary judgment and consider the facts in a light most favorable
    to Appellants. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 
    214 F.3d 402
    , 405 (3d Cir. 2000).
    3
    Appellants claim that their terminations resulted from reverse race discrimination.
    In analyzing such claims, we employ the familiar burden shifting analysis set forth by the
    Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973). Because the
    parties do not dispute that Appellants have established a prima facie case of
    discrimination or that ARI has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
    them—namely, that it applied objective, performance-based efficiency ratings—our
    analysis turns solely on whether Appellants have overcome the “difficult burden” of
    proving pretext. Fuentes v. Perskie, 
    32 F.3d 759
    , 765 (3d Cir. 1994). We hold that they
    have not.
    To establish pretext, Appellants must “point to some evidence . . . from which a
    fact finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate
    reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
    motivating . . . cause of the employer’s action.” Iadimarco v. Runyon, 
    190 F.3d 151
    , 165-
    66 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, Appellants admit that they do not—and cannot—dispute the
    accuracy of ARI’s employee efficiency scores. Nor do they dispute that ARI laid off only
    those employees with the lowest efficiency scores or that these layoffs affected both
    Asian and non-Asian employees. And finally, although Appellants allege that Asian
    employees were given easier work, thereby “making it impossible for non-Asians to score
    as well as Asians,” they admit that several non-Asian inspectors maintained efficiency
    scores better than many—if not most—of the Asian inspectors. We therefore hold that
    4
    Appellants have not shown such “contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate
    reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of
    credence.” 
    Id. at 166
     (citation omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate.
    B. Retaliation
    Appellants also allege that ARI retaliated against them for complaining about the
    alleged preferential treatment of Asian workers. To prevail on a retaliation claim, a
    plaintiff must prove that “(1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took a
    materially adverse action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between the
    protected activity and the employer’s action.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr.
    Ass’n, 
    503 F.3d 217
    , 231 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the only evidence presented by Appellants
    to show a “causal connection” is the claimed temporal proximity between their
    complaints and their terminations. Although temporal proximity alone may be sufficient
    to create an inference of causality in some cases, it must be “unusually suggestive” to do
    so. 
    Id. at 232
    . The record here, however, shows that Appellants complained numerous
    times over the course of several years of employment at ARI. Thus, far from being
    “unusually suggestive,” any proximity between Appellants’ final complaints and their
    terminations is merely coincidental. Consequently, summary judgment for ARI again was
    appropriate.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    5
    HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
    I agree with my colleagues that Appellants’ retaliation claims fail at summary
    judgment. I disagree, however, that Appellants’ discrimination claims fail for want of
    pretext under Fuentes v. Perskie, 
    32 F.3d 759
    , 765 (3d Cir. 1994).
    Before they were laid off, Appellants complained to management that Asian
    unloaders favored Asian inspectors in the distribution of work. Supervisor Arlene
    Yorgey validated these complaints, stating: “yes, I do know that . . . you’re not getting
    the work because it’s going down . . . to the . . . Asian girls.” Under our precedents, an
    employer’s reliance on objective criteria tainted by discrimination or inequality evidences
    pretext. See, e.g., Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 
    228 F.3d 313
    , 319–21 (3d
    Cir. 2000); Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 
    110 F.3d 986
    , 994–95 (3d Cir. 1997). In addition,
    ARI expressed racial bias1 and hired employees immediately before and after the 2006
    and 2007 RIFs.2 Finally, the fact that some Caucasians survived ARI’s layoffs and some
    Asians did not is not dispositive, see, e.g., Goosby, 
    228 F.3d at 321
    ; Iadimarco v.
    Runyon, 
    190 F.3d 151
    , 165 (3d Cir. 1999), particularly where, as here, ARI eliminated all
    but six or seven Caucasian processing employees in just two years.
    For these reasons, I would give Appellants their day in court.
    1
    Appellants and former co-workers testified that two supervisors said Asians
    work better, work faster, complain less, and do not call in sick as often as Caucasians.
    2
    ARI hired three inspectors two months after the 2006 RIF, converted four
    temporary employees to full-time status just three days before the 2007 RIF, and hired
    processing employees in the months following the 2007 RIF.
    1