Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction ( 2021 )


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    APPENDIX
    TALIB SHAHEER v. COMMISSIONER
    OF CORRECTION*
    Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland
    File No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
    Memorandum filed October 21, 2019
    Proceedings
    Memorandum of decision on petition for writ of
    habeas corpus. Petition denied.
    Robert J. McKay, assigned counsel, for the petitioner.
    Leah Hawley and Tamara Grosso, assistant state’s
    attorneys, for the respondent.
    Opinion
    SEELEY, J. The petitioner, Talib Shaheer, brings this
    petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his
    trial counsel provided him ineffective assistance in vio-
    lation of the state and federal constitutions. The peti-
    tioner is seeking to have his convictions vacated and
    the matter be returned to the trial court for further
    proceedings.
    Based on the credible evidence presented and for the
    reasons stated, the petition is denied.
    I
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The petitioner was a criminal defendant in the matter
    of State v. Shaheer, Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, in the
    judicial district of Hartford. He was charged in a nine
    count information with the following offenses: felony
    murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, kid-
    napping in the first degree in violation of General Stat-
    utes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), robbery in the first degree
    in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1), two
    counts of tampering with physical evidence in violation
    of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-155 (a) (1),
    hindering prosecution in the second degree in violation
    of General Statutes § 53a-166, false statement in the
    second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to
    2013) § 53a-157b, interfering with police in violation
    of General Statutes § 53a-167a and tampering with a
    witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151. Attor-
    ney Bruce Lorenzen represented the petitioner in the
    criminal proceedings.
    On April 16, 2015, the state filed a substitute informa-
    tion, and the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the
    Alford doctrine to robbery in the second degree in viola-
    tion of General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B) and he
    pleaded guilty to tampering with evidence in violation
    of General Statutes § 53a-155 (a) (1). The state summa-
    rized the underlying facts at the change of plea hearing
    as follows: ‘‘Your Honor, the [petitioner] went to buy
    marijuana from the victim, Christopher Jefferson, on
    September 5, 2013, on Bond Street in the city of Hart-
    ford. He invited the female codefendant, Madelyne Mar-
    tinez-Mercado, along for the ride. They had just met the
    day before. He drove the Mercedes that his girlfriend,
    Lourdes Tones, had rented for him to the location. Upon
    arrival, the victim was told to get in the backseat of
    the car. At this time, the [petitioner] pulled a gun from
    . . . under his seat, the driver seat, pointed it at the
    victim with the intent of robbing him. The [petitioner]
    claims that it was the female codefendant who pulled
    the gun and pointed it at the victim. The [petitioner]
    then took off, causing the car doors to lock. The victim
    tried to get out of the car . . . but he also tried to
    pound on the glass to signal his friends that he was
    [petitioner], but then [the] petitioner yelled for the code-
    fendant to take the gun, which she did. She put it to
    the victim’s head and shot him. They then drove to
    Portland, Connecticut, to dump the body, stopping for
    gas along the way in Cromwell. The [petitioner]
    removed the victim’s body from the car in Portland and
    dumped it in the woods . . . . He then drove to a car
    wash in Hamden where they cleaned the blood out of
    the car. He then drove to a dumpster in a housing project
    . . . in Hamden and disposed of the gun in a book bag
    that he had in the car. The gun was never recovered.
    . . . A passerby found the victim’s body in Portland a
    very short time after it was dumped and called the
    police. The victim died the next day as a result of the
    gunshot wound at Hartford Hospital.’’
    On June 16, 2015, the court, Alexander, J., sentenced
    the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fifteen
    years to serve. Thereafter, on or about August 9, 2017,
    the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    After counsel was appointed, the petition was amended
    several times. The operative pleading is the second
    revised petition dated February 4, 2019, and filed on
    February 13, 2019, which alleges he was denied the
    effective assistance of trial counsel in violation of his
    state and federal constitutional rights. Specifically, he
    claims the performance of his trial counsel was defi-
    cient in numerous ways, namely, failing to investigate
    certain witnesses, failing to timely raise a defense of
    duress, failing to provide critical information and/or
    correct information to the petitioner, and failing to
    review the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s evi-
    dence.1
    The court heard the trial on this matter on February
    27, 2019. The petitioner called five witnesses: himself,
    Attorney Bruce Lorenzen (trial counsel), Attorney John
    Stawicki (cocounsel), Andrew W. Meisler, PhD (an
    expert witness who examined the petitioner and sup-
    ported the petitioner’s general defense of duress), and
    Jamal Pilgrim (a lay witness). The petitioner also intro-
    duced numerous exhibits, including a copy of the certi-
    fied clerk’s file, transcripts of the change of plea hearing
    and sentencing hearing, various witness statements and
    police reports, and an evaluation prepared by Dr.
    Meisler. The respondent did not call any witnesses or
    introduce any exhibits.
    II
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    The court has reviewed all of the evidence presented
    and makes the following findings of fact:
    The petitioner’s trial counsel in the criminal case was
    Lorenzen, an experienced criminal defense attorney
    who graduated law school in 1984. He has served as a
    public defender exclusively since 1989.2 In 2013, as the
    public defender for the judicial district of Hartford, he
    was a supervisor, and he assigned himself to represent
    the petitioner. During his representation, he obtained
    discovery, including the police reports, witness state-
    ments, the arrest warrant affidavit, the petitioner’s
    statement to the police, the 9-1-1 call to the police, and
    the search warrant affidavits. Attorney Lorenzen met
    with the petitioner numerous times and reviewed the
    discovery with him. He also interviewed and counseled
    the petitioner, discussed the state’s evidence with the
    petitioner, pursued a general defense of duress by hiring
    a psychologist to conduct an evaluation, and engaged
    in pretrial negotiations with the prosecutor. Attorney
    Lorenzen received an offer from the state that was
    discussed with the petitioner and subsequently rejected
    by the petitioner. Based on the discovery provided and
    the information provided to him by the petitioner, Attor-
    ney Lorenzen had formulated a trial strategy, which he
    discussed with the petitioner, and he was prepared to
    try the case before a jury.
    Both the petitioner and his codefendant, Martinez-
    Mercado, spoke with law enforcement and made certain
    admissions in sworn statements. In a statement dated
    December 17, 2013, Martinez-Mercado admitted that
    she drove with the petitioner in his vehicle to Hartford
    to buy drugs. She claimed that the petitioner had given
    her the gun to hold and, after the dealer got into the
    backseat of the vehicle, the petitioner drove off and
    the car doors locked. She stated that the petitioner and
    the dealer began arguing and she shot the victim in the
    head. She indicated that the petitioner drove on the
    highway and got off in a town where the petitioner
    found a quiet area and then pulled the victim out of
    the car. She further claimed that the petitioner went
    through the victim’s pockets and took money and mari-
    juana. She admitted to going to the car wash and clean-
    ing the car with the petitioner. She also indicated that
    the petitioner placed the gun into a bag and then threw
    the bag into a dumpster near an apartment complex.
    The petitioner also provided a statement to the police
    on December 17, 2013. He admitted that he drove to
    Hartford with the codefendant in order to buy marijuana
    from someone she knew. He told the police that, when
    they arrived at a location on Bond Street in Hartford,
    the dealer got into the backseat of the car. According
    to the petitioner, they were discussing the drug transac-
    tion when his codefendant pulled out a gun from her
    purse, pointed the gun at the drug dealer and told him
    she wanted everything. The petitioner drove off, the
    doors locked, and the drug dealer began grabbing at the
    petitioner. The petitioner claimed that his codefendant
    shot the drug dealer. He told the police that he wanted
    to bring the drug dealer to the hospital, but his codefen-
    dant refused to do so. Instead, he claimed that she
    pointed the gun at the petitioner, so he continued to
    drive. He stated that, when he stopped for gas in Crom-
    well, his codefendant went into the store and paid for
    the gas, and that she pumped the gas. He further stated
    that he knew the victim was alive because he could
    hear him snoring.
    The petitioner told the police that, when he found a
    wooded area in Portland, he pulled the victim from the
    car, who was still alive, and dumped him on the side
    of the road. Prior to doing so, the petitioner claimed
    that his codefendant went through the victim’s pockets
    and took the marijuana and $500 in cash. According to
    the petitioner, his codefendant gave him the marijuana
    and $150 in cash. The petitioner stated that he drove
    to a car wash in Hamden where they cleaned the blood
    from the interior of the car, and then he drove to a
    condominium complex where the codefendant threw
    a bag containing the gun into a dumpster.
    Initially, Patricia Jennings, a friend of the petitioner,
    provided an alibi for him. She gave a sworn statement
    to the police on September 6, 2013, and claimed that
    the petitioner was with her at her house during the time
    period that the shooting incident occurred. After the
    police obtained cell phone records of the petitioner and
    Jennings that contradicted her claim that the petitioner
    was present with her at her house all day, Jennings was
    charged with the offense of giving a false statement.
    On December 8, 2013, after she was arrested,3 Jennings
    recanted her prior statement. She told the police that
    the petitioner stopped by her house during the morning
    of September 5, 2013, but that he left later in the morning
    and he was not with her all day. In his statement to
    the police, the petitioner admitted that he had called
    Jennings and told her to tell the police he was with
    her on the day of the shooting. Attorney Lorenzen was
    aware of both statements provided by Jennings and that
    she had recanted the alibi.4 Lorenzen did not interview
    Jennings since his theory of defense was not based on
    the petitioner having an alibi but, rather, it was based
    on the version of events provided by the petitioner to
    the police.
    On February 25, 2015, Martinez-Mercado entered a
    plea of guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine to the
    charge of murder. In the recitation of the factual basis
    for the plea, the prosecutor stated that, after the victim
    got into the backseat of the car that was being driven
    by the petitioner, Martinez-Mercado, who was sitting
    in the front passenger seat, ‘‘pulled a gun and told the
    victim to give her all his stuff.’’ According to the prose-
    cutor, the victim began to struggle with the petitioner,
    and Martinez-Mercado then shot the victim. Martinez-
    Mercado was sentenced to a period of thirty-five years
    of incarceration.
    On March 31, 2015, the first day of jury selection in the
    petitioner’s case, the state filed a long form information,
    which informed the petitioner that the state was pro-
    ceeding to trial on nine counts, including the charge of
    felony murder.5 The defense theory that was going to
    be presented to the jury, and communicated to the
    petitioner, was that the petitioner was unaware that his
    codefendant was going to rob the victim, and he was
    not aware that she had a gun. The petitioner intended
    to explain that his conduct following the shooting was
    the result of being under duress.6 In other words, it was
    the shock of seeing the codefendant shoot the victim
    and then point the gun at the petitioner that caused
    him to cooperate with her after the shooting.7 Attorney
    Lorenzen engaged the services of Andrew W. Meisler,
    PhD, who conducted an evaluation of the petitioner
    and issued a report on February 17, 2015. Dr. Meisler
    interviewed the petitioner, and he reviewed the police
    reports and statements relating to the shooting, as well
    as the police videotaped interviews of the petitioner
    and the codefendant. Dr. Meisler also reviewed the peti-
    tioner’s Department of Correction medical records. Dr.
    Meisler concluded that the petitioner’s actions ‘‘can be
    explained and understood as an acute and adaptive
    response to danger rather than as behavior driven by
    criminologic intent.’’ He further concluded that the peti-
    tioner’s ‘‘actions during and after the offense occurred
    during a state of altered consciousness and behavioral
    control resulting from a self-protective response to
    acute fear.’’
    The defense provided Dr. Meisler’s report to the state
    in the week prior to jury selection. The state filed an
    objection and argued that it was not disclosed in a
    timely manner. The trial court (Mullarkey, J.) indicated
    that it would give the state time to have the petitioner
    evaluated by the state’s expert witness, Dr. Donald R.
    Grayson, which was then scheduled for April 16, 2015,
    the date the petitioner elected to enter his pleas of guilty
    to the substitute information.8 During the petitioner’s
    guilty plea canvass, Attorney Lorenzen asked the court
    to confirm that the petitioner understood that the
    defense had intended to present a defense of duress
    but that, by entering his pleas of guilty, he would be
    waiving his right to present the defense. The court
    (Alexander, J.) asked the petitioner if Attorney Loren-
    zen’s representation was correct, and he responded that
    it was correct.
    During jury selection, Attorney Lorenzen together
    with Attorney Stawicki, met with the petitioner at
    Northern Correctional Institution on several occasions
    during the evening hours. At those meetings, Attorney
    Lorenzen discussed with the petitioner his options. He
    gave strong advice to the petitioner to plead guilty to
    the lesser offenses and receive a sentence of fifteen
    years rather than proceed to trial and be exposed to a
    conviction for the offense of felony murder, and risk
    the mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to serve
    with a maximum of sixty years on that charge alone.
    Attorney Lorenzen was concerned about the increased
    exposure, as well as whether a jury would credit the
    petitioner’s claims that he did not know anything about
    robbing the victim with a gun, and that his postshooting
    actions (i.e., dumping the body in a wooded area, clean-
    ing the blood from the car, throwing the gun away,
    asking Jennings to concoct an alibi) were as a result
    of being in shock from his codefendant’s actions. Addi-
    tionally, trial counsel discussed with the petitioner that
    there was an issue relating to telephone calls between
    the petitioner and other individuals. The telephone
    records received by the petitioner’s trial counsel did not
    support the petitioner’s version of what had transpired.9
    Pilgrim was an acquaintance of the petitioner who
    was interviewed by the police on February 27, 2014,
    after his telephone number showed up on the petition-
    er’s phone records on the day of the shooting. Pilgrim
    told the police that, in late August, 2013, he was hanging
    out with the petitioner and Jennings at his house on
    Bond Street in Hartford. The petitioner wanted to buy
    marijuana, so Pilgrim called Jefferson and arranged for
    them to meet. Pilgrim told the police that, after the
    petitioner and Jennings came back from meeting Jeffer-
    son to purchase marijuana, the petitioner was furious
    because Jefferson had charged them for an extra bag.
    Pilgrim told the police that the petitioner stated he
    should rob Jefferson for his stash of marijuana.
    Attorney Lorenzen contacted Pilgrim and asked him
    questions. Pilgrim, who was on parole, indicated to
    Lorenzen that he was going through his own issues,
    and it was not the right time for him to get involved.
    Pilgrim also was contacted by a representative of the
    state, and Pilgrim told the state he did not want to testify.
    During jury selection, Attorney Lorenzen informed the
    petitioner that Pilgrim had contacted the defense, and
    he was not going to take the witness stand at the peti-
    tioner’s trial.
    Prior to the conclusion of jury selection, the peti-
    tioner elected to plead guilty to a substitute information
    to the charges of robbery in the second degree and
    tampering with physical evidence on April 16, 2015.
    The court (Alexander, J.) conducted a thorough and
    complete canvass of the petitioner. The court explained
    the elements of each statute and summarized the evi-
    dence the state claimed provided the factual basis for
    each charge. The petitioner indicated that he under-
    stood the elements of both offenses as well as the evi-
    dence that formed the basis for each charge. The peti-
    tioner also confirmed that he had talked to his attorneys
    about his decision to enter a plea agreement rather than
    continue with the trial. Subsequently, on June 16, 2015,
    the court (Alexander, J.) sentenced the petitioner to a
    period of ten years of incarceration on the robbery in
    the second degree charge and to a period of five years of
    incarceration on the tampering with physical evidence
    charge for a total effective sentence of fifteen years
    to serve.
    III
    DISCUSSION
    As recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
    ‘‘the [s]ixth [a]mendment right to counsel exists, and
    is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to
    a fair trial.’’ Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    684, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984). The court
    also recognized that, ‘‘if the right to counsel guaranteed
    by the [c]onstitution is to serve its purpose, defendants
    cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel,
    and . . . judges should strive to maintain proper stan-
    dards of performance by attorneys who are represent-
    ing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.’’
    McMann v. Richardson, 
    397 U.S. 759
    , 771, 
    90 S. Ct. 1441
    , 
    25 L. Ed. 2d 763
     (1970). Therefore, ‘‘defendants
    facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assis-
    tance of competent counsel’’; id.; and that includes in
    the context of counsel advising a defendant whether
    to plead guilty. See Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 366
    , 
    88 L. Ed. 2d 203
     (1985). The decision to plead
    guilty is ‘‘ordinarily the most important single decision
    in any criminal case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Boria v. Keane, 
    99 F.3d 492
    , 496–97 (2d Cir. 1996),
    cert. denied, 
    521 U.S. 1118
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 2508
    , 
    138 L. Ed. 2d 1012
     (1997).
    The legal principles in cases involving claims of inef-
    fective assistance of counsel in connection with guilty
    pleas are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 
    supra,
    466 U.S. 668
    , and Hill v. Lockhart, 
    supra,
     
    474 U.S. 52
    .
    Under Strickland, an ineffective assistance of counsel
    claim ‘‘must be supported by evidence establishing that
    (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective
    standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense because there was
    a reasonable probability that the outcome of the pro-
    ceedings would have been different had it not been for
    the deficient performance.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Humble v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    180 Conn. App. 697
    , 704, 
    184 A.3d 804
    , cert. denied, 
    330 Conn. 939
    , 
    195 A.3d 692
     (2018); see also Skakel v. Com-
    missioner of Correction, 
    329 Conn. 1
    , 11, 
    188 A.3d 1
    (2018), cert. denied,      U.S.    , 
    139 S. Ct. 788
    , 
    202 L. Ed. 2d 569
     (2019). Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he [long-standing]
    test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is
    whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
    choice among the alternative courses of action open to
    the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hill
    v. Lockhart, 
    supra, 56
    . As noted in Strickland, ‘‘[u]nless
    a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said
    that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in
    the adversary process that renders the result unrelia-
    ble.’’ Strickland v. Washington, 
    supra, 687
    .
    Our courts have recognized that, ‘‘[t]o satisfy the per-
    formance prong under Strickland-Hill, the petitioner
    must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
    objective standard of reasonableness. . . . A peti-
    tioner who accepts counsel’s advice to plead guilty has
    the burden of demonstrating on habeas appeal that
    the advice was not within the range of competence
    demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . The
    range of competence demanded is reasonably compe-
    tent, or within the range of competence displayed by
    lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal
    law. . . . Reasonably competent attorneys may advise
    their clients to plead guilty even if defenses may exist.
    . . . A reviewing court must view counsel’s conduct
    with a strong presumption that it falls within the wide
    range of reasonable professional assistance.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Humble v. Commissioner of
    Correction, 
    supra,
     
    180 Conn. App. 704
    –705.
    Although the decision to plead guilty is the defen-
    dant’s to make, counsel ‘‘must make an informed evalu-
    ation of the options and determine which alternative
    will offer the defendant the most favorable outcome.
    A defendant relies heavily upon counsel’s independent
    evaluation of the charges and defenses, applicable law,
    the evidence and the risks and probable outcome of a
    trial.’’ Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    234 Conn. 139
    , 154, 
    662 A.2d 718
     (1995); Siemon v. Stoughton, 
    184 Conn. 547
    , 556 n.3, 
    440 A.2d 210
     (1981). ‘‘It is [well
    settled] that defense counsel have a constitutional duty
    to convey any plea offers from the government and to
    advise their clients on the crucial decision whether to
    accept a plea offer.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Cardoza v. Rock, 
    731 F.3d 169
    , 178 (2d Cir. 2013); Bar-
    low v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    150 Conn. App. 781
    ,
    797, 
    93 A.3d 165
     (2014). It is the duty of a criminal
    defense lawyer to fully advise his client whether plead-
    ing guilty ‘‘appears to be desirable’’; (emphasis omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted) Boria v. Keane, 
    supra,
    99 F.3d 496
    ; Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    123 Conn. App. 424
    , 437, 
    1 A.3d 1242
     (2010), cert. denied,
    
    302 Conn. 901
    , 
    23 A.3d 1241
     (2011); and ‘‘determine
    which alternative will offer the defendant the most
    favorable outcome.’’ Copas v. Commissioner of Correc-
    tion, supra, 154. Thus, the effective assistance of coun-
    sel includes counsel’s informed opinion as to what pleas
    should enter. Boria v. Keane, 
    supra, 497
    .
    As noted in Strickland, ‘‘[t]he object of an ineffec-
    tiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.’’
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    supra,
     
    466 U.S. 697
    . The sixth
    amendment ‘‘does not guarantee perfect representa-
    tion, only a reasonably competent attorney. . . . Rep-
    resentation is constitutionally ineffective only if it so
    undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
    process that the defendant was denied a fair trial.’’
    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 110, 
    131 S. Ct. 770
    ,
    
    178 L. Ed. 2d 624
     (2011); see also Skakel v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, supra, 
    329 Conn. 30
    –31.
    A trial of a habeas petition is not an opportunity for a
    new counsel to attempt to relitigate a case in a different
    manner. The court in Strickland cautioned that, ‘‘[a]
    fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
    every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects
    of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of coun-
    sel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
    from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the
    difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
    must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s con-
    duct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
    sional assistance . . . .’’ Strickland v. Washington,
    
    supra,
     
    466 U.S. 689
    ; Skakel v. Commissioner of Correc-
    tion, supra, 
    329 Conn. 31
    .
    In the context of guilty pleas, ‘‘[t]o satisfy the preju-
    dice prong [under Strickland-Hill], the petitioner must
    show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
    insisted on going to trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Humble v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 
    180 Conn. App. 705
    . As recently recognized by
    the Appellate Court, ‘‘an allegation of the ineffective
    assistance of counsel is a factor to be taken into consid-
    eration in determining whether a guilty plea was volun-
    tary and intelligent, but for the plea and the judgment
    of conviction based thereon to be overturned on this
    ground, it must be demonstrated that there was such
    an interrelationship between the ineffective assistance
    of counsel and the plea that it can be said the plea was
    not voluntary and intelligent because of the ineffective
    assistance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hen-
    derson v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    181 Conn. App. 778
    , 797–98, 
    189 A.3d 135
    , cert. denied, 
    329 Conn. 911
    ,
    
    186 A.3d 707
     (2018).
    With respect to the prejudice prong, a petitioner
    ‘‘must make more than a bare allegation that he would
    have pleaded differently and gone to trial . . . .’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Colon v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    179 Conn. App. 30
    , 36, 
    177 A.3d 1162
    (2017), cert. denied, 
    328 Conn. 907
    , 
    178 A.3d 390
     (2018).
    ‘‘In evaluating whether the petitioner had met this bur-
    den and evaluating the credibility of the petitioner’s
    assertions that he would have gone to trial, it [is] appro-
    priate for the court to consider whether a decision to
    reject the plea bargain would have been rational under
    the circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Flomo v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    169 Conn. App. 266
    , 280, 
    149 A.3d 185
     (2016), cert. denied, 
    324 Conn. 906
    ,
    
    152 A.3d 544
     (2017). As noted in Strickland, ‘‘[u]nless
    a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said
    that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in
    the adversary process that renders the result unrelia-
    ble.’’ Strickland v. Washington, 
    supra,
     
    466 U.S. 687
    .
    First, the petitioner’s claim that trial counsel’s perfor-
    mance was deficient because he failed to timely raise
    a defense of duress10 and did not timely disclose Dr.
    Meisler as an expert witness is without merit. Although
    the state objected to the disclosure and moved to
    exclude Dr. Meisler’s testimony due to late disclosure,
    the record reveals that the trial judge was not going to
    preclude Dr. Meisler’s testimony due to the timing of
    disclosure. The petitioner was present in the courtroom
    when the trial judge stated he would permit time for
    the state to engage its own expert to examine the peti-
    tioner. In fact, the petitioner was scheduled to meet
    with the state’s expert on the date he changed his plea
    to guilty. Therefore, to the extent the petitioner is
    asserting a claim that he pleaded guilty because he felt
    his duress defense was not going to be presented to
    the jury due to late disclosure, his claim is not credible.
    Trial counsel disclosed Dr. Meisler’s report to the state
    prior to jury selection and was prepared to call him as
    a witness to support the petitioner’s claim that he acted
    under duress after he witnessed his codefendant shoot
    the victim and then point the gun at him.11 Accordingly,
    trial counsel’s performance in securing an expert wit-
    ness to support his defense that he was acting under
    duress after the shooting occurred does not support a
    claim of deficient performance.
    Secondly, the petitioner’s claims that trial counsel’s
    performance was deficient because he failed to obtain
    Jennings’ second statement and he did not investigate
    her also is without merit. Jennings did not give a second
    written statement. Instead, she was interviewed by the
    police, and her recantation is memorialized in a police
    report. Both trial counsel were aware of her recantation
    of the petitioner’s alibi, and the court does not find
    credible that the petitioner was not aware that she had
    recanted. Regardless, the petitioner admitted to the
    police that he had asked her to lie for him and tell the
    police that he was with her on the day of the shooting.
    Therefore, based on the petitioner’s admission to the
    police, it was sound trial strategy for trial counsel not to
    investigate Jennings and, instead, pursue an alternative
    theory of defense based on the petitioner’s version of
    events.
    While ‘‘[c]onstitutionally adequate assistance of
    counsel includes competent pretrial investigation’’; Sie-
    mon v. Stoughton, 
    supra,
     
    184 Conn. 554
    ; ‘‘strategic
    choices made after less than complete investigation
    are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
    professional judgments support the limitations on
    investigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    306 Conn. 664
    ,
    680, 
    51 A.3d 948
     (2012). In Gaines, the court recognized
    the following: ‘‘[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable
    investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
    makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
    ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investi-
    gate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in
    all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of def-
    erence to counsel’s judgments.
    ‘‘The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be
    determined or substantially influenced by the [petition-
    er’s] own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are
    usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic
    choices made by the [petitioner] and on information
    supplied by the [petitioner]. In particular, what investi-
    gation decisions are reasonable depends critically on
    such information. For example, when the facts that
    support a certain potential line of defense are generally
    known to counsel because of what the defendant has
    said, the need for further investigations may be consid-
    erably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when
    a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that
    pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or
    even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investi-
    gations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
     680–81.
    In this case, based on the information supplied by
    the petitioner to Attorney Lorenzen as well as the peti-
    tioner’s statement to the police, Lorenzen’s decision to
    not investigate Jennings is sound legal strategy based on
    reasonable professional judgment. The defense strategy
    was to pursue a claim of actual innocence as to the
    robbery and felony murder, and then to argue that the
    petitioner was under duress after witnessing his code-
    fendant shoot the victim. Jennings’ original statement
    providing the petitioner with an alibi, and her later
    recantation, would not have been helpful to the petition-
    er’s theory of the case. Furthermore, this court ‘‘will
    not second-guess defense counsel’s decision not to
    investigate or call certain witnesses or to investigate
    potential defenses, such as when . . . counsel learns
    of the substance of the witness’ testimony and deter-
    mines that calling that witness is unnecessary or poten-
    tially harmful to the case . . . or . . . the petitioner
    fails to present, at the habeas hearing, evidence or the
    testimony of witnesses that he argues counsel reason-
    ably should have discovered during the pretrial investi-
    gation.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) 
    Id.,
     681–82. In the present
    case, Jennings’ testimony would have been potentially
    harmful to the defense, and the petitioner did not pre-
    sent any relevant evidence counsel should have uncov-
    ered with further investigation. Therefore, the peti-
    tioner has not presented any credible evidence that trial
    counsel’s decision to not investigate Jennings consti-
    tuted deficient performance.
    Similarly, while the petitioner alleged that trial coun-
    sel failed to investigate additional witnesses, namely,
    Pilgrim, Donraj Chandrat and Sheila Robinson, the peti-
    tioner did not offer any evidence that trial counsel did
    not conduct an investigation of these witnesses. Trial
    counsel was not asked whether he ever investigated
    these witnesses. See, e.g., Romero v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    112 Conn. App. 305
    , 312, 
    962 A.2d 894
    (petitioner failed to present evidence that would allow
    habeas court to determine whether counsel’s pretrial
    investigation was inadequate), cert. denied, 
    290 Conn. 921
    , 
    966 A.2d 236
     (2009). The only witness who testified
    at the habeas trial was Pilgrim. Pilgrim spoke with Attor-
    ney Lorenzen, but he told him he could not get involved
    since he had his own issues. Thus, trial counsel did
    contact Pilgrim, and the petitioner has not established
    that trial counsel did not investigate Pilgrim or that any
    investigation conducted was inadequate. Furthermore,
    the petitioner admitted that he knew at the time he
    entered his guilty pleas that Pilgrim had called his attor-
    ney’s office and stated that he was not going to testify
    at the petitioner’s trial. This admission defeats the peti-
    tioner’s allegation that Attorney Lorenzen failed to
    inform the petitioner whether Pilgrim intended to tes-
    tify.
    The court also rejects the petitioner’s claim that trial
    counsel misrepresented to the petitioner that the state
    possessed evidence that he made a five minute telephone
    call shortly after the incident to Jennings, which would
    have undermined his defense of duress. According to
    the petitioner, this misrepresentation contributed to his
    decision to plead guilty. He further testified that, after
    he pleaded guilty, trial counsel informed him he had
    been incorrect, and there was no five minute telephone
    call. The court did not find the petitioner’s testimony
    on this subject to be credible, and the petitioner did
    not offer any additional evidence regarding this claim.
    Furthermore, the petitioner testified that he told Attor-
    ney Lorenzen he called Jennings to tell her he could
    not make it back to care for his dogs that he kept at
    her house. Therefore, regardless of whether the tele-
    phone call lasted ten seconds or five minutes, Attorney
    Lorenzen’s advice to the petitioner that a jury could
    view the fact that he was able to have the presence to
    think about his dogs and make a telephone call at all
    as contrary to being under duress was reasonable.
    Finally, the credible evidence does not support the
    petitioner’s allegations that Attorney Lorenzen failed
    to communicate the strengths and weaknesses of the
    state’s case or that he failed to discuss the potential
    testimony of all anticipated witnesses. Attorney Loren-
    zen met with the petitioner to develop a strategy. There
    were numerous pretrial conferences between the peti-
    tioner and trial counsel as well as several conferences
    during jury selection. Attorney Lorenzen provided the
    discovery to the petitioner and discussed with the peti-
    tioner his options. He recommended to the petitioner
    that he should plead guilty to the lesser offenses and
    receive a sentence of fifteen years rather than proceed
    to trial and risk being convicted for the offense of felony
    murder and then being exposed to the mandatory mini-
    mum of twenty-five years to serve with a maximum of
    sixty years on that charge alone.
    The petitioner has not established that his trial coun-
    sel’s advice to plead guilty was not within the range of
    competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
    The petitioner did not establish that counsel’s represen-
    tation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
    ness such that the petitioner was unable to make an
    informed decision to plead guilty.
    IV
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the claims
    of ineffective assistance of counsel, and judgment shall
    enter denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    * Affirmed. Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    207 Conn. App. 449
    ,
    A.3d      (2021).
    1
    While the petitioner detailed numerous allegations against trial counsel
    in the operative petition, the court will address only those claims for which
    the petitioner presented evidence and provided a legal analysis in his post-
    trial brief. All other claims are deemed abandoned. See Walker v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    176 Conn. App. 843
    , 857, 
    171 A.3d 525
     (2017) (‘‘[i]n
    light of the petitioner’s failure to brief the due process claim, we conclude
    that the habeas court properly deemed it abandoned’’); Raynor v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    117 Conn. App. 788
    , 796, 
    981 A.2d 517
     (2009) (‘‘[t]he
    petitioner’s failure to brief his first claim to the habeas court, namely,
    improper preparation and investigation by trial counsel, resulted in an aban-
    donment of that claim’’), cert. denied, 
    294 Conn. 926
    , 
    986 A.2d 1053
     (2010).
    2
    Attorney Stawicki, another experienced public defender who has tried
    over 100 murder cases, served as cocounsel with Attorney Lorenzen during
    jury selection and the change of plea proceedings. The petitioner’s habeas
    petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel only as to Attorney Loren-
    zen.
    3
    Jennings pleaded guilty to the offense of giving a false statement in the
    second degree in violation of § 53a-157b on May 29, 2014.
    4
    Attorney Stawicki also recalled that Jennings had provided two versions
    and that her second statement was inconsistent with her initial statement.
    The petitioner testified that he never saw or received a copy of Jennings’
    second statement in which she recanted the alibi she originally provided to
    the petitioner. He also testified that he was never aware of it. The court
    does not find credible the petitioner’s testimony that he was not aware that
    Jennings had recanted her original statement.
    5
    When the petitioner was arrested, he initially was charged with kidnap-
    ping in the first degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), felony murder
    in violation of § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-
    134 (a) (1), criminal use of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
    216c and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes
    § 53a-217c (a) (1).
    6
    General Statutes § 53a-14 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any prosecution
    for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the
    proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened immi-
    nent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
    threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
    have been unable to resist. . . .’’ As recognized by the Supreme Court, ‘‘[i]t
    is well established that . . . § 53a-14 provides that duress is a defense to
    a crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonilla, 
    317 Conn. 758
    , 771, 
    120 A.3d 481
     (2015). However, ‘‘[d]uress is not an affirmative
    defense. . . . Thus, if that defense is raised at a trial, the state shall have
    the burden of disproving [it] beyond a reasonable doubt. General Statutes
    § 53a-12 (a). [T]he assertion and proof of the . . . defense nevertheless
    remains the defendant’s responsibility in the first instance.’’ (Citation omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
    7
    See, e.g., State v. Helmedach, 
    306 Conn. 61
    , 79, 
    48 A.3d 664
     (2012)
    (discussing defendant’s theory in that case that her sole defense as to robbery
    and felony murder charges was that state had failed to prove that she had
    planned robbery with codefendant, while her duress defense related only
    to acts that she admitted committing after her codefendant threatened to
    kill her, namely, stealing victim’s car and absconding with codefendant).
    8
    During the change of plea hearing, the state informed the court that
    the petitioner was scheduled to be interviewed by the state’s doctor later
    that day.
    9
    The petitioner testified that Attorney Lorenzen persuaded him to plead
    guilty because he was aware that Jennings had met with the prosecutor
    during jury selection, and Lorenzen told the petitioner the phone records
    showed that there was a five minute conversation between him and Jennings
    just after the shooting. According to the petitioner, Lorenzen told him that
    such a lengthy conversation would go against his defense of duress. The
    petitioner further testified that, after he pleaded guilty, Lorenzen then told
    him he had been mistaken, and the phone records did not show a five minute
    conversation. The court credits that Lorenzen counseled the petitioner that
    a jury could determine that the phone call between him and Jennings shortly
    after the incident undermined his defense of duress. However, the court
    does not credit the petitioner’s claim that Lorenzen provided the petitioner
    with misinformation regarding the length of the telephone call.
    10
    The petitioner does not provide any authority for the proposition that
    a defendant must provide notice to the state that he is asserting a defense
    of duress.
    11
    In the operative petition, the petitioner alleges that ‘‘counsel misrepre-
    sented that he intended to have Dr. Meisler testify at the jury trial in regard
    to the evaluation of the petitioner to support the defense of duress . . . .’’
    The petitioner presented no credible evidence in support of this assertion,
    and credits Attorney Lorenzen’s testimony that, if the case had gone to trial,
    he intended to call Dr. Meisler in support of his defense theory. Lorenzen’s
    testimony is supported by the prosecutor’s statement to the court during
    the first day of jury selection: ‘‘[The defense is raising the defense of duress
    to some of the charges and claim, I guess, of actual innocence with regard
    to the others.’’