Piasecki v. Shinseki , 555 F. App'x 88 ( 2014 )


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  •      13-1376
    Piasecki v. Shinseki
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 18th day of February, two thousand fourteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    8                GERARD E. LYNCH,
    9                              Circuit Judges.
    10
    11       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    12       Bonnie Piasecki,
    13                Plaintiff-Appellant,
    14
    15       Irene Prevorse, Jan Hensel,
    16                Plaintiffs,
    17
    18                    -v.-                                               13-1376-cv
    19
    20       Eric Shinseki, Secretary, Department
    21       of Veterans Affairs,
    22                Defendant-Appellee.
    23       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    24
    25       FOR APPELLANT:                        JEFFREY WICKS, Jeffrey Wicks,
    26                                             PLLC, Rochester, New York.
    27
    1
    1   FOR APPELLEE:              MICHAEL S. CERRONE, Assistant
    2                              United States Attorney, (Jane B.
    3                              Wolfe, Assistant United States
    4                              Attorney, on the brief), for
    5                              William J. Hochul, Jr., United
    6                              States Attorney, Western
    7                              District of New York, Buffalo,
    8                              New York.
    9
    10        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    11   Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.).
    12
    13        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    14   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    15   AFFIRMED.
    16
    17        Bonnie Piasecki appeals from the final judgment of the
    18   United States District Court for the Western District of New
    19   York (Arcara, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of the
    20   Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) on Piasecki’s Title VII
    21   (42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.) retaliation claims. On appeal,
    22   Piasecki argues that the evidence is sufficient to permit a
    23   reasonable jury to find that she was fired from her nursing
    24   assistant position at the VA for complaining about sexual
    25   harassment by a co-worker and not, as the VA claims, for
    26   lying under oath during an administrative investigation and
    27   inappropriate workplace behavior. We assume the parties’
    28   familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
    29   history, and the issues presented for review.
    30
    31        The district court’s grant of summary judgment is
    32   reviewed de novo. See Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728
    
    33 F.3d 149
    , 154 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is
    34   appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any
    35   material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
    36   as a matter of law.” 
    Id. In making
    this determination, we
    37   “resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual
    38   inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
    39   judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 
    336 F.3d 128
    , 137
    40   (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary
    41   judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole
    42   could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
    43   non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
    44   Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986).
    45
    2
    1        Retaliation claims are governed by the McDonnell
    2   Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework. See 411
    
    3 U.S. 792
    , 802-4 (1973). Once an employer asserts a non-
    4   retaliatory reason for a termination, the employer “will be
    5   entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff can point
    6   to evidence” that reasonably supports a finding of
    7   retaliation. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 
    398 F.3d 211
    , 216
    8   (2d Cir. 2005) (ellipsis and citation omitted).
    9
    10        In the district court, Piasecki conceded “that [the VA]
    11   has articulated a clear, legitimate and non-retaliatory
    12   reason for terminating [Piasecki], i.e. the [Administrative
    13   Board of Investigation]’s intervening findings against
    14   [Piasecki] after she complained about sexual harassment
    15   against Pontillo five months earlier.” Plaintiff’s
    16   Objections to M.J. Scott’s Report & Recommendation at 9,
    17   Piasecki v. Shinseki, No. 10-cv-208 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 29,
    18   2012), ECF No. 47 (“Objections to R&R”). However, Piasecki
    19   offered evidence that “the proposed removal in February 2009
    20   and the actual removal in May 2009 occurred in close
    21   proximity of time to [Piasecki’s] protected activity,” and
    22   argued that this was sufficient to show that the VA’s stated
    23   reason was mere pretext. 
    Id. at 10-11.
    24
    25        “The temporal proximity of events may give rise to an
    26   inference of retaliation for the purposes of establishing a
    27   prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, but without
    28   more, such temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy
    29   appellant’s burden to bring forward some evidence of
    30   pretext.” El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 
    627 F.3d 931
    ,
    31   933 (2d Cir. 2010). Although Piasecki asserted that the
    32   board “elect[ed] to focus on [Piasecki], the victim[], and
    33   not Pontillo, the perpetrator,” Objections to R&R at 10, her
    34   evidence does not support this claim. Moreover, Piasecki
    35   does not dispute the board’s findings that her oral
    36   statements during the investigation, made under oath,
    37   contradicted her earlier statements in numerous respects.
    38
    39        Piasecki’s reliance on Gilooly v. Missouri Department
    40   of Health & Senior Services, 
    421 F.3d 734
    (8th Cir. 2005),
    41   is unavailing. Gilooly held that a retaliation claim
    42   survives summary judgment when the employer’s stated reason
    43   for disciplinary action was simply that it disbelieved the
    44   employee’s discrimination complaint. Even assuming (without
    45   deciding) that holding was correct, that court distinguished
    3
    1   a case in which the employer “found a clearer record of
    2   deception and detailed the basis for such findings.” 
    Id. at 3
      741. Here, the VA conducted a lengthy investigation and
    4   laid out extensive evidence of Piasecki’s deception, as well
    5   as evidence of significant workplace misconduct. Piasecki
    6   offers no meaningful rebuttal of the VA’s findings and no
    7   evidence that those findings were pretextual.
    8
    9        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
    10   Piasecki’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
    11   the district court.
    12
    13
    14                              FOR THE COURT:
    15                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    16
    4