People v. Chavez ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 9/22/21
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                            2d Crim. No. B307951
    (Super. Ct. No. PA093925)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,         (Los Angeles County)
    v.
    DYLAN W. CHAVEZ,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Appellant Dylan W. Chavez challenges the sufficiency of
    the evidence supporting his conviction for leaving the scene of an
    accident resulting in permanent, serious injury to another person
    (Veh. Code,1 § 20001, subds. (a), (b)(2)). At the time of trial nine
    months after the accident, the injured victim had already
    undergone two surgeries to repair broken bones in his left leg, the
    bones had not healed, and he still had an open wound. The
    All undesignated statutory references are to section 20001
    1
    of the Vehicle Code. After the jury convicted appellant of
    violating section 20001, he admitted a prior strike conviction (§§
    667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to six years
    in state prison.
    victim testified that he found it difficult to walk, balance, and
    sleep as a result of his injuries and that he had been unable to
    return to work. The victim’s treating surgeon opined it was
    “likely” the victim’s leg would never be as good as it was prior to
    the accident, would “probably not” ever be as good as his other
    leg, and that the victim would “never be in as good of shape as he
    was prior to the accident.”
    Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support
    the jury’s finding that the victim had suffered a permanent,
    serious injury, i.e., “the loss or permanent impairment of function
    of a bodily member or organ.” (§ 20001, subd. (d).) In making
    this claim, appellant also asserts that the medical expert’s
    opinions on this issue were based on conjecture and speculation.
    We reject both contentions and accordingly affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The Accident And Its Immediate Aftermath
    On December 13, 2019, Juan Torres, Jr. (Torres) was living
    with his parents Juan Torres, Sr. (Juan) and Elsa Torres (Elsa),
    and his brothers Angel and Daniel. Torres got up early that
    morning and put on his uniform for his construction job, which
    consisted of jeans, a neon yellow shirt, a bright orange
    sweatshirt, and multicolored vest with reflective stripes.
    At approximately 5:45 a.m., Torres went outside to look at
    a flat tire on Daniel’s car, which was parked across the street
    from their house. Elsa followed Torres outside and stood in the
    driveway. As Torres was crouched down to inspect the flat tire,
    Elsa saw the headlights from a red Hyundai approaching at a
    high rate of speed and yelled at Torres to “[w]atch out.” Torres
    heard Elsa yell but did not have time to react. The Hyundai hit
    Torres, causing him to fly in the air and land on the ground
    2
    under the back of Daniel’s car. Appellant, who was driving the
    Hyundai, did not stop or slow down. He continued driving and
    turned onto a nearby dead-end street.
    Juan heard Elsa scream and ran outside. She told him
    what had happened and urged him to block the dead-end street
    with his truck so that appellant could not drive away. Juan
    drove his truck onto the dead-end street and saw the Hyundai,
    which was parked near the end of the street. Juan parked his
    truck in the street to prevent appellant from driving away.
    Appellant got out of the Hyundai and Juan approached him and
    asked him what had happened. Appellant ignored Juan as he
    inspected the damage to the front left side of his vehicle, then
    said he had not seen or felt anything that would have led him to
    believe he had hit someone. Appellant attempted to get back into
    his vehicle, but Juan wrested his keys from him so he could not
    drive away.
    Angel and several neighbors arrived and accompanied Juan
    as he walked appellant back to the scene of the accident.
    Appellant told Torres “I didn’t see you” and asked “[w]here were
    you?” Paramedics arrived and took Torres to the hospital. When
    the police arrived, appellant said “I didn’t do anything, bro. That
    guy was jaywalking . . . . I didn’t do nothin.”
    Torres’s Testimony Regarding His Injuries
    Torres testified regarding the injuries he suffered as a
    result of the accident, which occurred nine months prior to trial.
    Approximately 12 hours after Torres arrived at the hospital, he
    underwent surgery on his left tibia and fibula. Another surgery
    was conducted approximately six months later, i.e., three months
    prior to trial. During the first surgery, a metal plate and screws
    were placed in his leg.
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    Torres, who was 26 years old at the time of trial, showed
    his injuries to the jury and noted that he still had an open wound.
    For the first few months after the accident, his pain level was 10
    on a scale of 1 to 10. At the time of trial, his pain level by the end
    of each day was always 4 or 5. In the months following the
    accident he underwent painful physical therapy to regain his
    ability to walk, stand, sit, and climb stairs. He still needed
    physical therapy, but had to stop after three months due to the
    COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of his injuries it was difficult to
    walk, sit, and sleep and he could no longer run. He also had
    balance problems and had been unable to return to his
    construction job.
    Dr. Tilan’s Expert Testimony
    Dr. Justin Tilan, Torres’s treating orthopedic surgeon,
    offered expert testimony regarding Torres’s injuries. After
    testifying to his professional background and training and
    experience, Dr. Tilan indicated that he was still treating Torres
    for a “left open tibia fracture, delayed union or nonunion.” The
    doctor explained that Torres had “suffered an injury sufficient
    enough such that the broken bones poke outside of his body,” and
    that the injury had “fail[ed] to heal in a sufficient amount of
    time.”
    When asked what would be considered a sufficient amount
    of time for the injury to heal, Dr. Tilan replied that “for an injury
    like that . . . ideally it’s not so much time, but his x-rays and
    clinical follow-up should demonstrate healing of the [bone], . . .
    meaning that where the bones were fractured, they should have
    united and in [Torres’s] case that has yet to occur per our last
    clinic visit.” The doctor explained that “[i]f your tibia or your
    shin bone is broken sufficient enough to cause it to come out of
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    the skin, . . . healing becomes very difficult, meaning that the
    blood supply which helps us heal the bone is significantly
    damaged to the point where sometimes it heals very slowly and
    sometimes, unfortunately, it doesn’t heal at all, requiring surgical
    interventions beyond just one or two surgeries.” For such
    injuries, “it’s not uncommon” for a patient to require “between
    about four and seven surgeries and sometimes more.”
    Dr. Tilan performed Torres’s second surgery and was
    familiar with what had been done during the first surgery.
    During the first surgery, a titanium rod and screws were placed
    inside the bone. Dr. Tilan removed two of the screws during the
    second surgery to “allow the bones to collapse on each other and
    hopefully stimulate . . . healing.” The rod and remaining screws
    would have to remain in the bone permanently unless Torres
    sufficiently “progressed with his healing.” If the bone did not
    heal after the second surgery, Torres “would need several other
    surgeries in order to get that bone to heal, and that could include
    putting in new hardware, taking out bone from his femur or hip
    or his pelvis where his belt line is to put new bone into where he
    had previously broken his bone. And that’s one of a few options
    he has possibly in his future.”
    Dr. Tilan was “not sure” if Torres would need additional
    surgeries and “hop[ed]” he would not, but was “prepared to
    further escalate the type of surgery [Torres] would need.” The
    doctor clarified that his “hope” that the bone would heal was
    “based on how [he] hope[d] for [Torres] to feel, but the decision on
    whether someone’s healed is based on both the clinical
    examination and findings on x-rays or pictures of his bones to see
    that the bone is actually united.” At Torres’s next follow-up
    appointment, “the determination [whether to conduct further
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    surgery] would either be made at that time or . . . if things were
    moving in the correct direction, we would give him more time.
    But the decision to move on to the next phase should he not heal
    is kind of a shared decision process between [Torres] and me,
    which will [be made at] his subsequent clinic visits.”
    When asked what types of problems Torres would or could
    face in the future as a result of his injuries, Dr. Tilan replied:
    “[I]n one scenario where [Torres] no longer needs any further
    surgery, certainly he’s at risk for chronic pain both to the knee
    and to the ankle, the extent of which is hard to speculate.
    Stiffness of the knee joint, the ankle joint, and difficulty with
    doing activities that normal young people do, running, hiking,
    jogging—all dependent upon how well he heals. But the other
    scenario is should [Torres] need further surgeries, he’s certainly
    at risk for . . . complications of the surgery itself . . . and the same
    kind of complications going thereafter after multiple surgeries,
    . . . [such as a] significant amount of stiffness, scar tissue, chronic
    pain, and sometimes . . . a lot of these interventions don’t work.
    And so we’re left in a difficult position with a lot of our patients,
    trying to get them to heal.”
    When asked if he believed that Torres would not be able to
    run again, Dr. Tilan replied “it’s a possibility.” The doctor went
    on to opine it was “[l]ikely” that Torres’s injured leg would
    “[n]ever heal in a way that it will be as good as it was prior to the
    accident[,]” and would “probably not” “ever heal in a way that it
    will be as good as the non-injured leg.” The prosecution then
    asked: “And so is it a fair statement to say, then, that [Torres]
    will never have 100 percent healing in the sense that he will just
    in general never be in as good of shape as he was prior to the
    accident?” After the court overruled appellant’s objection
    6
    grounds of speculation, Dr. Tilan replied: “Yeah. That’s a fair
    statement.”
    Appellant’s Testimony
    Appellant testified that the accident occurred while he was
    making a delivery for a food delivery service. He was looking
    toward the right side of the street for the delivery address when
    he drove over what he thought was a bump, rock, or pothole. He
    did not see anyone or hear anyone yelling; his windows were
    rolled up and his car radio was on. After he drove down an
    adjacent street and pulled over to inspect his car for damage,
    Juan approached him, started yelling at him in Spanish, and
    grabbed his car keys. Additional people arrived and surrounded
    him and one of them punched him in the face before they
    forcefully walked him back to the scene of the accident. When
    the police arrived, appellant falsely stated that Torres was
    jaywalking because he was afraid of the group of people who had
    surrounded him.
    On cross-examination, appellant admitted falsely telling
    the police that his friend was driving when the accident occurred
    and had left on foot before Juan arrived. He also admitted telling
    the police he was planning to park and take a nap at the location
    where Juan confronted him, and that he had not felt or heard
    anything when he hit Torres.
    DISCUSSION
    Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support
    the jury’s finding that Torres suffered a permanent, serious
    injury as a result of the accident, as provided in subdivision (b)(2)
    of section 20001. We conclude otherwise.
    In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
    “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
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    judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
    evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
    solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We presume
    every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have
    reasonably deduced from the evidence. . . . If the circumstances
    reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the
    judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
    might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. . . .
    ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a
    witness’s credibility.’” (People v. Albillar (2010) 
    51 Cal.4th 47
    ,
    60.) We must affirm if “‘“any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.”’” (People v. Rich (1988) 
    45 Cal.3d 1036
    , 1081, italics
    omitted.)
    Section 20001, subdivision (a) provides that “[t]he driver of
    a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person,
    other than himself or herself, or in the death of a person shall
    immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and
    shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004.”
    Subdivision (b)(2) further provides that “[i]f the accident
    described in subdivision (a) results in death or permanent,
    serious injury, a person who violates subdivision (a) shall be
    punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
    four years, or in a county jail for not less than 90 days nor more
    than one year . . . .” Permanent, serious injury is defined as “the
    loss or permanent impairment of function of a bodily member or
    organ.” (§ 20001, subd. (d); CALJIC No. 12.70.)
    Dr. Tilan offered expert testimony on the issue whether the
    function of Torres’s leg was permanently impaired as a result of
    8
    the accident. The doctor opined that it was “likely” the leg would
    never be as good as it was prior to the accident, that the leg
    would “probably not” ever be as good as his other leg, and that
    Torres “will never have 100 percent healing in the sense that he
    will just in general never be in as a good of shape as he was prior
    to the accident.”
    Appellant does not dispute that Dr. Tilan was qualified to
    testify as a medical expert under Evidence Code section 720,2 or
    that his testimony was “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently
    beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would
    assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see People v.
    Clay (1984) 
    153 Cal.App.3d 433
    , 459 [recognizing that “[m]edical
    doctors obviously have greater knowledge than lay jurors about
    the gravity of most injuries”]; see also Bates v. Newman (1953)
    
    121 Cal.App.2d 800
    , 803 [“[a] medical expert may testify as to the
    nature of an injury or condition, the ability to inability of a
    person to do certain acts”]; People v. Mayfield (1997) 
    14 Cal.4th 668
    , 766 [same], abrogated on another ground as stated in People
    v. Scott (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 363
    , 390.)
    Appellant nevertheless contends that Dr. Tilan’s testimony
    provides no support for the jury’s finding that Torres suffered a
    permanent, serious injury as provided in subdivision (b)(2) of
    section 20001. He claims that the doctor’s opinions “consisted
    largely of conjecture, speculation, and a lots of ‘probably(s)’ and
    likely(s)” and that “an opinion that something is merely
    2 Evidence Code section 720, subdivision (a) provides in
    pertinent part: “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he
    has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
    sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his
    testimony relates. . . .”
    9
    ‘probable,’ ‘likely,’ or ‘more probable than not’ is insufficient to
    satisfy a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”
    Appellant adds that “since Dr. Tilan never discussed how likely
    and how probable he believed permanent impairment would be,
    and was never asked, his opinion could have been simply that it
    was more probable than not that the leg would fail to fully heal.”
    We are not persuaded.
    “‘“Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), states that a
    court must determine whether the matter that [an] expert . . .
    reasonably can rely on ‘in forming an opinion upon the subject to
    which his testimony relates.’ . . . We construe this to mean that
    the matter relied on must provide a reasonable basis for the
    particular opinion offered, and that an expert opinion based on
    speculation or conjecture is inadmissible.”’ [Citation.] In other
    words, assumptions which are not grounded in fact cannot serve
    as the basis for an expert’s opinion: ‘“The expert’s opinion may
    not be be based “on assumptions of fact without evidentiary
    support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors. . . .’”’
    [Citation.]” (People v. Wright (2016) 
    4 Cal.App.5th 537
    , 546.)
    Contrary to appellant’s claim, the fact that Dr. Tilan did
    not state his opinions to a more specific degree of certainty does
    not render those opinions speculative. In a criminal prosecution,
    “‘[a] medical diagnosis based on probability . . . is admissible; the
    lack of scientific certainty does not deprive the medical opinion of
    its evidentiary value.’” (People v. Cegers (1992) 
    7 Cal.App.4th 988
    , 998, quoting People v. Jackson (1971) 
    18 Cal.App.3d 504
    ,
    507; see also, e.g., People v. Stamp (1969) 
    2 Cal.App.3d 203
    , 209,
    fn. 2 [medical experts’ testimony that murder defendants’ robbery
    caused the victim’s fatal heart attack was sufficient to support
    the jury’s finding of causation beyond a reasonable doubt even
    10
    though the experts stated their opinions in terms of a “medical
    probability, rather than actual certainty”]; People v. McKelvy
    (1987) 
    194 Cal.App.3d 694
    , 700 [in prosecution for mayhem under
    Penal Code section 203, medical expert testified that victim’s
    blindness was “probably” permanent].)
    Moreover, appellant’s assertion that Dr. Tilan’s opinions
    were speculative erroneously conflates the doctor’s opinion that
    the function of Torres’s leg is permanently impaired with the
    doctor’s testimony regarding whether the leg would ever heal
    without further surgeries. Dr. Tilan acknowledged it was too
    soon to tell whether Torres’s broken bones would heal without
    further surgeries, then set forth a “scenario” describing the
    issues Torres “would or could” face even if no further surgeries
    were necessary. Although the doctor noted that the full extent of
    the impairment was contingent upon how well the leg ultimately
    healed, this did not undermine his opinion that the function of
    the leg was permanently impaired. As the People aptly put it,
    “[t]here is nothing in the record or the law to suggest Dr. Tilan
    would not be able to render a reliable expert opinion on whether
    his patient, nine months after the injury, who still has an open
    wound and cannot run or work, would ever be 100 percent
    again.”3
    In addition to Dr. Tilan’s expert opinion testimony, the jury
    heard Torres testify regarding the nature and severity of his
    3 Because appellant fails to demonstrate that Dr. Tilan’s
    opinions were speculative, we also reject his claim that the trial
    court erred in overruling his speculation objection to the doctor’s
    testimony that Torres “will never have 100 percent healing in the
    sense that he will just in general never be in as good of shape as
    he was prior to the accident.”
    11
    injuries nine months after the accident. Torres also showed his
    injuries to the jury and testified that as a result of those injuries
    he had problems walking, balancing and sleeping and had been
    unable to return to work.
    Although there are no published cases addressing the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of permanent,
    serious injury under subdivision (b)(2) of section 20001, the
    People draw an analogy to the crime of mayhem (Pen. Code,
    § 203).4 To prove mayhem based on a disabling injury, the injury
    must be more than “‘slight [or] temporary,’” i.e., permanent.
    (People v. Santana (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 999
    , 1010, citing People v.
    Thomas (1979) 
    96 Cal.App.3d 507
    , 512 (Thomas), overruled on
    other grounds in People v. Kimble (1988) 
    44 Cal.3d 480
    , 496;
    CALCRIM No. 801; see also Black’s Law Dict., 6th Ed. [defining
    “permanent” as “[g]enerally opposed in law to ‘temporary’”].) The
    long duration of an injury, such as a broken ankle that has not
    fully healed after more than six months, may support an
    inference that the injury is permanent and that the defendant is
    thus guilty of mayhem. (Santana, at p. 1004, citing Thomas, at
    p. 512.)
    Here, the jury was presented with evidence that the broken
    bones in Torres’s leg still had not healed nine months after the
    accident and that his injuries impacted his ability to walk,
    balance, and sleep. Moreover, Dr. Tilan opined that the function
    of Torres’s leg was permanently impaired. This evidence is
    sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Torres suffered a
    4Penal Code section 203 provides in pertinent part: “Every
    person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being
    of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it
    useless . . . , is guilty of mayhem.”
    12
    permanent, serious injury to his leg as a result of the accident, as
    provided in subdivision (b)(2) of section 20001.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    PERREN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P.J.
    TANGEMAN, J.
    13
    Sam Ohta, Judge
    Superior Court County of Los Angeles
    ______________________________
    Laura R. Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting
    Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising
    Deputy Attorney General, Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B307951

Filed Date: 9/22/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/22/2021