Bennett v. Comm'r of Soc. SEC. ( 2023 )


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  •    22-281
    Bennett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
    GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
    LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
    THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
    CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 23rd day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
    PRESENT:
    RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    ALISON J. NATHAN,
    SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    MARIE F. BENNETT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             No. 22-281
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _______________________________________
    For Plaintiff-Appellant:                   PATRICK G. RADEL, Getnick Livingston
    Atkinson & Priore, LLP, Utica, NY.
    For Defendant-Appellee:                    MOLLY E. CARTER, Special Assistant
    United States Attorney (Michael J.
    Pelgro, Regional Chief Counsel –
    Region I, Office of the General Counsel,
    Social Security Administration, Boston,
    MA, on the brief), for Carla B. Freedman,
    United States Attorney for the Northern
    District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of New York (Christian F. Hummel, Magistrate Judge).
    UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,           IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Marie F. Bennett appeals from the district court’s judgment upholding the
    denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security
    Act (the “Act”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 301
     et seq.   On behalf of the Commissioner of Social
    Security (the “Commissioner”), an administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) found
    that Bennett was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act.       The
    Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration (the “Appeals Council”)
    affirmed the ALJ’s determination and adopted his findings and conclusions in
    2
    their entirety.   Thereafter, Bennett commenced this action in the district court to
    seek judicial review of that decision.        The district court concluded that the
    Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence
    supported her findings.      Bennett timely appealed.      We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
    When the district court upholds the Commissioner’s benefits determination,
    we review de novo the administrative record to determine “whether the
    Commissioner applied the correct legal standard” and “whether there is
    substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision.” Zabala v. Astrue,
    
    595 F.3d 402
    , 408 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).          “The
    substantial[-]evidence standard means [that] once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject
    those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.”
    Schillo v. Kijakazi, 
    31 F.4th 64
    , 74 (2d Cir. 2022) (emphasis omitted) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    On appeal, Bennett argues that the Commissioner erroneously determined
    her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) by failing to adequately consider her
    alleged difficulties turning her head and neck and by improperly discounting the
    3
    opinion of her treating physician.    We address each of these two arguments in
    turn.
    First, the Commissioner adequately addressed Bennett’s allegations that she
    had difficulties moving her head and neck, finding that her “statements
    concerning . . . [her] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical
    evidence and other evidence in the record.”      Certified Admin. Record at 88–89.
    In support of this assessment, the Commissioner cited an MRI result showing only
    “mild multilevel degenerative disc disease,” 
    id. at 89
    ; treatment notes indicating
    that Bennett’s neck “pain and stiffness [had] improved . . . with therapy,” 
    id. at 90
    ;
    Bennett’s representation that she was “able to drive and perform simple
    household tasks,” 
    id.,
     such as “do[ing] laundry,” sweep[ing],” and “mop[ping],”
    
    id. at 88
    ; as well as the fact that Bennett’s treatment “ha[d] been generally routine
    and/or conservative,” 
    id. at 90
    . Notwithstanding these findings, Bennett contends
    that the Commissioner improperly rejected her assertions without adequately
    considering the opinions of Dr. Elke Lorensen, the Commissioner’s consultative
    expert, and Ms. Mary Barbara, the physician’s assistant who treated Bennett.      We
    disagree.
    4
    The Appeals Council acknowledged that the ALJ did not consider
    Dr.   Lorensen’s    report     because     it   was    “erroneously      marked     as
    duplicative evidence.”    
    Id. at 5
    .   Nevertheless, the Appeals Council found that
    Dr. Lorensen’s findings supported the ALJ’s decision, since they confirmed that
    Bennett was able to do a wide range of daily activities, showed full cervical flexion
    and extension, and indicated that she had only mild limitations in turning her head
    sideways. See id.; see also 
    id. at 602
    ; 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.979
     (“After it has reviewed all
    the evidence in the [ALJ’s] hearing record and any additional evidence
    received, . . . the Appeals Council will make a decision or remand the case to an
    [ALJ],” and “[i]f the Appeals Council issues its own decision, it will base its
    decision on the preponderance of the evidence.”).          As to Ms. Barbara – the
    physician’s assistant who treated Bennett – the ALJ assigned “little weight” to her
    opinions because “the objective medical evidence . . . d[id] not support them.”
    Certified Admin. Record at 90–91.      For instance, the ALJ noted that Ms. Barbara’s
    opinion that Bennett could “rarely turn her head” was contradicted by Bennett’s
    report of “going to a water safari where she road some rides,” as well as by
    Ms. Barbara’s own treatment note suggesting that Bennett “ha[d] [a] full range of
    motion.” 
    Id.
     at 91 (citing 
    id. at 442
    ).   On this record, a “reasonable factfinder”
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    could agree with the Commissioner’s RFC determination concerning Bennett’s
    ability to move her head and neck.   Schillo, 31 F.4th at 74.
    Second, the Commissioner properly discounted the opinion of Bennett’s
    treating physician, Dr. Adekola Alao.        When “determining the appropriate
    weight to assign a treating physician’s opinion,” the ALJ first “must decide
    whether the opinion is entitled to controlling weight.”         Estrella v. Berryhill, 
    925 F.3d 90
    , 95 (2d Cir. 2019).    A treating physician’s opinion will be assigned
    controlling weight “so long as it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
    and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
    substantial evidence in the case record.” 
    Id.
     (alteration and internal quotation
    marks omitted).     If the ALJ determines that the opinion is not entitled to
    controlling weight, then the ALJ “must determine how much weight, if any, to
    give it,” after considering the following “nonexclusive” factors:                “(1) the
    frequency, length, nature, and extent of treatment; (2) the amount of medical
    evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the
    remaining medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a specialist.”            
    Id.
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    at 95–96 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 1 “If the Commissioner
    has not otherwise provided good reasons for [her] weight assignment, we
    [may] . . . remand for the ALJ to comprehensively set forth [his or her] reasons.”
    
    Id. at 96
     (alterations added) (internal quotation marks omitted).                 But if “a
    searching review of the record assures us that the substance of the
    treating[-]physician rule was not traversed, we will affirm.”                  
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Schillo, 31 F.4th at 75 (explaining that a treating
    physician’s opinion will not be given controlling weight if it is not “well supported
    by medically acceptable . . . diagnostic techniques” or is “inconsistent with (or
    contradicted by) other substantial evidence in the . . . case record”).
    Here, the Commissioner acknowledged that Dr. Alao’s opinion constituted
    “a treating acceptable medical source,” but provided good reasons for giving
    Dr. Alao’s opinion “limited weight.”                Certified Admin. Record at 91.
    Specifically, the Commissioner pointed out that Dr. Alao “had only been treating
    [Bennett] for six months,” that “medical evidence of record d[id] not support”
    1 The Social Security Act and the regulations applicable to the evaluation of medical opinion
    evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. “For claims filed before March 27, 2017 (as is
    the case here), the agency must apply 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    .” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 70; see also
    
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (c).
    7
    Dr. Alao’s findings, and that Dr. Alao’s conclusion that Bennett experienced
    “significant limitations” due to “short-term memory loss” was inconsistent with
    other providers’ examination results demonstrating that Bennett had “intact or
    only mildly impaired memory.”      
    Id.
    Our “searching review” of the record corroborates the Commissioner’s
    determination. Estrella, 
    925 F.3d at 96
     (internal quotation marks omitted).     For
    instance, contrary to Dr. Alao’s assessment that Bennett could not “[u]nderstand
    and remember very short and simple instructions” or “[c]arry out” such
    instructions, Certified Admin. Record at 386, treatment records from other
    healthcare providers reflected that Bennett’s “[m]emory [was] grossly intact,” id.
    at 276; that her “[c]ognitive functioning was normal,” id. at 436; that “[n]o
    disorientation” or “confusion was observed,” id. at 317; and that she reported “[n]o
    dizziness,” “vertigo,” “fainting,” “anxiety,” “depression,” or “sleep disturbances,”
    id. at 413.
    Bennett nevertheless asserts that the Commissioner failed to adequately
    explain her rejection of Dr. Alao’s conclusion that Bennett could not maintain a
    consistent work schedule despite that conclusion’s alleged consistency with other
    evidence.     This aspect of Bennett’s argument seeks an impermissible reweighing
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    of the evidence.    Although there is some evidence in the record that could
    support Bennett’s position, “whether there is substantial evidence supporting
    [Bennett]’s view is not the question here; rather, we must decide whether
    substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.”   Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 
    523 F. App’x 58
    , 59 (2d Cir. 2013).   The record here reflects that there was substantial
    evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Bennett was not as limited in her ability
    to maintain a regular work schedule as Dr. Alao opined.
    As a threshold matter, Dr. Alao offered no explanation for his opinion
    regarding Bennett’s ability to maintain a work schedule. See Certified Admin.
    Record at 386.   The RFC questionnaire asked Dr. Alao to explain Bennett’s mental
    limitations and provide “medical/clinical findings that support [his] assessment.”
    
    Id.
       Dr. Alao left that space blank, and elsewhere on the questionnaire, he listed
    only “short term memory loss” as the “clinical findings . . . that demonstrate the
    severity” of Bennett’s impairment.    
    Id. at 384
    . Contrary to Dr. Alao’s conclusory
    assessment, the record reflects many psychiatric and neurological examinations
    that yielded normal results, including some reflecting that Bennett had intact
    memory.     See, e.g., 
    id. at 286, 309
    , 317–18, 328, 422, 436, 442.   Other medical
    professionals found Bennett to have only mild limitations in maintaining a
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    schedule, see 
    id. at 75
    , 348–50, which support, rather than undermine, the ALJ’s
    decision to discount the portion of Dr. Alao’s opinion finding that Bennett was
    significantly limited in that domain.2
    Although neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council offered explicit reasons
    for discounting the portion of Dr. Alao’s opinion addressing Bennett’s ability to
    maintain a consistent schedule, both adequately explained the reasons for
    assigning the opinion limited or little weight. Bennett points to no case requiring
    that an ALJ explain the weight afforded to every issue discussed in a treating
    physician’s opinion.       See Mongeur v. Heckler, 
    722 F.2d 1033
    , 1040 (2d Cir. 1983)
    (“[W]e do not require that [the agency] . . . mention[] every item of testimony
    presented to [it] or . . . explain[] why [it] considered particular evidence
    unpersuasive or insufficient to lead [it] to a conclusion.”).            In sum, because the
    Commissioner provided “good reasons” for her decision to give Dr. Alao’s
    opinion little weight, and because “a searching review of the record assures us that
    2 To the extent other medical opinions might support additional non-exertional limitations in the
    RFC, the Commissioner must formulate her RFC determination based on the entire record, not
    just the medical opinions. See Veino v. Barnhart, 
    312 F.3d 578
    , 588 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Genuine
    conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve.”); Trepanier v. Comm’r of
    Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    752 F. App’x 75
    , 79 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Even where the ALJ’s determination does not
    perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision, however,
    the ALJ was entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make a residual functional capacity
    finding that was consistent with the record as a whole.”). Here, the Commissioner’s RFC
    determination is adequately supported by the record as a whole.
    10
    the substance of the treating[-]physician rule” was not compromised, Estrella, 
    925 F.3d at 96
     (internal quotation marks omitted), we cannot agree with Bennett’s
    contention that “[r]emand is required” because the Commissioner “did not
    properly apply the treating physician’s rule when considering Dr. Alao’s
    assessment,” Reply Br. at 18.
    We have considered all of Bennett’s remaining arguments and find them to
    be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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