Depa v. Holder , 486 F. App'x 933 ( 2012 )


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  • 11-1804-ag
    Depa v. Holder
    BIA
    Nelson, IJ
    A093 397 355
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 10th day of July, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT D. SACK,
    REENA RAGGI,
    PETER W. HALL,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________________________________
    TASHI DEPA,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     11-1804-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                Jason A. Nielson, Law Offices of
    Thomas Mungoven, New York, New York
    FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Greg D. Mack, Senior
    Litigation Counsel; Shahrzad Baghai,
    Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, Civil
    Division, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Tashi Depa, an ethnic Tibetan, seeks review
    of an April 5, 2011 decision of the BIA affirming the
    February 6, 2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
    Barbara A. Nelson denying Depa’s application for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Tashi Depa, No. A093 397 355
    (B.I.A. Apr. 5, 2011), aff’g     No. A093 397 355 (Immig. Ct.
    N.Y. City Feb. 6, 2009).    We assume the parties’ familiarity
    with the underlying facts and procedural history of the
    case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of
    completeness.”     Zaman v. Mukasey, 
    514 F.3d 233
    , 237 (2d Cir.
    2008).   The applicable standards of review are well-
    established.     See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    2
    While “a ‘petitioner’s nationality, or lack of
    nationality, is a threshold question in determining . . .
    eligibility for asylum,’” Wangchuck v. DHS, 
    448 F.3d 524
    ,
    528 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Dhoumo v. BIA, 
    416 F.3d 172
    , 174
    (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)), the IJ reasonably concluded
    here that Depa is a Chinese national in light of her
    statement on the record that she is a native and citizen of
    Tibet.       The United States currently recognizes Tibet to be
    part of China.
    The agency did not err in finding that the alleged
    persecution of Depa’s parents and husband for opposing
    Chinese control of Tibet did not constitute persecution of
    Depa that would render her eligible for asylum.1      “As a
    general principle, an asylum applicant cannot claim past
    persecution based solely on harm . . . inflicted on a family
    member on account of that family member's political opinion
    . . . .”       Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 137
    , 141 (2d Cir.
    2007).       The agency reasonably concluded that Depa failed to
    1
    Depa does not challenge the agency’s finding that
    her testimony regarding a beating she allegedly suffered
    as a child in China was not credible.   Though Depa
    challenges the IJ’s finding that her testimony regarding
    harm she allegedly suffered in Nepal was not credible, we
    need not reach this argument because Depa has been
    ordered removed to China, not Nepal.
    3
    carry her burden of showing that she “shares (or is
    perceived to share) the characteristic [i.e., being a
    dissident] that motivated persecutors to harm th[ose] family
    member[s].”   
    Id.
       The agency was therefore not required to
    consider Depa’s allegation that she “suffered . . .
    continuing hardship after the[se] incident[s]” in the form
    of emotional and psychological harm.    Id.; see also Kone v.
    Holder, 
    596 F.3d 141
    , 146 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that
    “humanitarian asylum” is reserved for aliens who suffered
    “particularly severe” past persecution).
    In addition, the agency did not err in concluding that
    Depa failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
    persecution in China based on her political activities in
    Nepal and the United States.   In order to establish such a
    well-founded fear, “an alien must make some showing that
    authorities in [her] country of nationality are either aware
    of [her] activities [outside that country] or likely to
    become aware of [such] activities.”    Hongsheng Leng v.
    Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 143 (2d Cir. 2008).    The agency
    reasonably concluded that record evidence did not show that
    Chinese authorities were likely to view Depa as a dissident
    based on her political activities outside China.    See Jian
    Xing Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005)
    4
    (reasoning that absent “solid support” in record that fear
    of future persecution was objectively reasonable, such fear
    was “speculative at best”).
    Finally, because Depa’s asylum, withholding of removal,
    and CAT claims share the same factual predicate, the agency
    did not err in denying all three forms of relief.    See Paul
    v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5