United States v. Farooq ( 2023 )


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  • 21-0707
    United States v. Farooq
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit
    August Term 2022
    Argued: November 23, 2022
    Decided: January 30, 2023
    No. 21-0707
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD FAROOQ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of New York
    Before: KEARSE, PARK, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant Khawaja Muhammad Farooq pled guilty
    to one count of extortion under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d) for threatening to
    disseminate nude photographs of Jane Doe if she did not return to a
    relationship with him. Farooq now appeals, arguing that the plea
    proceedings were defective because the district court did not explain
    the “wrongfulness” element of extortion under United States v.
    Jackson, 
    180 F.3d 55
     (2d Cir. 1999). He also challenges two special
    conditions of supervised release on First Amendment grounds: (1) a
    requirement that Farooq seek retraction of articles he published about
    Jane Doe and her brother-in-law, John Doe, and (2) a requirement that
    he seek approval from the district court before publishing any further
    information about them.
    We conclude as follows: First, the plea proceedings were not
    defective because the district court correctly determined that Farooq
    understood the “nature of each charge” to which he pled. Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). Jackson does not require a separate explanation
    of “wrongfulness” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d) when, as here, the
    defendant stipulates that he has no plausible claim of right to the
    thing of value. See 
    180 F.3d at
    70–71. Second, the special condition
    that Farooq seek retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe
    and John Doe has expired, so Farooq’s challenge to that condition is
    moot. Finally, the special condition that Farooq seek approval from
    the district court before publishing further information about Jane
    Doe and John Doe does not violate the First Amendment under the
    circumstances here. Farooq pled guilty to extortion by threatening
    to publish nude images of Jane Doe, and he is a journalist who had
    published or threatened to publish information about her and John
    Doe in the past. So the district court acted within its broad discretion
    by imposing the narrowly tailored special condition requiring Farooq
    to obtain approval from the court before publishing any further
    information about them. We thus AFFIRM.
    JOSHUA PHILIP BUSSEN (Brian A. Jacobs, on the brief),
    Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., New
    York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    KAYLA C. BENSING (Amy Busa, on the brief), Assistant
    United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United States
    Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, New York,
    NY, for Appellee.
    2
    PARK, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant-Appellant Khawaja Muhammad Farooq pled guilty
    to one count of extortion under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d) for threatening to
    disseminate nude photographs of Jane Doe if she did not return to a
    relationship with him. Farooq now appeals, arguing that the plea
    proceedings were defective because the district court did not explain
    the “wrongfulness” element of extortion under United States v.
    Jackson, 
    180 F.3d 55
     (2d Cir. 1999). He also challenges two special
    conditions of supervised release on First Amendment grounds: (1) a
    requirement that Farooq seek retraction of articles he published about
    Jane Doe and her brother-in-law, John Doe, and (2) a requirement that
    he seek approval from the district court before publishing any further
    information about them.
    We conclude as follows: First, the plea proceedings were not
    defective because the district court correctly determined that Farooq
    understood the “nature of each charge” to which he pled. Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). Jackson does not require a separate explanation
    of “wrongfulness” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d) when, as here, the
    defendant stipulates that he has no plausible claim of right to the
    thing of value. See 
    180 F.3d at
    70–71. Second, the special condition
    that Farooq seek retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe
    and John Doe has expired, so Farooq’s challenge to that condition is
    moot. Finally, the special condition that Farooq seek approval from
    the district court before publishing further information about Jane
    Doe and John Doe does not violate the First Amendment under the
    circumstances here. Farooq pled guilty to extortion by threatening
    to publish nude images of Jane Doe, and he is a journalist who had
    published or threatened to publish information about her and John
    3
    Doe in the past. So the district court acted within its broad discretion
    by imposing the narrowly tailored special condition requiring Farooq
    to obtain approval from the court before publishing any further
    information about them. We thus affirm.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A.     Facts 1
    Farooq met Jane Doe in 2013 when she traveled from Pakistan
    to the United States for business. They remained in touch and began
    a romantic relationship after she returned to Pakistan.                 They
    communicated over Skype and WhatsApp and had some accounts
    with shared passwords. In 2016, Farooq asked Jane Doe’s family for
    permission to marry her, and the family refused. Jane Doe ended
    the relationship shortly after that. Farooq continued to contact Jane
    Doe, but she did not respond.
    Farooq then began sending emails and text messages to Jane
    Doe’s coworkers. He also sent individuals to Jane Doe’s workplace
    to ask her to contact him. In early 2018, one of Jane Doe’s coworkers
    told her that Farooq was asking Jane Doe to log on to a shared Skype
    account to see some photos. She logged on and saw sexually explicit
    photos that Farooq had taken of her without her consent.              Farooq
    threatened to share the photos with her family, coworkers, and village
    if she did not call him.       Farooq knew that Jane Doe is from a
    conservative village in Pakistan where women may be harmed or
    even killed if they are perceived to bring dishonor on their families.
    1 Unless otherwise noted, all facts are drawn from the Presentence
    Investigation Report (“PSR”), which the district court adopted in its entirety
    at sentencing.
    4
    Farooq’s threatened disclosure of the photos thus caused Jane Doe
    substantial distress and fear.
    Jane Doe shared what was happening with her brother-in-law
    John Doe. Farooq continued to send threatening messages to Jane
    Doe: “Don’t treat anyone like a dog. When a dog becomes crazy, it
    bites and its poisonous bite can kill a person. . . . You treated me less
    than a dog. . . . You would not have listened to me, if I had not saved
    all your pictures.” PSR ¶ 10. He also sent threatening messages to
    John Doe, stating that he would send the photos to John Doe’s
    colleagues, get him fired, and “destroy” him. Id. ¶ 18.
    At the time, Farooq worked as a journalist for a Pakistani
    publication and carried a United Nations press pass. He referenced
    his press access in his messages to Jane Doe and John Doe, including,
    for example, by stating to John Doe: “I have started the proceedings
    with a local TV channel in the US. I am requesting you to stop this
    non sense [sic] . . . otherwise this news will broadcast on CNN, Fox
    news and BBC London.”        District Ct. Doc. No. 59, Ex. 3.    Farooq
    messaged one of Jane Doe’s coworkers that “it’s better for [Jane Doe]
    to talk to me. Otherwise I will post her nude pictures and whatever
    [John Doe] is saying about her, on all the university websites and
    social media.” PSR ¶ 15. Farooq also contacted the Prime Minister
    of Pakistan, the Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court, the
    Consul General of Pakistan to the United States in New York, and the
    Chief Minister of Punjab with information about Jane Doe and John
    Doe.
    Farooq’s messages came to the attention of the FBI, and he was
    arrested in Brooklyn in 2019.
    5
    B.    Procedural History
    The government charged Farooq with two counts of extortion
    with threats to injure Jane Doe and John Doe under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (c)
    and two counts of extortion with threats to injure their reputations
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d).
    1.    The Plea Proceeding
    In June 2019, Farooq pled guilty to Count Two of the
    indictment—extortion of Jane Doe under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d). At the
    plea hearing, he admitted the following: “On September 16, 2018, I
    sent an e-mail from Brooklyn, New York to a woman in Pakistan
    called Jane Doe in the indictment and I threatened to send naked
    pictures of her to other men in Pakistan unless she came back to me.”
    App’x at 208. During the plea colloquy, Farooq’s counsel had the
    following exchange with the district court:
    Defense counsel: Your Honor, if I may add as a matter
    of law, there are two elements that I think are legal
    questions rather than factual. I’ve discussed with Mr.
    Farooq, and he will stipulate, that the relationship that he
    sought to have with Jane Doe, if she complied with his
    requests, is a quote, “thing of value.”
    The Court: That’s what I was going to ask you.
    Defense counsel: And is also not something to which
    he was legally entitled.
    The Court: So you would stipulate to the fact that this
    relationship meets the definition of thing of value for
    purposes of Section 875(d)?
    6
    Defense counsel: I would. And that his threat to send
    the pictures in exchange for that thing of value
    constitutes legal extortion.
    
    Id.
     at 208–09. Farooq also stipulated that his “intention” was to make
    Jane Doe “feel that if she did not come back to [him, Farooq] would
    send the pictures to other men.” 
    Id. at 210
    .
    Seven months later, Farooq, proceeding pro se, moved to
    withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that it was not voluntary and that
    the statements he made during the plea proceeding were false and
    coerced by his attorney. The district court denied Farooq’s motion
    to withdraw the guilty plea because of the delay between his plea and
    the motion, the failure to raise any new evidence to support his claims
    of innocence, and the absence of evidence of coercion.       See United
    States v. Farooq, No. 19-CR-100, 
    2020 WL 1083624
    , at *2–6 (E.D.N.Y.
    Mar. 6, 2020).
    The district court also denied Farooq’s subsequent motions to
    withdraw his guilty plea after reviewing transcripts that Farooq
    argued would show his innocence.        The court concluded that the
    transcripts did not support his new theory that Jane Doe consented to
    the extortion to persuade John Doe to let her return to her relationship
    with Farooq.
    2.     Sentencing
    The district court sentenced Farooq to the maximum sentence
    of two years’ imprisonment with one year of supervised release.
    The district court imposed two special conditions of supervised
    release at issue on appeal:
    [1] The defendant shall endeavor to have retracted any
    newspaper or press article that he has facilitated the
    7
    publishing or posting of, either directly or indirectly, and
    that contains the true name or other personal identifying
    information, place of employment, or visual image of
    John Doe or Jane Doe.
    [2] The defendant shall refrain from disseminating any
    information about Jane Doe or John Doe in any medium,
    either directly or indirectly, including through other
    individuals, absent seeking and obtaining permission
    from the Court.
    District Ct. Doc. No. 142 at 5.
    3.      Post-Sentencing Developments
    Farooq’s initial term of supervised release was set to expire in
    April 2022.    In March 2022, the district court extended that initial
    term to resolve Farooq’s alleged violation of the conditions of his
    supervised release. Farooq pled guilty to one count of violating the
    conditions of supervised release by contacting John Doe.             In
    November 2022, the district court sentenced Farooq to time served
    and imposed a renewed term of supervised release set to expire on
    February 9, 2023. The new term of supervised release included the
    special condition prohibiting dissemination of information about Jane
    Doe and John Doe, but it did not renew the condition requiring
    Farooq to seek retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe and
    John Doe.
    II.     DISCUSSION
    Farooq argues that the district court erred by not separately
    explaining the “wrongfulness” element of extortion to him during the
    plea proceeding. This argument is without merit. Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 11 requires that the defendant understand the
    8
    “nature of each charge” against him. Farooq’s stipulations during
    the plea proceeding confirm that he understood the nature of the
    extortion       charge   under     
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d),   including   its
    “wrongfulness.”
    Farooq further challenges the special conditions of supervised
    release on First Amendment grounds.              First, the special condition
    requiring Farooq to seek retraction of articles he published is now
    moot.        Second, the special condition requiring the district court’s
    approval before Farooq publishes information about Jane Doe and
    John Doe is narrowly tailored under the circumstances here.
    A.      The Plea Proceeding
    1.       Legal Standards
    We review Farooq’s challenge to the plea proceeding for plain
    error because he did not object below. United States v. Balde, 
    943 F.3d 73
    , 95 (2d Cir. 2019). To show plain error, there must (1) be an error
    that (2) is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
    dispute,” and (3) the error must have “affected the appellant’s
    substantial rights,” and (4) have “seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”            
    Id. at 96
    (citation omitted).
    Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
    that the district court “inform the defendant of, and determine that
    the defendant understands, the . . . nature of each charge to which the
    defendant is pleading.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). Rule 11 does
    not require that the judge personally “explain the elements of each
    charge to the defendant on the record” as long as “the record
    accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of
    9
    the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent
    counsel.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 
    545 U.S. 175
    , 183 (2005); see also United
    States v. Torrellas, 
    455 F.3d 96
    , 102 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hile Rule 11
    imposes strict requirements on what information the district courts
    must convey and determine before they accept a plea, it does not tell
    them precisely how to perform this important task in the great variety
    of cases that come before them.” (cleaned up)).
    Farooq pled guilty to extortion under 
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (d), which
    states:        “Whoever, with intent to extort from any person . . . any
    money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign
    commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the
    property or reputation of the addressee . . . shall be fined under this
    title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” The statute
    does not include the word “wrongfulness,” but we have clarified that
    § 875(d) contains an implicit wrongfulness element. United States v.
    Jackson, 
    180 F.3d 55
    , 70 (2d Cir. 1999).
    2.      Application
    The question here is whether Farooq understood the “nature of
    [the extortion] charge.” Fed R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). Farooq argues
    that it was plain error here for the district court not to explain on the
    record the wrongfulness element as articulated by Jackson.           But
    neither the extortion statute nor Jackson supports his argument.
    As an initial matter, Jackson involved jury instructions, which
    are generally held to a higher standard than the district court’s
    guidance during a plea proceeding. See United States v. Saft, 
    558 F.2d 1073
    , 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The contention that even in [a plea
    proceeding] the judge must deliver to the defendant the equivalent of
    10
    a jury charge finds no support in the language of [Rule 11] and runs
    counter to the legislative history.”).
    In     any    event,    Farooq     misreads    Jackson’s   analysis   of
    “wrongfulness.”           The defendant in that case requested a jury
    instruction separately explaining the “wrongfulness” element of
    extortion.    Jackson, 
    180 F.3d at 65
    .        The district court rejected the
    proposed jury instruction because “threatening someone’s reputation
    for money or a thing of value is inherently wrongful.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted). We clarified, however, that a threat to reputation is not
    wrongful under § 875(d) if the person has a plausible claim of right to
    the thing of value.         Id. at 67 (“For example, the purchaser of an
    allegedly defective product may threaten to complain to a consumer
    protection agency or to bring suit in a public forum if the
    manufacturer does not make good on its warranty.”). So the jury
    instructions would have been proper if they made clear that the
    “threat to disclose was issued in connection with a claim for [a thing
    of value] to which she was not entitled or which had no nexus to a
    plausible claim of right.” Id. at 71.
    The record reflects that Farooq understood the wrongfulness of
    his conduct. He stipulated that the relationship he sought to have
    with Jane Doe is a “thing of value” and is “not something to which he
    was legally entitled.” App’x at 209. Under Jackson, that amounted
    to an admission that Farooq’s threat was “inherently wrongful.” 
    180 F.3d at 71
    .        And the threat to Jane Doe’s reputation—i.e., the
    dissemination of nude pictures—“had no nexus with any plausible
    claim of right.” 
    Id. at 70
     (noting that threats of disclosure of “sexual
    indiscretions”      are    “inherently    wrongful”).       Thus,   Farooq’s
    stipulation makes clear that he understood the nature of the charge
    11
    against him, including the inherent wrongfulness of his conduct.
    We conclude that there was no plain error in his plea allocution. 2
    B.    The Conditions of Supervised Release
    1.     Legal Standards
    We review special conditions of supervised release for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. McLaurin, 
    731 F.3d 258
    , 261 (2d Cir. 2013).
    But “[w]hen a challenge to a condition of supervised release presents
    an issue of law, we review the imposition of that condition de novo,
    bearing in mind that any error of law necessarily constitutes an abuse
    of discretion.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    In general, “a district court may impose special conditions of
    supervised release that are reasonably related to certain statutory
    factors governing sentencing, involve no greater deprivation of
    liberty than is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory
    purposes of sentencing, and are consistent with pertinent Sentencing
    Commission policy statements.” United States v. Eaglin, 
    913 F.3d 88
    ,
    94 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Relevant factors include the “nature
    and circumstances of the offense,” “the history and characteristics of
    the defendant,” and the need for “adequate deterrence,” “protect[ing]
    the public from further crimes,” and “provid[ing] the defendant with
    needed . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
    United States v. Bolin, 
    976 F.3d 202
    , 210 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S.S.G.
    2   For the same reasons, the district court acted within its broad
    discretion to deny Farooq’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The
    district court determined that Farooq’s “statement that everything [he] said
    during that plea proceeding was a lie” was not “credible” and that there
    was no “support in the record that [his] lawyer improperly pressured [him]
    into pleading guilty.” App’x at 399.
    12
    § 5D1.3(b)(1)).   For fundamental liberty interests, the condition is
    “’reasonably necessary’ only if the deprivation is narrowly tailored to
    serve a compelling government interest.” Id. (quoting United States
    v. Myers, 
    426 F.3d 117
    , 126 (2d Cir. 2005)).
    2.     Retraction Requirement
    The special condition of supervised release requiring Farooq to
    seek retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe and John Doe
    has expired, so his challenge to this condition is moot. In November
    2022, the district court did not renew this condition when sentencing
    Farooq for the violation of his initial term of supervised release.
    Farooq asserts that his challenge to the condition is not moot because
    it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Turner v. Rogers, 
    564 U.S. 431
    , 440 (2011). We are unpersuaded.
    Expiration or modification of a special condition of supervised
    release typically moots an appeal challenging that condition.             See
    United States v. Juv. Male, 
    564 U.S. 932
    , 936 (2011) (holding that there
    is no presumption of collateral consequences for an expired sentence);
    United States v. Johnson, 
    446 F.3d 272
    , 276 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that an
    objection to a condition of supervised release became moot when the
    condition was modified).         The district court did not renew this
    condition, and there is no indication that it would reimpose it again. 3
    Farooq’s appeal of this condition is thus moot.
    3  Farooq’s reliance on United States v. Melton, 
    666 F.3d 513
     (8th Cir.
    2012), is misguided. That case involved different circumstances in which
    the defendant had been ordered multiple times to complete stays at a
    halfway house for time periods that were too short to challenge in court
    before they ended. See 
    id.
     at 515 n.3.
    13
    3.     Publishing Limitation
    Farooq also challenges the special condition of supervised
    release requiring him to seek the district court’s approval before
    disseminating any information about Jane Doe and John Doe.
    Although this condition restricts Farooq’s First Amendment rights,
    we conclude that it was within the district court’s discretion to impose
    this condition under the circumstances here. The condition is closely
    related to Farooq’s criminal conduct and is narrowly tailored to
    protect Jane Doe and John Doe in light of Farooq’s history of
    threatening them and his background as a journalist.
    As a general matter, conditions that would be unconstitutional
    “when cast as a broadly-applicable criminal prohibition” may be
    “permissible when imposed on an individual as a condition of
    supervised release.”     Eaglin, 
    913 F.3d at 96
    .     The constitutional
    rights of defendants subject to conditions of supervised release may
    be limited. See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 
    449 F.3d 470
    , 497 (2d Cir. 2006)
    (“[W]e note that the First Amendment rights of parolees are
    circumscribed.”); Porth v. Templar, 
    453 F.2d 330
    , 334 (10th Cir. 1971)
    (“[One on probation] forfeits much of his freedom of action and even
    freedom of expression to the extent necessary to successful
    rehabilitation and protection of the public programs.”).
    We recognize that the special condition of supervised release
    prohibiting Farooq from “disseminating any information about Jane
    Doe or John Doe in any medium . . . absent seeking and obtaining
    permission from the Court” is a content-based prior restraint on
    speech. See United States v. Quattrone, 
    402 F.3d 304
    , 309 (2d Cir. 2005)
    (defining a prior restraint as a “judicial order that suppresses
    speech—or provides for its suppression at the discretion of
    14
    government officials—on the basis of the speech’s content and in
    advance of its actual expression”).          And there is “a heavy
    presumption against [the] constitutional validity” of “[a]ny
    imposition of a prior restraint.” 
    Id. at 310
     (quoting Bantam Books, Inc.
    v. Sullivan, 
    372 U.S. 58
    , 70 (1963)).     We have thus vacated overly
    broad conditions of supervised release implicating First Amendment
    rights.    See, e.g., Bolin, 976 F.3d at 215–16 (vacating as
    unconstitutional   condition    of    supervised   release    prohibiting
    defendant from engaging in internet speech “that promotes or
    endorses violence, unlawful activity, or any groups that espouse such
    ideas”). But see, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 
    876 F.2d 272
    , 276–77 (2d
    Cir. 1989) (upholding as constitutional condition prohibiting
    association with groups advocating noncompliance with tax laws).
    Under the circumstances of this case, the special condition is
    narrowly tailored. First, it is “reasonably related” to the “nature and
    circumstances” of Farooq’s offense.        U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1).   The
    charged conduct and the conduct to which Farooq pled guilty related
    to exposing Jane Doe’s and John Doe’s identities and disseminating
    information that would embarrass and harm them.              Farooq pled
    guilty to emailing Jane Doe and “threaten[ing] to send naked pictures
    of her to other men in Pakistan unless she came back to [him].”
    App’x at 208. Farooq also contacted Jane Doe and John Doe both
    directly and indirectly through their coworkers.        So the conduct
    covered by the special condition is closely related to the conduct for
    which Farooq was charged.
    Second, the special condition is closely related to Farooq’s
    “history and characteristics.”        U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1).     Farooq
    repeatedly violated court orders throughout the case, including
    15
    violating a family-court order of protection and contacting someone
    in Pakistan about John Doe.            Throughout the district court
    proceedings, Farooq tried to publicize information about Jane Doe
    and John Doe against the district court’s express orders.          This
    included sending letters to the President of the United States and
    various government officials identifying both Jane Doe and John Doe
    and sending copies of allegedly published articles to the district court
    identifying Jane Doe and describing Farooq’s relationship with her.
    Farooq also repeatedly alluded to or sought to introduce into
    evidence articles that named the victims and disclosed potentially
    harmful details about them. So the condition was closely related to
    Farooq’s history of disseminating information about Jane Doe and
    John Doe, including in defiance of court orders.
    Third, the condition is narrowly tailored because it restricts
    public dissemination of information only about Jane Doe or John Doe.
    It is not a broad prohibition on speaking about the case or criticizing
    the attorneys or the district court. See United States v. Coleman, No.
    98-1299, 
    1999 WL 278878
    , at *2 (2d Cir. May 4, 1999) (explaining in
    dicta that prohibiting the defendant from criticizing the government
    “or anyone else” would “surely exceed a District Court’s discretion”).
    The condition itself limits the restriction to “information about Jane
    Doe or John Doe.” The district court explained the limited scope of
    the condition during the sentencing hearing, noting that the purpose
    was to “prevent Mr. Farooq from continuing to threaten [the victims]
    through media.” App’x at 573. So the scope of the condition was
    limited to information about Jane Doe and John Doe.
    Fourth, the condition is limited in duration.     Upon Farooq’s
    guilty plea to the violation of supervised release, the district court
    16
    imposed a new term of supervised release in November 2021 set to
    expire in February 2023—lasting approximately three months.
    Finally, the condition still allows Farooq to seek permission
    from the district court to publish information about Jane Doe or John
    Doe.    In light of these limitations and the record before us, we
    conclude that it was within the district court’s discretion to impose
    this special condition.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We have considered all of Farooq’s remaining arguments and
    have found them to be without merit.        For the reasons set forth
    above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    17