United States v. Lamont Bellamy , 456 F. App'x 863 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 7, 2012
No. 11-10065 JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00058-SDM-TBM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAMONT BELLAMY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(February 7, 2012)
Before MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
Lamont Bellamy appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence gathered when officers, acting pursuant to an arrest warrant, entered his
girlfriend’s apartment to arrest him. The pertinent facts and procedural history of
this case are capably set forth in the Report and Recommendation adopted by the
district court in its Order of September 24, 2010. For our purposes, we need only
add that, as a result of the evidence found in his girlfriend’s apartment, Bellamy
was convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), being a convicted felon in possession of
firearms and ammunition. He was sentenced to 84 months imprisonment. In this
appeal, Bellamy claims the officers’ entry did not meet the standard set forth in
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980), and thus violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.1 After thorough consideration of the oral and written
submissions of both parties, we affirm the denial of Bellamy’s motion to suppress.
“Because rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of fact
and law, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its
application of the law to the facts de novo.” United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d
1Payton states that “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 603, 100 S. Ct. at 1388.
In United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1995), we described Payton as creating “a
two-part inquiry: first, there must be a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the
suspect’s dwelling, and second, the police must have reason to believe that the suspect is within
the dwelling.” Id. at 1533 (quotations marks omitted).
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1530, 1536 (11th Cir. 1995). Conducting this review, we construe all facts “in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below”—here, the United States. Id.Bellamy first asks us to decide whether Payton’s “reason to believe”
standard differs, in terms of quantum of proof, from the conventional probable
cause standard. Facing this precise issue in Magluta, we concluded:
We think it sufficient to hold that in order for law enforcement officials
to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the
premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law
enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a
reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s
dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry.
Id. at 1535.2 We have since relied on Magluta to treat “reasonable belief” as
distinct from, but analogous to, probable cause. See United States v. Bervaldi,
226 F.3d 1256, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that “reasonable belief is
different than probable cause,” then judging, for Payton purposes, evidence’s
staleness by analogizing to the probable cause context, id. at 1265 (citing Magluta,
44 F.3d at 1534–35)). In evaluating Bellamy’s appeal, then, we will simply follow
the “reasonable belief” standard as it is set forth in the language of Magluta.
2
Magluta thus followed our pre-Payton precedent, which drew a “helpful analogy”
between the two qualitatively distinct standards, while not directly comparing the quantum of
proof each requires. Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States
v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Probable cause is essentially a concept of
reasonableness. . . . [While] reasonable belief embodies the same standards of reasonableness but
just allows the officer . . . to determine if the suspect is probably within the certain premises
without an additional trip to the magistrate and without exigent circumstances.”).
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Applying the first prong of the Payton test, we rely on “common sense
factors” to determine whether the arresting officers harbored a reasonable belief
that the apartment was indeed Bellamy’s residence. See id. at 1263 (quoting
Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535). Without a doubt, the officers here were entitled to rely
on the information they received from the St. Petersburg Police Department. See
United States v. Bennett, 555 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 2009) (officers held
reasonable belief that apartment was suspect’s residence where they received
information from out-of-state law enforcement that suspect was living with his
mother); see also United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1504–05 (11th Cir.1986)
(distinguishing “an officer in the field,” who is able to rely on information from
other officers, from a magistrate who “must be presented with facts as to the
source” of information for “probable cause” purposes). That information was then
corroborated when the apartment complex’s staff confirmed that Bellamy’s
girlfriend still lived in the same unit suggested by the St. Petersburg Police
Department, and that Bellamy had been seen at that complex before. Beyond that,
the suggestion of other possible addresses does not invalidate the reliability of that
information. See Bervaldi, 226 F.3d at 1266 (concluding that evidence of
defendant’s permanent address “does little to undermine the officers’ reasonable
belief that [the defendant] actually resided [elsewhere], and that he merely used his
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parents’ address for various documents, such as his driver’s license”).
Addressing the second prong of the Payton test, we conclude that the
arresting officers, already harboring a reasonable belief that Bellamy resided at his
girlfriend’s apartment, also held a reasonable belief that he was present there at the
time they entered. The officers who arrested Bellamy identified the car, whose
last known driver was Bellamy, next to the apartment where they believed he
resided. See Magluta 44 F.3d at 1538 (stating “presence of a vehicle connected to
a suspect is sufficient to create the inference that the suspect is at home”); see also
United States v. Beck, 729 F.2d 1329, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 1984) (according weight
to the fact that a suspect’s car was parked near the entered home). The car’s
location represents a specific fact which indicated that Bellamy would be found in
the apartment at the time the officers decided to enter.
For these reasons, we conclude that “the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality” warranted
a reasonable belief as to Bellamy’s residence and presence. Magluta, 44 F.3d at
1535. Having therefore found both requirements of the Payton test to be satisfied,
we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Bellamy’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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