United States v. John Bloch, III , 825 F.3d 862 ( 2016 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 15-1648
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    JOHN W. BLOCH III,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
    No. 12-CR-2 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED JANUARY 21, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2016
    ____________________
    Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant John W. Bloch III has
    had three sentencing hearings in four years. He now seeks a
    fourth. Bloch argues he is entitled to such relief because the
    district court committed error in imposing the length and
    conditions of supervised release.
    The third time happens to be a charm in this instance
    though, as Bloch is not entitled to another sentencing hear-
    2                                                  No. 15-1648
    ing. The district court not only adequately explained its justi-
    fication for imposing a term of supervised release, it also
    adopted a “best practice” suggested by this court for provid-
    ing adequate notice to defendants of proposed conditions of
    supervised release and justification for the same. Therefore,
    we affirm the district court’s sentence.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Bloch’s journey through the federal criminal system has
    so far included a trial, two appeals, and three sentencings.
    We first recount how his case entered into the system before
    discussing these subsequent proceedings.
    A. Arrest, Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing
    In November 2011, police responded to a report of gun-
    fire at an apartment belonging to Bloch’s girlfriend in
    Elkhart, Indiana. An obviously intoxicated Bloch greeted the
    officers who had knocked on the door. The officers asked
    Bloch and his girlfriend to step outside the apartment so
    they could perform a sweep inside to ensure no one was
    hurt. During their sweep, the officers discovered a loaded
    Glock .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun, a SKS assault ri-
    fle, and ammunition for the firearms near both guns.
    As the officers proceeded to remove the guns and am-
    munition from the apartment, Bloch objected to the officers
    removing the firearms, claiming the guns belonged to him.
    Bloch’s status as a convicted felon made his possession of
    those firearms illegal, which prompted the officers to arrest
    him. Bloch continued to demand the return of his firearms,
    even as the police took him to jail.
    In January 2012, a grand jury returned a two-count in-
    dictment against Bloch for: (1) unlawful possession of a fire-
    No. 15-1648                                                 3
    arm by a felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1); and (2)
    unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted
    of a domestic-violence misdemeanor in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(9). A jury convicted him on both counts in April
    2012. Three months later, the district court sentenced Bloch
    to a total of 138 months’ imprisonment and a 3-year term of
    supervised release. The district court’s sentencing memo-
    randum filed on the same day of sentencing indicates it in-
    corporated the twenty-two conditions of supervised release
    contained in Bloch’s presentence investigation report.
    B. First Appeal and First Resentencing
    Bloch appealed both his conviction and sentence. We up-
    held the jury’s verdict but remanded for resentencing be-
    cause his “convictions arose from the same incident of fire-
    arm possession, and the only difference between them is the
    disqualified class to which Bloch belonged.” United States v.
    Bloch, 
    718 F.3d 638
    , 644 (7th Cir. 2013). As a result, Bloch’s
    two § 922(g) convictions had to be merged—one conviction
    is vacated and merged into the other—because “a person
    cannot be convicted of more than one § 922(g) crime based
    on a single incident of possession.” Id. at 643–44.
    On remand, the district court sentenced Bloch to 120
    months’ imprisonment in October 2013. The district court
    also imposed a 3-year term of supervised release with the
    same conditions it imposed during Bloch’s first sentencing.
    C. Bloch’s Second Appeal and Second Resentencing
    Bloch again appealed, but on this occasion, he only chal-
    lenged his sentence. According to Bloch, the district court
    miscalculated his sentencing guidelines range by determin-
    ing that a battery by bodily waste conviction qualified as a
    4                                                         No. 15-1648
    crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(1) and 4B1.2(a).
    Even though Bloch had failed to object to the miscalculation,
    the government agreed and joined in a motion seeking an
    order vacating Bloch’s sentence and a remand to the district
    court so he could be resentenced. Agreeing with the gov-
    ernment and Bloch, we granted the motion in December
    2014 and issued an order vacating Bloch’s sentence and re-
    manding his case for resentencing.
    Prior to Bloch’s March 23, 2015, resentencing, 1 the district
    court filed in the electronic docket a document captioned
    “Notice of Proposed Conditions of Supervision.” The docu-
    ment begins by noting that “[s]entencing courts in this cir-
    cuit must give advance notice of proposed supervised re-
    lease conditions, and the law concerning supervised release
    conditions has changed since the previous judgments in this
    case.” (citations omitted). The district court then stated that
    it would not “re-impose the conditions originally ordered”
    and proposed “the following 13 conditions, which [it] be-
    lieve[d] to be less onerous than those originally imposed.”
    After each proposed condition, the district court provided an
    explanation in italics for why it was imposing the condition.
    At Bloch’s second resentencing hearing, the district court
    posed this question to both the government and Bloch: “did
    you get a chance to review the March 18th notice of pro-
    posed conditions of supervision, and, if so, do you have any
    objection to any of those proposed conditions?” Both the
    1 The district court said during sentencing that the order was entered on
    March 18, 2015, which is the date that also appears on the document it-
    self; however, the electronic docket indicates the order was entered into
    it on March 19, 2015.
    No. 15-1648                                                   5
    government and Bloch acknowledged they had received and
    reviewed a copy of the district court’s notice of proposed
    conditions.
    Bloch objected to only one condition, the condition which
    required him to “permit a probation officer to meet the de-
    fendant at any time, at home or elsewhere, and shall permit
    confiscation of any contraband the probation officer ob-
    serves in plain view” (“home-visit condition”). According to
    Bloch, his concern was with the word “elsewhere” and its
    possible infringement on the Fourth Amendment rights of
    people with whom he associates.
    The district court attempted to allay Bloch’s concern with
    the condition by stating the following:
    When I set forth—proposed to provide that the
    probation officer—that you have to permit a proba-
    tion officer to meet with you at any time, at home
    or elsewhere, my “or elsewhere” didn't suggest
    people’s places where you were not living. The
    idea was that you could—the probation officer
    could make you come to this building to meet with
    you or meet you at a Starbucks or something. I
    would like to maintain that option because it
    doesn't seem like every visit should have to be at
    your home. There should be home visits, but not
    necessarily every visit. So I guess what I would
    propose to do is to provide that you shall permit a
    probation officer to meet you at any time, at home,
    at the Probation Office, or at some public place, and
    shall permit confiscation of any contraband the
    probation officer observes in plain view.
    Bloch responded by telling the district court that he now
    wanted to object to the entire condition. The district court
    6                                                 No. 15-1648
    then stated that the “proposed change in language was
    simply to try to improve the comfort level for” Bloch before
    overruling the objection.
    After the district court announced Bloch’s guideline
    range of 84 to 105 months, it proceeded to consider the fac-
    tors contained in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and explain its reason-
    ing in relation to several of those factors. Of particular note
    was the district court’s discussion of Bloch’s history, includ-
    ing his criminal history and the need for a sentence to pro-
    tect the public from him. With regard to his history, the dis-
    trict court noted that Bloch had multiple felonies and
    “seem[ed] to be one of those people about whom the law
    should be most serious, as far as possessing firearms.” The
    district court also noted that Bloch had “difficulty complying
    with conditions of supervision” and denied having an alco-
    hol problem, even though his family thought otherwise.
    As for the need for Bloch’s sentence to protect the public
    from him, the district court said his extensive criminal histo-
    ry “suggests that [he] pose[d] a far greater risk of future
    criminal conduct than most defendants who pass through
    here do.” And before stating that it planned to impose a 105-
    month term of imprisonment, the district court explained
    that “in light of [Bloch’s] history of alcohol abuse and com-
    mitting crimes while drinking or while having drunk,” it
    could not risk the public’s safety on the chance that Bloch’s
    years of sobriety in prison would make him less likely to re-
    cidivate. Anything less, according to the district court,
    would be inappropriate in light of “the seriousness of the
    risk that you pose of future criminal conduct, [and] the risk
    of violent crime.”
    No. 15-1648                                                     7
    The district court also stated that it planned to impose a
    3-year term of supervised release and to incorporate the
    conditions from its March 18 notice of proposed conditions
    of supervision. The district court then asked Bloch if he had
    any objections to the sentence other than his objection to the
    condition allowing for home visits. Bloch responded that he
    did not. To be sure that this was Bloch’s only objection, the
    district court asked him to again confirm his answer, and he
    did. The district court then orally pronounced the sentence
    of 105 months’ imprisonment and 3-year term of supervised
    release, whose conditions it incorporated by reference to the
    March 18 notice.
    II. ANALYSIS
    In this third appeal, Bloch only challenges his term of su-
    pervised release and the conditions associated with it. Ac-
    cording to Bloch, the district court committed procedural er-
    ror when it failed to make adequate findings to support the
    imposition of a supervised release term. With respect to the
    conditions of supervised release, Bloch argues the district
    court committed procedural error by failing to orally pro-
    nounce all of the supervised release conditions from the
    bench. Bloch also presents various constitutional and sub-
    stantive challenges to eight of the supervised release condi-
    tions imposed upon him.
    When reviewing challenges to the term and/or conditions
    of supervised release, we do so with the following frame-
    work in mind:
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (d), a sentencing court has
    discretion to impose appropriate conditions of su-
    pervised release, to the extent that such conditions
    (1) are reasonably related to the factors identified in
    8                                                      No. 15-1648
    § 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances
    of the offense and the history and characteristics of
    the defendant; (2) involve no greater deprivation of
    liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purpos-
    es set forth in § 3553(a); and (3) are consistent with
    the policy statements issued by the Sentencing
    Commission. Policies emphasized by the Sentenc-
    ing Commission include deterrence, rehabilitation,
    and protecting the public.
    United States v. Armour, 
    804 F.3d 859
    , 867 (7th Cir. 2015)
    (quoting United States v. Ross, 
    475 F.3d 871
    , 873 (7th Cir.
    2007)). We review Bloch’s procedural challenges de novo.
    United States v. Baker, 
    755 F.3d 515
    , 522 (7th Cir. 2014).
    Substantive challenges to conditions of supervised re-
    lease have a different standard of review. We review the dis-
    trict court’s imposition of a condition for abuse of discretion,
    so long as the defendant objected to it before the sentencing
    judge. United States v. Poulin, 
    809 F.3d 924
    , 930 (7th Cir.
    2016). When a condition goes unchallenged though, we re-
    view the district court’s imposition for plain error. 
    Id.
    A. Findings to Support Supervised Release Term
    A sentencing court must follow a two-step process.
    “First, it must determine the defendant’s sentencing range
    under the guidelines. Second, it must hear the arguments of
    the parties and conclude by making an individualized as-
    sessment of the appropriate sentence based on the [18
    U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Adkins, 
    743 F.3d 176
    , 189 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Bloch challenges the district court’s performance of the
    second step here. He contends the district court committed
    No. 15-1648                                                   9
    reversible error when it “said nothing to justify its decision
    to impose 3 years of supervised release.” (Appellant Br. at
    14.) Bloch reads our precedent as requiring a district court to
    provide “separate § 3553(a) justifications” for its imposition
    of a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release
    pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3853
    (c). (Appellant Reply at 3.) From
    Bloch’s perspective, any justification that the district court
    provided for its sentence during the hearing was in connec-
    tion with its decision to impose a term of imprisonment, not
    supervised release.
    We disagree. Contrary to Bloch’s position, the district
    court was not required to provide two separate explanations,
    one for the term of imprisonment and one for the term of
    supervised release. Nothing in the statutes at issue—
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
     and § 3583—supports Bloch’s strained inter-
    pretation. Section 3553(c) states that “[t]he court, at the time
    of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its im-
    position of the particular sentence.” (emphasis added). Con-
    gress used the singular form of “sentence” because at sen-
    tencing a district court hands down only one “sentence,”
    which can include a term of supervised release. See United
    States v. Downs, 
    784 F.3d 1180
    , 1182 (7th Cir. 2015) (recogniz-
    ing that one criminal sentence can “consist[] of more than
    one form of punishment”); United States v. Kappes, 
    782 F.3d 828
    , 837 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Any term of supervised release is
    considered part of the overall sentence.”); Adkins, 743 F.3d at
    192 (our precedent “suggests that terms of supervised re-
    lease are part of the sentence”). No part of § 3553(c) requires
    the district court to bifurcate its consideration, discussion,
    and evaluation of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, which al-
    10                                                         No. 15-1648
    so happens to include all the factors a district court must
    consider in imposing a term of supervised release. 2
    We have come to the same conclusion before and recog-
    nized that a district court need only provide one overarching
    explanation and justification—tethered, of course, to the
    § 3553(a) factors—for why it thinks a criminal sentence com-
    prised of both terms of imprisonment and supervised release
    is appropriate. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 847 (calling a district
    court’s decision “to discuss [its] reasons for imposing the
    sentence as a whole,” including combining its explanation
    for “the length of custody and supervised release, consistent
    with the relevant § 3553(a) factors” a “reasonable choice”);
    Armour, 804 F.3d at 867–68 (rejecting defendant’s argument
    that “his term of supervised release [was] improper because
    the district court gave no justification for the length of the
    supervised release” and explaining that “[s]upervised re-
    lease is part of the sentence imposed, so the district court's
    justifications for imposing [a term of imprisonment] also ap-
    ply to the … term of supervised release.”) Adopting Bloch’s
    interpretation would be not only impractical but inconsistent
    with our precedent. Indeed, we do not even require the dis-
    trict court to discuss any particular factors in any particular
    fashion when imposing a sentence of incarceration, so long
    2 There are only two subsections from § 3553(a) that are excluded from
    the list of factors the district court may consider in imposing a term of
    supervised release. Those subsections excluded are “the need for the sen-
    tence imposed—to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
    spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,”
    § 3553(a)(2)(A), and “the kinds of sentences available,” § 3553(a)(3). See
    § 3583(c).
    No. 15-1648                                                   11
    as it considers them and provides an “adequate statement of
    reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence
    it selects is appropriate.” United States v. Shannon, 
    518 F.3d 494
    , 496 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
    Here, the district court provided ample justification for
    its sentence, including its imposition of a 3-year term of su-
    pervised release. The district court discussed Bloch’s history,
    including his criminal history, and the need for Bloch’s sen-
    tence to protect the public from him, which are two factors
    the district court had to consider in determining the appro-
    priate term of supervised release. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (c). In
    so doing, the district court observed that Bloch posed a high
    risk of recidivism, including “the risk of violent crime,” and
    had “difficulty complying with conditions of supervision.”
    As we have observed, “[r]educing recidivism is the main
    purpose of supervised release.” United States v. Siegel, 
    753 F.3d 705
    , 708 (7th Cir. 2014).
    The district court also noted Bloch’s refusal to
    acknowledge a substance abuse problem that his family be-
    lieves he has, a problem that has led to many encounters
    with law enforcement. That these justifications may also
    form the basis for Bloch’s term of imprisonment is of no
    moment. The district court was under no requirement to
    provide two separate justifications for one criminal sentence.
    See § 3553(c) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state
    in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular
    sentence.” (emphasis added)).
    Bloch argues against our reliance on Armour because he
    says it “misapprehends” United States v. Thompson, 
    777 F.3d 368
     (7th Cir. 2015). (Appellant Reply at 3.) He seizes upon a
    passage from Thompson in which we explain that § 3583(c)
    12                                                   No. 15-1648
    requires a district court to state at the sentencing hearing its
    reasons for imposing supervised release based upon the
    § 3553(a) factors. 777 F.3d at 373. According to Bloch,
    “Thompson never said that by adequately explaining the
    length of a defendant’s prison sentence, a district court nec-
    essarily gives a sufficient justification for the length of su-
    pervision.” (Appellant Reply at 3.)
    It is Bloch, however, who misapprehended Thompson by
    reading too much into this particular passage. That passage
    states that a district court imposing a criminal sentence that
    includes a term of supervised release must provide justifica-
    tion—considering the § 3553 factors—for why it did so. No
    more, no less.
    Thompson at no point suggests that a district court must
    give two separate justifications for one criminal sentence.
    There, we did not assume the district court’s sentencing jus-
    tification in those cases related only to its imposition of the
    term of imprisonment, and as a result, remanded the cases to
    reconsider the term imprisonment as well as the term and
    conditions of supervised release. We took this approach be-
    cause, as we explained in Kappes:
    [T]he custodial and supervised release portions of a
    sentence serve somewhat, though not entirely,
    overlapping purposes, there might properly be an
    interplay between prison time and the term and
    conditions of supervised release. If certain super-
    vised release conditions are vacated, the balance
    struck by the sentencing judge might be disrupted
    to a degree where the judge would wish to alter the
    prison term and/or other conditions to ensure that
    the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and pro-
    tecting the public are appropriately furthered by
    No. 15-1648                                                  13
    the overall sentence. Accordingly, as we did in
    Thompson, we vacate the entire sentences and re-
    mand for a complete resentencing
    782 F.3d at 867 (citation and footnote omitted). The relation-
    ship and interplay between these components all but re-
    quires them to be considered and discussed together in justi-
    fying a defendant’s sentence.
    Bloch’s reliance on United States v. Moore, 
    788 F.3d 693
    (7th Cir. 2015) and Downs, 
    784 F.3d 1180
    , is also misplaced.
    In Moore, the district court did not “enunciat[e] its finding
    that a term of supervised release was necessary,” which is
    what lead us to remand the case for resentencing. 788 F.3d at
    696. Here, unlike Moore, the district court enunciated that a
    “three-year supervised release term that was originally im-
    posed [at Bloch’s earlier sentencing] is appropriate.” And, as
    discussed above, the district court explained why he needs
    supervision in light of his past recidivism and substance
    abuse issues.
    As for Downs, Bloch argues the following sentence sup-
    ports his position: “[The district court] was required, before
    deciding on the length of the defendant’s term of supervised
    release, to calculate the guidelines range and assess its ap-
    propriateness as a guide to sentencing the defendant, in light
    of the sentencing factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).” 784 F.3d at
    1181. Nothing in that passage is incompatible with our con-
    clusion today or with what the district court did in Bloch’s
    case. The district court here properly calculated the guide-
    lines range, assessed its appropriateness in sentencing the
    defendant, and explained its justification for its criminal sen-
    tence through a discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. The dis-
    trict court gave an adequate explanation for its sentence, in-
    14                                                        No. 15-1648
    cluding his term of supervised release, and therefore did not
    commit procedural error.
    B. Oral Pronouncement of Supervised Release Conditions
    In Thompson, we expressed a concern that district courts
    in this circuit were not providing defendants adequate no-
    tice of the supervised release conditions that the court may
    impose upon them and the reasons for doing so. 777 F.3d at
    377. 3 There, we suggested one “best practice” could be for
    the court to “inform the parties of the conditions and the
    possible reasons for imposing them, so that they can develop
    arguments pro or con to present at the sentencing hearing.”
    Id. at 377. We expressed the same concern in Kappes and
    suggested a similar approach. 782 F.3d at 842–43 (stating
    “that it is important [for sentencing judges] to give advance
    notice of the conditions being considered” and suggesting
    that those judges require the reasons for the recommended
    conditions appear in presentence reports).
    Thompson’s suggested best practice was the one embraced
    by the district court here. Prior to Bloch’s sentencing, the dis-
    trict court circulated the conditions it proposed to impose
    upon Bloch and the reasons why it planned to impose each
    condition. The government and Bloch acknowledged receipt
    of these proposed conditions, and we can infer from Bloch’s
    concerns with the home-visit condition that he had a chance
    to review them. Neither the government, nor Bloch could
    claim lack of notice. It was no surprise then that Bloch did
    3 We have long required that defendants receive notice of special condi-
    tions of supervised release that are “out of the ordinary, and thus unex-
    pected.” United States v. Scott, 
    316 F.3d 733
    , 736 (7th Cir. 2003).
    No. 15-1648                                                 15
    not object when the district court incorporated those pro-
    posed conditions by reference during its oral pronounce-
    ment, as Bloch confirmed on two prior occasions that he had
    no further concern with his sentence other than the home-
    visit condition.
    Typically, in these circumstances, no good deed goes un-
    punished. Bloch now complains that the district court need-
    ed to orally pronounce each and every one of the thirteen
    conditions the district court imposed. While it is true we
    have said that a district court “need[s] to orally pronounce
    all conditions [of supervised release] from the bench,”
    Kappes, 782 F.3d at 862, we did so only because of the rule
    that “when there is a conflict between an oral and later writ-
    ten sentence, the oral judgment pronounced from the bench
    controls,” United States v. Johnson, 
    765 F.3d 702
    , 710–11 (7th
    Cir. 2014). As we saw in Johnson, this rule works to prevent
    the practice of district courts imposing supervised release
    conditions that were never pronounced at sentencing. 765
    F.3d at 711. If such conditions are never pronounced at sen-
    tencing, then the defendant is deprived of the right of object-
    ing to them. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843 (“The goal of provid-
    ing the parties with advance notice of the conditions at issue
    is to allow the parties to present an informed response.”)
    That possible harm is not present in this situation where
    Bloch had a chance to review the supervised release condi-
    tions as well as the reasons for imposing them, and he was
    given a meaningful opportunity to object. In fact, Bloch had
    far more opportunity to review and consider objections to
    those conditions than the defendants who have them read
    and imposed upon them at sentencing.
    16                                                       No. 15-1648
    Just as important is that the district court’s approach here
    does not create a situation where the oral sentence conflicts
    with the written judgment filed in the case’s docket after
    sentencing occurs. Neither the government, nor Bloch con-
    tends there is any conflict between the March 18 notice of
    proposed conditions, which was orally incorporated by ref-
    erence, and the written judgment entered. The reason then
    for the rule laid down in Kappes is satisfied, as the oral pro-
    nouncement and written judgment do not conflict. Also, of
    equal importance is the fact that the defendant received ade-
    quate notice of the proposed conditions. We see no reason
    why a district court cannot follow this approach moving
    forward. The district court could also specifically confirm
    that the defendant waives a formal reading of the conditions
    during the court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. Sec-
    tions 3553 and 3583 are not, after all, the court reporter’s
    welfare act. The district court did not commit procedural er-
    ror in imposing Bloch’s conditions of supervised release by
    incorporating its March 18 notice by reference into Bloch’s
    sentence.
    C. Challenge to the Supervised Release Conditions
    Bloch challenges the imposition of eight of the conditions
    of his supervised release, including the imposition of the
    home-visit condition. At his second resentencing, he objected
    to the home-visit condition but no others. We begin by eval-
    uating the government’s argument that Bloch waived his
    right to challenge those other seven conditions.
    1. Waiver as to Seven of the Eight Conditions
    Waiver is “‘when a criminal defendant intentionally re-
    linquishes a known right.’” Armour, 804 F.3d at 865. (quoting
    No. 15-1648                                                   17
    United States v. Brodie, 
    507 F.3d 527
    , 530 (7th Cir. 2007)). It
    works to “extinguish[] any error and precludes appellate re-
    view.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted). In addressing waiver
    in the supervised release context, we have articulated the fol-
    lowing rule: “[a] response to a general inquiry at the end of
    sentencing, and unaccompanied by either (1) an explicit ap-
    proval of the condition or (2) a strategic reason to forego the
    argument at the hearing, does not constitute waiver.” United
    States v. Hinds, 
    770 F.3d 658
    , 665 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United
    States v. Farmer, 
    755 F.3d 849
    , 853 (7th Cir. 2014). Applying
    this rule, we have refused to find waiver in the supervised
    release context where the district court asked if there was
    “anything else” at the end of sentencing, Farmer, 755 F.3d at
    853–54, and where the defendant answered “no” to the dis-
    trict court’s “question regarding awareness of legal reasons
    why the sentence should not be imposed,” Hinds, 770 F.3d at
    665. See also United States v. Speed, 
    811 F.3d 854
    , 857 (7th Cir.
    2016) (refusing to apply waiver where the judge asked if
    there was “anything unclear or confusing” about the de-
    fendants’ sentence, and the defendants said no).
    This rule, however, does not work to prevent the applica-
    tion of waiver here. As an initial matter, Bloch cannot claim
    lack of notice or surprise at the conditions the district court
    planned to impose, which distinguishes this case from those
    where we refused to apply waiver. See Hinds, 770 F.3d at 665
    (defendant received no advance notice of the special condi-
    tions imposed on him); Farmer, 755 F.3d at 852–53 (proposed
    conditions of supervised release were not distributed to the
    government and defendant prior to sentencing). Here, Bloch
    acknowledged that he had a chance to review the district
    court’s March 18 proposed notice of conditions.
    18                                                No. 15-1648
    Bloch also had the opportunity to object to the proposed
    conditions. The district court asked him if he had any objec-
    tions to the conditions, and he responded that he had only
    one objection—to the condition allowing for home visits.
    And Bloch’s decision to single out and object to only one
    condition is the very “[t]ouchstone of waiver,” as it indicates
    “a knowing and intentional decision.” Armour, 804 F.3d at
    865 (quotation marks omitted). In other words, it reflects “a
    strategic reason to forego the argument at the hearing.”
    Hinds, 770 F.3d at 665. While there may not be a good strate-
    gic reason for holding back a valid objection to a condition,
    that fact does not render the defendant’s decision any less
    intentional. That is why we require defendants to voice their
    objections to the district court if they wish to preserve them
    for appellate review.
    Finally, nothing about the district court’s questioning
    concerning Bloch’s supervised release conditions is vague or
    confusing. Bloch knew that “he could lodge an objection and
    purposefully declined to do so.” United States v. Murry, 
    395 F.3d 712
    , 717 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying waiver where district
    court twice asked defendant if he objected to jury instruc-
    tions, and defendant responded that he did not). Before pro-
    nouncing its sentence, the district court asked “assuming
    [Bloch] continues to object to Supervised Release Condition
    10, does the defense have any further objection to the pro-
    posed sentence?” Bloch responded that he did not “other
    than [the objection] previously stated.” Bloch undoubtedly
    understood that the district court’s question here applied not
    only to the proposed term of imprisonment but also to the
    proposed conditions of supervised release. And, the district
    court confirmed that Bloch had no further objections to the
    proposed sentence. All together, the district court asked
    No. 15-1648                                                              19
    Bloch three times if he had any concerns with the proposed
    conditions of supervised release. Other than objecting to the
    condition allowing for home visits, he said he did not have
    any.
    Therefore, Bloch waived his ability to challenge all but
    the supervised release condition relating to home visits. See
    United States v. Lewis, No. 14-3635, 
    2016 WL 3004435
    , at *5
    (7th Cir. May 24, 2016) (finding waiver where “[t]here were
    no surprises in the sentencing hearing related to supervised
    release” and the defendant did not object).
    2. Home Visits
    The only condition that Bloch can challenge on appeal
    then is the condition allowing the “probation officer to meet
    [Bloch] … at home or elsewhere” and to confiscate “any con-
    traband the probation officer observes in plain view.” The
    condition generally prohibits the probation officer from con-
    ducting such a visit to between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7
    a.m. Bloch argues the imposition of this condition upon him
    is invalid under the Fourth Amendment and that the district
    court abused its discretion in imposing it. 4
    As to Bloch’s argument that this condition violates the
    Fourth Amendment, we have already considered and reject-
    ed the same in Armour. 804 F.3d at 870; 5 see also United States
    4 While Bloch casts his challenge to this condition as a procedural one,
    we assume his challenge to be substantive in nature, as he admits the
    district court provided some justification for the imposition of this condi-
    tion. His concern lies with the reasonableness of that justification.
    5Contrary to Bloch’s assertion in his reply brief, Armour does not rely
    upon a “‘waiver’ case” in supporting its conclusion on this issue. (Appel-
    (continued…)
    20                                                          No. 15-1648
    v. Carson, No. 15-2899, 
    2016 WL 2641821
    , at *1 (7th Cir. May
    6, 2016). We see no reason to revisit our decision and find its
    reasoning applies with equal force here. Supervised release
    conditions may implicate fundamental constitutional rights,
    “so long as those conditions are reasonably related to the
    ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public from re-
    cidivism.” Armour, 804 F.3d at 870 (quotation marks omit-
    ted). As we describe below, the district court did that here.
    His other principal concern appears to be with the ade-
    quacy of the district court’s reasoning in imposing this con-
    dition. According to Bloch, the district court failed to ex-
    pound upon its justification that the home visit can “facili-
    tate the probation officer’s ability to help” him. For example,
    Bloch contends the district court did not properly explain
    how home visits “provide the defendant with needed educa-
    tional or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
    tional treatment in the most effective manner,” which is a
    factor to consider under § 3553(a).
    Bloch misunderstands what is required to justify the im-
    position of a discretionary condition of supervised release.
    The district court here provided a more than adequate and
    reasonable explanation for why a home-visit condition was
    appropriate. As a preliminary matter, the district court
    properly incorporated its justification from the March 18 no-
    (…continued)
    lant Reply at 21.) The case relied upon by this court in Armour is United
    States v. Sines, 
    303 F.3d 793
     (7th Cir. 2002). While we found the defendant
    there waived some of his arguments, we did not apply waiver in the sec-
    tion Armour cited and quoted. Rather, we reviewed the condition at issue
    for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
     at 800–01.
    No. 15-1648                                                 21
    tice into Bloch’s sentencing hearing. This approach gave
    Bloch advance notice of the court’s reasoning for why it
    planned to impose certain conditions, which gave him more
    than enough time to formulate objections.
    The court’s explanation that the home visit would “help”
    Bloch makes sense when read in context of the sentencing
    hearing as a whole. We have observed this condition helps
    the defendant “reintegrate into society after his time in pris-
    on and to ensure that he is abiding by the conditions of his
    supervised release.” Armour, 804 F.3d at 870. Further, the dis-
    trict court expressed concerns about Bloch’s “difficulty com-
    plying with conditions of supervision” during the hearing.
    The Supreme Court has recognized that assistance in this
    “decompression stage” is particularly necessary for defend-
    ants like Bloch who have demonstrated issues in complying
    with conditions of supervised release. Johnson v. United
    States, 
    529 U.S. 694
    , 709 (2000).
    The district court also stated in its March 18 notice that
    this condition was necessary to “monitor” and “protect the
    public if the defendant is found to be violating the condi-
    tions of release.” We have already concluded such a justifica-
    tion for imposing the home-visit condition is sufficient. See
    Carson, 
    2016 WL 2641821
    , at *2 (finding sufficient a “judge’s
    statement that the home-visit condition will enable the pro-
    bation office to ‘keep watch’ and help enforce the other terms
    of release”).
    There was even more said during the sentencing hearing
    to justify this condition. The district court explained that
    Bloch posed a high risk of recidivism, a risk that was made
    greater by his purported problems with alcohol. Meetings
    with a probation officer then at Bloch’s home or a “public
    22                                                 No. 15-1648
    place” could not only serve to check on Bloch’s sobriety but
    also to see if he was in possession of firearms. The explana-
    tions provided by the district court here for this condition no
    doubt are adequate and reasonable.
    Finally, we address Bloch’s objection with the district
    court’s use of “or elsewhere” in the home-visit condition at
    the sentencing hearing, even though Bloch did not raise this
    argument on appeal. In United States v. Henry, we expressed
    concern with the use of “or elsewhere” in a similar home-
    visit condition, as it could allow for a probation officer “to
    pick a location that may be inconvenient for the defendant.”
    
    813 F.3d 681
    , 683 (7th Cir. 2016). Unlike the situation in Henry
    though, the district court here provided further clarification
    for what it meant by “or elsewhere.” According to the dis-
    trict court, the term “elsewhere” means a “public place,”
    such as a Starbuck’s coffee shop, or the probation office.
    While not as ideal as the suggestions made for this condition
    in Henry, we believe this explanation provides sufficient
    guidance to the probation officer as to what an acceptable
    meeting place would be. As we said in Kappes, “at some
    point, we must fairly presume [the defendant]’s probation
    officer will apply the conditions in a reasonable manner.”
    782 F.3d at 857 (quotation marks omitted).
    No. 15-1648                                23
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.