Liu v. Garland ( 2022 )


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  •      21-6080
    Liu v. Garland
    BIA
    Nelson, IJ
    A201 117 960
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 22nd day of September, two thousand twenty-
    5   two.
    6
    7   PRESENT:
    8            GUIDO CALABRESI,
    9            MICHAEL H. PARK,
    10            ALISON J. NATHAN,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   JINGQUAN LIU,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                    v.                                  21-6080
    18                                                        NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                  Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York,
    25                                    NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
    28                                    Attorney General; Mary Jane
    1                                   Candaux, Assistant Director;
    2                                   Nicole J. Thomas-Dorris, Trial
    3                                   Attorney, Office of Immigration
    4                                   Litigation, United States
    5                                   Department of Justice, Washington,
    6                                   DC.
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    8    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    9    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    10   is DENIED.
    11       Petitioner Jingquan Liu, a native and citizen of the
    12   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 26,
    13   2021, decision of the BIA affirming a November 14, 2018,
    14   decision     of   an    Immigration       Judge   (“IJ”)   denying    Liu’s
    15   application       for   asylum,   withholding        of    removal,    and
    16   protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).                In
    17   re Jingquan Liu, No. A201 117 960 (B.I.A. Jan. 26, 2021),
    18   aff’g No. A201 117 960 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 14, 2018).
    19   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    20   and procedural history.
    21       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for
    22   the sake of completeness.”            Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland
    23   Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                    The applicable
    24   standards of review are well established.                   See 8 U.S.C.
    2
    1    § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are
    2    conclusive    unless   any    reasonable      adjudicator    would    be
    3   compelled to conclude to the contrary . . . .”); Hong Fei Gao
    4   v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse
    5   credibility    determination         under    substantial     evidence
    6   standard).
    7         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    8   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    9   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
    10   the   applicant . . . , the     inherent      plausibility    of     the
    11   applicant’s . . . account,      the      consistency     between     the
    12   applicant’s . . . written      and     oral   statements . . . , the
    13   internal   consistency   of    each    such   statement,    [and]    the
    14   consistency of such statements with other evidence of record
    15   . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy,
    16   or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
    17   any other relevant factor.”       
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    18   “We   defer . . . to     an    IJ’s     credibility     determination
    19   unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could
    20   make such an adverse credibility ruling.”              Xiu Xia Lin v.
    21   Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); accord
    3
    1    Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.       Substantial evidence supports
    2    the adverse credibility determination given the IJ’s demeanor
    3    finding and issues with Liu’s corroborating evidence.      See 8
    4  
    U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    5        The IJ is permitted to rely on demeanor in assessing
    6    credibility.   
    Id.
       We afford “particular deference” to the
    7    IJ’s demeanor finding because the IJ is “in the best position
    8    to evaluate whether . . . testimony suggest[s] a lack of
    9    credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an innocent cause
    10   such as difficulty understanding the question.”      Lin v. U.S.
    11   Dep’t of Justice, 
    453 F.3d 99
    , 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation
    12   marks omitted).   We find no reason not to defer here as the
    13   IJ explained that she had the impression Liu was testifying
    14   from a script and displaying insincere emotion, and she issued
    15   her decision at the close of the testimony.       
    Id.
     (deferring
    16   to IJ’s “impression that [petitioner] was not testifying from
    17   actual experience” (quotation marks and brackets omitted));
    18   cf. Su Chun Hu v. Holder, 
    579 F.3d 155
    , 158–59 (2d Cir. 2009)
    19   (per curiam) (holding that same deference is not due to a
    20   demeanor finding issued years after the testimony).
    21       The IJ’s findings related to Liu’s corroboration also
    4
    1   support the adverse credibility determination.                  “An IJ is
    2   fully entitled to make findings concerning the authenticity
    3   of submitted evidence, based on her own examination and her
    4   professional analysis.         Such findings will ordinarily merit
    5   deference.”      Niang v. Mukasey, 
    511 F.3d 138
    , 146 (2d Cir.
    6   2007).     The   IJ    reasonably     determined   that   the    matching
    7   pictures on Liu’s driver’s license and medical record, called
    8   into question the authenticity of that evidence and Liu’s
    9   overall credibility.         See Zaman v. Mukasey, 
    514 F.3d 233
    , 239
    10   (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (upholding IJ’s conclusion that
    11   document was fraudulent “based on the similarity between
    12   . . . two photos” and IJ’s reliance on that “conclusion to
    13   call into question the other aspects of . . . testimony”).
    14   These concerns were compounded by Liu’s testimony that his
    15   sister in Fujian Province mailed the documents to him, while
    16   the envelope they came in included a return address in Taiwan.
    17   The   IJ   did   not   err    in   concluding   that   these    documents
    18   undermined Liu’s credibility because the medical record was
    19   material to Liu’s claim that he was injured while detained
    20   for attending an underground church.            Id.; see also Siewe v.
    21   Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false
    5
    1    document    or   a   single   instance    of   false   testimony   may
    2   . . . infect the balance of the [applicant’s] uncorroborated
    3   or unauthenticated evidence.”).
    4        These findings provide substantial evidence in support
    5   of   the   adverse   credibility   determination.       See   8 U.S.C.
    6   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    ; Siewe,
    7   
    480 F.3d at 170
    .       The adverse credibility determination is
    8   dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
    9   because all three forms of relief are based on the same
    10   discredited factual predicate.           See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
    
    11 F.3d 148
    , 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    12        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    14   stays VACATED.
    15                                   FOR THE COURT:
    16                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    17                                   Clerk of Court
    18
    6